


AMPO



イゲレン
何が
ベトナム復興
おまじに
えくわどか
2008.11

Oldest べトナムの僕
一日の労働 1,200円
僕は日本国の主権者だ
ベトナムの北越朝鮮も
同じ主権者だ
イゲレン
の中食代
1,200円
1973.6.11日の中食

戦車を止めて
なぜ悪い。
経団連、
裁かれるのは
お前だ。
[Drawing of a tank]

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to our readers

A report on the Pacific-Asia Resources Center (PARC), on the next page, was made by its 19-member initiators' committee: AWAZU KIYOSHI (graphic art); INOUE KIYOSHI (history); UI JUN (engineering); ODA MAKOTO (literature; Beheiren); KITAZAWA YOKO (Asia and Africa studies; AMPO and Rentai); SASAO HISASHI (political economy); SHISHIDO KAN (Asia and Africa studies); SHIRANISHI SHIN-ICHIRO (China studies); SODEI RINJIRO (America studies); TSURUMI YOSHIYUKI (Asia studies); NAKAJIMA MASAOKI (Christian minister); TAKAHASHI TAKETOMO (AMPO and Rentai); HIDAKA ROKURO (sociology); FUJII HARUO (military strategy); HONDA KATSUICHI (journalist); NAKAZAWA OSAMU (journalist); MUTO ICHIO (AMPO and Rentai); YOSHIKAWA YUICHI (Beheiren) and WADA HARUKI (history). All correspondence concerning PARC should be addressed to: PARC, P.O. BOX 5250, Tokyo International, Japan.

Most of the authors for this issue took part in the Anti-War Citizens' Conference held in Tokyo (May 3-4) on the initiative of Beheiren to form a broad coalition of popular forces fighting in different areas (anti-war, pollution and labor movements). Buddhist nun Mandala and Catholic priest Fr. Thi attended the conference representing the Third Force in South Vietnam. Takahashi Kosei, another participant at the conference, is a medical practitioner teaching at the Univ. of Tokyo Medical School; he is a staunch fighter against the monopoly drug companies whose aggressive and callous commercialism undermines the health of people both inside Japan and abroad. In order to give coverage to the labor front for the first time, we have made an interview with Higuchi Tokuzo, a leading activist of the labor movement, who was also at the conference. Murata Goro's accompanying piece on IHI, the leading Japanese shipbuilder, supplements the general Japanese labor scene explained by Higuchi. AMPO will carry in future issues more stories about Japanese labor movement in relation to Japanese monopoly capital's economic aggression overseas. We would appreciate it very much if our readers inform us about concrete instances of unabashed misadventures by the Japanese capitalists outside Japan.

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Report on the Progress of The Pacific-Asia Resources Center (PARC)

July, 1973, Tokyo

As you know, four years ago the English-language magazine AMPO was launched to bring news of the Japanese People's Movements against the Vietnam war to the world. Since that time the magazine has been transformed from a magazine about anti-war activities into a forum for analysis and discussion not only of the Japanese People's Movements, but also of the rapidly expanding Japanese domestic economy and overseas empire. It has become an indispensable tool for patriotic struggles throughout South-east Asia and Africa, as well as for scholars and others concerned with the developments in Japan and throughout Asia. In the process, members of AMPO collective have established numerous working relationships with progressives around the world.

The time has come to make substantial leap forward, improving and extending the coverage and analysis of AMPO, and building an organization in Japan able to bring together scholars and activists -- Japanese, Asian, and Westerners, -- for broad-ranging studies of capitalism and imperialism.

The Pacific-Asia Resources Center Tokyo, is designed to accomplish this.

-- The Pacific-Asia Resources Center, Tokyo, will collect and distribute economic, political, military and cultural information on the activities of Japanese and American imperialism in Asia and elsewhere.

-- The Pacific-Asia Resources Center, Tokyo, will provide space and content for the quarterly AMPO and for other publication undertakings, and will, by October, 1973, inaugurate a news service covering political, economic, and cultural aspects of Japanese life.

-- The Pacific-Asia Resources Center, Tokyo, will build and maintain a library to collect and make available materials of all sorts (including business and specialized periodicals, government publications, movement publications, revelent books, clippings, etc.) and will, by September 1, publish a monthly biographical bulletin of its holdings.

-- The Pacific-Asia Resources Center, Tokyo, will establish, by Sept. 1st, a copying service, based on the PARC Bibliographical Bulletin to provide rare and hard to find material to researchers in Japan and throughout the world on a commercial basis.

-- on the basis of these programs Pacific-Asia Resources Center, Tokyo, will conduct research and study activities with the participation of both foreign and Japanese scholars and activists.

Tokyo is the most expensive city in the world, but it is also a center of imperialist activities in the Pacific. To purchase the necessary space, equipment, and to pay the salaries of three full time staff to handle the business of the library and publications on an efficient basis will require a minimum of \$50,000. Most of this will be raised within Japan, but some portion must be raised abroad.

We need your assistance, both in extending our cooperation, and in this fund raising undertaking.

Schedule of contributions:

Life-time supporting member; entitling one to the full range of Center Publications and 50 per cent discount on commercial services:

individual: \$300
institution: \$700

Three year supporting membership, with benefits as above:

individual: \$250
institution: \$600

One year membership, entitling one to receipt of AMPO, and the bibliographic service:

individual: \$50
institution: \$100

Movement individuals and institutions are entitled to a 75 per cent discount on all the above rates.

Nixon Doctrine Over Japan

by Nakazawa Osamu

A superficial reading of the Japanese press since the January 28 ceasefire in Vietnam -- with headlines like "Post Vietnam War" -- might suggest to some that high-level pressure for increased Japan-U.S. military cooperation and for a stronger Japanese military is decreasing. In fact a closer reading of the press shows the opposite is happening. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Ampo) system is being strengthened, with more and more of its weight being shifted to the Japanese military.

On the same day that the Vietnam ceasefire agreement was initiated in Paris, Japan and the U.S. agreed in Tokyo to set up a new structure for closer military collaboration -- the Council for the Implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The council has been busy, with full-scale meetings on April 24 and May 14. During these same two months, ammunition shipments from Japan to Vietnam continued.

Then, in Washington in mid-May, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense William Clements told visiting Japanese businessmen that the U.S. "expects Japan to deploy its Self-Defense Forces overseas" and that the Constitution of Japan "should be revised to enable the SDF to be so deployed". The remarks attracted surprisingly little attention in the Japanese press, even though they strike at the heart of the Nixon Doctrine and at Japan's role in the doctrine.


The evolving pattern of military cooperation in Asia becomes clear when one considers a whole string of other stories which have received equally little coverage in the press:

-- Visits to Japan by the chiefs of staff of the South Korean Navy, Army and Air Force, one after another; between March and May. At the same time, high-ranking Japanese military leaders, including the Deputy Chief of the Defense Agency, paid visits to Seoul.


- A series of joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea from early January through March, climaxed by a nine-day "Flying Dragon" landing operation participated in by U.S. military men stationed in Japan including Okinawa.
- A counter-submarine joint exercise between the U.S. and Japan carried out April 11-15 over a large area south of Japan.
- A joint naval exercise by ANZUS countries in Malaysia April 2-5; a joint naval and air force exercise by the U.K., Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in Philippine waters April 18-19; and a joint missile shooting exercise between the U.S. and Taiwan April 10-May 2.
- Five consecutive maneuvers by Japan's navy and air force in Japan and off the South Korean coast between April 4 and 13.
- And finally, in a new training operation, Japan deployed its naval fleet from the port of Kure (in Hiroshima Prefecture) to Guam in late April.

These and other operations show two increasing patterns in military strategy. First, naval forces are receiving increased emphasis (a pattern already established with plans by the U.S. to home-port the aircraft carrier Midway at Yokosuka in Japan). Along this line, the Tokyo Shimbun (May 24) reported on its front page that "U.S. naval authorities have demanded from the Japanese SDF a declaration of its determination to play a supplementary role to the U.S. Seventh Fleet".

Secondly, the military strategists of Washington seem increasingly concerned about the "deteriorating situation" in South Korea because of an ongoing power struggle in the Pak Chung Hee regime and because of increasingly successful diplomacy by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Here again, Japan is deemed the key force to fill the "vacuum" in Korea.



Recent Military Maneuvers Near Japan



The tempo of Japan-U.S. diplomacy is being stepped up in this context. The SDF chiefs of staff have been urged to visit Washington this summer. P. Peterson, former secretary of commerce, sent to Japan this spring as a special presidential envoy made an ominous statement before he left, that from now on economic problems should be dealt with as part and parcel of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. He further said that President Nixon would soon take a "critical decision" toward Japan. Premier Tanaka is invited to visit Washington at this juncture. Nixon certainly will try to link Japan's military buildup with drastic steps to restore confidence in the dollar and urge Japan to buy more weapons from the U.S. He will also try to get Japan to agree on the Resources Strategy centering on petroleum.

Emperor Hirohito, too, was invited by Nixon to visit the U.S., but the Japanese Government in an awkward manner had to cancel the plan. One of the reasons is that the Tanaka Cabinet felt that President Nixon would then be obligated to come to Japan, and that this would inspire large-scale anti-government and anti-Nixon demonstrations in Japan. Though Tanaka knew perfectly well that the cancellation of Hirohito's visit would worsen Japan's relationship with the U.S., he had to drop the plan because large demonstrations are the last thing he wants to have at this point. Last year, when he organized his Cabinet, a vigorous image and a projected trip to China boosted his popularity polls over the 60% mark. Today only 17% of those polled believe Tanaka is doing a good job.

In a move to recoup his sagging political fortunes, Tanaka has planned to go to Washington and Moscow, and then to West Europe. There is no guarantee that his travel abroad will be a pleasant one, but Tanaka's big business constituents are desperately eager to get on with the exploitation of West Siberian petroleum resources, and his party is pledged to get back from the Soviet Union the Kuriles islands taken by Russia in 1945.

Late April saw a massive strike by Japanese workers in the public service sector struggling for higher wages and the right to strike. More than

3,500,000 workers walked out on April 27, the largest strike since the abortive Feb. 1, 1947, strike suppressed by the U.S. occupation. Tokyo and other large cities were brought to a complete halt.

But an even more serious reversal for the "computerized bulldozer" was his failure to ram a new election system through the Diet in May. Hoping desperately to gerrymander the electorate before the slipping LDP loses its control over the Diet, Tanaka was resoundingly defeated by the combined opposition forces. Barring the unforeseen, the Liberal Democratic Party will experience a miserable defeat in the Tokyo municipal elections in July (Tokyo Population: 10 million), and in the Upper House elections in June 1974.

Thus for the next year Japan will be in a crucial transition period as the contradictions of Japanese capitalism, already manifesting themselves in steep inflation (land prices are now at 2500 in Tokyo, 1965 prices taken as 100), and rapid deterioration of the social and natural environment, play themselves out.

For the time being, however, Tanaka must continue playing his games with Washington and Moscow; Mitsubishi, Mitsui and other enormous business combines continue to rake in fantastic profits; and the opposition parties are groping their way toward a moderate coalition among the Socialists, Democratic Socialists, Komei (Clean Government) Party, and -- perhaps -- the Communist Party under the reformist leadership. It is noted that a leading businessman known for his rightist persuasion, had this to say, "We need not be tied permanently to the Liberal Democrats. A coalition government of the current opposition parties is worth trying". Clever spokesmen for the ruling class thus have begun to speculate that a "progressive" (reformist) coalition government may be a way to prolong the life of capitalism in Japan.

A new front of people capable of working a fundamental change in this society is still to be created. Watch this space for an account of this critical transition year. ■■

ON THE BOYCOTT MOVEMENT

Dynamics Of Imperialist Politics

by Ohara Ken

INTRODUCTION

In developing countries subject to imperialist penetration, a single move (stimulus) to disturb the status quo tends to heighten the level of political conflict between the people and the ruling elite. A move on the part of the local populace, moreover, is invariably seen as a potential threat to the power structure in the imperialist country itself. Accordingly, the latter counters with action (response) of its own, and the dynamics of imperialist politics are laid bare for all to see, and not least for those actively engaged in the struggle against the status quo.

Although certain aspects of the situation remain to be elucidated, the recent boycott of Japanese goods in Thailand would seem to be a classic case of this pattern.

STIMULUS

The anti-Japanese boycott in Thailand was not the first indication that Southeast Asians resented Japanese economic domination of their region. Pent-up frustration would be expressed in various ways, ranging from critical editorials in leading newspapers (such as Sin Chew Jit Poh and Nan Yang Shin Poh, Singapore's two major Chinese language dailies) to occasional murders of Japanese nationals (in Thailand and the Philippines). The latter cases tended to involve Japanese businessmen who had been dispatched abroad and whose often arrogant behavior provoked considerable local resentment.

As might be expected, since these expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment

were individual and unorganized, they did not elicit much response within Japan itself. To be sure, any incident involving a Japanese abroad is quickly picked up and reported by the mass media, and anti-Japanese editorials from Asia are occasionally translated in the Japanese press (at least the underground press). But all such expression has a way of being absorbed and forgotten, especially at the top levels of government, in the hectic flow of business-as-usual in Japan.

The significance of the Thai boycott of Japanese goods was that it was the first instance of organized resistance being felt as such in Japan.

Filipino revolutionary movement, e.g., the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, has consistently denounced Japanese militarism and its role as a junior partner of US imperialism in Asia, but they have been effectively ignored in Japan. Since Marcos' promulgation of martial law in September 1972, moreover, and his monopoly of the mass media, it has become even more difficult for critical voices to get through to the Japanese people. Perhaps most shocking to the Japanese ruling class was that the boycott had been initiated by students, who were regarded as an easily co-optable source of labor, in view of their elite orientation and qualifications for employment in the civil service or in foreign-owned private industry, generally located in the major cities. Students should have been consumers of Japanese goods rather than the victims of unfair competition with Japanese industry. Thai society, moreover, was considered the most "stable" of Southeast Asian countries under the dictatorship of Field Marshal Thanom. Surely, thought the Japanese leaders of government, industry, etc., such a thing couldn't be happening here. This notion of

Thai "stability" is of course highly illusory to begin with, in view of the fact that Thanom's so-called "bloodless revolution" or coup d'etat of November 1971 was merely a stop-gap maneuver designed to maintain him in power against growing resentment and opposition. Thai society is still very restless for change. After all, Japanese

business leaders mumble to themselves, "we left Thailand relatively untouched during World War II, didn't we?" Many of them actually count on the fact that Thailand suffered less than its neighbors from Japan's oppressive embrace as a plus in their present efforts to reassert a Japanese economic presence there.

The anti-Japanese boycott was triggered by a minor incident involving Japanese infringement of what is effectively Thailand's national sport, kick-boxing. For several years, rumors that Thai-Japanese kick-box matches held in Japan had been fixed in favor of the Japanese boxers have aroused resentment among Thai students both in Japan and in Thailand. It was thus not surprising that when a Japanese kick-boxing entrepreneur and trainer opened a kick-boxing gymnasium on one of Bangkok's main shopping streets, he found his enterprise the object of emotional demonstrations. For two days, on October 16 and 17, 1972, crowds of Thai high school and university students assailed the gymnasium, decrying it as a national humiliation.

Within a few weeks the focus of protest had been extended to include a nearby Japanese department store. Furthermore, the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which had by now assumed control of the spreading protest announced that a 10-day boycott would be held from November 20th to 30th explicitly protesting Japan's economic control of Thailand.

Simultaneously with their call for a boycott, the NSCT issued demands more like recommendations in tone respectively to the Thai and Japanese governments.

To Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, the following ten demands were submitted as a program for reviving Thai autonomous control of its economy.

1) The National Executive Council (NEC)

should immediately enact a law to prevent aliens from taking jobs from local residents.

2) The NEC should immediately enact a law to control alien businesses in Thailand, and at the same time should guarantee Thai nationals access to those careers for which they are as well qualified as foreigners, e.g., engineering and architecture.

3) Foreign-owned department stores are not necessary in Thailand; the NEC should prohibit expansion of existing ones and the establishment of new ones. The NEC should impose controls on existing foreign-owned department stores so that at least 40 per cent of the stock will be native Thai produce and not more than 20 per cent imports from the home country.

4) The NEC should consider controlling or prohibiting the importation of unnecessary goods and investment.

5) The NEC should improve control measures on foreign investment; it should close all existing loopholes.

6) There are still many irregularities in government agencies which deal with foreigners, such as the Immigration Division and the Customs Department. The NEC should impose stricter controls on officials working in these agencies.

7) The NEC should negotiate with other countries regarding cargo transport. The present system whereby all imports come in on a CIF basis, and exports go out on the FOB basis causes the loss of millions of baht to the country each year.

8) The NEC should establish an organization to conduct research and analysis of foreign investors in Thailand, and follow this up with appropriate control provisions.

9) The NEC has studied the influence of television programs on Thai students and has discovered that most of them spend disproportionately large amounts of time watching films of dubious value most of which are Japanese. These are shown between 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. when the audience is largest. The NSCT feels that most television stations in Thailand are presently operating for purely financial gain rather than acting as

responsible servants of the public. The NEC should impose controls on the operation of Thai television stations.

10) The NSCT urges the ranking members of the NEC to act as examples for others to follow; they should vigorously promote Thai products, and institute a policy whereby government agencies are

2) investment should be made in accordance with the real needs of the recipient nation, 3) dividends on investments should be reinvested locally in Thailand, and 4) investment should be directed toward the development of national industries. (2)

It is noteworthy that the Thai government registered no opposition to



Over population of Hondas

SAIGON

required to use locally produced goods as much as possible. (1)

At the same time, NSCT made public an appeal it was issuing to the Japanese Prime Minister, to the effect that the growing anti-Japanese sentiment among the people of Southeast Asia cannot be attributed exclusively to the imbalance of trade, but must also be seen as the result of indiscriminate investment by Japanese industries in the region and the insensibility and arrogance of Japanese businessmen. The NSCT further demanded that; 1) the Japanese Government should establish "overseas investment regulations",

the boycott. As the Far Eastern Economic Review reported on December 30, 1972, "200,000 Thai students, with the tacit support of the National Executive Council, demonstrated against Japanese influence." One factor here may have been the rather moderate tone of the NSCT demands, which could be taken by both governments as friendly advice. By not trying to suppress it, the Thai government clearly hoped to prevent any violence and to assure that the protest did not turn into an anti-government affair.

One Thai intellectual observed, "our leaders are never sure which side

their police will shoot." Whatever the motivation, the Thai government not only acquiesced in the initial boycott, but a month later promulgated a new Alien Business Control Decree requiring foreign-owned companies in Thailand to either restrict production or sales increases to 30 per cent annually (any higher increases requiring special permission) or to sell their holdings to Thai nationals within two years.

Nevertheless, one should be wary of concluding that the NEC was politically capitulating in any way to NSCT. The basic principles of the decree had been agreed on at a Cabinet meeting as far back as February 1970. It is still not clear why the government had maintained secrecy about it and delayed its promulgation for almost three years. Thus, it is not inconceivable, although it would be difficult to ascertain, that the student actions did prove to be a catalyst if not a direct impetus here.

It would also be naive to conclude that mere promulgation of a decree is adequate. As is often the case with even "landmark" decisions in the U.S. and other leading "democracies", no sooner had the Thai edict been issued than the question of enforcement became a black-clouded question mark, in view of the already pervasive influence of U.S., European, and Japanese business interests in the Thai economy. (3) Ironically enough, while few would argue this point, the foreign interests themselves do not think their position in Thailand will be secure enough until they can completely manipulate the government. A recent survey of the Thai economy for prospective Japanese investors by a Japanese "think-tank" regretfully noted that, while industrial capital in Thailand (of which the majority is foreign) does have access to the Ministry of Industry, it cannot yet be said to be powerful enough to maneuver the Thai government as a whole. (4)

While the tone of the students' appeal was restrained, it did not fail to highlight the only too real Japanese economic dominance of Thailand. The country's excessively large trade deficit dramatically illustrates the extent to which Japan exerts control through trade (see Table 1). As

Thailand's major trading partner, Japan enjoyed a surplus of US\$341 million in 1971. This constituted as much as 71 per cent of Thailand's total trade deficit in that year. In the area of capital investment, moreover, Japan has benefited from the incentives provided by the Industrial Investment Promotion Act to the tune of almost 12 per cent (or twice the US figure) of Thailand's total capital investment (see Table II).

It is not only those well-versed in reading economic statistics who appreciate those facts. A mere glance at the crowded signboards advertising Japanese products in Bangkok should leave no doubt in the visitor's mind as to the overwhelming influence of Japanese industry there. Nor is the Japanese presence limited to goods. The painful irony afforded by a common sight in Bangkok is not lost on the Thai people (nor among certain Japanese): "The Japanese (almost all male) arrive here on a JAL flight, ride to their Japanese owned hotel in a Japanese made taxi, go out to dinner in a Japanese restaurant, and spend the evening in an exclusively Japanese oriented nightclub cavorting with specially high-priced imported Japanese hostesses."

Of course, these are but surface manifestations. What the student boycott was directed against was the more far-reaching arrogance and racism which Japanese businessmen manifested in their business practice with Thai nationals. To name just a few: Japanese business-

Table I. Thailand's Balance of Trade

Year	Exports		Imports		Balance (a)	Balance with Japan (b)		%
	Amount	%	Amount	%		(a)	(b)	
1964	2,950	6.572	-	-	- 4,405	- 3,142	70.5	
1967	3,000	8.046	-	-	- 8,002	- 5,046	63	
1968	2,874	8.274	-	-	-10,424	-5,370	52	
1969	3,192	9.515	-	-	-11,244	- 5,325	47	
1970	3,770	10.107	-	-	- 12,237	- 6,337	52	
1971	4,277	10.093	-	-	- 9,466	- 6,016	71	

Notes: (a) \$1.00 = Thai 20.8
Sources: Calculated from Monthly Review, Nov., 1972, Bangkok Bank

Table II. Registered Capital under Promotion of Industrial Investment Act

No.	Investor Country	Single Investment		Joint Ventures		Total	
		Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
1	Thailand	1,891,818,243	85.81	2,495,612,177	57.77	4,387,430,420	66.42
2	Japan	394,194,000	8.81	650,884,200	15.16	1,045,078,200	16.02
3	U.S.A.	68,440,000	3.11	358,878,341	8.65	427,318,341	6.70
4	Taiwan	3,000,000	0.14	368,632,709	8.66	371,632,709	5.70
5	England	31,000,000	0.50	124,037,450	2.51	155,037,450	2.39
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							
13							
14							
	Total	2,204,540,243	100	4,344,744,000	100	6,549,284,243	100

(Source: Investment, 1972)



The signing of the January Paris Peace Agreement meant the failure of American aggressive policies in Vietnam and a victory for the Liberation Front.

But for nearly a year before the peace agreement went into effect, the Americans and the Thieu regime had stepped up their oppression of the Vietnamese people to levels hitherto unknown. Any citizen regarded as even slightly critical of the Thieu regime was marked out as "pro-communist," arrested, and thrown into prison.

The May, 1972, decree law states that neither communists nor "pro-communists" are under the protection of the law, and that those who advocate or agitate for neutralism shall be regarded as "pro-communist." Today, as a result of this law, there are some two to three hundred thousand political prisoners held by the Saigon regime.

It is impossible to know the precise number because the Thieu regime has charged many of its political arrestees with common crimes, and the picture has been further confused by Thieu's disingenuous insistence that there are only some 5000 people imprisoned for political reasons.

Five months after the signing of the Paris Accords, peace for Vietnam still lies in the future. Thieu's intention to make of chapter 4 of the Accord a dead letter is manifested in his failure to release the political prisoners and his continued slaughter and torture of old men, women, and children. Chapter 4 calls for establishing a free, democratic system and for open activities of a third force; the freedom of the political prisoners is one of the most important means of implementing the Paris Agreement's provisions for peace.

By "the Third Force," I mean those living under the domination of the Thieu regime who resist it and fight against it. Many are now political prisoners.

In its message addressed to the Beheiren sponsored "Vietnam Fortnight" campaign (April 24-May 5), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam insisted upon the establishment of democracy and freedom in South Vietnam, the liberation of political prisoners, and the formation of a national committee of concord and reconciliation.

In January a large number of anti-war Japanese citizens' organizations, centered around Beheiren, formed a temporary Japan Citizen's Coalition to End the Vietnam War. Demonstrating at the American Embassy, sitting in, etc., since February, this "citizens coalition" has been collecting signatures on petitions demanding the release of all the political prisoners. Five thousand signatures have been collected so far. In view of the numbers of political prisoners, it seems to me that this number of signatures is far too small, bespeaking the insufficiency of activists to spread the movement throughout the country.

We think that we should take a variety of measures -- radical or moderate -- to get these political prisoners released; especially important is to bring about a swelling world public opinion to demand their freedom. But our movement is still at a beginning.

We have, for example, gone to the Embassy of the Roman Catholic Church in Tokyo to convey to the Pope Japanese citizens' demands for the release of political prisoners, and to ask that the Pope use his moral influence on Thieu, who is a Catholic. Mgr. Mario Rollando of the Embassy expressed his deep concern about the fate of the "political prisoners," and promised to help us.

We have also mounted a number of demonstrations at the Tokyo embassy of the Saigon regime. On one occasion ten or fifteen of our members valiantly entered the Embassy and occupied a room, shouting cries of resistance. (This can be done by anyone on the spot.)


Father Nguyen Dinh Thi, a leader of the third force who recently visited Japan representing The Catholic Movement to Serve the Nation, made a deep impression on us, and from his appeal came the establishment of the Japan Committee for Freedom for Political Prisoners in South Vietnam (Comité japonais pour la demande de la libération des prisonniers politiques au Sud-Vietnam). Taking the initiative in the Committee are Oda Makoto and other anti-war activists of Beheiren, as well as social scientists, writers and critics, mathematicians, and religious figures. In its appeal, the Committee stated:

"We demand their release. Their only 'crime' is that they tried to act like human beings. It is natural for human beings to oppose oppression and invasion, and to seek reconciliation among the people. But what is natural for human beings is regarded as a 'crime' by the Saigon regime, which tried to distort the present and the future of the country by banishing these human beings into darkness.... Japan has helped the United States of America and supported the Saigon regime. Those Japanese who ignore this undeniable fact and talk about 'restoring' and 'developing' Vietnam are taking further steps to support the Saigon regime. They are, in fact, helping the hands that create 'political prisoners'."

Another name of the Committee is "The Society of 0000 demanding the Release of Political Prisoners," where the blank "0000" is the number of people who have signed the petition signifying their support of the movement. Now it is 5000, but we hope to make a committee of 20,000.

At present our plan is:

- (1) to continue to collect signatures, spreading the movement all over the country;
- (2) to compile a White Paper on the actual situation of political prisoners. We already have a good pamphlet in Japanese entitled "Political Prisoners in South Vietnam," and we shall issue a second edition in the near future. This kind of pamphlet should be published in every nation.



(3) hold lecture meetings and demonstrations and issue an international appeal.

(4) join with various other movements -- for example the Japan branch of Amnesty International -- to demand their release;

(5) raise funds for aid to political prisoners.

(6) Beheiren is considering a concentrated campaign to flood the Saigon Embassy in Tokyo (and through it, the Thieu government) with postcards carrying the message of protest. We have made picture post cards for the purpose which carry photographs of people released from the Tiger Cages of Con Son Island and returned to the Vietnamese mainland -- people who can no longer walk unaided.

We know the names of several thousand "political prisoners." We may launch a campaign of letters sent directly to Thieu to inquire into the reasons for arrest, the present situation, and the health of "Mr. So-and-So who is among those named in the list of your political prisoners which has been distributed all over the world." The only problem with this tactic -- a problem which must be carefully handled -- is that the people named in the letters must not suffer by such action.

The way to deal with this problem is for large numbers of letters to be sent to the Thieu government from all over the world.

We know very little of the present situation of the political prisoners. But we have seen the appeals from the liberation movement in South Vietnam and letters from the prisoners themselves, letters written from prison with tiny letters on a small scraps of paper. Thus some reports from the cells leak out to convey the truth to the people of the world to spur on the movement for their inhabitants' liberation. This kind of information is invaluable, for it is probable that even if a distinguished "Commission of Inquiry into Political Prisoners" were to be allowed to enter South Vietnam, it would be permitted to see only model prisons.

It is likely that within Thieu's domain there are people who are carrying out secret and difficult activities to relieve the suffering of political prisoners, but they need money for medical provisions, etc. To find out about this, and to contribute to the effort, write:

Communauté Vietnamienne
18 rue du Cardinal Lemoine
75005, Paris, France.

Interview.....

Father Thi On Vietnam, Japan, Asia

Editors Note: While Father Nguen Chih Thi was in Japan, at the invitation of Beheiren and the Japan National Council of Churches, AMPO questioned him on his views of the cease fire, the third force in Vietnam, the economic invasion of Japanese capital, and the nature of the world-wide Movement. The following is excerpted from his replies.

AMPO: How do you regard the economic and political situation in Vietnam since the cease fire?

Fr. Thi : First, we have to say that the Paris Cease Fire was a victory for the people of Vietnam. Foreigners have occupied my country for a hundred years, and now they are leaving. Nevertheless, the war is not over. Because the Paris Agreement did not favor the Saigon government or the Americans, they are trying to sabotage it in any way they can. Millions of Vietnamese are still bearing arms, battles still occur, and the economy is still very much in turmoil. As long as people who were forced out of their villages to live in squalid resettlement camps cannot return to their land, conditions cannot be favorable for production. As long as the Council for Reconciliation and National Concord is not established, as long as American aid for the present Saigon government continues to flow, as long as the political prisoners are not released, the war will continue and production will be disrupted.

AMPO: Are there any contradictions within the Saigon government?

Fr. Thi : The Saigon regime is based on the dollar, the rifle, and the Catholics. Although they are less strong than

the revolutionaries, the government in Saigon has always favored the Catholics, exploiting religion. There are many contradictions, military and economic. Vietnamization is not solid. Since the Paris Agreement, the soldiers, children of poor families, do not want to make war but the generals want to continue it because they make money out of it. Here is a contradiction between the generals and the army.

The Americans think they can control the Vietnamese people with dollar, but although Vietnamese have to accept American dollars -- both the people in the resettlement villages and the government in Saigon need it to stay alive -- it cannot make them follow the path Americans want them to follow. Opposition is growing particularly among the refugees. The Vietnamese will always oppose the Americans with the aid they receive.

AMPO: Who are the political prisoners? What would be the political and military meaning of their liberation?

Fr. Thi : Since 1954 the Americans have attempted to force the Vietnamese people to be anti-communist by arresting former resistance fighters and the people in the areas where the resistance lived on. Arrests and bombings are part of the same policy, but it is cheaper to arrest than

to bomb, and the result has been the creation of some hundred thousand political prisoners. Many are being killed in their cells. Until they are released, until the students and pacifists who cannot pay are released from their cells, the war is not over.

AMPO: What is the position of the third Force?

Fr. Thi : The third force are people who oppose both the Americans and the Saigon government. There are some Catholics among them, but not many; they are fighting against Thieu's exploitation of the Catholics in the support of his regime. Catholics should go with the revolutionaries, for Catholicism is a religion of the poor. Nevertheless, for centuries

do you assess these movements-- their present and future? What are your views on the Movement?

Fr. Thi : My impressions of the Japanese movement are still subjective, but I think there are here, as there are all over the world, men and women and people who are young and others not so young who are struggling to change themselves and the situation of the world around them. Many things are still not yet clear to them, but their mentality is what is important: their consciousness is collective and they are proceeding in a way that is becoming more and more profound.

In Paris and in other places I have visited, I find that the movements that are growing up are rather undisciplined.



the Church in Vietnam has been separated from the people, and Catholics have been privileged people. Now Catholics must have the same objectives as those fighting for the revolution; we must fight for liberation in South Vietnam, for liberation of the political prisoners.

There are some people in the third force who would like to rely upon the Japanese and build up in Vietnam an economy like that of Japan, but most think that the critical thing is to implement the Paris Accords and change the government in Saigon. The new team there may be pro-American, but it has to be for peace as well. The objectives must change. We must create in Vietnam something that corresponds to the desires of the Vietnamese people, a Vietnamese socialism with a humane face. You cannot look to the present government for this kind of change.

AMPO: You have knowledge about movements in various countries supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people, How

If you are going to put a plan into effect, you have to have discipline, but these movements have difficulties with organizational plans. One never knows when they are going to begin something. But if you want to go furthest, if you want to develop something new and keep freedom of movement, then it is necessary to accept an undisciplined state of affairs. Some people call these movements adventurist, and they do lack a kind of discipline, but there are movements, and they are proceeding in a generally good direction. It is a pleasure for me to work with all the young of various countries, to see their movements developing. It is good that all these activists are not solidified, for they are still developing.

The important thing is not to choose which group of activists to support. The decision as to which group will grow will not be made through general elections, but through a progressive sort of acceptance by the masses. It cannot happen in a minute, like a vote. It

takes months and years. The important thing is for the people to accept a change, a democratic evolution, and in developing these democratic ideas the activists have their greatest responsibility. It is necessary for the activists to elaborate their movements within the masses. They must work from below, so that they can hear the criticisms and aspirations of the masses. When the time comes to march ahead, they will know, a way will be found. The movement must not pursue arbitrary policies, but must come from within the social organism. You understand that it is relatively easy to direct an organization, but very difficult to direct a spartan government.

AMPO: You attended the Anti-War Conference sponsored by Beheiren. There you have heard people discuss a Conference of Asians against economic invasion and spread of pollution, a grand alliance to be forged between movements working on the Vietnam issue and those fighting pollution. Would you discuss pollution and the economic invasion for a few minutes?

Fr. Thi :For me, pollution is a new problem, one that I have heard discussion about only for the last two or three years. For a long time I thought it was a problem of wealth, merely a matter of pure air or impure air. But while I have been in Japan, I have come to see how important it really is. It is closely connected with problems of war and peace.

Why is Japan polluted? It is because of the development of industry here by individuals and corporations who do not ask the needs of the masses, but think only their own profit. Ipso facto this will cause grave problems for society.

Perhaps that is too simple an answer. Let me explain. I have visited the center of Tokyo for a while. It is fearful, dead and drab. Throughout Tokyo poor people live six to a room; when a person falls sick, he must remain in the same room with others. In the center of the city people work in unsympathetic places and amuse themselves little. I am not against the city. It is important for the intellect. But physical and psychological vitality are also crucial. The industry that has built Tokyo is not an industry that serves the

masses, but an industrial group that serves for its own profit. It is necessary for the masses to understand that departure from natural things is very dangerous. But the industrialists, in collusion with the intellectuals, have obscured the elementary fact that to give up air and water is very dangerous, since they are the very basis of life itself.

I am not against technology, but if you harm the health of peasants with the methods of industry. More and more the earth is entangled with industry and more and more the air and the water are dangerous, eventually killing men.

Not only is there this terrible physical danger: there is also a crippling psychological danger to the spread of industrial society. A man is forced to negate himself, his friends and his family -- he has no time for his family -- and live his life with objects. The emptiness of this life leads people to acquire a kind of empty morality. This is a kind of mental pollution.

Finally, there is the very important connection between Japan and Vietnam. Among the many things that have been imported from the U.S. and Japan to bombard Vietnam are chemicals. The chemical pollution of Vietnam does not come on little by little as it has here. It comes suddenly. In two or three hours people are killed by it. Killed by pollution. And I think that Japan is not far away from Vietnam in this respect. People are dying here from pollution, too. Only the suddenness is different.

They are all interconnected: war, pollution, and the false peace now coming down on Vietnam. War, peace and pollution are manifestations of the same thing. We either die together, or we live together. This is why the people of Japan must deal with the problems of industrialization and pollution. All the world must consider the problems of Vietnam. I think that people should work to end pollution in both the cities and in the countryside -- all over Japan and all over the world. Industrial civilization is now in a crisis, for it has faced the people of the world with a kind of chemical invasion of their lives. It is dangerous and must be combatted by the movements that are now growing up around the world. ■■

Women Fight for CONTROL

ABORTION STRUGGLE IN JAPAN

by Nagano Yoshiko

Japan - an "abortion paradise"? In the late '60s, as Japan started blossoming - economically, politically, militarily and ideologically - as a "great power," a campaign was launched to get rid of this country's supposedly disgraceful image as a heaven for abortions. This campaign has now become a national issue centering on the government's efforts to put through a bill reforming the "abortion" law. The ultimate aim of this campaign is to prevent the liberation of women from the male supremacist social structure and to insure our continued repression and exploitation in the interests of the "great power" of the '70s and beyond.

On May 11th of this year - for the third time in four years - the government introduced a bill in the Diet to change the present "Eugenic Protection Law" in order to tighten up the regulation of abortions. The bill's introduction was greeted by a strong opposition movement comprised of radical women's liberation groups, "handicapped" persons, liberals, even some conservatives. The Family Planning Federation, for instance, noting that many countries had followed the lead of Japan in liberalizing their abortion laws, called the bill "regressive" inviting "the ridicule of the world."

A clue as to the government's aim in sponsoring this unpopular and seemingly anachronistic legislation was provided by former Prime Minister Sato last year when he defended the same bill in the Diet. Though he touched on the "disgrace" of the "abortion paradise" label, his concern went further: to the so-called "destruction of the social order."

"Respect for life is being ignored in these times - as symbolized by the





confusion in sexual morality... We have to preserve the sense of nurturing the embryo as our own child, a gift from Heaven...not for the labor supply, but in relation to the social disorder, we should revise the Eugenic Protection Law which is a fundamental cause of social vice."

.... lady, you ain't poor

A key element in the proposed reform is the removal from the law of the "for economic reasons" clause as grounds for abortion. The government contends that whereas acute food and housing shortages in the immediate postwar years necessitated the liberal policy in effect up until now, the current improved standard of living obviates this part of the law.

In its reaction to the proposed reform, Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) challenged this contention. The chief of Sohyo's Women's Section stated that the present conditions of low wages, housing shortage and lack of childcare facilities compel women to have abortions. "The government should

take measures to solve these social problems instead of revising the present law."

A number of women's organizations such as Tokyo YWCA, the Japan Nurses' Association, the Women's Electorate League have united to oppose the bill; but the strongest opposition movement is being conducted by progressive women's groups like the Asian Women's Association and the Women's Democratic Club, women's liberation groups focused on the Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center, and persons suffering from cerebral palsy.

The day the reform bill was introduced in the Diet, a coalition of 22 such groups, "The Working Committee to Block the Reform of the Eugenic Protection Law," protested at the Ministry of Health and Welfare under slogans like "Women decide whether to bear babies or not," "Don't permit the government to control women's bodies," etc. On May 15th women's liberationists were ejected from the offices of the Health and Welfare Minister whom they had sought, unsuccessfully, to meet. Prospects for passage of the reform bill in the current Diet look dim, but the women and "handicapped"

persons leading the movement for its defeat have continued the demonstrations and teach-ins to fight the pernicious ideological trends the "reform" is aimed at consolidating.

.... we don't need 'em

Prominent in the struggle against the reform bill have been members of Aoishiba-no-kai, a group of cerebral palsy victims and their supporters. Labelled "handicapped," they are often regarded more like defective products than human beings; and the proposed reform of the Eugenic Protection Law contains a provision which further undercuts their already precarious existence. This provision explicitly OKs abortions in cases where it is found that if the pregnancy came to term the child would be born physically or mentally "handicapped." Actually the present, liberally administered law has given latitude to women to have an abortion in such cases. The inclusion of this clause, then, which might at first glance appear "compassionate," on the contrary, reinforces discrimination against the "handicapped." Yokota-san, a spokesman for Aoishiba-no-kai, said at a recent demonstration, "The reform bill denies the right of the

'handicapped' to live. It fails to put first things first. It is the urgent task of government to create a society where those who are born as the 'handicapped' do not feel unhappy."

.... mothers first

A third proposed change in the Eugenic Protection Law would authorize expansion of the service of the Eugenic Counseling Office set up under the present law to include "guidance" to women to encourage starting childbearing at the "proper" age (read "young"). This move to preserve the oppression of women in the nuclear family has its counterpart in the current outcry in the mass media against "the loss of motherhood" supposedly responsible for the infanticide and child-abandonment cases which have been given remarkable coverage in the past year. A recent court ruling in a child-custody case declared that mothers who were not wives and full-time stay-at-home baby-sitters were not fit. Another recent ruling which upheld discrimination against women in the work place underscores the government's determination to keep less oppressive life options outside the home closed to women.

Taken as a whole, then, the reform bill is aimed at prohibiting abortions "for economic reasons," encouraging abortions in cases of "handicapped" embryos, and finally, lowering the age at which women start childbearing, thus effectively controlling their entire life cycle.

Those were hard times....

The Eugenic Protection Law was established in 1948 to cope with the postwar social and economic chaos. There was a "baby boom," population control was considered essential for reconstruction, and black-market abortions were flourishing. The "for economic reasons" clause was added in 1949 in conditions of general and often acute poverty. A second revision in 1952 simplified the administrative procedure for obtaining an abortion, stipulating that only the permission of a certified doctor was required. The next year the figure for reported abortions jumped to over 1 million where it remained until 1961, when it started a slight decline. The total annual rate of abortions (illegal abortions included) is now estimated at between 2 and 3 million.

Also in 1952, anti-abortion forces, Catholic groups and a "Catholic-Shinto" groups called Seicho-no-Ie, formed the "League to Abolish the Eugenic Protection Law." Claiming that the Law, in permitting abortions "without restrictions," was responsible for a breakdown in morals, even "the loss of motherhood and humanity," they launched a campaign to outlaw abortion and eradicate the "abortion paradise."

The league's propaganda further bemoaned the fact that whereas in the good old days "natural selection" (without doing violence to "the traditional Japanese thought and spirit" no less) wiped out all but fit offspring by the age of twenty, these days, "superior babies are being aborted together with inferior ones." The present Eugenic Protection Law is, they say, "having a harmful effect on the Japanese race" in spite of the fact that its stated purpose is, besides protecting the life and health of the mother, "to prevent the birth of offspring inferior from the eugenic point of view."

The voices in the Diet raised in support of the present reform legislation

have, in fact, echoed this position. And the statement of the Minister of Health and Welfare defending the bill in last year's Diet all but declared abortion "immoral." But in the days of reconstruction, the Ministry felt the Eugenic Protection Law functioned effectively for population control and put off the strong demands of the ultra-nationalists and religionists with the argument that family planning was a priority.

It was in the late '60s that, backed by Seicho-no-Ie, LDP Diet members began to take up the question of revising the Eugenic Protection Law. In 1967 the then Minister of Health and Welfare launched the "wipe away the dishonor of the 'abortion paradise'" line, and the next year a white paper on public welfare announced: "Now that the national income has increased, it is time to consider prohibiting abortion for economic reasons."

The following year the Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted a survey on abortion with the cooperation of doctors of obstetrics and gynecology throughout the country. The result of this and other studies on population trends provided another angle for the forces calling for abortion reform. The 1969 Interim Report on Population Trends in Japan noted that while a fertility rate of 2.33 is necessary to maintain zero population growth, the present fertility rate in Japan is just 2. The net reproduction rate is less than 1, the lowest in the world except for Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Since this low rate has continued for over ten years, the Report concludes that "it is desirable to regain a net reproduction rate of over 1, that is, an average of over 2.10 babies per female."

Business circles, already faced with a labor shortage and worried by the figures showing a declining birth rate, joined the movement to revise the Eugenic Protection Law. Their tone recalled the prewar nationalist slogan, "Have babies, increase our posterity!" Yet, interestingly enough, when its Final Report came out in 1970, the Ministry of Health and Welfare played down the alarmist conclusions others had drawn from the survey results. The head of the Ministry's Institute for Population Problems noted, furthermore, that while

Japan had a net reproduction rate below 1, so did all Western countries. And he pointed out that the females born in the "baby boom" years would soon start childbearing.

Nationalists and a few business men aside, few people in the year 1973 believe abortions should be curtailed because of a "population crisis." The question remains: what is the aim of the legislation to reform the Eugenic Protection Law?

Many critics of the proposed reform have maintained that if abortion for economic reasons is outlawed many women will be forced to resort to illegal abortions. If we look more carefully at the administration of the present law, however, and at the attitude of the medical establishment toward the proposed reform, this criticism would seem to miss the point. This author shares the opinion of those who believe that the bill is not aimed primarily at decreasing the number of legally performed abortions.

In the present Eugenic Protection Law there are five items under which a woman may be granted an abortion. Item 4 covers the case of "A mother whose health may be affected seriously by continuation of pregnancy or by delivery from the physical or economic viewpoint." Although women's reasons for seeking abortions are obviously varied, 99.7% of them turn up on the mandatory reports from abortion practitioners simply as the "maternal health" of Item 4.


When the abortion reform bill was first presented in the Diet four years ago there was considerable protest from the medical profession. This year hardly a doctor's voice was heard on the matter - an indication, in part at least, that doctors are confident that their discretionary powers would not be lessened under the bill, nor their clientele decreased.

The aim of the reform law is not to decrease abortions - to insure an adequate labor supply, say - but to shift the "blame" for abortion from society (which in itself necessitates abortions for economic reasons) to the individual woman. The reform bill, which would substitute the "mental health" of the mother for

"economic reasons" carries the implication that women who have abortions are not psychologically normal or are "easy women" who have deviated from public morality. The government would like to have this invisible moral weapon to hold over the heads of the women of the "Japanese Empire" it is now in the process of shaping. "Wipe away the dishonor of the 'abortion paradise'" - but not abortion with its attendant suffering for women.

The Eugenic Protection Law, whose purpose is "to prevent the birth of inferior posterity and to protect the life and health of mothers," inherited the spirit of the National Eugenic Law in effect from 1940 to the end of the war. To preserve the purity of the Yamato race, that law forced women to have babies for Tenno (the Emperor) with penalties for the "crime of abortion." The same ultra-nationalist, male chauvinist motivation has lain dormant in the postwar Eugenic Protection Law and would seek fuller expression in its "reform." This is shown by the fact that while liberally applying the Eugenic Protection Law for its own purposes after the war, the government never struck the "crime of abortion" from the books. Article 212 of the Criminal Law makes it a crime punishable by






imprisonment for a woman to abort her unborn fetus. Since the number of persons who have been prosecuted under this law since the war has been infinitesimal, its purpose is clearly not to prevent abortion, but to assert the government's "right" to control women's reproductive function.

.....

On a recent Sunday in Tokyo over 500 people gathered at a meeting called by the "Working Committee to Block the Reform of the Eugenic Protection Law." Most were young women, some with little children; there were older women scattered here and there; a large contingent of "handicapped" persons attended, some in wheelchairs; there were some men, too. After several speakers explained the significance of the reform bill's three main points, discussion was opened and the mother of a mentally retarded person stood up to speak.

"When I came into this hall somebody handed me a leaflet calling for the dissolution altogether of the Eugenic Protection Law. When I saw that I could have jumped for joy. Even the Law as it now stands expresses an essential discrimination against the 'handicapped.' Besides fighting against



this reform bill, we must cry out against the whole 'Eugenic Protection' system!"

The leaflet she referred to, prepared by a Tokyo women's liberation group, questioned the dominant line in the anti-reform bill movement which sees an increase in illegal abortions as the main threat of the bill. "That is not the point," the leaflet says.

"The reform bill illustrates clearly the character of the Eugenic Protection Law: an ideological attack on women who challenge the family system in which children are brought up for the interests of the ruling powers... Now is the time to demand the dissolution altogether of the Eugenic Protection Law, to call into question a society based on authoritarianism and discrimination, to smash the structure of 'superior - inferior'."

I believe that, whatever their opinion may be when they enter the struggle, women will more and more come to recognize the moralistic repression as the movement develops to dissolve the Eugenic Protection system and to abolish the crime of abortion. Confident that the movement has prevented the reform bill from coming up for deliberations this year, the coalition of women and "handicapped" persons have planned rallies and demonstrations in the movement against the Eugenic Protection System. ■ ■

Where is the PILL?

Six big drug companies in Japan produce the Pill for export to Southeast Asia. It is not commercially available in Japan.

In December, 1971, the Pill was designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare as a drug to be bought only with a doctor's prescription. The Ministry's "warning" to druggists up to then not to sell the Pill for purposes other than "regulating menstruation" had proved ineffective. Now conversations like the following are apt to be heard at drug-stores around the country.

"Do you have the Pill?" a woman asks. "Sorry, we don't carry such a thing," a druggist replies with a frown.

"Well, then, do you have 'Norluten-Dl' or 'Ovulen'?" The woman mentions the names of two "pills" she has learned by heart.

"Yes, but we can't sell them without a doctor's prescription."

"'Norluten and Ovulen are the same as the Pill, aren't they? It's funny you have them, but you don't have the Pill.'"

The flustered druggist replies, "We would be prosecuted if we sold the Pill," and he explains the notice of the Ministry.

Interestingly enough, since the Pill was designated a drug for which a doctor's prescription is required, production and sales have increased. According to one Diet member's investigation, sales of the brand "Evinat" have gone up 40%, and 80% for "Lindiol" in the first three months after the Ministry decision. Women

have difficulty getting the Pill at pharmacies - where they cost from 500 to 700 yen for a month's supply - but doctors sell the Pill freely, charging from 1,800 to 2,000 yen for the same amount. The Ministry is dealing with the "problem of harmful side effects of the Pill" by making its restricted sale a lucrative business for doctors.

But while the Pill is still "banned" in Japan, it is being exported on a massive scale to Southeast Asia. Ono-Seiyaku, one of the big pharmaceutical companies in Japan, has been conducting research on the postconception abortifacient, "Prostaglandins," for eight years. Two years ago doctors in the medical schools of National Universities started clinical tests of the effects of this drug. These tests were deemed successful enough to permit the production of Prostaglandins in tablet form for export to Southeast Asia. The doctors did not feel, however, that the drug was safe enough yet for sale in Japan! Further research was necessary, they said, to eliminate the danger of harmful side effects of the drug.

Recalling the Black and Puerto Rican women who were used as human guinea pigs for the development of the Pill in the United States, Southeast Asian women are being given an evidently risky drug while in Japan women are being "protected" from the harmful effects of the Pill by an illogical and inconsistent "policy" of prohibition.

Photos:

- P. 14, above: "Dissolve the Health and Welfare Ministry" -- Women's surprise sit-in on May 15, 1973
- P. 14, below: The first nation-wide assembly of women's liberation groups held in Tokyo May, 1972
- P. 15: Health and Welfare Ministry's male bureaucrats terrified by women's shout against the bill
- P. 16: Women fight for control -- Demonstration in Tokyo June, 1972
- P. 18: "Unmarried" mothers fighting against the family system
- P. 19: "Block the reform of the Eugenic Protection Law" -- Meeting held in Tokyo on May 20, 1973

 * With this article, *
 * AMPO starts carry- *
 * ing a series of *
 * articles of Japan- *
 * ese women fighting *
 * against sexual *
 * discrimination. *
 * *
 * Women's caucus *
 * in AMPO *
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People's Power is Only Pollution Counter-Measure

AMPO: It is well known that pollution is one of the most serious problems in Japan, and that the government and some business firms nowadays speak frequently about pollution countermeasures. As an activist in the anti-pollution movement and also as a specialist, would you explain something about this recent situation?

UI: Pollution countermeasures should not just be understood in terms of technology as people often do. They are primarily a social behavior of the polluting corporations and the government, and should be understood as their countermeasures against the anti-pollution movements carried on by the victims of their pollution and local people. Whether proper steps are taken to eliminate pollution or not is determined not by economic factors alone but by broad sociological factors, the most important of which are the awareness of the people and the power relationship existing between the victims and the victimizers. This is why I say that there is no third party as far as pollution is concerned. If the victimizing side is socially powerful, pollution is aggravated. If the victims become socially strong, the assailants find it more difficult to keep polluting the environment. Any action or measure taken serves either to strengthen one side or the other and only the measures that serve to help the victims can be considered the real pollution countermeasures.

AMPO: So, are you saying that under no circumstances can business firms and government think in terms of the interests of the people?

UI: Correct. The Japanese government has developed a special mechanism for protecting the interests of business firms. We cannot distinguish between the government and business, when they set out to decide, for instance, criteria for waste discharge. They collude with each other. Under these circumstances, the victims of pollution always confront not only the victimizing corporations but also the entire political-bureaucratic structure because they mystify the root cause of pollution by taking complex measures.

AMPO: Is that why you once said that the best pollution countermeasure is to set up libraries in all localities where necessary documents are available to the public? In a word, you trust only in the power of the people to fight against pollution.

UI: You are right. Let me talk about the case of Kochi Pulp Co. set up in 1948 and closed down last year. It is a typical case. Its sulphite pulp factory was built as a major regional development project of Kochi Prefecture in Shikoku Island, with the strong backing of the prefectural office. However, local people were warned because they knew that a sulphite pulp factory would cause tremendous pollution. Therefore, they forced the company to sign a fantastic agreement with them--an agreement unparalleled in its democratic contents. They set up a joint control committee, two thirds of whose members were from local inhabitants and the remaining one third from "third party" people. Under the contract, the company had to deposit




Ui Jun, Assistant at Tokyo Univ. School of Engineering is one of the leaders of the anti-pollution movement in Japan.

money every year as a reserve in anticipation of future compensations. The company would suspend operation should any harm be caused. But that excellent agreement was not applied once during more than 20 years of the factory's operation. This does not imply that pollution did not occur. On the contrary, the company discharged most of its pernicious waste and seriously polluted the environment. What happened? The prefectural government intervened and paid compensations on behalf of the factory. When fishermen, who suffered the gravest damage, complained, the authorities decided to "reclaim" the bay of Urato to wipe out local fishing and thus to eliminate the very right of the fishermen for compensations. The prefectural office paid money to them, and the money was said to include both pollution compensation and compensation for the confiscation of the fishing right. Later, the Kochi Pulp Co. attempted to expand its plant and was met with strong opposition by local people. The company promised that the old facilities would be abandoned in order to appease the people. In fact, the old facilities were sealed, but it later turned out that the company stealthily fitted removable pipes to the old plant without breaking the seals and continued to operate it. When official supervisors came, the pipes were removed and the plant's operation was temporarily suspended. The local people of course got indignant, protested and began negotiations with the company. The answer from the company was always that it had left everything to the judgment of the central government. At that time, the government was just drawing up the waste water criteria, and the

company was waiting for the new criteria. The criteria were worked out and announced, and the company found them acceptable. So, the company unilaterally discontinued negotiations. At last, a leader of the local people resorted to direct action. He stuffed concrete into the waste pipe, blocking it off. He was arrested and brought to trial. However, this direct action made the case of Kochi Pulp known throughout the country. The factory was finally closed down last year. This story shows clearly that the original agreement did not work at all. It also illustrates how the local and central governments acted in the interest of the business firm. In essence they are no different from a section of the company.

AMPO: The government hides the real state of affairs from the eye of the public. Is that what you characterized as the government's mystifying role?

UI: Yes. Take the case of Chisso Co., which caused the notorious Minamata disease. There, the so-called "third party" always intervened as "mediator." They never listened sincerely to what the victims had to say. They were there just to gloss over the "difference" between the victims and the assailants. First, the Mayor of Minamata City was called in as a mediator, and then the Prefectural Governor wanted to appease the victims and fishermen by securing some compensation for them, and then Mr. Chigusa organized his committee for mediation at the request of the Welfare Ministry. Now the Central Government has organized the National Commission for Pollution Issue Adjustment to arbitrate in pollution issues. It is characteristic that the mediating function has been shifted, one step after another, to higher echelon organizations so that the solution becomes farther removed from the realities of the victims. Thus the problems become less tangible and more sophisticated. This is what the polluting industries want. They expect the higher echelon mediators to offer them greater assistance. And they do.



AMPO: You once pointed out that business and government, faced with the rising anti-pollution movement in Japan, intensified their direct PR activities in order to win the consent of the local people, and at the same time, they have tried to use more and more of the national land development program to impose the polluting plants of private enterprises on local residents. Premier Tanaka's Japanese Archipelago Overhauling Program seems to be the culmination of this second tactic. Could you please tell us something about what is happening in this respect?

UI: It is said that land, water and labor are the three vital factors that can bottleneck development. But these three eventually boil down to land. Labor can be, and actually is, economized through tremendous "rationalization." Water, too, can be greatly economized. Land is

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really the only vital consideration of business. So, Japanese business firms are crazy about land. They want to build a huge industrial zone in the remote Mutsu-Ogawara area at the northern tip of Honshu because land was considered cheap there. But now they calculate reclamation of the sea is better, because the price of land is rising. They are fast expanding into the sea. They must be prepared to pay ¥100,000 per Tsubo (3.3 square meters) to buy the land, however remotely it may be located; but, if they reclaim the sea area they need pay only ¥10,000 per Tsubo in compensation to local fishermen and another ¥10,000 - ¥20,000 in sea reclamation costs. So, they are intent upon securing shallow waters in such places as Suo Nada and Shibushi.

AMPO: So, they take the land and build plants there. But, have they

learned any lessons? Are they now building safe plants?

UI: It is here that false information and PR activities are used. Officials never hesitate to spread false information to help business enterprises. For instance, the government plans to establish a cluster of enormous chemical combines in Shibushi, in Kagoshima Prefecture. Due to local opposition, the first draft program was scrapped and the officials are now drafting the second one. The official announcement was that the plants, including a 1,000,000 barrel per day oil refinery, to be set up there will cause no pollution. When the local people had a mass negotiation with the officials who drafted the program, I was there and exchanged these questions and answers with one of the officials:

Ui -- You say these plants are harmless. But before you

assure so, tell me what kinds of wastes are expected from them if they are built as you have planned.

Chief of the Development Office -- Frankly speaking, I simply don't know what actually will be coming out of them. Nobody can predict or exhaustively enumerate the kinds of waste. Ui -- How can you say you can stop them when you don't know what exactly will be coming out?

Official -- I am sorry. I admit I contradicted myself. Another kind of lie told so often is that the plants in question will increase local employment. At Sakata City in Niigata Prefecture, the local government is trying to get Sumitomo Light Metal Co. to establish an aluminium factory with an annual output of 180,000 tons. The prefectural office promised that 3,000 local workers will be

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employed by the plant. This was an utterly groundless and unwarranted statement. It turned out later that the plant will need almost no local workers. They just want to get land, and once land is obtained, they think they can do anything.

AMPO: That is alarming. When Japanese businessmen and officials are acting like that in Japan, what do they do in other countries, especially in Asian countries? Do you think these polluting industries, in quest of land, will move their plants increasingly to other countries?

UI: They are doing so. First to remote land in Japan, then reclamation of the sea, and then they move their dirty plants abroad. Oil refiner officials openly say that they need land in foreign countries since they cannot hope to build the needed number of refineries in Japan.

AMPO: To take land of other countries is sheer aggression. And, in actuality, they are doing so in many other countries. They are now building a big petrochemical combine in Thailand, and operating "bonded areas" (with their virtual extra-territoriality) in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. What behavior do you expect from them in operating these petrochemical plants, steel mills, paper-pulp companies, etc., in other land?

UI: They are expected to do at least what they have done in Japan, and most likely far worse things can be expected in other countries. They will probably claim that they will follow Japanese safety criteria, which they say are strictest in the world. They have already cheated people here by saying so. What they have done to evade control in Japan may serve as an example from which lessons may be drawn. A worker at the Yawata Steel Works of Nippon Steel Corp. told me that at night the management stops the operation of the dust collector. In fact, it is proven that Goi and Kimitsu, two giant steel bases in Japan, suffer from increased air pollution at night.

The companies pledge loyalty to regulations when vigilant people are present, but switch anti-pollution devices off when they are absent. I once had a rather funny experience. In March, 1970, I visited the Sakai power plant of Kansai Electric Power Co. whose dust collecting device the management is proud of. I went there with 20 foreign visitors. They showed us an industrial TV system watching the conditions of the smoke. We were satisfied, and left the plant. Then we went to a restaurant nearby to have lunch and rest. When we left the restaurant an hour later, we looked back at the plant. The chimney of the plant was spouting black smoke. The foreigners shouted, "Oh! Kogai!" This is what they do. The Kochi Pulp Co. I mentioned had a waste disposal device for whose operation certain chemical agents were needed. After the closure of the factory, we found in the daily record of the company that on the days when officials did not visit the plant they were not consuming any amount of these agents. I can give you a hundred such examples.

AMPO: Please give us a few more.

UI: The rudest cases are those in which they do not fit dust collectors or waste disposal facilities at all. The Japanese steel industry is known for the world's highest productivity. The reason, apart from labor conditions, is that Japanese steel makers simply did not put dust collectors on their Bessemer converters, while Europeans have huge devices for the purpose. In the oil refining process, Japanese refineries, until the 1950's, had no gravity separators for wastes, while U.S. refineries have used them since the 1920's. It is also well known that a waste disposal system based on the activated sludge process should be mounted on all refineries. But that system was absent in some refineries. If a petroleum plant making lubricating oil is built it uses acids and alkali in large quantities, and disposal of these wastes is a serious problem. This might be a problem for Japanese

plants in other lands. In Japan we have specialized systems to deal with these wastes, but other countries may not have such systems. I don't know what Japanese businessmen are going to do with these pernicious wastes abroad. In the paper-pulp industry, there should be three stages of waste water discharge, namely, sedimentation, flocculation and activated sludge processes. It is questionable whether Japanese paper manufacturers are going to equip their overseas plants with all of the three. Paper manufacturers on the Tagonoura bay, the bay polluted most seriously with "hedro" from the plants, had only two stages. Utmost vigilance is needed over sulphate and sulphite pulp plants, or kraft pulp plants, which pollute water most seriously.

AMPO: Japanese enterprises are really the most egocentric beings on earth. To what degree could they economize investments by skimping on these necessary processes?

UI: It's hard to say in general. But I can say they economized enormously at the sacrifice of life and the living conditions of the people. In the case of steel mills with Bessemer converters lacking dust collectors, I estimate they reduced their equipment investments by 20 - 30 per cent. It's surprising that as far as I know the Kure steel mill of Nisshin Steel Mfg. did not have the dust collector even after 1960.

AMPO: What other lessons can you draw from the Japanese experience?

UI: Japanese corporations buy off officials, scholars and supervising bodies. When the notorious Yokkaichi pollution came to the fore, the local office of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) solidly supported the pollution-causing enterprises and fought openly against the local branch of the Maritime Security Agency where conscientious officials were working. The local MITI office put pressure on the MSA in an attempt to get the con-

scientious people fired. Some of the critical officials made investigations, and took note of all cars parked at night in front of cabarets in the city. They found many government agency cars. Circumstantial evidence shows that graft is rampant.

AMPO: Are scholars bought off the same way?

UI: I'll give you a typical case, the case of the Tamiya Committee. When the real cause of the Minamata disease was being exposed, the company got Prof. Miyata Takeo of Tokyo University to organize a committee. It was to produce data supporting the company. Prof. Miyata was promised ¥20 million, but the committee dissolved when the company paid only ¥7,000,000. A spokesman for the company proudly testified to this at the Minamata trial.

AMPO: Do you expect the same thing to occur in other countries where Japanese enterprises are building their mills and plants?

UI: Yes, I think it can be expected. It is clear that they cause more pollution in Southeast Asia and other areas of the world than they do in Japan. This can be inferred from their general behavior and from their past records. In Japan, the anti-pollution movement has built up into a fairly large counter-acting force. In order to evade its pressure, the pollution-causing industries are moving into other countries. One thing true here and in foreign countries may be this: Japanese enterprises would behave decently only when they are forced to do so. ■■

Interview with

Higuchi Tokuzo

LABOR MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

Its Present And Future

Editor's Note

Higuchi Tokuzo is an organizer and a secretariat member of Torokatsu (Tokyo Trade Union Activists' Conference) and Zenrokatsu, the nationwide version of Torokatsu. He is a staunch militant in the Japanese labor movement, having participated and played important roles in major struggles of the Japanese working class since 1948 when he started his revolutionary career at a plant of the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co. Torokatsu and Zenrokatsu, born in the summer of 1970, are at the moment the major labor organization coordinating on the national level the activities of scattered left workers' groups though, as Higuchi admits, they are still a loose liaison association of workers.


ANTI-IMPERIALISM REVIVED AMONG WORKERS

AMPO: Tell me about the background against which Torokatsu was organized.

Higuchi: In starting Torokatsu in 1970, we wanted to inherit the cream of the Hansen movement and the New Left movement in general in the late 60s. The years following the 1960 struggle against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the defeat of the coal miners' struggle in the Miike colliery of Mitsui Mining Co. were featured essentially by the retreat and corruption of the labor movement. The movement was pushed more and more to the right by the Ikeda Cabinet's political maneuvering coupled with the high tempo economic growth. The trade union movement sought to obtain only minor material gains in exchange for major concessions to capitalists. At workshops, struggle really confronting the labor control system and capital was abandoned and almost eradicated. But after 1965 a new surge of struggle came up under the impetus of the Vietnam revolution. New movements were created centering on the issue of Vietnam. Beheiren emerged out of the anti-Vietnam war movement. Later, Zenkyoto (the joint committee of all-campus students' strug-

gle) developed to its nationwide campus struggle. On the labor front, Hansen (the Anti-war Youth Committee) was born as a counter to the rotten union movement and it carried out resolute street fighting. Through the medium of Hansen, revolutionary spirit was revived among the working class.

But these movements, generally called the New Left, were defeated in their fight in the fall of 1969 when they staged a concerted struggle against the government on the issues of "Okina-wa reversion" and the extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although the street fighting tactics, attacking where the state could least extend its power, were a breakthrough for the workers' movement, it had to be defeated and reorganized to return to the workplace. Hansen challenged the conventional union movement by replacing the traditional slogans of "democracy, unity and solidarity" -- an empty slogan of always glossing over differences and pulling the workers' struggle back "for the sake of unity" -- with clear anti-imperialist slogans and spirit. Zenrokatsu and Torokatsu were formed to carry on Hansen's task and re-establish the anti-imperialist cause



for the Japanese working class with emphasis on the buildup of workers' power on the workshop and union level.

ZENROKATSU AS COALITION OF STRUGGLE CORES

AMPO: First, will you describe the strength of Zenrokatsu and Torokatsu?

Higuchi: In the three years since we started the organizations, we have shifted our anti-imperialist emphasis from the anti-war movement directed solely against the Vietnam war to the labor front which will fight against Japanese imperialism on all sides. We are an organization of activists working at factories all over Japan.

In Tokyo, our members include workers who are carrying on their anti-imperialist struggle in various plants, including Origin Electric, General Oil, and IHI's Tanashi factory, a key war industry plant tied to the 4th Defense Forces Build-up Plan. At Origin Electric, workers struck against the construction of a new plant that would cause pollution, and workers at General Oil started the first resistance within a petrochemical complex. Some of the workers at SONY are also fighting with us.

AMPO: How large do you think the Zenrokatsu is in Japan's total labor movement?

Higuchi: Still a small minority. Members of the re-organized anti-war group -- I would call them New Leftists in a broad sense -- account for 3-5% of the 11 million organized workers in Japan, out of a total of about 30 million workers. But there are other figures too. A public opinion poll carried out

by the National Railways Workers Union's Youth Department showed that ten per cent of its 25,000 members support the New Left. And a concentrated effort by the anti-war group in Toshokuro (the Union of the Metropolitan Government Workers), the biggest single union with a membership of 100,000, got one of its members elected to the executive committee. The JCP and JSP slates won 26 and 24 seats respectively, but the anti-war group secured 5,000 out of the 100,000 votes.

So even though it is obvious that we are an absolute minority, our group now has an important place in the unions, and our determination to fight imperialism means that we can't be overlooked. But let's look at a few more examples. Ten of the thousand unions belonging to the National Metal Workers' Union are affiliated with Zenrokatsu, and every one of them keeps up its struggle in various parts of Japan. In particular, workers at Motoyama Mfg. Co. in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture, are carrying on a large-scale struggle. Now one can't talk about the struggles of the National Metal Workers' Union without referring to these ten unions.

Or look at the shipbuilding industry. 200,000 workers belong to Zosen-jukiro (Association of Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Workers), which has a close relationship with the right-wing Domei (Japanese Confederation of Labor), while 10,000 workers belong to Zenzosen (the National Shipbuilding Workers' Union) which collaborates with Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). These 10,000 workers include minority unions actively fighting at such key enterprises as the Nagasaki Shipyard of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries and Uruga Dock. Though they are small compared with the major rightwing unions operating in these plants, yet their fighting capacity cannot be ignored. You cannot measure their strength by their numbers. Speaking about minority unions, I can cite the case of IHI. The union of IHI workers until recently belonged to the Zenzosen (friendly with Sohyo) but under the pressure of the company it decided to withdraw from Zenzosen and join the rightwing Domei. It is characteristic that the factory cell of the Communist Party, believed to have 400 to 500 members, decided to

pour into the rightwing company union. But our comrades, only 28 in number, refused to do so, and stayed with Zenzosen. They formed their own union and carry on their militant struggle. They are militant and energetic, and a lot of sympathy exists for them among the 36,000 workers of IHI. Although only these 28 workers are still fighting among the 36,000 employees of IHI, they must not be ignored, for they are carrying on their fight resolutely.

AMPO: Are you saying that Zenrokatsu is a liaison organization uniting activists and workers whose political position is left of the JCP under the banner of anti-imperialism?

Higuchi: Yes, exactly.

TYPICAL STRUGGLES AND COMPANIES' VIOLENCES

AMPO: Do you consider that it is rather a center of communications between groups which fight independently than a structured organization?

Higuchi: Up to now this has been so. But we are going to step forward to become a real movement organization ourselves. We have to fight together with the mass of people against combined capital's tendency to total aggression against the people by centering around the plan to re-model the Japanese Islands. The struggle of the Motoyama Mfg. Co. workers in Sendai is representative. They understand clearly why they should fight and that they are against the capitalist grand design for total development of the Tohoku area including extension of expressways and the super-express railroad.

Because they are fighting against capital's Grand Design, they are suppressed brutally. In the Motoyama plant, workers have been repressed by the collective violent power of capital, DOMEI, police and right-wing thugs. These counter-revolutionary rightists play their role as guards for the capitalists by making raids on people's movements everywhere. In Motoyama, too, the 200 workers out of the corporation's 700 who have been organized into a first union have been attacked almost 600 times in all, which means each worker has been assaulted at least three times. 150

workers have been sent to doctors. And yet, they have been waging their struggle against a lockout for almost six months.

AMPO: What are their demands? What is the issue?


Higuchi: The violent suppression itself has grown into the major issue. During the spring labor offensive last year, several guards hired by the company harrassed the union members, so the workers started to fight, demanding that the lockout be ended, hired guards removed, and regular wages paid. One and half years ago, the company used the formation of a productivity committee to manipulate and divide the union, whose executive committee had been controlled by the New Left group. And for the last five months the company has locked the New Left workers out.

Adding to the indirect violence in the form of the lockout, there is direct physical violence by both police and rightists. The company even recruited the former assistant inspector of North Sendai Police Station's guard section to become the chief clerk of its general affairs department.

AMPO: How do you fight back against this all-out repression against anti-war, radical workers?

Higuchi: A movement to support them is being organized by various citizens' groups and the movement around Beheiren, but of course, the JCP has not joined. There is a move to organize a supporting group in Tokyo, too. Although Sohyo approved a motion to support the fighting workers of Motoyama Mfg. Co. as well as those of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Hiroshima factory at its February 1973 convention to plan the spring labor offensive, they are actually annoyed at the radicalism of the workers. They are only talking about support instead of doing something for them.

Repression like that against the Motoyama workers is also occurring against other unions such as Kobunsha Publishers, the Haneda Office of the Japan Postal Workers' Union, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and so on. This means that the emphasis of suppression against the New Left is moving from the students' movement to the



labor movement. We cannot let it pass. That is, labor movement is becoming the front for confrontation with capital at the moment.

AMPO: If workers stand up consciously against imperialism, capitalists always repress them with violence. This, I think, is a typical phenomenon deeply embedded in the labor-management relationship in Japan and its social situation which appears outwardly as one of peace and quiet....

Higuchi: Exactly.

MECHANISM OF LABOR CONTROL

AMPO: I would like to ask how the workers are controlled?

Higuchi: While I have talked about the repression of radical workers waging their anti-imperialist or anti-management fight, this is a rather new type of suppression which will become increasingly characteristic in a couple of years. During the '60s control of the working place was reinforced in preparations for oppression in the '70s. In other words, control was based on the ideology that "the working place (company) is the state" in which all political activities are prohibited. The most typical cases were Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nissan Motors, both of which own their fascist private

militias. When we organized a joint struggle with seasonal workers in Nissan Motors and the struggle spread to other works of the company like the Kawaguchi Plant in Tokyo, the company recruited young, strong workers and administrative staff and provided them with helmets and bamboo sticks to attack workers' groups in the middle of leafleting.

The workers at the Nagasaki Shipyard of MHI were also attacked by the same kind of private militia recruited by capitalists. A sympathetic worker in the plant told me that the company ordered the attackers to beat the workers as hard as they could except on their heads. This is what is actually being done at world-famous Nissan or MHI. Now violence against workers is a built-in system in Japanese industry. In an ordinary day's work, employees enrolled as henchmen of the capitalists work hard at the movement to raise productivity, happily believing that to improve the productivity of their factory will inevitably bring improvement in their own lives.

PRODUCTIVITY DRIVE

Although the idea of the Productivity Drive was imported from the U.S. in 1955, it struck root in Japan and has by now become a perfectly Japanese movement - one which has been

exported even to Asian countries since 1960. Almost six million workers, or 60 per cent of the organized workers in Japan are involved in the drive. Its aim is to completely "rationalize" all systems of the factory to facilitate automation at every stage of the labor process.

Capitalists and the government claim that working hours have been shortened. But the reduction of working hours is coupled with the "rationalization" in the way the hours are counted. Nowadays, the arrival time-counting system has been changed at most of the plants. While formerly the time recorder was set at the gate, it has been moved to the entrance to the workshop. Before entering the workshop, they have to change their clothes, finish collective radio gymnastic exercises and do a lot of other things. During work, the intensity of labor has been unbearably increased. And when they finish their work, the same way of counting hours is applied. They are bound to the workshop until the minute the rated labor hours are over. The time to change clothes, wash themselves etc. is not counted as working hours. In this way, workers actually have to work almost the same long hours as ever. Generally, their working hours have been shortened no more than 20 to 30 hours per year, even when two holidays a week are given.

SUBCONTRACT WORK SYSTEM

The introduction of great numbers of subcontract workers is another vicious aspect of the "rationalization" drive. All major factories hire these subcontract workers or "outside workers". They are employed as a matter of formality by small firms which have sub-contracts with the major factories. The parent company employs only enough regular workers to accomplish the key production process or clean processes, and it uses outside workers (or temporary workers) for the rest of the labor process. The outside workers in other cases work side by side with regular workers, doing the same job, but they are paid far less and their status is unbelievably precarious. This type of labor system has increased at an extraordinarily rapid rate.

AMPO: Can you give some concrete, representative examples?

Higuchi: In the case of Nippon Steel Corporation, the world's largest steel maker, even ahead of U.S. Steel, there are almost 80,000 subcontract workers - the same number as regular employees. In its most advanced and powerful works at Kimitsu, the subcontract workers account for 77 per cent of the working force there. Three years ago, the proportion was half and half. In the completely computer-controlled system, regular workers are working in comfortable operating rooms perfectly sound-, humidity-, and heat-proof, while subcontract workers engage in handling hot slabs and billets in worse conditions.

These subcontract workers are deprived of almost all their rights as workers. We sometimes hear reports that there have been no accidents in NSC works during a special campaign such as "eliminating labor accidents month," but the reports never include accidents involving outside workers, which kill one hundred workers every year.


The more rationalization is strengthened, the more often labor accidents occur. At the Miike Coal mines, nearly 500 coal miners died and an equal number became disabled in an instant because of poisoning with carbon monoxide. Generally speaking, among ten victims of labor accidents, six to seven are outside workers.

And yet whenever a worker stands up to resist, what is waiting for him is an established structure of violence.

The Capitalists' violence, however, is not limited within their factories. They also use violence toward people living in the neighbourhood by pollution and contamination of their environment which threatens their lives.

CORPORATIONS WANT TO CO-OPT LOCAL COMMUNITIES

At the same time, we have to pay attention to the recent moves on the side of the capitalists. They have been forced to change their policy because of the mounting anti-pollution move-



ments everywhere. Recently, the Industrial Planning Council, a capitalist think-tank composed of leading businessmen from MHI, Tokyo Electric Power Co. etc. etc., proposed that such resources consuming industries as steel, oil refining and petrochemicals should be removed from the already packed areas - the bays of Tokyo, Osaka and Ise. On the one hand, this reflects a crisis consciousness by the capitalists. But on the other hand, it is intended as a preemptive attack on the people. These capitalists are the New Right in the ruling class, and their thinking is more "advanced" than the coopted left - the JCP. They are trying to organize the whole locality on their side. By eliminating unwanted industries they want to foster the ideology that the business enterprises and local people share the same fate. This is the extension of their intra-enterprise line of getting workers to feel as though their fate were one with the fate of capital. This line of unifying local citizens, workers and capitalists in the interest of enterprises was clearly manifested by the Japan Productivity Center early this year.

This policy has been put into practice already by Idemitsu Kosan and Matsushita Electric Co. They set up gymnasiums, libraries and other public facilities open to local people; they planted turf around their plants to please the neighboring inhabitants. These steps are coupled with efforts

to win over the local people ideologically to their side. It is therefore our urgent task to learn how to counter this cooptation of the people. The JCP type politics has been completely forestalled by this kind of cooptation. As a pollution countermeasure, JCP proposes increases in the import of low sulphur oil. But capitalists on their initiative will do this when the local, anti-pollution movement gets strong enough. The real issue is more profound. Workers are challenged by the alternative - whether they are going to defend capitalist Japan or to fight it.

AMPO: In terms of the capitalists' change of policy, I understand that ideological control over the workers is also intensifying. Will you talk about this kind of control and also the attitudes of the unions toward this?

Higuchi: The policy of high economic growth, that is, putting exclusive emphasis on economic growth, has been most important for the Japanese bourgeoisie and its political representative, the LDP. During the '60s, their ideology advocated that men should love their own wives, their industry and their state. But, the ideology has been transformed twice since the late '60s. In the period of the Sato Cabinet, the main note became more outspokenly imperialistic. Nevertheless, the present Tanaka Cabinet is beginning once more to emphasize the "welfare state" that was favored during the Ikeda Cabinet in the early '60s. The idea of the welfare state itself is in reality fraudulent, although all the reformist parties support it and are committed to the idea.

While the unity of labor, management and local residents and the idea of the welfare state are spread throughout country, such things as pollution producing industries are to be removed to other Asian countries. This is the new stage of the ideological offensive, and it is in the background when people are encouraged to take an interest in close relationships between Japan and Asia.

ROLE OF RIGHTWING UNIONS

How do most trade unions cope with the "welfare state" idea? Well,

the first we have to pick upon is Domei (Japan Confederation of Labor) whose membership of around 2.5 million represents the largest trade union in Japan's private sector. Domei closely collaborates with the capitalists. The organization is so faithful to the bourgeoisie that it was the first to propose the importance of "international solidarity" and begin to work for its realization. Domei clears the way for the capitalists' economic expansion overseas. In 1965, as soon as the LDP government signed the Japan-Korea Normalization Pact, Domei promptly sent its team to South Korea and established a close relationship with the South Korean General Confederation of Labor.

When the reversion of Okinawa became an issue it planned to put the labor unions in Okinawa under its domination through the ICFTU. You might say that Domei is no less than an organization of labor aristocrats and labor bureaucrats, representing the world's second largest imperialist power.

In 1970, Domei initiated the organization of the Asian Electric Workers' Union, the first international industrial union in Asia to include South Korea and Taiwan. Needless to say, electric power is the key industry for capitalists to build up new industries, and Domei, cooperating with Japanese capitalists, tried to secure Asian workers in this key branch under Japan's influence.

Another force is Sohyo, which used to be one of the largest, most powerful forces in the Japanese labor movement. But during the process of high economic growth in the '60s, the organization was pushed more and more to the right and lost its membership to Domei. Frankly, it has become a kind of group that identifies itself with leftists in its slogans but is against them in its actions. In other words, Sohyo has failed to fight not only against the Productivity Drive, and rationalization but also in political struggles as well. Although in size the organization is still the biggest, Sohyo is now a new in-between group in the Japanese labor movement. That is, it is taking a middle position between Domei on the right and Hansen on the left, and it is criticized by both sides.

AMPO: And Tekkororen (the Japan Federation of Iron and Steel Workers' Union) is still a member of Sohyo, though it has been transformed into an outright company union suppressing workers and promoting an almost Domei-type political line. What is the actual state of affairs at the bottom?

Higuchi: Let's talk about Tekkororen. During the process of high economic growth in the '60s, the iron and steel industry in Japan was out-distancing the U.S., an achievement based on an increasing number of subcontract workers, as we have seen in the case of Kimitsu Mill, and a strengthened lower management control system. This system is a modification of the American foreman system, in which the foreman is equivalent to a noncommissioned officer in the old army, with from twenty to thirty men under him. He knows almost everything about them, from their ideology to their family life. It is the foreman who makes up the main element of the trade union. Tekkororen represents this sector of workers and although its chairman, Miyata, comes from the working class, he is now a representative of aggregate capital as well as of the foreman class. The main function of the union at the workplace is to police itself. If workers organize a radical group like Hansen or a trade union in the subcontracting companies, union executives hurriedly go to persuade them to stop, or they cut them off immediately, carrying out their role as capitalist henchmen. This is the actual role the unions play in the big corporations.

AMPO: Don't you think the present union executives will be soon defeated in an election?

Higuchi: No, they won't be defeated for a while.

AMPO: Does this mean there is a mechanism to keep them in their position?

TOWARD A BREAKTHROUGH

Higuchi: Yes, the mechanism to keep watch on every worker and prevent them from rising up exercises its power fully over the workers. Besides, from the workers' side, they have been provided with benefits one after another, such as shorter working hours or higher wages.

Under social conditions of rapid development, workers themselves had the illusion that their annual income would double in a few years. From 1966 to around 1970, there was mounting aspiration within the working class for a better society for themselves. But workers are, of course, workers. They saw how cruelly their colleagues were killed in labor accidents. They saw capitalists paying no attention at all. They pay only ¥300,000 - ¥500,000 in compensation when an outside worker is killed in an accident in the plant. Workers have watched the inhumanity of capitalists and at the same time learned from their own experience how the computer-controlled system alienates them. No matter how much their wages are raised, their own life never gets better, as inflation spirals with amazing speed and the environment becomes more and more polluted.


Consequently, workers were becoming aware of the real situation. And then around the end of last year, various types of resistance emerged more explicitly. One executive in charge of labor relations at Nihon Kokan Kaisha (NKK) expresses this sentiment. He said, "A very dangerous state is coming about, filling workplaces with a threatening atmosphere!"

There is no particular demand to inspire those workers but dissatisfaction with everything around. However, at the moment, the feelings of discontent or awakening are being absorbed by JCP or JSP. When the Democratic Socialist Party, another spokesman for capital, was defeated in the last election, many workers burst into cheers. They understood that their phony union supports DSP, and as long as neither LDP nor DSP can be trusted at all, JSP or JCP might be a little bit better.

Our urgent task, therefore, is to overcome the limitation of these two parties. JCP used to be a revolutionary party, but it is not one now, as is often pointed out. Only experience in struggle waged by the mass of workers enables people to overcome the level of JCP, as the struggles of the Sarizuka peasants or and that of the Minamata victims have proved. In both struggles, neither the JCP or JSP is trusted at all. When peasants and fishermen have already gone beyond these parties in their mass

struggles, why is it only workers who are left behind?

In my opinion, the ruling system is very different for farmers, fishermen and workers. In rural communities, capitalism's material rule has been undermined in the process of destruction of family life in farm villages and fishing villages. And people's anger has been inflamed against capital. On the other hand, in industry, the sacred zone of capitalism, everything - materials, wisdom, knowledge, and of course violence - is mobilized to defend it. That is, workers are surrounded by the thickest wall of control.



But once the contradiction reaches a certain point, the workers' energy will certainly gush up. The struggles of the Shinko Machinery (a subsidiary of Kobe Steel Mfg.) and Motoyama Mfg. Co. workers predict it. No matter how few they are at present among the 30 million workers, their struggle can spread all over. Now is the time when a new move is going to start.

RAILWAY WORKERS' STRIKE AND APRIL RIOTS

AMPO: The National Railways workers in this year's united spring struggle for higher wages carried out a powerful nationwide strike halting the nation's

traffic almost completely. That seems to be an entirely new development. Also, the go-slow tactic called the "law-abiding tactic" preceding the strike provoked a violent uprising of commuters and the masses of people who were fed up with their commuting troubles and difficulties. The uprisings were directed after all against the striking workers, and Sohyo and the National Railways Workers' Union announced that ultrarightists and fascists were agitating the masses. How do you comment on these development?

Higuchi: First on the uprising. The first violent uprising occurred at Ageo station in Saitama Prefecture on the Takasaki line carrying a large number of commuters. Frustrated by the confusion in the train service caused by the go-slow tactic, hundreds of people, mostly passengers, suddenly began to destroy trains and station equipment. And in April, the same type of uprisings occurred at 38 stations in Tokyo. It can't be denied that those uprisings were partly provoked by organized rightists, but at the same time you must understand two basic elements in the series of riots: first, the characteristics of the Japanese National Railways' workers struggle, and second, the reason why some of the National Railways workers themselves participated in those riots in the guise of commuters.

Traditionally National Railways workers have spearheaded almost every struggle fought by the Japanese labor movement. They were the locomotive of the labor movement. But in the late '60s, the drive to raise productivity and rationalization were brought into the National Railways, too. Because rationalization in this area was started much later than in other industries, it has been carried out very aggressively and speedily since the spring of 1970. The drive to raise productivity in National Railways, has been particularly severe, with any worker who refused to join it being discriminated against and even advised to resign. Under these conditions, National Railways workers regained the strength to take the lead in the struggle, and this is why 10 per cent of the young union members support the New Left.

Not only that, but they themselves have grown enough to lead a mass strug-

gle. Because of modernization and rationalization in the National Railways, around 50,000 workers were to be dismissed. The train crews were cut from two men to one and train operations are completely computer-controlled by such means as the Automatic Train Stop.

It might seem that the automation system makes for accurate and safe railway operation but that was not the case at all. Besides, the job becomes a much greater strain on the nerves for the workers.

Besides, with the overloaded train schedule, workers must spend three nights a week away from home. They sleep in a poorly equipped room in the station. They cannot sleep peacefully there as crews of different shifts are constantly coming and going. They set the timer in an air-pillow for 6:00 a.m. to blow up and wake them lest they should oversleep.

Did they get a wage raise then? No. At the end of 1972, the wage of a 49-year-old motorman who had worked for the National Railways for more than 30 years was only ¥82,000 per month; another 39-year-old motorman was paid 70,000 yen. It is impossible for them to send their children to high school or college.

Thus, their struggles are against both hard living and hard work. That's why middle-aged workers carried out the struggle most resolutely. No matter how severely capital repressed them or the mass media denounced them, they wouldn't stop fighting.

"Go-slow tactics" were devised by the workers themselves since they have been deprived of the right to strike. In a sense, this is more difficult than a strike, because it depends on each worker being determined to fight alone in his train. Both the Go-slow struggles and the series of riots at stations attacked the weakest point of Japanese capitalism. For the first time, the world famous Japanese Railways were completely paralyzed.

This is one aspect of the characteristics of railway workers in Japan. But there is another point in terms of workers' ideology or temperament. The struggle of the National Railway workers has a definite weakness

their attitude toward sub-contract workers. The National Railways also employs lots of outside workers, and they do all the shit work such as cleaning the super-express trains. But the regular workers' union doesn't even know how many outside workers are hired. In other words, the workers themselves are so split from each other that the unions can't understand the real situation of the outside workers. Even young, active workers who fight vehemently against the authorities play their role as supervisors over subcontract workers at their jobsite. The riot against the strikers also must be seen in this context. The strikers fought militantly but they could not relate to the frustrated masses of people outside just as they could not in their relationship with subcontract, underprivileged workers employed by the National Railways. We have to find a way to break through this intricate structure of discrimination and division in our class - the division between the regular workers and subcontract workers as well as between organized workers and the angry masses. This is the most important task for us to accomplish if we are aiming for an anti-imperialist labor movement based on firm class consciousness.


Then, what do the uprisings mean? It was a dim but very intense consciousness of crisis that exploded in the riots during the spring labor offensive. The incident, I would say, is very important for it shows a historical turning point in the Japanese mass movement. But at the same time, we also have to watch a tendency to fascism carefully, as a grave warning to us. Indeed, the class struggle in Japan is coming to an important point. Certain-

ly, the mass movement has already advanced to the point of breaking the stable framework of capitalism, but in which direction it is heading remains to be seen. We will have to concentrate our efforts to fight the trend to fascism.

JAPANESE WORKING CLASS AND ASIA

AMPO: You have made the structure of control over workers very clear: basically it is based on violence and control has concentrated on dividing the working class. Ideologically it obstructs worker solidarity by granting some privileges to regular workers and cutting them off from outside workers. And now the ruling class of Japan is going to expand this structure of control to other countries. The Tanaka cabinet is trying to create and intensify the illusion of realizing the welfare state, while it tries simultaneously to transfer the current contradictions within the country to areas outside of Japan. In the past, domestic contradictions were resolved by waging war and mobilizing people, but today capitalists are doing the same thing in the form of an economic invasion. Japanese economic advance overseas has been carried through aggressively everywhere. For instance, almost all big corporations are pushing into South Vietnam, and although investment in Taiwan and South Korea dropped after the restoration of relations with China, they have again begun to increase rapidly. What do you think of workers' awareness of this dangerous trend?

Higuchi: Frankly speaking, the awareness is still very weak. For we are



faced with the challenge of learning to fight in solidarity with outside workers in our own works as well as with people in Asia. Unless we establish such solidarity, our struggle will be converted into a chauvinistic labor movement, no matter how bravely we carry on the struggle at home.

We must begin fighting back as soon as possible. Now that middle-sized companies are also very actively moving into Asia, we run into challenges in our daily life. For instance, the union of Origin Electric, whose membership is almost 100, won the right to strike against pollution by their own company and crushed its plan to build a new plant in Fukushima Pref. according to the government's remodelling plan. Faced with the union's opposition, the president of the company flew to Taiwan in February this year and made a contract to construct the new factory there. Another case is that of Mitsumi Electric, which makes parts. It has employed Taiwanese for years at Taiwan Mitsumi, where they work much harder than Japanese, are more productive, and get one third as much pay. The company is going to build a second Taiwan Mitsumi in the near future.

(continued from p.67)

(9) In the June and July issues, he wrote a series on the "History of the Asian Students' Movement."

(10) Obi Toshio, "Boycott will spread" (Mada hirogaru Nikka Haiseki Undo), Choryu, Apr., 1973.

(11) "Holding the aces," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), December 30, 1973. The facts referred to in this section are mostly taken from this anonymously written article. There is reason to suspect that the article was itself politically motivated, i.e., designed to give a final push to the Japanese group to come to terms. For example, Stewart Dalby, Hongkong correspondent of FEER, wrote in the same issue: "Holding the Aces" is written by a correspondent who undoubtedly reflects both official and to some extent popular feeling in Bangkok."

(12) *ibid.* FEER, Dec. 30, 1972

(13) John G. Roberts, "The American

AMPO: Recently I happened to read in the weekly "Ekonomisto" the president of Mitsumi boasting that he could recoup the whole of the invested capital in Taiwan within three years.

Higuchi: Most of the heavy, chemical industries are going out of Japan, especially the polluting industries. For us, Japanese workers, it isn't true that we shouldn't demand higher wages, for we are compelled to live a very hard life everyday. But at the same time, we have to clarify our position on the principle of equal pay for equal work for all workers, including outside workers, Asian workers who come to Japan to work in the name of technical training, and all workers in Asia employed by Japanese corporations. Traditionally in the Japanese labor movement, the starting point for the fight for equal pay for equal work was the struggle to end discrimination against Korean and Chinese workers as well as sexual discrimination. We must go back to the starting point and regain the meaning of class struggle. It is easy to say, but it's not so easy to realize. We have to start with ideological struggle and make the facts public. That seems the best start we can make at the moment.■

Zaibatsu" FEER, No.30, July 24, 1971 (Quoted from "Japanese Imperialism Today").

(14) "Oil: Thai counterpoints," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1972.

(15) Jon Marshall, "Piping Oil Through Thailand," Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram, Sept.-Oct., 1972

(16) *ibid.*, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1972

(17) Nan Yang Shin Poh, Weekly, Aug. 20, 1972. ■

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IHI - A Fake "Kingdom of Shipbuilding"

by Murata Goro

Japan's shipbuilding industry symbolizes modern Japanese capitalism in many different ways. One of its characteristic features is, of course, its fast growth rate. Japanese shipbuilders outstripped their British competitors back in 1956 when they did 26% of the world's annual naval construction, and at its peak their share in the world market reached as much as 5%. Even though the recent international monetary crises slowed their business somewhat, in 1972 they still launched a total of 1.28 million GT of new vessels, or 48% of the world's total. A "loss" of some 200 billion yen, reportedly suffered as a result of the change in the exchange rate several months ago, has already been cleared, thanks to an emergency tax reduction measure devised by the government, to a rush for mammoth tankers in the wake of the "energy crisis" and to an intensive drive for "rationalization" on their own part. Thus, the glorious Japanese "kingdom of shipbuilding" seems to be on the rise: in the early part of 1973 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry (IHI) each finished constructing 1 million ton capacity shipbuilding docks; by 1975 the Japanese shipbuilders are expected to have 65% of the world's shipbuilding capacity.

Another important aspect of the shipbuilding industry, indeed a serious concern for the revolutionary left, is a fact that the industry's labor union leaders, who are on good terms with the management as in many other major Japanese industries, unabashedly and

quite chauvinistically sing in praise of the "kingdom." A striking example of this is the discussion at the international conference of the rather reactionary International Metalworkers' Federation's (IMF) Shipbuilding Section held in Tokyo in March, 1973. The representatives of the Western shipbuilding workers jointly directed their spearhead against the dumping policy of the "Japanese kingdom of shipbuilding" which, as they rightly claimed, takes advantage of the government's protection and exploits the Japanese workers. At the same time, the participants from abroad denounced the Japanese delegation representing 210,000-member Zenzosen Juki Roren (National Federation of Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Workers' Unions)--a close adherent of rightist-reactionary Domei (National Confederation of Laborers)--for not simply allowing but actually supporting the aggressive behavior of the shipbuilders, which deprives their fellow workers in the West of their jobs. In reply, Japanese delegation rejected the criticism as groundless and maintained that the high growth of the Japanese shipbuilding is an outcome of intensive "technical innovation" and "structural reform" in the industry.

If the attitude of the leaders of Zenzosen Juki Roren, completely without any sense of solidarity with fellow workers abroad, is shared by the mass of Japanese shipbuilding workers, it can be of no small concern. This is especially so because the "structural reform of the industry," part and parcel of the latest grandiose st-

ategy of Japanese capitalism as a whole, is aimed at "reforming" the shipbuilders' "kingdom" into a more mature "empire." With an enormous sum of capital funds accumulated as a result of export drive, the shipbuilding industry, like many other branches of "Japan Incorporated," is feverishly invading the third world of Asia, Latin America and the Middle East to use "cheap and abundant" labor there for ship repairing and building operations. While relocating more "labor intensive" sections of their business into the third world, the shipbuilders are keen on renovating their domestic operations into less "labor intensive" and more "knowledge intensive" varieties that would mainly turn out expensive products such as extra-mammoth vessels, liquid natural gas carriers and nuclear powered vessels.

These outstanding characteristics of the shipbuilding industry suggest that it is worth our effort to examine how the "kingdom" capable of commanding full-fledged loyalty from the union leaders, has been constructed and what are the real conditions of the shipbuilding workers. We shall take Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry (IHI) as a concrete example, because it seems to cut a striking figure among other Japanese shipbuilders.

"DOKO-ISM" & "SHINTO-ISM"--- BACKBONES OF RATIONALIZATION FOR JAPANESE SHIPBUILDING


IHI, capitalized at 39 billion yen, is one of the best known shipbuilders and heavy machinery manufacturers in Japan. It has 14 factories and several research institutes in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Aioi and Kure employing a total of 38,000 people. Although it has a hand in a variety of products including mammoth tankers, ore carriers, marine engines, steel and petrochemical plants, nuclear powered vessels and Self Defense Forces' Phantom jets' engines, it has been traditionally concentrated in the business of shipbuilding. Controlling as much as 20% of the annual Japanese naval construction, IHI shares with Mitsubishi Heavy

Industry (MHI) the foremost position among shipbuilders in Japan, and in the world.

IHI represents the "kingdom of shipbuilding" not only in terms of its absolute size, but also in terms of its growth rate, since December, 1960, when Ishikawajima Heavy Industry and Harima Shipbuilding, respectively 7th or 9th largest in the industry at that time, merged with each other to form IHI. In a country where economic history is synonymous with that of the zaibatsu groups, it is next to impossible for non-zaibatsu company to dominate a leading industry of the economy, unless it is beloved by a goddess of fortune or something extraordinary.

A secret of IHI's "success" has been an excessive dumping policy, often known as "IHI's way of business." This in turn has been made possible by a combination of drastic rationalization in managerial administration--known as "Doko-ism" à la Doko Toshio, former president and board chairman of IHI and former president and present board chairman of Toshiba Electric--and drastic rationalization in shipbuilding processes and techniques--known as "Shinto-ism" à la Shinto Hisashi, president of IHI since 1972.

As Shinto recently declared, what is called "Doko-ism" is "something essential for IHI." But it is more than that. It has been a "theoretical" backbone of Japanese capitalists' rationalization drive especially since 1965 when Doko, after having paved the way for expansion of IHI, became president of then half-bankrupt Toshiba Electric. Doko not only brought Toshiba back into life in a few years, but he made it one of Japan's largest manufacturers of electric appliances. To quote some typical phrases from his Keiei no Kodoshishin (Action Guide for Management) and other statements: "Everybody should be assigned to a job that can be rewarded only by a better and bigger job"; "Leave the personnel quota always unfulfilled because that's the way



to bring up new talents; "Since men's abilities are practically equal, what makes one man different from another is his determined effort"; and "I was the first to use the idea of a 'systems industry' in Japan." As these words suggest, "Doko-ism" as such is meant to pursue efficiency and effectiveness to the utmost extent (and to use human ability only for the sake of the prosperity of a private corporation). It is by no means a mythical "ism" but the pure rigor of a capitalist in pursuit of profit.

Doko, once an engineer who specialized in designing turbine engines for the Imperial Navy's destroyers, made a rather "happy" start as president of Ishikawajima Heavy Industry. He was assigned to save the company from the threat of the postwar depression but it was only 10 days after he became president that the Korean War broke out. Thus his assignment would have been easy as a result of the Korean War "boom," coupled with expanding governmental subsidies, a rush for tankers due to the worldwide shift from coal to oil as the chief energy source and the rise of petrochemical industry, and the further increased demand for

tankers brought about by the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956.

But what made Doko and Ishikawajima different from other shipbuilders was his determined effort to pursue efficiency to its utmost extent. Immediately after he became president, he fired with his right hand some of the good-for-nothing executives, and with his left hand a large number of union activists by riding the tide of the nationwide "red purge." He was now ready to go ahead with the aggressive business practices which were later called as "IHI's way of business."

Taguchi Renzo, former president and now board chairman of IHI, recalls how Doko and himself, then vice-president under Doko, sold ships in those days: "Suppose that you want to export a ship. If you can't take an order at an international price, then you can't compete in the market. What we did to acquire international competitive power was to take orders at the international price, and scrape them together 30% or 50% in excess of our productive capacity, by any means. Then we did our best to deliver them in due time and with-

in the limit of that price by renewing the facilities and improving the production control method. That was one of the most important incentives of export."

(It is a common practice among Japanese shipbuilders, unlike their Western competitors, to exclude a "slide scale" clause from contracts when accepting orders for new ships and to deliver them at predetermined prices. The practice has had a great appeal to Onasis and other Greek shipowners who place orders on a more or less speculative basis. And it is Doko and Ishikawajima that gave an impetus to such a practice.) In three years of his presidency, Doko made deficit-burdened Ishikawajima into a profitable company capable of paying a dividend of 10%.

The prosperity was shortlived, however, as the reopening of the Suez Canal in April, 1957 reduced ocean freight and calmed down the export boom. The shipbuilders found their means of survival in further rationalization and in diversification of their operations. They started producing machinery and engines for use on land so as to reduce the risk involved in shipbuilding with its fluctuating demand. It was under these circumstances that Ishikawajima and Harima merged with each other. Before the merger, Ishikawajima had relied on production of engines, boilers and manufacturing machines for use on land for 70% of its sales, while Harima, with relatively advanced facilities for production of large vessels, had between 70% and 80% of its sales in shipbuilding. Thus, the merger was ideal for fulfilling the two vital requirements of the day: rationalization and diversification of operations.

With this merger, newly born IHI was ready to strive for and lead the 1960s' period of "busyness without profit," when the Japanese shipbuilders made expansion of operations their first priority. To do this, they placed cost reduction before the safety of workers, gathered enormous amounts of orders without paying attention to pro-

fitability, and competed with each other in the expansion of scale. IHI was always ahead of the other competitors. Immediately after the merger, it devised a "ten-year plan" to increase its sales up to 1 billion dollars, or by 5.3 times, in a decade. As a result of intensive rationalization, the ten-year plan was achieved by the end of 1968. As it absorbed Ishikawajima-Shibaura Precision Machine (in 1962), Nagoya Heavy Industry (in 1964), Shibaura Kyodo Industry (in 1967) and Kure Shipbuilding, a former naval dockyard that produced the "Yamato" (in 1968) one after another, IHI outstripped Hitachi Shipbuilding and Mitsui Shipbuilding and others to become what it is today.

Shinto Hisashi, now president of the company, was elected from the Harima side at the time of the merger to an executive position in charge of this all-out offensive. A Tokyo University Ph.D. in Engineering who had earned his degree in 1958 with his thesis, On Production Control in Construction of New Vessels, Shinto is a qualified expert at production control and rationalization. He is responsible for many rationalization ideas, including "Shinto-senkei," "standardized vessels," and prior fitting-out, all of which are now commonly used by shipbuilders throughout the world.

"Shinto-senkei," a synonym for a vessel with an economized shape, was invented in 1961. Short, fat and deep in draught, a vessel of this type, as its name suggests, can carry a far greater load than a more conventional one constructed with the use of the same amount of steel.

Invention of "standardized vessels," built in accordance with standardized designs and specifications devised by a shipbuilder, represented a real "revolution" for the shipbuilding industry, which had previously treated large ships as something like dishes a la carte to be built on special orders of each shipowner. Not surprisingly, the idea of such

ships was devised on the eve of WWII by Shinto and other talented shipbuilding engineers of the country. But it was Shinto who developed the idea further and made it possible to build "standardized vessels" continuously and en masse through highly standardized and rationalized production processes. The best known postwar "standardized vessel" is a 14,8000 DWT "Freedom" type multi-purpose cargo ship launched by IHI in 1964, when the "Liberty" type cargo vessels, mass-produced in the U.S. during WWII, began to be scrapped. From the time it launched the first "Freedom" ship until the end of 1972, IHI had sold 80 of them. The scene of construction for these vessels is not so different from an automobile assembly line: two of the vessels are built simultaneously on the same shipway in about 3 weeks each; they leave the shipway quietly without a launching ceremony; and in a period less than 1 month they are outfitted and ready for delivery. After having almost replaced "Liberty" by "Freedom," in 1970 IHI started to undertake continuous production of a new and slightly larger version called "Fortune."

More recent innovations introduced at IHI, a company with a "progressive" spirit inspired by Shinto, include: building of highly automated vessels and nuclear powered vessels; mechanization and automation in the manufacturing processes with the help of computers and numerical controlling systems; and utilization of automatic welding equipment in the erection procedure.

Prior fitting-out, another invention of Dr. Shipbuilding, is a method meant to reduce the time required for shipbuilding. Each block of a ship's body is furnished with all necessary fittings such as turbines, power generators, pumps, wireless apparatus and illuminating devices during its construction.

It is undeniable that the "technical innovations" and "structural reforms" at IHI have proved quite effective, as the following set of indices signify clearly. In the eight year period from 1960 through 1968, during which IHI's production more than quintupled, the company kept faith with "Doko-ism's" teaching on "unfulfilled personnel quota" and merely doubled its employees. While it cost IHI U\$125 to build one ton of tanker in 1956, the figure was halved to U\$67 by 1969. As for the average time required for building one gross ton of a new vessel, it drastically decreased from 42.7 hours in 1961 to 18.3 hours in 1969.

However, its remarkable growth, notwithstanding, "World Famous IHI" has revealed that it has been "structurally reformed" for the worse, to build dozens of vessels that cannot navigate the ocean.

"KINGDOM OF SHIPBUILDING" BUILT ON SLAVE LABOR

IHI made news headlines in January, 1969, when the Boribaa-maru (54,271 DWT), a new and powerful ore carrier built by IHI and owned by Japan Line, broke in two while she was at sea. Although the cause of the shipwreck is still under investigation in the Marine Disasters Inquiry Court, the bereaved families of the crew and the Seamen's Union have been attributing the disaster to careless manufacture on the part of IHI, which traditionally sacrifices quality for quantity. Judging from the fact that the ship was built in 1964, amidst the period of "busyness without profit," such an assertion does not seem to be unfounded.

Confronting the accusation, IHI has admitted that some materials it used for minor sections of the ship were not up to standard, but it continues to blame the shipwreck on "mis-operation" on the part of the crew.

On October 18, 1972, another "fact" came to light which substantiates the assertion of the



surviving families of the Boribaa-maru's crew. On that day, executives of IHI and of Kawasaki Heavy Industry were summoned by the Ministry of Transportation to be informed and strictly warned that 3 large ships built by each company had been found to have defects due to careless manufacture, and that a total of 49 more ships, 48 of which were products of IHI, were under similar suspicion. The event showed the "kingdom of shipbuilding" as such as a perfect fake, as the press reported sensationally on the following day under headlines like "Japan, a country of shipbuilding sustained by a raised bottom" (Mainichi) and "The unheard-of scandal disgraces the nation's reputation" (Nihon Keizai).

Each of the 6 ships reported to have been "carelessly" manufactured had abnormal cracks in the weld-joint surfaces, where its component blocks come into contact with each other. The welding flux that should have been applied in multiple layers to fill in the gap between two adjacent blocks was applied only on the surface, on top of metal bars inserted into the gap quite "intentionally," but by no means "carelessly." According to the Ministry, the ships of defective quality were built with the help of sub-contractors and sub-sub-contractors, in the period of "busyness without profit" when demands were sky-high.

Taguchi, then president and currently board chairman of IHI, used this last fact as an excuse when he met the press and remarked: "It's a shame and there's no room for an excuse. But I would like to remind you that the defects were not found in the major skeletons of the ships, and I don't think they would lead to a safety problem while they are at sea.... It may sound a bit queer, but I felt relieved to hear that these defects were not made by our own staff but by the shitauxe-koh (outside workers or piece workers)..." (Mainichi) Taguchi's arrogant attempt to confine the matter to its narrowest scope and to shuffle the responsibility onto the "outside workers" was

enough to provoke indignation from the bourgeois press. Mainichi commented: "How can he say this, if he knows that the glory of the Japanese shipbuilding industry, which now shares approximately half of the world's total naval construction, was built on the labors of these innumerable 'outside workers'?" Truly, the existence of these workers was the most vital condition for the rise of the "kingdom of shipbuilding."

There are today more than 3,000 such "outside workers" (also known as "lent-out workers" or "standing cooperating workers") working within the compounds of IHI's factories. At one peak time, the number climbed up to 10,000. As their various titles suggest, they are not employed directly by IHI, but are "lent out" to IHI by their employers ("sub-contractors"), whose business it is to provide IHI with the necessary extra workers. Although the exact number of IHI's "sub-contractors" is unknown to us, there are about 50 of them supplying "outside workers" to IHI's Tokyo No.2 Factory alone. Many of these "sub-contracting" companies are capitalized at 500,000 or 1 million yen each and run by IHI's high ranking staff. It is not rare that a "subcontractor's" facilities consist simply of a telephone and a few desks installed in a small office "rented" inside IHI's factory. They can be built and dissolved at any time, at the convenience of IHI.

Once "lent out" to IHI by their employers, the "outside workers" are enrolled into teams of regular employees, where they are supervised by regular employees and supplement their work. Moreover, they are usually assigned to the kind of jobs that regular employees dislike ---outdoor jobs under a blazing sun or a chilly wind, filthy or dangerous jobs, night shifts, etc.. Much of the work the "outside workers" do is left unrationalized even by IHI's intensive drive for rationalization-automation-mechanization, and therefore it involves lots of manual operations. Even though they do not require much sophisticated skill or train-

ing, these jobs are becoming more and more important as "technical innovation" gets further along.

There are, of course, some "outside workers" with special skills who are better paid than regular employees. But most are extremely underpaid. IHI hires them simply because it is less expensive to let them do the jobs that are unpopular among its own employees. In addition, their direct employers, the "sub-contractors," rake off about 30% of the "piece wages" paid by IHI in return for their own labors.

Subject to being laid-off and fired at any time, the "outside workers" are nothing but a group of reserve workers, or a bundle of safety valves. In the wake of the dollar crisis in 1971, for example, many of them were fired at the imperative request of IHI. In such an event, IHI can stand aloof from legal responsibility for forcible firing. And their direct employers are utterly incapable of carrying out the legal responsibility they are supposed to owe their own employees.

Shipbuilding involves dangerous and hard work, and more than half of newly employed workers quit their jobs in 5 or 6 years. Even IHI's own investigation reveals that 60% of its employees are complaining of cramps in their backs. Many are suffering from other typical occupational disease such as eye diseases caused by sparks and dust, and hearing defects. Also, an appreciable number of them in special job sites fall victims to silicosis.

But what is most serious is that shipbuilding workers are threatened by accidents which often claim their lives. Of an average of 100 workers killed on the job each year in the Japanese shipbuilding industry as a whole, the absolute

majority are "outside workers"--- the most oppressed and exploited in the industry. A glance at the table below, giving the number of workers killed at IHI each year during the period of "busyness without profit," will serve as an eloquent proof of discrimination against the "outside workers".

Aside from fatal accidents, many minor, but serious, accidents take place from day to day. If an "outside worker" happens to be injured in any such daily accident, IHI does not recognize the injury as one incurred in the line of duty but tries to handle it as a "private" injury. Kobayashi-san, an "outside worker," tells us his own experience: "I started to work at IHI's Tokyo No.2 Factory in 1966. Two years later, I got burnt on the right wrist, see? The gas burner. I had to be away from the job for about 20 days, but the doctor at the company's clinic refused to issue a physician's certificate. You can't get your accident compensation insurance without a certificate. Then I got injured for the second time in March last year. I was hit on the shoulder by a wire-ropo. But the doctor just said 'no official injury is supposed to take place here.' It was only after I brought the case to the local Labor Standards Inspection Office that they issued me a certificate. The company's labor management section was in a great turmoil. According to their standards, my injury was nothing. So, they just couldn't believe that I, a 'poor outside worker,' could demand that they should recognize my injury as a workman's accident on duty."

"Outside workers" are exploited doubly and triply by IHI. But today, not all of them submit to the crude discrimination and exploitation. They are rising up against IHI to take their long

Workers killed at IHI

Year	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69
Outside workers	1	0	11	5	13	25	1	8	9
Total	4	5	19	10	19	33	20	17	11

suppressed rights back into their own hands.

In June, 1970, a group of "outside workers" working at IHI, including Kobayashi-san, organized their own union. They have been fighting for such key issues as "recognition of workmen's accidents without delay," "payment of allowances for overtime work in the full amount," and "advance notice about lay-off and firing supplemented by payment of adequate compensation." IHI, however, lost no time in suppressing this union of the weak. Ever since it was organized, and especially since March, 1972, when the union's leader, Kobayashi-san, was injured, IHI has forced the "sub-contractors" to fire the activists. It even dissolved one "sub-contractor" employing a large number of union members.

The "outside workers' union" responded in November, 1972, by suing IHI and 4 of its "sub-contractors" for violation of labor laws, but a spokesman for IHI remarked bluntly: "We are not the only company using the outside workers. The outside-workers system is deeply rooted in the Japanese economy as a whole." Perhaps because the issue concerns Japanese capitalism in its entirety, the Tokyo District Prosecutors' Office is yet to make its decision whether to accept or reject the union's legal complaint. Meanwhile, IHI keeps confining the "outside workers" to a position as modern slave labor.

"LABOR UNION" IN THE SERVICE OF CAPITALISTS ?

IHI has thus built its prosperity on direct and thorough discrimination against and exploitation of these "outside workers." At the same time, their existence has been a vital prerequisite for IHI's good relations with its regular employees and its maintenance of a friendly labor-management relationship, since it can afford to treat its own employees a little better than the "outside workers." IHI, among

other big businesses in the country, has been outstanding in its practice of such a "divide and rule" policy to place its direct employees under strict control and make them turn whichever way it likes.

As early as 1952, Doko established an in-company "management Conference" to be run jointly by representatives of the workers and of the management. It was a proto-type model for what is now popular among business firms under the name of "workers' participation in management," a shrewd policy to draw a veil over class-conflicts. And the ten-year plan consolidated immediately after the merger in 1960 set a fashion in the shipbuilding industry.

What is more, IHI's management has played an important role in the shipbuilders' joint effort to silence those workers who dare to speak out and fight for their class interests, an effort to contain the shipbuilding workers under the banner of Zenzosen Juki Roren (National Federation of Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Workers' Unions), an adherent of Domei (National Confederation of Laborers) and servant of capitalists. Though Ishikawajima and Harima merged into IHI without much difficulty in 1960, the two former company unions did not merge completely. The Ishikawajima union had a leftist orientation and was rather closely aligned with Sohyo (General Council of Japanese Labor Unions), while that of Harima workers had a strong reactionary orientation and was dominated by Domei. They formed a weak coalition but kept functioning as two practically independent unions in harsh competition. As IHI absorbed several more companies and enlarged its dockyards, its management began to consider it imperative to have all the employees reorganized into a single company union under the leadership of Domei activists, who openly advocate close labor-management collaboration and an all-out productivity drive. The management and the Domei-affiliated union leaders joined hands in dissolving the leftist union, or

what they called "anti-company, communist sympathizers who see class struggle as a supreme order." The joint offensive bore fruit in the fall of 1970--all the employees of IHI with the exception of only about 30 were reorganized into a new chapter of the 210,000-member Zenzosen Juki Roren together with the majority of workers at other major shipbuilding companies. (The Communist Party of Japan's cell at IHI, one of the largest in private corporations in Japan with about 500 members, joined the new chapter, saying that they would "fight from within." But all these CPJ activists have done in the past two and a half years has been to suppress those who try to be true to their class interests in opposition to the company.)

This majority union under Domei's hegemony is rarely matched by other Domei-affiliated unions in the way it closely collaborates with the company executives and controls the workers at IHI. One recent example that vividly highlights the union's activities is the "two-days-off a week system" which IHI adopted along with MHI in April, 1973, in advance of other competitors.


The two-days-off a week system supposedly constitutes an essential part of a weird-sounding policy, "utilize the fruits of economic growth and promote welfare." This is the aim Japanese monopoly capitalists are claiming to pursue in the 1970s in order to head off a severe international criticism against Japan's notorious low wages and long working hours, and to soothe the working class people inside Japan who are living in the depths of contradictions. In implementing the "system," IHI was always running ahead of its competitors---it had been practicing two-days-off every other week for two years when it switched to a more genuine one this April.

Under this system, as summarized below, a worker must work for 8 hours instead of the 7 hours which were standard before March, 1971, but his total annual working

hours are supposed to be reduced by 95 hours.

As far as the annual working hours are concerned, the system appears to be progressive enough to waive off the complaints of the Western capitalists. In reality, however, the "reduction of working hours" as such compels the workers to work much harder. Prior to the commencement of the new system, IHI's labor management office circulated a leaflet to its employees saying:

"In most of the discussions of the two-days-off system in Japan



today, too much emphasis seems to be placed on such aspects as 'we Japanese have been working too much,' 'Japan has earned too much foreign reserves,' and 'we had better take it easy and slow down. But the arguments of this type are wide of the mark.

"The two-days-off system must be seen from a completely different standpoint: 'If we tax our ingenuity, we should be able to complete in 5 days what used to take us 6 days a week. There ought to be something to be desired in the way we have been doing our work. We must make whatever improvement we possibly can, because the two-days-off a

	One day off a week (by Mar.'71)	Two days off every other week (from Apr.'71)	Two days off a week (from Apr.'73)
Daily working hrs.	7hrs.	7½hrs.	8hrs.
Opening hr. --closing hr.	8:00 a.m. -- 4:00 p.m.	8:00 a.m. -- 4:30 p.m.	8:00 a.m. -- 5:00 p.m.
Annual working hrs.	2,079hrs.	2,040hrs.	1,984hrs.
Overtime work per month	42hrs.	30hrs.	18hrs.

week are not something to be produced automatically, but something we should create for ourselves through these efforts.'

"There is no sense in practicing the two-days-off system if the total working hours, inclusive of overtime working hours, are not reduced.

"The only way to meet the imperative, 'reduction of total working hours unaccompanied by any reduction of production,' is the improvement in productivity. The possibility for improvement in productivity is limitless. Let us all show our wisdom and find ways to make our work much more efficient."

In essence, the two-days-off system is meant to reduce the overtime work without reducing the net production. The system thus represents a real threat to the workers, who had been barely earning their bread by working overtime to supplement their small wages, about one half of what their European counterparts receive. As a result of the reduction in overtime work, IHI workers lost an average of 7,000 to 8,000 yen a month when the system of two-days-off every other week was introduced, and as much as 10,000 yen a month since April, 1973. (Although their salaries were increased by an average of 14,000 yen a month as a result of the recent "spring wage increase struggle," most of the increment was cancelled out by the reduction in overtime allowances. Hard pressed by the sky-high infla-

tion, quite a number of IHI workers find side employment in their now "increased" holidays, while their wives do needlework and other tedious jobs.)

Even worse, the "reduction of working hours" is actually attained by an increase in unpaid working hours. In the summer of 1972 IHI introduced at one of its factories a new system of work practices symbolized by what is called Menchaku-sei (practice of reporting at one's whorkshop in preparation for the forthcoming "two-days-off" system. Under the new practice, the time-punching machines previously installed at the factory's front gate were removed, allegedly because workers, human beings, should be better controlled and disciplined by and for themselves rather than by crude machines. Previously, the workers were in time for work as long as their time cards were punched before 8:00. But now, they have to change into working clothes and "report at their respective workshops" in time for the jobsite callisthenics held from exactly 8:00 a.m.

In a large shipyard compound, it may easily take 15 or 20 minutes to change clothes in a locker-room and walk over to one's job site. About 90% of the workers arrive at the main gate by 7:40 or 7:45 in the morning, therefore, fearing lest they should fail to report at their job sites in time, which would lead to wage cuts and delays in promotion.

A similar practice is strictly observed when the day's work ends.

Previously, the workers were allowed to take showers during working hours, but now, it is only after the closing bell that they can go to the shower room. And IHI has even started to rip off their lunch time. They must "report at their job sites" by 1:00 p.m. to take part in the day's second callisthenics. All these minutes IHI steals from a worker amount to something between 30 and 40 minutes a day. In other words, each worker is forced to work much longer than before March, 1971, for a total of 2,100 to 2,150 hours a year. Yet IHI boastfully calls this as the "reduction of working hours."

But what is more terrible is that this forcible rationalization, including Menchaku-sei, was put into practice at the request of the union, which also intimidates discontented workers and suppresses their complaints. In the April, 1973, issue of Ai Eichi Ai, the in-company magazine, the union chairman and the executive in charge of labor management exchange the following words about the two-days-off system:

Executive: "A thing like this couldn't have been realized by management alone. Collaboration between labor and management made this possible. It was quite remarkable that the union took the initiative and leadership in mobilizing the employees to fulfill the vital prerequisite for the new system, improvement in the company's productivity and capacity. Of course we're very glad that we managed to realize the two-days-off system; but what makes us much happier is that we have a wonderful labor-management relationship that can achieve a common aim like this. In this sense, we have no words to thank you people enough."

Union chairman: "The fact that IHI was the first in the industry to accept the request of the union and put it into practice is really epoch making for IHI's labor and management as well...But I don't think it wise for you management to speak much about improvement in productivity, more intensive work

during short working hours, and the like. When we workers are determined to act on our own initiative to do these things, you shouldn't meddle too much. We are going to do our best in the future, as in the past, to reform our own consciousness and make ourselves ready to promote labor-saving innovation and rationalization much more intensively. The company should put much faith in the union, and leave the room wide open for the union's independent activities."

The company-patronized union admires its boss, while the boss speaks highly of the "independent" union, capable of grasping the boss' idea and fully determined to give shape to it. The majority union is nothing but a sub-branch of the company's labor management section whose self-assigned duty it is to control the workers "voluntarily."

Thus it is not at all difficult to imagine how strongly IHI management wanted to smash the less cooperative leftist union. In the course of its offensive to split the unions and unite the workers into a new and cooperative one, IHI laid out an enormous sum of money to establish and sponsor various in-company organizations, which are becoming more active these days. (It was one of the first Japanese businesses to introduce a company-financed "home helpers system"--in which the company dispatches a company-employed houseworker to an employee's family in need of one and thereby impresses its employees with its generous paternalism.)

Such company-patronized organizations as the "IHI Cultural and Athletic Association" and the "Committee to Make the Workshop a Cheerful Place" are run by the "Democratic Union," a union sub-organization consisting of team leaders, foremen, assistant section managers and other low ranking supervisors, many of whom are also company-authorized "recreation leaders" to plan and lead the company-sponsored "recreation" activities. They are armed with the philosophy of the productivity

drive at company-sponsored "training sessions," and they actively organize rank-and-file workers and mobilize them for the sake of rationalization and productivity drives.

Under such an intricate system of control, the ordinary worker's life is the one of an alienated man. In a company-wide rat race called the "zero defect movement," all the workshops are forced to compete with each other under the leadership of these spearhead union activists. Since a workshop with outstanding records is awarded a section manager's prize, a factory manager's prize or a company president's prize, the members of the shop keep watch on each other even to the extent of sacrificing individuals' rights to a better achievement of the shop. Thus, workmen's accidents are often reduced to "private" accidents. It is not uncommon that if someone in the shop is absent from work because of an injury, his absence is not ascribed to an accident but is handled as an "official business trip." Perhaps thanks to the energetic activities of the "Committee to Make the Workshop a Cheerful Place," the atmosphere of the workshop is purified to such a degree that an individual worker is made to feel guilty if he asks for a physician's certificate, which is a fundamental right.

Another instance worth citing is a "QC (quality control) circle," a fraudulent device to promote "self control by a small team." Each team, usually with 7 or 8 members, elects its own leader, who is often a member of the "Democratic Union." Given some major theme or a target by the company, the team is held responsible for deciding for itself the concrete procedure through which it is going to attain the given goal and for actual execution of the schedule thus determined. After the callisthenics in the morning, each team holds a "QC meeting" on a regular basis. At such occasions, the leader urges his fellow workers to shout one after another some gallant set-phrases of encouragement he has learned at the company-sponsored "training sessions"--a

practice quite reminiscent of newly enlisted U.S. Marines shouting a war cry, "Kill, Kill, Kill," in their training camps.

This is not a mere allegory. IHI's Tanashi Factory in suburban Tokyo, engaged in production of Phantom jet engines for use by the Japanese Air Self Defense Force, is a perfect miniature model of what can best be termed the "military-industrial-labor union complex." A large number of employees at the factory are former JASDF members who have their in-factory chapter of Kuyu-kai, a nationwide association of retired JASDF members. Not surprisingly, they are leading and controlling the factory's "Democratic Union." In late 1971, when the factory tried to introduce a three-shift system in order to accelerate its production for the Third National Defense Build-up Program and for the forthcoming Fourth Build-up Program, they persuaded the workers to accept the new shift by saying that "we workers should have guts to work during the night if it is for the sake of the nation."

IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

The vigorous rule over the workers by union leaders in close teamwork with company executives cannot but remind us of the gloomy past of the Japanese shipbuilding industry and the union of shipbuilding workers. The Japanese shipbuilding industry, born and matured as a twin sister of the Imperial Navy, forcibly "requisitioned" tens of thousands of colonized Koreans and Chinese as slave labor to build warships and troop ships during WWII. Many of these enslaved victims ended their lives on the shipways or at the bottom of shipbuilding docks, but their exact number is still left unknown. And the labor union, on its part, functioned as a part of the "Sangyo-hokoku-kai" (Association for Service to the State through Industry). For example, the chairman of the "Strenuous Labor Union" of Ishikawajima workers before the war wrote as follows in his book:

"Collaboration between labor and management is not enough, because the word 'collaboration' somehow connotes that the two parties can be pitted against each other at any time. The two parties should not only collaborate, but they must become one with each other."

The kind of labor-management relationship now existing at IHI, one in which both parties are becoming "one with each other," serves as a vital condition for the company's expansion abroad. To sing the praise of peace at a fake "kingdom of shipbuilding," with one's eyes closed to the fact that the "kingdom" has been built on the divide-and-rule policy and on the modern slave labor called "outside workers" is to assume a chauvinist, anti-foreign, imperialist attitude toward working class people overseas.

It seems, therefore, appropriate for us to glance at "IHI's way of business" at work in overseas expansion, especially in the area of direct overseas investment. In this respect, too, IHI has been running ahead of the other Japanese shipbuilders. Unlike other competitors which have just recently started opening overseas operation, IHI opened its first operation abroad in the late 1950s. (We shall limit ourselves here to the two oldest and largest operations IHI has in Brazil and Singapore, but the company has already established joint ventures in Turkey, South Vietnam and Peru, to mention a few.)

ISHIBRAS, Brazil

According to recent press reports about 700 Japanese companies, large and small, are interested in starting operations in Brazil. Symbolic of this furious rush into Brazil, Kawasaki Steel announced in May, 1973, its decision to have a 24.5% share in a 6-million-ton capacity integrated steel mill to be built in the Tubarao littoral district by 1978. "Low wages" and "inexpensive raw materials" were cited as two major reasons for the decision by the company executives, along with another factor

that it is becoming extremely difficult to secure appropriate plots of land inside Japan.

Earlier in the year, it was decided that the Export-Import Bank of Japan and a syndicate of banks including Mitsubishi and Mitsui will finance 70% of a US\$500 million project which the Brazilian government is now consolidating under the name of the "Export Corridor Program," to construct port facilities, storage and collecting facilities, and maritime and land transportation systems.

Many of the Japanese businesses now invading Brazil owe much to IHI for having paved their way since January, 1959, when it established Ishikawajima do Brasil Estaleiros S.A. (ISHIBRAS). Capitalized at US\$4.4 million (of which 93.3% is held by IHI), equipped with a 25,000 DWT construction dock and a 300,000 DWT repairing dock, and employing some 2,000 people, ISHIBRAS is the largest shipyard in Latin America. Upon completion of its new 400,000 DWT shipbuilding dock under construction, it will be as big as many Japanese shipyards.

In the 5-year period before it established ISHIBRAS, IHI managed to monopolize construction of the Brazilian Navy's troop ships, thereby inducing the Brazilian government to find it more convenient to "invite" IHI to its territory. Upon its establishment, ISHIBRAS received about 30% of its initial investment in facilities as a grant in aid from the Brazilian government, which also assured continuous placement of orders for the Navy's warships and troop ships.


The joint venture with the military dictators proved profitable within 4 years after it started business. Recently it has been paying a 10% dividend.

IHI has also been making the best use of its close ties with the military regime and its sub-branches. For example, it has been supplying most of the vessels ordered by the government-owned oil and mining companies; and it has built 3 units of blast furnace for USIMINAS, one of the 3 major steel works now existing in Brazil.

Jurong Shipyard and Jurong Shipbuilders, Singapore

With its "Pioneer Industries Ordinance," "Industrial Expansion Ordinance," "Economic Expansion Incentives Act" and other generous legal provisions, Singapore's door is wide open for foreign capital investment. Located at the mouth of the Malacca Straits, Japan's "survival line," it has recently been attracting many shipbuilders from abroad, mainly from Japan. In this case, too, many of the Japanese shipbuilders owe much to IHI for having invaded first and established jointly with the government of Singapore a "pioneer industry," Jurong Shipyard Co. Ltd. (JSL) in 1963.

IHI controls 51% of the paid capital of JSL, which is one of the largest companies in Singapore and is equipped with one each of 90,000 DWT and 300,000 DWT repair docks, and employing about 1,500 regular workers and 700 more "outside workers." When invited to start a pioneer industry, IHI made it a policy to "procure whatever funds



SINGAPORE

15c

Featured in the commemorative stamp issued by the government of Singapore in late 1972 is a "Freedom" ship launched for the first time by JSBL, a Singapore's "pioneer industry." IHI has replaced "Liberty" by "Freedom" and while its overseas branch builds "Freedom," it makes "Fortune" at home.

necessary in Singapore with the exception of the initial paid capital." It has thus procured more than U\$50 million including a U\$9.5 million loan for the initial investment in facilities offered by the Economic Development Bureau of Singapore.

What IHI saw most attractive was of course "cheap labor," available at 1/3 or 1/2 the price of "cheap" Japanese labor. In the construction of a new ship, materials take up 70% of the total cost, the balance being the personnel costs. But in the repair work, the percentages are reversed. Under such favorable conditions JSL soon proved to be profitable. In 1966 when the first dock went into operation, JSL paid off all the deficit (about U\$5.5 million) it had incurred in the preceding years and furthermore it managed to pay a 15% dividend.

Observing the wonderful performance of JSL, the government immediately took action to talk IHI into establishing another joint venture, the one for shipbuilding this time. In late 1968, as a result of time-consuming negotiations, Jurong Shipbuilders Co. Ltd. (JSBL) was established, with IHI, JSL, and the government of Singapore having equal shares in it. In taking part in this new venture, IHI devised a sophisticated scheme to place JSBL under its multinational, comprehensive, production system. In other words, JSBL was assigned, along with one of IHI's affiliates in Japan, to build IHI's famous "Freedom" type multi-purpose cargo vessels, while IHI's Tokyo No.2 Factory began to build new and bigger versions called "Fortune" ships in 1970. (Of course, IHI's head office handles all the orders for "Freedom" ships and allocates them to its "sub-contractors," including JSBL.)

In August, 1972, JSBL launched its first "Freedom" ship, the "Neptune Ruby." The government held a magnificent ceremony and issued a commemorative stamp to celebrate the launching of this ship, while those built in Japan to exactly the same specifications

leave the shipways one after another without even a launching ceremony. This striking contrast is indeed a symbol of IHI's imperialist nature. From the fall of 1968 through the fall of 1972, some 280 workers chosen from other Jurong workers were sent to IHI's factories in Japan to receive technical training, with all expenses being paid not by IHI but by the government of Singapore in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on technical assistance signed between the two. The trainees, dreaming of the day of their promotion after returning home, contented themselves with a small stipend of ¥12,000 a month per person (as of 1971) and endured hardships in a foreign land. What is more, despite the fact that IHI did not spend even a penny in training these Jurong workers, it did not want to have them recruited by other shipbuilders. Before they left for Japan, the trainees were asked to sign a paper promising that they would pay Singapore \$3,000 to their employer should they quit working for JSL or JSBL within two years after returning home.

Although concrete data are not available for us at the moment, it is reported that many of the workers, especially the "outside workers" at JSL and JSBL are Malaysian in nationality. In view of the fact that both ventures are functioning as complete "sub-contractors" of IHI, it is not difficult to imagine that the discrimination against the "outside workers" is practiced in a more formidable proportion than it is in Japan.

Already in 1972, the much celebrated JSL and JSBL had killed more than 20 workers in serious accidents. The drastic rationalization policy of cost-minded IHI has thus claimed victims not only in its own shipyards in Japan but in those abroad.

MINORITY UNION IN STRUGGLE

One important aspect of IHI left unmentioned in the previous sections is that it is one of the largest Japanese defense contractors.

In terms of the amount of contracts signed with the Self Defense Forces in fy 1971, IHI's 29 billion ranks next only to MHI's ¥80 billion. In addition to ships and various plants, IHI's list of products includes warships, tanks, jet engines, missiles, rockets, and nuclear powered vessels.

With this last aspect taken into account together with many others pointed out above, IHI is indeed the epitome of modern Japanese militarism-imperialism; cruel discrimination against the "outside workers" and a labor union in service of the company's expansionist policy; drastic rationalization in technology and management; a high growth that ended up in building dozens of defective ships; production of Japan's mobile pipeline--mammoth tankers and troop ships; close ties with counterrevolutionary rulers in the third world; production of war toys to be used for securing safe navigation of its products and safe operation of its overseas shipyards; etc.

But one final aspect of IHI concerns us most--besides the members of the outside workers' union there are at least 30 regular employees of IHI who still function as a chapter of Zenzosen Kikai Roren (National Federation of Shipbuilding and Machinery Workers' Unions), in direct opposition to the joint fascist rule of IHI management and the majority union leaders. They are an extreme minority among the 38,000 employees of IHI, but their determined actions to fight for working class interests have had significant political implications.

I interviewed some members of this minority union including Tanaka-san, secretary general, and Suzuki-san, chief of the chapter's organizing bureau, on a Saturday afternoon at their small office near IHI's Tokyo No.2 and No.3 Factories, on the east side of the mouth of the Sumida River.

They assuredly assess their functioning as a radical, unyielding, minority union, especially

when 500 odd CPJ activists chose to ally with the majority union. They say that the majority union at IHI is typical of the large company unions that function more and more as a supplementary organ of the ruling class and as business firms' second labor-management sections. "The Domei-union leaders even dare to say that since the IHI management is so generous and benevolent there's no need for the workers to stage a strike. They say that only weak and bad unions stage strikes. Can you believe that? It's a shame! We're trying to be a workers' stronghold to block the joint efforts of the management-union, to resist the reactionary current, and to fight for the liberation of the working class, including ourselves. We are indeed a minority, as you said. But we find it essential that our activities be organized not simply around our own interests



but around the interests of the workers at IHI as a whole," says Suzuki-san.

For example, they are waging a struggle to smash the so-called "two-days-off" system described above. When the company removed the time-punching machines and urged the employees to report at their job sites rather than at the main gate by 8:00 a.m., they started using the machines for the "outside workers." But the company soon prevented them from using the machines. Now, they write down the time of their arrival at the front gate on their own time cards with ball-point pens. One of them says with a smile, "I guess our way of 'self-control' is much closer to true 'self-control by the workers.'" And recently the minority union filed a law suit against IHI for arbitrarily changing the contents of the "working hours," for prolong them, and for intensifying the work.

These and other minor, but important, struggles by the minority union have demonstrated concretely that workers' determination to fight for their own rights and for their fellow workers' can make difference. But since the members openly oppose IHI's management, they are, of course, severely discriminated against in salary raises, promotion, and assignments. They agree unanimously, however, "The series of oppressions has just helped us strengthen ourselves. We have come to hate the management more than ever, and to love our fellow workers more deeply." Even after having endured two and a half years of suppression, these few people are quite cheerful, because they are sure of what they are doing.

Once or twice every week, the minority union prints 12,000 copies of its paper, Shinsui-shiki (launching ceremony), and hands them out to all the IHI workers in the Tokyo area. "You see," says Tanaka-san, "even the workers who aren't members of our union willingly contribute as much as 100,000 yen each time we distribute the paper. That is because our paper tells the true

story and discloses the greed of IHI management and its running dogs--the majority union leaders. The Domei fascist pigs and the low ranking supervisors try to prevent the workers from making their contributions. While we are handing out the paper, some workers whisper to us in a low voice, 'Well, my boss is watching over there, and I can't put my money in right now. But I'll give it to you later at lunch time.' And recently some of them have started quarrelling with their bosses. 'You're my team leader, yes. But this is none of your business. Leave me alone when I use my own money as I like best.' What matters is not the size of a union but its quality--whether it is really representing the interests of the workers. Potentially, we have a good chance of winning many more to our side. But it's a long and difficult task, because you ought to be independent in order to make your position known openly to everybody else and to remain uncorrupted even if you are severely denounced and attacked."

And their activities with respect to IHI's overseas aggression? Suzuki-san replies, "Frankly, so far we've been too busy sustaining ourselves inside IHI. We can see conceptually that our struggle here in Japan against IHI's labor-economization, rationalization and defense production is one and the same thing as the struggle against its overseas aggression and exploitation of workers abroad. While management is modernizing and enlarging the facilities inside Japan, and saving as much labor as it can, it is multinationalizing the company to take advantage of 'cheaper labor' abroad.

"But when it comes to concrete problems faced by the workers abroad, we must confess we know very little. You see, it's not so difficult to convince the workers here that IHI's defense production is bad, but we are so isolated from the workers overseas. As for serious cases, like the labor accidents at Jurong about which we learned recently, we are trying to charge the management as we have been doing on similar occasions

here in Japan. In one case, the management tried to suppress our paper and one of our members who wrote that 'IHI has killed workers with its intensified labor practice.' We'll face similar suppression, but we're ready.

"In this regard there are two things we can and should do immediately. One is to fight along with the union of outside workers, who are in fact colonized inside the compounds of IHI. We are doing this already. The other is to disclose--to our fellow workers and to the public both inside and outside Japan--the imperialist character of IHI management and the majority union."

"For example," Tanaka-san interrupts, "after the Jurong accidents, the majority union shamelessly offered a helping hand to its boss and dispatched some of its leaders like Tamura Fusao, chairman of the union's committee for production safety, and Sakamoto Tadao, chairman of the union's welfare committee, to ISHIBRAS and Jurong, to transplant the IHI method of safety-control to overseas branches. Not only the company

ON THE BOYCOTT MOVEMENT
-- DYNAMICS OF IMPERIALISTS' POLITICS

(continued from p.8)

men regularly bribe key Thai government officials in order to obtain concessions; they employ "dummy" personnel in order to maintain a Japanese shareholding majority, thus assuring control of joint ventures; they artificially create a false demand for a locally produced product in Japan (as in the recent case of dried jelly-fish) and then abruptly suspend purchases, forcing the Thai producers to sell to them at absurdly low prices; they practice a system of wages and working conditions in Japanese-controlled joint ventures which are highly discriminatory toward their Thai employees.

In view of the widespread animosity that such practices might be expected to breed, it should come as no surprise that within hours of the

but the Domei union, too, is trying to multinationalize itself and spread its time-tested technique for controlling the workers."

"Here's another example," one person in the office points at a recent issue of Shinsui-shiki. It reports a speech made by a foreman upon returning home from overseas duty at the construction site of Djumai Refinery Plant which IHI exported to Indonesia: "The Indonesians are living very poorly, mainly eating banana peels.. Their industrial facilities are just like scraps, they are using the type of welding machines we quit using 15 years ago... Those bare-footed workers are just lazy and don't work at all; about 3:00 in the afternoon they quit working... Politically, the situation is quite unstable... Considering all these things, I think we Japanese are very happy...."

"These are tiny examples," concludes Suzuki-san. "We'd like to know in detail what these bastards are doing abroad, because when we become more familiar with the real situations of the workers abroad, we can further deepen and enrich our struggle here." ■■

announcement of the NSCT program, general participation sprouted in every region and sector of Thai society. The boycott burst beyond the modern capital of Bangkok to such local areas as Chiang Mai, Korat, and Hong Khai on the Laotian border, and quickly attracted active support from non-student and non-middle-class elements. The prestigious Japanese daily, the Asahi Shimbun (November 22, 1972) observed that taxi drivers and bus conductors were participating in the leafletting. An opinion poll conducted by the Japan Trade Center (a Japanese trade promotional organization) in Bangkok just prior to the start of the boycott could not but be pessimistic about its results: 90 % of those interviewed expressed support for the boycott, and more than 50 % of these felt it would be necessary to extend it beyond the scheduled ten days.(5) A number of Japanese and Thai commentators, mainly economists, expressed the alarmist fear (notably different in



cott should spread throughout the region? In the eyes of Japanese business (and government), Southeast Asia is vital to Japan's economic development; any united action against their interests there would have to be regarded as a direct threat. The Japanese government and its business allies, as is their want when it serves their interests, reacted with characteristic speed and instituted a number of stopgap measures, including the mobilization of certain Japanese student groups to deal with their Thai counterparts.

Viewed in toto, the measures taken by Japan vis-a-vis the boycott were nothing other than the vital response of an imperialist power-structure caught up in the dynamics of politico-economic confrontation with a popular front in a developing country. In order to better understand the nature of Japanese perception and response, it will be necessary to analyze the evolution of these measure.

RESPONSE

I. Side one of the coin: the Japanese Government

The Japanese government had instituted a re-examination of its Southeast Asian policies in every Cabinet Ministry while the boycott was still in progress. As early as November 28, 1972, the Foreign Ministry officially announced a new aid policy, in response to the "fluid" situation in the region, notably the impending ceasefire in Vietnam and the boycott in Thailand. The statement set forth three major principles:

- 1) In order for Japan to live amicably as a responsible member of the international community, it must promote international cooperation;
- 2) Japan will direct its economic aid so as to contribute to the development of countries which receive its aid;
- 3) Japan's economic aid will be dispersed under a policy of not seeking any direct "return" from the recipient country.

tone from the students' demands) that immediate total renewal of the Japanese presence in Thailand would cause the country to revert to the stone age. Exaggerations such as these of course only confirmed the popular mass nature of the boycott for the nervous Japanese government and business leaders, who hastened to introduce makeshift adjustments in their policies.

Viewed in retrospect, it would appear that the key event in the Thai confrontation with "Japan, Incorporated" was NSCT's announcement that it would sponsor an all-Asian student conference in Bangkok in May to discuss common problems relating to Japanese economic invasion of the region. The Japanese ruling elite was not unaware of the implication of this. There was serious alarm at the prospect of students from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Vietnam, the Philippines, and Hong Kong getting together to discuss ways of dealing with Japanese trade and investment. What if the boy-

The Ministerial statement was characteristically ambiguous, although it unquestionably indicated a loosening of the conditions governing economic aid. The Ministry hinted two types of untied loans: one to apply to individual developing countries and to be effected by bilateral agreement; and the other to be a regional loan to be used by Southeast Asian nations to purchase each other's products. It also indicated that Free Yen Loans might henceforth be used to finance the local costs of development projects (previously the availability of such funds had been tied to purchases of Japanese goods), and that loan and credit terms might be eased, conceivably to the level of IDA loans.(6) What the above signify was a decision on the part of Japanese business circles, anxious to defuse a tense situation, to allow the smaller nations of Asia to have a share of the post Vietnam Indochinese reconstruction "pie". By inviting other Asian to participate in their profit making ventures, Japan was effectively instituting an economic version of the Nixon military doctrine of "Asians fighting Asians."

Looked at from another perspective, the Japanese government was seeking to kill two birds with one stone, i.e., linking its response to the Thai boycott to its post-Vietnam foreign aid policy, which it now sought to expand to all of Indochina. From the Thai point of view, this could simply be viewed as a logical extension of the imperialist drive toward domination, here shifting form from U.S. "patronage" via the U.S. war economy to Japanese patronage via Japanese industrialization.

The benefits of America's war economy for Thailand had been mixed: there had been an easing of pressure on foreign exchange reserves and a boom in certain industries (oil refining, construction, furniture, cement, bottling), but this had been accompanied by a general economic deterioration, especially noticeable in the aftermath of the Second Five-year Plan (1967 - 71), one of whose major targets had been an increase in agricultural productivity. It is estimated that during the Second Five-Year Plan the average annual inflow accruing from the Vietnam war reached \$250 million; this has now shrunk to \$75 million per

annum. Furthermore, General Domestic Products (GDP) growth during the same period was 7.2% while agricultural productivity came to only 2.7%. Agriculture as a part of GDP had thus dropped from 33% in the early 60's to 24% in the early 70's. Thus, what had seemed like easy money from the Vietnam war had instead led to the ruin of Thai agriculture, and made inevitable the incorporation of the Thai economy into the Japan-U.S. master plan for Indochina reconstruction.

The Japanese were perhaps a bit clumsy in their role as "patrons". It seemed that the Thais, with their boycott, had now perhaps awakened the Japanese humanitarian consciousness. How else can we explain the apparently magnanimous gesture on the part of the traditionally bureaucratic tight-fisted Foreign Ministry in announcing these liberalization measures. It would indeed seem that, in anticipation of pressure for precisely such actions at the forthcoming Dec. 1972 7th Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference on Development in Saigon and at the 5th Japan-Thai Trade Joint Committee meeting scheduled in Bangkok in late January, 1973, Japan had indeed decided to gracefully acknowledge its obligations. In fact, however, one may detect another rationale behind this ostensibly low posture: might it not be acceptable to absorb a temporary loss now in order to prevent the boycott from spreading, especially when that loss would be more than made up for in the overall aid-giving process in Indochina. While MITI head Makasone, personally exemplifying the new aid policy by his presence at the Japan-Thai Trade Joint Committee meeting, announced that Japan would designate ¥46 billion out of its already pledged 2nd Year Credit loan as an "untied loan", the Asahi Shimbun in its optimistic comments on the meeting (Editorial, Jan. 27, 1973) revealed the underlying assumption of Japan's new approach to Asia: "The strong competitive nature of Japanese goods in any case assures that untied aid will ultimately find its way back to Japan" (Emphasis added).

Another step taken by the Foreign Ministry was the dispatch in late Nov. 1972 of a survey team to study local employee conditions in Japanese-controlled joint ventures in Southeast

Asia. This was either a false gesture of concern or an indication of the lack-of-coordination endemic to the Japanese bureaucracy, as the Ministry, through its affiliate organization the Institute of Developing Economics (the Japanese name is literally The Institute for the Study of Asian Economics) had contracted with Professor Nakane Chie, an anthropologist at Tokyo University, to do an identical survey just a year ago.

The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) made several decisions at this time that are perhaps of even greater importance. Japan's version of the Wall Street Journal, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported on Nov. 29, 1972, that MITI, in response to the boycott of Japanese goods in Thailand, was instituting a policy of an international division of labor in an effort to improve Japan's trade imbalance. Two official guidelines were set forth: 1) In order to reduce domestic iron, steel and petrochemical productions, MITI will promote the establishing of large-scale steel plants and petrochemical combines in Thailand; 2) In support of such projects, MITI will also give priority to investment in and aid to infrastructural development (roads, ports, water systems, etc.).

These "new" policy pronouncements require some comment. First, what MITI stressed was the role it would play in "fostering" a self-sufficient Thai economy, i.e., by exporting to Thailand capital goods such as plants and combines which would then produce export goods with a higher added value. Yet, it was precisely the expansion of export industries to the detriment of import-substitute industries (which might truly benefit the local country) which had characterized "development strategies" of the early 1960's. Moreover, improvement of the trade balance was anticipated as a result of this same emphasis on exports, since all products would be destined for Japan. To put it more bluntly, the whole plan was geared to meet only the needs of Japan; no genuine concern was given to Thailand's real needs.

Indeed, none of Japan's policies in Asia can be properly analyzed without an understanding of the mounting pressures building up in Japan. In

particular, the soaring prices of land, the ironic result of Premier Tanaka's plan to solve the land-population problem, together with the growing awareness of environmental destruction by the Japanese public, have made it virtually impossible now for Japanese entrepreneurs to set up new petrochemical and thermoelectric power plants within the Japanese archipelago. Clearly then, more than any "demand" on the part of distraught Thais, what motivated Japanese industrialists was their need to displace certain vital but domestically offensive industrial sectors, i.e., labor intensive and pollution-creating industries.(7) Hence, the intended effect of the MITI guideline was above all to strengthen Japanese domination of the Thai economy.

A second aspect of the MITI initiative was that it constituted the long-awaited go-ahead signal for a Japanese-Thai petrochemical joint venture, a project which had suffered from prolonged delays and suspensions, being effectively suspended since the early part of 1969. Less than six months after the MITI declaration, in May 1973, the final agreement was signed between a 6-company Japanese consortium and the Thai Petrochemical Company (TPC), itself a joint venture between Shell Oil and a Chinese-Thai entrepreneur. This point will be examined in detail subsequently, but what should be noted here is that the building of the petrochemical plant was mentioned for the first time in connection with the boycott.

A third point that bears watching is MITI's inclusion of an oil pipeline project across the Malay Peninsula as part of its infrastructure promotion program. This may be expected to have far-reaching consequences for the already delicate relations among the nations of the region.

II. SIDE TWO OF THE COIN : JAPANESE BUSINESS

Intimacy between the government and the private sector is perhaps one of the most characteristic features of the Japanese economy, often making it difficult to attribute the action

of either sector to an autonomous decision making process. Accordingly MITI's "green light" to the petrochemical joint venture project in response to the Thai boycott led quite smoothly to the consummation of a formal contract within several months time, suggesting that consultation had occurred as a matter of course.

Leading Japanese business circles and industrial associations did make a public effort to counter their negative image in Southeast Asia drafting an "overseas investment charter," intended to regulate investment practices, and a "code of behavior," intended to show Japanese readiness to be less arrogant in relations with Asians. To what extent these guidelines will be observed is open to question as they are totally lacking in binding force. One is tempted to view them as essentially for international and Thai consumption rather than as a serious code of ethics for Japanese in Southeast Asia.

In fact, the actual motivation for even these gestures is subject to doubt. It was MITI that had suggested the inclusion of concrete criteria such as the following:

1) Japanese holdings in joint ventures should not exceed 75 %; 2) there should be a minimum ratio of 30 local employees to each Japanese employee; 3) half of the management shall be local (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 23, 1973). The "Guidelines for Investment in Developing Countries" announced on June 4, 1973 by six of Japan's most prestigious business organizations (including the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai), Employers' Association of Japan (Nikkeiren), and the Japan Trade Association (Nihon Boekikai), after consultation with MITI, revealed that their sole interest was form, not substance. There were, moreover, troublesome contradictions in parts of the work. While Article I, for instance, advocated that Japanese firms learn to adapt to local conditions, i.e., suggesting a long range perspective, Article II called for a progressive phasing out of Japanese control (Yomiuri Shimbun, June 5, 1973).

If the final version did not include a reciprocal clause requiring

the local government to guarantee it would not nationalize Japanese holdings in return for Japanese assurances to regulate investment practices, this was not for lack of pressure on the part of the members. Indeed, several of them, in their insistence on this point, revealed their rather inflated sense of their own importance in their tendency to almost equate themselves with sovereign states, much in the same vein as the multinational giants of the western industrial world. The "Guidelines" in effect illustrated the awesome concentration of power which is "Japan Incorporated," and demonstrated that Japanese business was quite determined to respond in its own way to the Thai protest, and indeed exploit that protest to the fullest.

As the effective leader of Japanese business, Keidanren took the boycott especially seriously. On November 30, 1972, an emergency meeting of the Japanese-Thai Cooperation Committee, a standing subcommittee of Keidanren chaired by Sato Kichiro, a leading figure of the Mitsui Group, was called. Featuring the attendance of the Japanese Ambassador to Thailand, who was temporarily back in Japan, the meeting decided to dispatch Chairman Sato to Thailand for an on-the-spot survey. Upon his return, Sato announced that Keidanren would send a mission to deal with Thai frustrations.

Similar measures were taken by individual firms, some of which moved to give up their majority holdings, and by the Keizai Doyukai, whose outspoken representative, Kikawada Kazutaka, announced that organization's intention to propose to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) business leaders the establishment of a regional organ to deal with such economic conflicts in the future.

Before proceeding to a final analysis of the dynamics underlying these gesticulations, mention should be made of certain Japanese student groups whose activities, whether intentionally or not, made them appear as the cultural agents of Japanese business circles.

III. JAPANESE "STUDENT" RESPONSE

In tandem with these Japanese government and business actions, two

consecutive groups of Japanese students, the Japan International Students Union (JISU) and the Japan Students League (Nishigakudo), working in close coordination with each other, immediately sought to establish contact with the boycott movement led by NSCT in an effort to co-opt it. (8) While JISU is more or less representative of Japanese business interests, Nichigakudo is the student offshoot of an ultra-right nationalist group.

JISU was organized in 1969 by a few students from Keio University, one of Tokyo's affluent private schools. Its objective was the promotion of cultural programs and the establishment of contacts with foreign student organizations. JISU tends to attract two types of students, majors in international relations and members of the English Speaking Society (ESS). The latter is an extracurricular activity originally introduced by the U.S. Occupation Forces and assisted by American academics under the Fulbright program. While attracting in the main students seeking to improve their English language ability, the student personality it features is a peculiar blend of aggressiveness in trying to speak English and a conspicuous insensitivity to socio-political issues. With this dominant ESS cast, JISU not surprisingly found itself active from its inception in two areas: establishing contacts with student organizations abroad and operating student charter flights. JISU joined the Asia Students Association, which had been set up in Kuala Lumpur in April, 1969, the International Student Travel Conference (ISTC), and subsequently itself organized the Student Travel Association of Asia (STAA). It is worth noting that the last meeting of STAA, under JISU sponsorship and held at a luxurious hotel in Atami, one of Japan's leading resort centers, in Aug. 1972, was addressed by none other than Minister of International Trade and Industry, Nakasone Yasuhiro.

As to JISU's standing as a representative of Japanese students, it clearly represents little beyond itself. An article written by a member of JISU (in The Basoon, mimeography, vol. 1, 1972), Nagashima Masayuki, admits the organization has mobilized little support among Japanese students. It is known to them, if at all, as a student travel agent. While JISU does enjoy generous rebates from international airlines and may be able to tap the "assistance" of Japanese business circles interested

in its international affiliations, it cannot lay claim to any legitimate student support.


In contrast to JISU, Nichigakudo is a full-fledged political organization which openly supports Japan's controversial National Defense Forces, issues hawkish appeal for a stronger military stance, and oozes hawkish admiration for the late Mishima Yukio. In mid-December, 1972, Nichigakudo sent one of its leaders, Miyasaki Masahiro, to Thailand to deliver a letter of protest and demands to NSCT. Nichigakudo requested that desecration of the Japanese flag be stopped, (this referred to an NSCT leaflet carrying a Japanese flag which had been crossed out) and that no violence be instituted against Japanese residents in Thailand. What was most surprising, in view of the usual violent rhetoric of Nichigakudo, was the very restrained tone of the letter, which even extended sympathy to the suffering people of Thailand. The letter also contained a passage warning NSCT to guard against infiltration by Communists, referring to the "historical precedent of the May 4th Movement in 1921 in China when Communist infiltration led to a deterioration of the relations between the two nations (China and Japan)." This unusual interpretation of the May 4th Movement, in addition to being a completely erroneous reading of history, indicated considerable prejudice and an incapacity to comprehend the growing nationalism of third world peoples. Nevertheless, framed as it was in a tone of restraint and advice, the letter was accepted by NSCT, which formally apologized for its disrespectful use of the Japanese flag. Indeed, NSCT, lacking substantive information and revealing a certain lack of prudence, allowed "friendly relations" to be constituted at this time between it and Nichigakudo.

Nichigakudo was quick to turn this state of affairs to advantage. In the January issue of Nihon Gakusei Shimbun, its monthly organ, it boasted that Nichigakudo would establish an International Development and send an official delegate to the regional student conference NSCT was organizing for May in Bangkok. The same report made reference to a conference of AISEC to be held in August also in Bangkok, and also made mention of the international convention of the

PEN Club which had been held in Kyoto in November, 1972.

In spite of the fact that the above referred to conferences and organizations are generally associated with a western liberal ideological orientation, a number of facts suggest the existence of a strange almost symbolic interrelationship of liberal and ultra-rightist organizations. For instance, we may note the fairly frequent coverage of the Thai boycott in such rightist organs as Nihon Gakusei Shimbun and Yamato Shimbun. There is also the fact that Obi Toshio, a Keio graduate who is scheduled to join the World Bank in fall of this year, in addition to being an early member of JISU and a key figure in the AISEC movement in Japan, was also a frequent contributor to the Nihon Gakusei Shimbun. (9)

In late December, 1972, JISU dispatched a student to Bangkok with a formal invitation to Thirayuth Bunmee, Secretary General of NSCT, to visit Japan. (JISU was making full use of its charter flight connections.) There is reason to believe that JISU also negotiated secretly with NSCT, offering to provide the badly needed funding for NSCT's proposed Bangkok conference. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Feb. 22 and April 23, 1973) reported that the Japan Economic Trade Organization (JETRO) had offered to raise a half-million yen, but on the condition that NSCT drop its original plan of discussing "common regional problems with neo-imperialism." There are further indications that JISU was very likely acting as a student agent for Japanese business interests in an effort to co-opt the growing resentment of the Thai people. It is interesting that Obi Toshio of JISU not only happened to be in Bangkok at the same time (late January 1973) as MITI head Nakasone, in attendance at the 5th Japan-Thai Trade Joint Committee in order to confirm Japan's ¥46 billion credit grant, but also, as he himself wrote somewhat nonchalantly, "succeeded in arranging a meeting of Thai student leaders with Nakasone's secretary, Mr. Yoda. (10) One is left to speculate on the precise nature of JISU's relations with Japanese government and business circles, but that they are close is beyond doubt. At this point, it would be hard to prove that JISU is actually controlled by Nakasone, the key personality of the up-and-coming "new rightist school"



of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, or that it has been receiving financial support from business interests involved in trade with Thailand. But such possibilities cannot be discounted.

There is reason to believe that Japan also played a major role in preventing the boycott from spreading to other parts of Southeast Asia, where resentment at Japanese economic domination is very close to the boiling point. Indonesia is an especially good example. Upon his return from a student conference in Jakarta in early April, NSCT leader Thirayuth disclosed at a press conference in Bangkok (Bangkok Post, April 20, 1973) that Indonesian students had planned to launch an anti-Japanese campaign in the wake of the Thai boycott, but they had been stopped by stiff government pressure. Perhaps most significant, as Thirayuth indicated, was that shortly after this certain Japanese quarters started providing donations and assistance to Indonesian universities and students. Indeed, suddenly it seemed that the "economic animal" had changed its spots and become a species of "homo philanthropic". In April, the President of the Toyo Rayon Co., Fujiyoshi Tsuguhide, announced a plan to establish a Textile Development Foundation in Indonesia, with

scholarship and equipment contributions to the tune of \$300,000. The previous month, the Mitsubishi Group had contributed \$500,000 to an Indonesian Government project designed to provide clothes and school equipment to children in the remote island of west Irian. Sumitomo Trading Co. provided a set of experimental instruments to a new medical school in Semarang, and Toyota Motor Co. is planning to build a technical training institute. Perhaps the biggest giver in the field is Matsushita Electric, whose joint venture affiliate in Indonesia contributed a new TV station in Makasat last fall (Mainichi Shimbun, April 14, 1973).

As Thirayuth observed, the influence such "gifts" can have is clearly significant. They should dispel any lingering doubts as to the capacity of Japanese industry to temporarily suppress anti-Japanese outbreaks.

A word about Thirayuth's trip to Japan for a week in April, 1973, via the auspices of JISU. He had perhaps been somewhat naive politically when he accepted this invitation, but he soon became aware of the intentions of his imperialist hosts. Upon his arrival, he discovered that his JISU-arranged schedule has left him no free time to address his protest to the Japanese people. In fact, the first formal event arranged for him was a luncheon meeting at Keidanren hosted by Sato Kiichiro, Chairman of the Japanese-Thai Cooperation Committee (see above). Thirayuth wisely decided to officially dissociate himself from JISU, which he did by repaying the ticket he had accepted, and proceeded to turn his stay in Japan into a self-study effort. He chose to travel to Minamata to observe first hand the conditions and effects of industrial mercury pollution. This visit rudely awakened him to the too real possibility that Thailand could become a victim of the Japanese government's new policy of "pollution dumping," i.e., switching pollution-producing industries to developing countries (Bangkok Post, April 20 and 22, 1973).

It should be added that as of the present moment, NSCT's planned regional student conference seems to have been indefinitely postponed. This is a healthy sign indicating a mature awareness of the dangers of cooptation that

oppressed peoples must forever be wary of in dealing with the imperialist power structure.

UNDERLYING THE BOYCOTT:

PETROCHEMICAL WAR

While it may be overly optimistic to view Thailand as having the upper hand in the boycott confrontation, concessions were clearly won: i.e., the untieing of ¥46 billion worth of credits and the getting underway of the joint venture petrochemical operation. One could also include the Indonesian "windfall" donations as a byproduct of the boycott.

It remains to be seen of course whether these can be truly considered as gains in Thailand's favor or not. As noted above, the Asahi Shimbun has already predicted that the untied loan benefits will flow back to Japan. It is the petrochemical combine, however, together with the related Malay Peninsula oil-pipeline project (both "gains" granted by MITI in the boycott confrontation) which may require careful scrutiny as time goes on.

The story of the petrochemical plant goes back to April 1969 when the Board of Investment (BOI) of the Thai government approved an application for a petrochemical company submitted by Chow Chowwanyuen (also known as K.Y. Chow), a leading Chinese-Thai industrialist who also runs the Thai Oil Refinery Company (TORC), Thailand's first oil refinery. The approval granted, Chow established the Thai Petrochemical Company (TPC) with 50 % participation by the Shell Group agreed. The Thai petrochemical industry functions in a rather complicated way: TORC sells its products, refined oil or naphtha, to TPC, which produces petrochemical intermediates such as ethylene through a naphtha-cracking ("upstream") process. These products are then sold to the new Japanese plant, which produces a variety of plastics and synthetics ("downstream" process).

At the same time, that TPC was being established, several US and European companies expressed interest in the downstream projects. After successfully applying for BOI promotional privileges, they began negotiating with TPC. It was quite clear to the Japanese interests that participation of Western

capital in the as yet completely undeveloped downstream field would spell the ruin of the Japanese monopoly of the Thai petrochemical market. Within two months, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups had between them submitted eight applications for BOI promotional rights to operate downstream projects. Their offers were so competitive that the Western companies had no alternative but to withdraw. They immediately cancelled their previous applications with BOI. At the very outset, therefore, the petrochemical war featured two major components: a frenzied international struggle for monopoly of the Thai market, and the K.Y. Chow's ambition to extend his influence over the entire petrochemical industrial process. (11)

During the latter part of 1969, the Japanese group had initiated provisional contracts, and indicated that the final contract had to be concluded as soon as they received the promotional certificates from BOI and a go-ahead from MITI. Once it became clear that other foreign companies were no longer in the competition, however, (the anonymous Thai correspondent protests), the Japanese began to slow down. Although they had taken only four months to complete a comprehensive feasibility study, they have delayed the final agreement for three years, during which they sent 28 separate missions to Thailand (to quibble rather than conduct negotiations). Since each team is composed slightly differently from its predecessor, it is able to claim ignorance about what was discussed between the previous teams and TPC. The Japanese continue to add demand after demand in an effort to slow down the process of agreement. They managed to negotiate for themselves an exclusive monopoly for Japanese petrochemical exports to Thailand (more than 90 % of Thailand's total annual petrochemical imports) during the four-year building period of the plants. A more acute point of dispute was the price for ethylene that they will have to purchase from TPC. In response to the Japanese assertion that the price offered by TPC would cause a 3.5 - 7 % rise in the finished product price, the Thai side resentfully noted that the Japanese, during 1972 alone, had already raised their supply price for ethylene by as much as 50 %. The Japanese at one point whipped out their standard scare tactic, intimidating that they might have to import ethylene from their new Iranian combine

(Iranian Chemical Development Corporation), a similar joint venture arrangement between the Mitsui group (Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd., Mitsui Toatsu Industries, Ltd., and Toyo Soda Manufacturing Co., Ltd.) and the state-owned Iranian National Petrochemical Corporation. Few would have suspected that the Thai boycott's ramifications might extend as far as Iran.

Even the UN somehow got involved. An independent study of the new petrochemical combine was carried out in March this year by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). It produced the recommendation that "the government of Thailand should make all possible efforts to bring the present negotiations for the establishment of a petrochemical complex to an early conclusion since conservative market estimates show that, with the exception of polypropylene, the planned major thermoplastics plants will be almost fully loaded in 1976." The study also suggested that it would not be surprising if the Japanese companies concerned were deliberately setting construction estimates and operating costs on the high side, to justify both the deferment of the project for another two years as well as increased prices for the products. (12) The Far Eastern Economic Review report did not explain how and why UNIDO became involved as an advisor. Whether the United Nations organization was a neutral arbiter in this case or whether it was acting on behalf of an interest group can only be guessed at. The question is worthy of being raised, however, since after international organizations would appear to lend themselves to such activities: "It is hard to imagine that the World Bank really expects their pittance to substantially relieve Asian poverty. It is much more credible that they are attempting to create and preserve a climate favourable to foreign investment while building up an infrastructure that will facilitate the exploitation of Asian resources. (13)

After a series of moves and counter-moves between the Japanese and Thai (with the Shell group), a contract was signed on May 19, 1973. The petrochemical combine, to be built at a cost of \$316 million in Sriracha to

last year also included an affirmative the south of Bangkok, is scheduled to start production in 1977. The upstream operation of the Chow-Shell Group will produce 140,000 tons of ethylene and 60,000 tons of propylene yearly, while the Japanese side plans to produce yearly 30,000 tons of high-pressured poly-ethylene (Mitsubishi Petrochemical Co., Ltd.), 30,000 tons of polypropylene and 70,000 tons of low-pressured poly-ethylene (Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd.), 40,000 tons of vinyl-chloride (Mitsui Toatsu Industries, Ltd.), and 20,000 tons of acryl-benzene (Nihon Petrochemical Industries, Ltd.). The other two companies, Mitsui and Co., Ltd., and Mitsubishi Corp., were the initial developers.

The Thai petrochemical combine project had often ramifications in adjacent areas. The National Executive Council of Thailand decided in June last year to grant the Thai Maritime Navigation Company (TMNC), a state enterprise, 50 % of the transport rights for annual Thai crude oil imports. Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Director of Communications, Agriculture and Development, said the decision had been taken because the NEC did not want the country's oil operations to remain in the hands of a few. The NEC's decision was interpreted as a counter move to the recent formation of a crude oil shipping company by a group of Thai and foreign industrialists, which had just been granted investment promotion status by the Board of Investment (headed by Pote Sarasin, Assistant to NEC chairman, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn). It was reported that the company was 70 % Thai owned, with the remaining 30 % capitalization coming from an undisclosed group of foreigners. The prime mover behind the venture, however, is reported to be the same Chow Chowkwanyuen who is managing director of the Thai Oil Refinery Company. These moves of course are quite rational in view of the sharp increase in oil import: expected to result from the new petrochemical combine. It should be noted that it was MITI's go-ahead to the petrochemical combine project, in reaction to the boycott, which led to the establishment of Chow's shipping venture.

It may be recalled at this juncture that MITI's decision of late November

refers to a project to build an oil-pipeline across the Malay Peninsula at Thailand's Isthmus of Kra. Japan is the largest oil importer in the world at present, and 85 % of its oil comes from the Middle East. This means that the better part of Japan's badly needed oil has to pass through the shallow, 300-mile long Straits of Malacca, which is already one of the most dangerously congested passages in the world. The Straits at their narrowest point is only 6 miles wide, and the 200,000-ton tankers, with a draw of over 20 meters, are just able to negotiate the crowded passage. (Japan's giant 500,000-ton tankers have to pass through the Lombok Strait off Bali.) In addition to this, both Malaysia and Indonesia claim 12-mile territorial waterlimits and therefore refuse to recognize the Straits as an international waterway. For Japan, therefore, the Malacca Straits problem is a constant headache, as was intimated in a slip of tongue of Kikawada Kazutaka, key leader of Keidanren, to the effect that the Straits are vital to Japan. Indonesia and Malaysia are of course aware that a secure hold on the Straits will provide them with some leverage against the overwhelming economic might of Japan. It is in this context that the Malay pipeline project assumes importance, for it would not only eliminate the political weakness of Japan, but it would cut a thousand miles or 4 days sailing time off the present route through the Straits of Malacca.

The pipeline is a pet project of Marubeni Corp., a major Japanese trading concern belonging to the Fuji Bank Group. Under Marubeni sponsorship, Japanese engineers started to explore the possibility of the project as early as 1969. (Recall that the petrochemical combine project started in the same year.) Then, in September, 1970, MITI formally approached the Thanom regime with the pipeline project. The Thai government expressed interest and in 1971 Japanese surveyors mapped out several alternative routes. Two government committees were formed, one in Thailand and one in Japan, to evaluate the project.

Then, suddenly, in July, 1972, Japan became reluctant to pursue it, and labeled it not feasible. The Japanese said it would be cheaper for them to rely on giant oil tankers on the lengthy routes for the immediate future. The Japanese finding was challenged by the

National Energy Authority (NEA), which accused the survey team of tampering with the report's figures to make the costs of building the pipeline seem more expensive than the roundabout shipping costs. It was reported that the Japanese decided to back out because of the presence of a number of competitors vying for rights to survey the pipeline project. An American pipeline building company was believed to be running very strong in the "Kra race." (14) It was at this point that the MITI decision of November 1972 came on the scene.

The final decision on the pipeline site has yet to be made but at the present writing the route connecting Ban Kantang on the Indian Ocean and Songkhla on the South China is considered to be most feasible. Pumping stations at both ends of the 150-kilometer line would move oil from the huge 500,000-ton tankers arriving from the Middle East to Thailand's eastern coast, where it would be shipped either to Bangkok or Tokyo in 200,000-ton tankers. (15) The total cost is now estimated to reach US\$400 million.

It is not too difficult to suspect that a number of vested interests and untold human ambitions are involved in a mammoth project of this scale, but what complicates the affair beyond reasonable limits is the presence of a rival proposal for a canal to be cut through the peninsula at almost the same site. Historically the Kra Canal Project, as it is called, goes back to 1793 when King Rama I of Thailand favored it as a military aid in holding off military pressure from Burma. De Lesseps, after he completed the Suez Canal, also visited the Isthmus of Kra in 1881 to investigate the possibility. The Japanese military in the 1930's also showed keen interest in the project. Although there was a report that a Japanese consultant firm started to survey the area in 1968 (Tokyo Shimbun, Jan. 26, 1973) the public revival of the project on the contemporary scene came like a thunderbolt out of the blue in July, 1972 when the National Energy Authority of Thailand announced that the government was investigating three possible routes and that it was hopeful of completing construction in 9 years at a cost of some 9 billion Baht. The NEA plan for the Kra Canal envisages a distance of 155 kilometers at a width of 120 meters and a depth of 18 meters, adequate to

allow 100,000-ton tankers through. Then, along with (or perhaps in competition with) the NEA plan there was the familiar Mr. Chow Chowkwanyuen's canal proposal. The National Executive Council had authorized Chow to make a feasibility study, for which, he contracted an unnamed private firm, believed to be foreign, at a reported cost of Baht 10 million. It was reported however, that this go-ahead for the first stage of Chow's plan does not mean that the NEA is being muscled out of the project. As another enthusiastic backer of the project, the NEA has been allowed to retain its original assignment of doing a mapping survey.

The main stumbling block for the Kra Canal project, however, lies in the fact that the canal will sever Thailand's long, narrow southern peninsula where its four Muslim-dominated provinces are located. It is for security reasons, then, of all things, that the prospects for the canal do not appear exceedingly bright. (16)

A coldblooded analysis of the situation should make it clear to all the Thai parties running in this race that Japan considers either the canal or the pipeline project to be of vital interest to it. Japan's ever accelerating demand for oil will, sooner or later, force it to face up to the problem of the Malacca Straits. Accordingly, astute Thai will have room to maneuver in their power game with the Japanese giant. And, only too aware of this, Japan is somewhat skeptical about whether either of the projects can go smoothly. It is interesting to note in this connection that a Singaporean observer questioned whether interest in the Kra canal project was genuine at all; it could very well be taken as a ploy to secure Japan's irrevocable commitment to the pipeline project. (17) One thing is certain, however: The one person who has everything to gain, regardless of which project is finally decided upon, is Mr. Chow.

EPILOGUE

The significance of the Thai boycott of Japanese goods has two aspects: On the one hand, it constitutes a serious warning to a Japan just now beginning to flex its neo-imperialist muscles in an apparent way, as the gears of

government and big business begin to mesh; on the other hand, it may be taken as the battle-cry of Asia against this same neo-imperialism, i.e., a call, to all Asian peoples to join in a common front. It is to be regretted, of course, that there was effectively no popular response on the part of the Japanese people, and that what potential there was for a coordinated effort among Thailand's neighbors was stifled, as in Indonesia. At the same time, it must be noted that the Japanese power structure and its Thai counterpart were quick to exploit the boycott and turn it to their own ends, ultimately nullifying or distorting its original meaning. There can be no denying that the international coordination of the world's imperialist powers is at this point far in advance of that which can be realized by those who struggle against them.

In spite of this, the boycott movement must be seen as a breakthrough; the fact that Thai voices were able to be heard at all is an inspiration to all engaged in the struggle. To those voices, without which this study could not have been made, we express our deepest appreciation.

NOTES:

- (1) Bangkok Post, Nov.21,1972
- (2) Re-translated from Jishu Koza, No.21, Dec.10, 1972
- (3) Pacific Basin Reports, Mar.15, 1973, p.59
- (4) Foreign Industry in Thailand (Taikoku ni okeru Gaikoku-kigyo no Shinshutsu-jokyo), Nihon-Keizai-chosa-kyogikai, Mar., 1973, p.19. This is the most up-to-date manual for Japanese capital interested in Thailand. It contains detailed information on the industrial promotion policy of the Thai government, on the infrastructure, on land prices, wages, and labor conditions.
- (5) Mainichi Simbun, Nov.26, 1972. The survey also revealed the mixed feelings of many Thais resulting from their forced dependence on the Japanese industrial presence in Thailand. While expressing their resentment of the latter, more than half admitted they felt that Japanese investment had also been beneficial to the Thai economy.
- (6) Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nov.28,1972. The IDA (Industrial Development Associ-

ation) is a World Bank affiliate which exclusively funds infrastructural projects in developing countries.

(7) Saburo Ohkita, a leading development and overseas investment strategist who is now the head of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, at a panel discussion sponsored by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. in Oct. 1972 (one month prior to the Thai boycott), proposed the creation of an Asian "Marshall Plan" as an international complement to Mr. Tanaka's Remodelling of the Japanese Archipelago Program. He predicted that the Remodelling scheme would necessarily lead to a Japanese initiated "remodelling" of Southeast Asia. While Japanese development in Asia would contribute to higher GNPs and improved trade balances for Southeast Asian countries, it would also lead to even greater income differentials within the individual country. Mr. Ohkita expressed anxiety that such a situation might lead to social tension which could be exploited by the People's Republic of China while Japan would find itself without adequate means of countering it. Although the thrust of Mr. Ohkita's argument speaks for itself, we may note that he specifically envisages the benefits of "added value" products resulting from capital investment in petrochemical combines, etc., going to the rich shareholders, with no discernible impact on the lives of the poor masses of Thailand.

Mr. Ohkita's organ, the OELF, may be expected to offer ¥4 billion in loans and credits over the next ten years, calculated at a rate of 1 per cent of Japan's GNP. Σ MHI, No.1, 1973, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

(8) Students to the left of the political spectrum, who had struggled actively against the US occupation of Okinawa, the Japan-US Security Treaty, the US invasion of Vietnam, etc, were notably lax in responding to the issues raised by the Thai students. This was due partly to their ongoing preoccupation with the internal Japanese front and partly to their lack of means of communicating with NSCT, although it would not have been impossible for them to dispatch a mission to Thailand, had they been a bit less inclined toward theory and idealism.

(continued on p.37)

A MYTH OF MEDICINE A Warning to the World on Internal Pollution

by Takahashi Kosei

Japan now ranks second only to the United States in world-wide production of drugs. Although most of these drug products are consumed domestically, about 3% are exported, particularly to Southeast Asia. Included in this 3% are drugs which were originally developed abroad, but which are now being produced in Japan, as well as drugs like Alinamin and Gronsan, which have been both developed and produced here.

The year 1961 marked the rise of two popular movements against drugs being marketed on a mass scale in Japan. The first was a citizens' campaign to call attention to the low level of reliability of the Drug Authorization Law, which is the yardstick used by the Welfare Ministry in approving new drugs. The second was a protest movement demanding action with regard to severe physical harm attributed to a variety of drugs, including several brands of sleeping pills, thalidomide, and intestinal drugs such as chinoform. While superficially distinct and provoked by different events, both these movements in fact spring from a common ground: Both are the result of the intensification of the contradictions of the capitalist system of medical care adopted, without adequate reflection, during the Meiji period. In much the same way, direct contamination of the human body, it should be added, is substantially the same as "drug pollution," or contamination of the environment, which is ultimately responsible for such afflictions as Minamata disease (caused by the presence of organic mercury in factory wastes), Itai-itai disease (caused by mining wastes), and Yokkaichi asthma (caused by poisonous gases emitted in factory smoke).

Today, these "blessings" of Japanese medicine are not the exclusive

privilege of the Japanese people. Japanese drug manufacturers are seeing to it that the benefits are also extended to the peoples of Southeast Asia via the auspices of their own local medical care facilities. Takeda Drugs, inc., Japan's largest manufacturer of drug products, is in the process of setting up mergers in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and other nations. As Japanese, it is our duty to inform the people of these areas as to the nature of the "blessings" they can expect to reap from these activities. As Japanese citizens who are severely critical of these products ourselves, we must not allow them to be "exported" to the detriment of the people of Southeast Asia.

WHAT ARE DRUGS?


When the human body is in a subpar condition or when it is afflicted by disease, health may generally be restored by adequate rest and dietary regulation. Over the long course of biological history, living organisms have developed within themselves natural restorative powers, which generally allow us to recover in a natural way. In cases where these natural restorative powers are weak, however, or where the disease-causing mechanism is excessively strong, people tend to use drugs in an effort to restore health.

Why not just take drugs right away? Why bother with rest and diet at all?

The answer should be obvious. Drugs are fundamentally different substances from the foods which the human species, in its centuries of evolution, has selected out of nature and become accustomed to. To repeat what has been said many times, drugs are basically poisons which are alien to the human body. Let

us take, for example, a situation where pneumobacilli are rapidly multiplying in the lungs. In this case we have no choice but to rely on the use of antibiotics, which are a poison produced by molds. The antibiotics, by combining with the pneumobacilli and robbing them of their life force, permit the sick person to recover from the disease. At the same time, however, other cells exist in the human bone (in the bone marrow, liver and kidney) which have the same organic composition as pneumobacilli and which share common elements in their enzymes and cell structures. A person to whom antibiotics are administered will thus inevitably sustain a certain amount of damage to these organs. In exchange for avoiding death by pneumonia now, he runs an increased risk of contracting diseases in these organs in the future.

As we can see from this example, in order to determine whether or not a chemical substance should be used as a drug, it is necessary to measure the potential good it may yield against possible harm it may result in. Yet, in a society like Japan, where drugs are above all commodities, it is not surprising that pharmaceutical companies distort the results of such evaluations in order to play up the beneficial effects, while playing down, and often concealing, the harm that may result. This leads them to play up to the egos



of the scientists they hire to carry out tests on their products, and sometimes even to offer them funds in excess of those necessary for their research. Under such conditions, the objectivity of the tests can only be suspect, and the results generally predictable.

DRUG TESTING

The scientific testing of a drug involves several stages. First, the drug is administered to test animals in order to demonstrate effectiveness (realization of the intended medical effect) and of safety (lack of significant unintended side-effects). Once these have been demonstrated, sick people potentially interested in participating in experiments may be approached. A patient who, after adequate explanation, agrees of his own free will to become a subject of the experiment must express his consent in writing. Participation in the experiment may be expected to benefit the patient provided the intended effects are realized. But it is also imperative that at the time of the experiment, there exists no possibility of using a superior means of treating his illness, and that full preparation has been made to care for him in the event that any harmful side-effects occur.

The volunteer patients are put on standard treatment with the best available nursing care, and then divided into two groups. One group receives doses of the drug being tested, while the other receives placebos. After a prescribed number of days, the symptoms of the patients are recorded, and an average value for the test results (which reflect these symptoms) is calculated. Statistical confirmation is required to assure that the differentials recorded do not result from accidental discrepancies.

The purpose of carrying out the simultaneous relative comparison is to allow for cases involving a natural or psychological cure; statistical calculation of the differential between the two groups is necessary to determine whether or not the over-all effectiveness of the drug has been great enough to compensate for accidental, individual discrepancies within the groups.

In England, scientific quality testing of this kind has been in existence since the end of World War II; in the U.S. too, it has been the rule since the passage of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Law Amendment of 1961. In Japan, however, while as early as 1961 young people were voicing strong criticism of the fact that drug testing did not conform to approved scientific procedure, it was not until the passage of the Drug Approval Law Revision in October 1967 that proper testing began to be generally practiced.

The intensifying pressure of the citizens movement has also led the Japanese government to institute retesting of the approximately 40,000 drugs approved prior to October 1967. Unfortunately, inasmuch as the scientists appointed to the committee in charge of the retesting are the same ones who in the past cooperated closely with the drug companies, and since they are using data provided by the very companies whose products are being inspected, one cannot but be skeptical that significant results will be produced.

Mention should also be made in this connection of two glaring weaknesses inherent in the standard type of report results both in Japan and in many other countries. There is first of all a noticeable tendency to rely on the faulty logic of what we may describe as "applied, cured, works." While applica-

tion of a certain medicine may coincide with the cure of an illness, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the medicine is effective. The type of circumstances and discrepancies which make such assumptions invalid have already been discussed in detail above.

A second critical deficiency in test reports is the pathetic shortage of information they contain with regard to the harmful effects of the drugs they deal with. In applying for authorization to market a new drug in Japan, the law requires that clinical data from 150 cases be presented. However, not only do the standards for specifying what is a harmful effect vary considerably from report to report, but also many companies fail to even present the full 150 cases required. Moreover, harmful effects documented in the original data are often omitted or else favorably interpreted in the final report.

Another consideration which is glossed over in favor of the company is that drug effectiveness tests are often carried out in university hospitals or similar institutions where the test groups benefit from standardized living conditions--e.g. quiet surroundings, hospital food, etc. The harmful effects observed under these conditions may satisfy the Health Ministry, but it should be clear that once on the market, the drug will be consumed by people of widely varying constitutions and circumstances. The same drug in the same doses may very differently affect diverse groups of the population, ranging from small children to grown-up persons, from young girls to women during their menstrual periods or pregnancy, from laborers engaged in strenuous work subsisting on a meager diet to rich people who live leisurely lives and enjoy gourmet food. As a result, both the types and the rate of occurrence of these harmful effects will be multiplied many times over. For these reasons, unless the individual is fortunate enough to reside in a country with a post-sale drug supervision system which rapidly relays information on harmful effects to the users, he cannot rely on the safety of the drugs available to him. It is especially regrettable that Japan has had such a system for several years now, but has not seen fit to make it work as it might.

"SPECIAL" VITAMIN B1 - ALINAMIN

Among any people whose staple food is rice, particularly refined white rice, there is the danger of the occurrence of widespread Vitamin B1 deficiency and beri-beri. The only effective counter-measure for a population in this situation would be to eliminate its dependency on refined white rice and to supplement its diet with foods rich in Vitamin B1. Postwar Japan, however, rather than adopting this socially sound policy, chose instead to popularize the drinking of "preventive" Vitamin B1 drinks manufactured by drug companies. In support of this campaign, a vast promotional effort was launched to make "health drugs" acceptable on a mass scale. Also appearing around this time was fortified rice, i.e. white rice to which is added Vitamin B1 and a host of other Vitamin additives in such a way they will be retained even during cooking.

The human body, as we have noted, has evolved a number of ingenious mechanisms to protect itself from harmful substances. It is also able to regulate the amount of certain substances which if absorbed to excess might prove dangerous. One such substance is Vitamin B1 (an amino structure) which the body requires in limited quantities, but which, if allowed to penetrate the inner organs in excessive amounts, i.e., through subcutaneous or intravenous injection, results in such symptoms as an accelerated peristaltic movement in the colon, a lowering of blood pressure, and allergy or shock when the Vitamin B1 fuses with certain protein substances.

How does the body see to it that just the right amount of Vitamin B1 is absorbed? Vitamin B1 in its pure liquid state cannot penetrate the stomach or intestinal wall since its cell membranes are lined with fat. In order for Vitamin B1 to enter the internal organs at all, it must first be combined with a fat absorbent substance known as phosphoric acid. This is accomplished by an organ located in the upper part of the small intestine. The crucial fact here, however, is that there is a biological limit of about 10 milligrams of Vitamin B1 which can be taken into combination with phosphoric

acid at a time. As a rule, therefore, there is no danger of unlimited absorption of Vitamin B1, regardless of the amount consumed.

In 1948, in Vitamin B1-deficient Japan, it was discovered that extract of garlic, a popular traditional fortifier, seemingly had this very effect. Moreover, when this devitalized Vitamin B1 was given to animals with artificially induced beri-beri, it had an extraordinary curative effect. On the other hand, when the amount of devitalized Vitamin B1 absorbed by the same animals was measured, it was found that, while ordinary Vitamin B1, it had penetrated the innermost parts of the body in apparently unlimited quantities. In spite of this indication that consumption of the Vitamin B1-garlic compound posed definite risks to health, Takeda Drugs, Inc., in concert with the Kyoto University researchers, made certain changes in the composition of the substance and received permission to market it under the brand name Alinamin (a combination of the technical names for the two components, garlic (*alium*) and Vitamin B1 (*thiamin*)) in 1954. On the heels of this development, the drug companies, with large amounts of funds, mobilized large numbers of scientists to conduct research on Alinamin designed to extend the drug's applicability to almost all illnesses. Inspection of the hundreds of pages of reports produced at that time, however, reveals that they suffer from the same prescientific logic of "applied, cured, works," which has throughout prevented the Japanese medical profession from fulfilling its responsibility.

This notwithstanding, Alinamin quickly made its way onto the list of medicines approved for use in health insurance programs and, thanks to a big sell from Japan's rapidly developing mass media, it came to be used in large quantities by the general population. Originally sold in tablets of 5 mg., after 1961 Alinamin began to appear in large tablets of 25, 50, and even 100 mg. Against the backdrop of Japan's extraordinarily expanding economy and an accompanying mood of euphoria, the Alinamin campaign got into full gear with its new slogan: "Big dose therapy." The erroneous and extremely dangerous idea that this highly

suspect drug should be absorbed in large doses was innocently accepted by both doctors and the public at large. Meanwhile, the drug capitalists thrived.


In 1965 I decided to do a systematic investigation of the existing clinical literature on Alinamin. I tried to show how these studies almost without exception lacked even the rudiments of acceptable scientific procedure, and how they invariably failed to provide any objective evidence of the effectiveness of Alinamin. Unfortunately, this revelation did not make much of an impact.

In the summer of 1969, thanks to the cooperation of students, nurses, and others, I was able to conduct an experimental study on the effects of Alinamin. Over 190 volunteers were divided into two groups; a dose of 50 mg a day of Alinamin was administered to one group, while the other received placebos. 38 initial symptoms were observed over a twenty-day period. Statistical analysis of the final results established that subjects using Alinamin had experienced absolutely no alleviation of symptoms such as fatigue and languidness. In fact, they displayed an unexpectedly high incidence of other nervous symptoms such as headaches, dullness, absent-mindedness, and irritation. This observation prompted me to reexamine all the earlier treatises describing animal experiments with Alinamin, which confirmed my suspicion that the substance was indeed a possible source of harm.

Another important discovery was made in the course of examining these treatises: the Surgical Institute of Nagoya University, as far back as 1930's, had observed that consumption of large quantities of garlic (a constituent component of Alinamin) caused structural weakening of the red corpuscles, leading to anemia, and even supported this with research on animals. All of this had been reported in academic journals at the time.

In 1954, researchers for Takeda Drugs reported that the addition of Alinamin to liquid containing red corpuscles greatly increased the concentrations of Vitamin B1 in the corpuscles. From 1961 to 1965, moreover, it was reported by researchers at Kyoto and Okayama Universities that, while the injection of

pure Vitamin B1 speeded up the growth of human cells raised in test tubes, Alinamin inhibited that growth. There can be no doubt that it was the same factor which gave rise to these reports and the observations made at Nagoya University.



In 1970, it was finally ascertained that Alinamin's capacity to increase Vitamin B1 concentrations in the cells is due to its fat dissolving capacity which allows it to permeate cell walls. It is precisely this fat dissolving capacity which gives rise to one of the harmful effects of Alinamin. The increasing concentration of Vitamin B1 results in functional cell damage. The resulting effects may include stomach and intestinal damage, nerve damage, anemia, post-natal hemorrhaging, birth deformities, etc.

A stimulatory effect on the autonomous nerves is a second type of injury which has been related to Alinamin. It has been known for quite some time that the combination of Vitamin B1 and garlic, by inhibiting a certain kind of enzyme located in the tips of the autonomous nerves, keeps these nerves in a state of perpetual stimulation. This

may cause such problems as frequent defecation and urination.

A third harmful effect results from the fact that when Vitamin B1 fuses with organic protein it produces an antigen, which may give rise to a state of intense shock in the body, possibly even leading to death.

In April 1970, I published a book in which I detailed these facts for the general public, and urged that the government suspend the sale of Alinamin. Since then, sales did decline by about half, and advertising became somewhat less aggressive; the government, however, has yet to resolve that Alinamin should be taken off the market.

In Japan itself, therefore, the revelation of the facts about Alinamin suggest that it will not afflict Japanese too much longer. Takeda Drugs does not seem about to take this defeat lying down, however. In a determined effort to salvage its profits, it is seeking to export its surplus production to Southeast Asia. It is not unlikely, in fact, that the motivation for the recent mergers in Southeast Asian countries is precisely to force down the throats of their populations the bitter pill which the Japanese people are now refusing to swallow.

Beware! Anyone seeking medicine for Vitamin B1 deficiency is urged to rely on ordinary Vitamin B1, and to avoid Alinamin and all similar green B1 derivatives.


GRONSAN LIVER MEDICINE: A DETOXICANT

For years, Japanese scientists and drug companies clung to a pious belief in the anti-toxic powers of a liver medicine known as Gronsan, produced by a small firm, Chugai Drugs. Originally developed in the Pharmacology Department of Tokyo University in 1951, Gronsan's main component is Glucron acid, a close relative of glucose which is known for its tendency to detoxify poisons absorbed by the body by combining with them and forming precipitates which are then excreted in the urine. This extraordinary capaci-



ty of glucron acid has been known to science for the last hundred years. What the researchers and their employers (Japanese drug companies) never saw fit to investigate was whether artificially manufactured Glucron acid has the same capacity as the natural substance.

The Japanese medical profession is guilty of shameful ignorance, if not outright neglect, of foreign research done on precisely this question. I personally became aware of this in 1961, when I was invited to participate in a research conference sponsored by Chugai Drugs: To my amazement, I there realized that the majority of Japan's liver pathologists were completely ignorant of the existence of available scientific methods for testing drug effectiveness. My shock at this led me, together with several friends, to track down all available information, both in Japan and abroad, relating to glucron acid. In the course of our work, we found that the subject had in fact been thoroughly researched in America, where results having direct bearing on the production of Gronsan had been reported as far back as 1955. According to the U.S. reports, during its formation process in the liver, natural glucron acid is combined with a high energy substance known as V.D.P. When the glucron acid comes in contact with poisons, it is the V.D.P. which provides the crucial energy for fusion.

It would seem that Chugai's drug researchers, when they assembled their "data" for the drug permit application for Gronsan in 1951, were completely oblivious to the possibility that the artificially produced glucron acid might lack the crucial component which



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enabled the natural acid to act as a detoxicant. Here again their disregard for proper scientific procedure was only too evident.

As soon as our discovery was reported and became generally known in Japan, sales of Gronsan went down by 90%. This did not stop the drug manufacturers, however. Within no time at all, they had trotted out the tried and true "big dose therapy" slogan, which they applied to both the domestic and export varieties of Gronsan, and had launched a new propaganda campaign, extending the "curative" powers of Gronsan to acute inflammation of the liver.

NERVE DAMAGE CAUSED BY CHINIFORM POISONING: SMON

Early in 1955, clusters of people manifesting symptoms of cerebrospinal meningitis accompanied by intestinal ailments were discovered in various parts of Japan. The cause of the affliction was unknown. After a rash of outbreaks in limited areas of Japan during the summer, the phenomenon began to die down. With the cause of the disease

still unknown, the symptoms were given the name Subacute Myloptico Neuropathy, abbreviated as SMON. After this first outbreak, the number of victims swelled so rapidly that by 1970 the number of recorded cases had reached about 10,000, including 500 dead, 200 totally blind, and a wide range of other disabilities. Almost all victims suffered partial eye damage, and some degree of immobilization. Of the worst cases, those who were lucky were able to get around with crutches or wheel chairs; the others lay immobile in their beds.

Numerous scientists set about trying to elucidate the cause of the disease. Their early results tended to confirm the initial and erroneous impression that the symptoms were contagious, with the result that the victims found themselves outcasts society. Thus, in addition to the severe physical and economic consequences of the disease, SMON patients had to endure the extreme psychological and personal suffering imposed by this social stigma. In not a few instances, this burden exceeded the limits of human endurance: the number of suicides of SMON patients is already above 10.

In early 1970, a joint research team from the Neurology Clinic and Pharmacology Department of Tokyo University began to investigate the cause of a greenish coating discovered on the tongues of SMON victims. They were able to conclude that this substance was a compound formed from Chinoform and iron. However, since chinoform was being tested at that time as a possible cure for SMON, it remained unclear whether chinoform had actually caused the SMON or whether the green coating was just a side-effect which accompanied the use of the drug.

A study was subsequently launched comparing data on a group of patients sharing identical hospital conditions, half of whom had been using chinoform and half of whom had not. When the results of this investigation were published, and the incidence of SMON relative to the amount of chinoform administered calculated, it became certain beyond a doubt that chinoform was the cause of the disease.

On September 8, 1970, the Japanese Government announced that it was

suspending the production and sale of chionoform. In March of the next year, the government-funded SMON Research Investigation and Consultation Center announced that subsequent to the ban on the sale of chionoform, the incidence of SMON disease sharply decreased, and that 84% of SMON cases so far investigated had occurred in persons using chionoform-based drugs. On the basis of these and other facts, the Center concluded that "Chionoform is the cause of SMON in the majority of cases."

(Chionoform is used in a number of internationally produced drugs, the best-known of which are the world-famous Swiss CIBA products Enterovioform and Mexaform, marketed in Japan by Takeda Drugs. Emaform, produced and marketed by Tanabe Drugs in Japan, also contains chionoform.)

But if the use of chionoform drugs extends over such a large geographical area, why, we may ask, is it only in Japan that SMON disease has occurred on such a large scale, while in other countries it is comparatively rare?

There are several reasons. First, in contrast to the U.S., which has for some time now restricted the use of chionoform to such disorders as amoebic dysentery, Japan has actually extended its application to include almost every conceivable stomach and intestinal disorder.

Secondly, while some countries, aware of chionoform's high absorptive and accumulative capacity, limit dosages to a maximum of 0.5 gr. per dose and 1.0 gr. per day, Japanese drug companies have boosted dosage amounts as high as 2.4 gr./day.

Thirdly, although some countries stipulate that during prolonged treatment, 10-day administration periods be alternated with 7-day intervals of non-administration, Japan has no limits of this kind at all.

Fourthly, in foreign countries, chionoform drugs generally carry a warning to the user to stop taking the drug immediately in the event of severe stomach-ache and diarrhea. In Japan, however, no such information is provided.

A final factor influencing the Japanese situation derives from the distinctive structure of the Japanese health insurance system. Japanese health insurance regulations are structured in such a way that hospitals and clinics (which dispense their own medicines) derive greater profits the greater the amount of medicines they prescribe. Since, moreover, health insurance guarantees reimbursement for all medical expenses incurred, there is a strong tendency to prescribe large quantities of drugs.

At the present time, several hundred SMON victims are pressing suits against the government for neglect of its responsibility in supervising drug sales and against the drug companies for neglect of responsibility in marketing chionoform. They are simultaneously trying to engage these two in direct negotiations over the payment of damage claims for the physical suffering they have sustained. In this effort, they have not feared to use their handicapped bodies as best they can, and, on crutches and in wheelchairs, have brought their cause before the public eye.



The victims, however, face a subtle legal problem. For while there remains effectively no doubt that chionoform is the cause of SMON disease, it is rather difficult to show that the government or drug companies were in a position to foresee the potential harm at the time. There are two other events which may complicate the determination of the degree to which foresight was possible. On the one hand, there is the fact that the Swedish government, alarmed by the appearance of several apparent cases of SMON, prohibited all preventive use of the drug in early 1969, informing all domestic companies (including CIBA) marketing chionoform-based drugs of this measure. On the other hand, an explanation must be sought for the anomalous fact that, although chionoform continued to be prescribed in several areas of Japan even after the Swedish government's action, the incidence rate of SMON in these areas dropped sharply by 1/3 to 1/4 between the first and second halves of this year. This fact suggests that the composition of chionoform-based drugs may have changed in that time.

By calling the government to account for the SMON tragedies, the trial launched by the SMON patients resembles the well-known Thalydomide trial. In the great numbers of afflicted victims it involves, however, the SMON case is different from other Japanese cases involving diseases caused by industrial pollution (such as Minamata disease, Yokkaichi asthma, and Itai-itai disease) and closer in nature to cases involving processed food pollution such as the Morinaga Milk case (in which arsenic was found to have been mixed into milk during the manufacturing process) and the Kanemi Oil Case (where cooking oil was found to be contaminated with PCB). All the more because it is a case with such far-reaching social implications, we can only hope that the appeal of the SMON victims will not be limited to a court struggle within the system. Its objective should be rather a broad social indictment, spearheaded by a citizens movement, and calling to account before the world the scholars, administrators, and leaders of industry whose narrow social vision is the root cause of their excruciating pain. ■■

AN APPEAL

Keeping an Eye on Drugs Imported from Japan

We, the members of the People's Association to Inspect Drugs (PAID) wish to join with those of you whose countries are menaced by the threat of drug pollution from Japan in blocking the export of dangerous drugs. Therefore we appeal to you:

1. To send a list of any drugs which your country imports from Japan to the following address:

K. Takahashi
516 Minamitanaka, Nerimaku, Tokyo, Japan

We will investigate these drugs and inform you of their reliability.

2. To send (in Latin, if possible) drug inventories used by doctors in your countries. We will send you the results of our investigations.
3. Furthermore, if you are aware of any Japanese drug firm which is attempting to make inroads into your country, please send whatever information you have to us, particularly if that firm is planning to set up production locally. We are in a position to provide concrete and useful information with regard to such activities. With your co-operation we will seek to prevent the production abroad of any drug which has already been found to be hazardous by the people of Japan.

Medical Imperialism: SEAMHO And Its Background

by Kaji Etsuko

"During the days of Imperialism in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Christian missionaries played an important role as the vanguard for acquiring colonies. Today, in the 20th Century, missionaries can no longer play that role effectively. Today medical teams, fully aware of their role, can most effectively lead Japan into the backward countries of Asia and Africa, economically and politically; they can help establish Japan's dominant power over there."

This frank remark, revealing the real nature of Japan's medical aid programs, appeared in 1965 in the weekly paper of the Japanese medical community, *Ujishinpo*, in an article written by Hasegawa Shuji. Hasegawa was then the president of the Society for Tropical Medicine (Nippon Nettai Igakukai). Today he is president of Gumma University.

Over the last decade or more there has been mounting interest among business and government circles in Japan in promoting medical cooperation as a part of Japan's technical aid program. But Japan's technical aid has never been meaningful because it has always been used, as Dr. Hasegawa suggested, to further Japan's expansionist foreign policy. There is indeed an urgent need for better medical services among the people of Asia. Thus one should be even more critical of Japan's tendency to use superficial humanistic aid such as medical cooperation in a selfish and narrow attempt to gain foreign markets and expand her power.

Widespread anti-Japanese sentiment throughout Asia has forced the Japanese ruling class to shift its emphasis somewhat away from financial aid toward technical aid or "cooperation," but it is simply a front. It is one of the

best means for Japanese imperialists to tamper with the social, cultural, and institutional environment to prepare the ground for additional investment and expanding power by mitigating anti-Japanese sentiment.

Between 1966 and September, 1972, nearly 950 medical experts were sent in traveling clinics to Asian countries. In 1971, 850 million yen were spent on "medical cooperation," such as sending doctors or experts abroad, gifts of medical equipment, etc. ¥ 700 million were spent for the construction of Choulai Hospital in South Vietnam.

Back in the days of the Colombo Project, which Japan joined in 1954, medical "cooperation" used to be carried out on a government-to-government basis. But since about 1966, Japanese business and political organizations and medical agencies, have worked hard to establish a collective effort at medical cooperation -- the Asia Medical Organization -- to promote this aid undertaking. These efforts have culminated in the establishment of the South East Asian Medical Health Organization (SEAMHO), proposed by the Japanese government at the 7th South East Asian Ministerial Conference for Development (Saigon, Dec., 1972), and embodied in a draft treaty agreed to in March, 1973.

The purposes of SEAMHO sound innocent enough. As stated in the preface to the March, 1973, draft, SEAMHO "will contribute to the improvement of people's health and to the eradication of diseases in South East Asian countries." Ten Asian countries are expected to join: Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, and Burma. The World Health Organization,

and the South East Asian Educational Organization will also join as members, and the International Medical Foundation of Japan (IMFJ) will be an observer.

In fact, it was the IMFJ that had the leading role in creating the Asian Medical Organization and SEAMHO. This foundation was organized in September, 1967, as the successor to the Overseas Medical Cooperation Association. This outfit was, in turn, one of the sub-groups of the ad hoc External Economic Cooperation Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The Board of Directors of the Foundation is made up of representatives from big pharmaceutical companies, medical equipment manufacturers, banks, and construction companies. Former Premier Kishi Nobosuke (a member of the wartime Tojo cabinet) is its honorary president, and former president of the Bank of Japan Ichimada Naoto, is its president. Takemi Taro, president of Japan Medical Doctors' Association; Uemura Kogoro, president of Keidanren, (the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations); Kikawada Kazutaka, president of Tokyo Electric Power Co.; Senga Tetsuya, chairman of Keidanren's Defense Industry Committee, and other leading figures in Japan's new Zaibatsu are members of the committee.

The plan that this group of business leaders and politicians presented to Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in September, 1967, embodied their grand vision of an expansionist Japan, a Japan cloaked in the veils of humanism and "cooperation". It is worth looking at this plan in some detail for the motives behind the medical aid program.

The system of government-to-government cooperation had, by that time, broken down. There were not enough resources in the budget to support any expansion of the existing program. Yet the need was increasing, especially in Asian countries, for the brain drain had so reduced the numbers of trained medical personnel that Japanese doctors simply could not fill the needs. They saw an urgent need to establish an international medical institution to train doctors, and stressed the uses of such an institution in standardizing the pharmacopoeia of the various countries and the vary-

ing licensing systems. Asian students trained in Japanese medical schools have great difficulty passing the examinations upon their return home, and Japanese doctors working in South East Asia have almost no chance to earn such licenses. Standardization of pharmacopoeia along Japanese lines would make it much easier for Japan's big drug companies to build up their export market. As Welfare Minister Sonoda remarked when he learned of the AMO plan, "Today Japan exports only 4% of its total pharmaceutical production, but the world is changing in ways favorable to the industry. That is why I support the AMO plan."

Foreign Minister Miki also stressed its advantages: "We have invested quite a lot of money in financial cooperation. But only a little cooperation in the medical area will bring back much more advantage than economic aid. And one of the leading heart doctors in Japan, Dr. Sakakibara, said: "Japanese doctors can exercise a strong influence on backward countries by working with the doctors of those countries. I am convinced that they will discover a lot in Japan and will come to buy things from us." (In July, 1968, Dr. Sakakibara was sent to Indonesia to perform operations.)

The IMFJ group stressed the humanism and political neutrality of medical aid, that it alone among all kinds of "cooperation" had never been attacked on political grounds. The more 'backward' a country, the higher the status that doctors enjoy. Their opinions carry political weight. If Japan can train large numbers of doctors, it can help bring up the future leaders of Asia and, at the same time, undermine the grip of graduates of American and European universities in these lands.

As originally proposed, the Asia Medical Organization aroused considerable opposition in South East Asian countries. It was too blatant.

So the Japanese gave up the idea of establishing an international medical university; training is to take place in each individual country. The Japanese also agreed to allow the word "health" to appear in the name of the organization, for other coun-

tries emphasized the importance of practical efforts to improve public health and sanitation instead of concentrating solely on fancy research institutions.

Thus the Asia Medical Organization became the "South East Asian Medical Health Organization" (SEAMHO).

At present SEAMHO plans to train doctors, recruit and train para-medical staff people, establish research and clinic centers, and build an international medical center. Japan will finance the establishment of the organization and will share administrative expenses with other member countries. In fiscal year 1973 Japan has appropriated ¥150 million (about \$575 thousand) for the project; this represents double the previous year's appropriation for medical "cooperation." ¥29 million is to go for the medical information center.

Meanwhile, there have been a series of moves closely related with the SEAMHO plan. For example, standardization of pharmacopoeia in Asia has been promoted since 1966. The president of Japan Pharmacist Association, Ishidate Morizo, organized the Federation of Asian Pharmacists, whose general meeting in Bangkok in December 1972, decided to set up a "Pharmaceutical System Information Center" as a step toward a standard Asian pharmacopoeia. By the way, Ishidate was a professor at Tokyo University. He is famous for the invention of **Gronsan** and played an important role in the Pharmaceutical Council which gives permission to drug companies to manufacture and sell new drugs. He is also the president of Christian Overseas Medical Cooperation Association in Japan. Ishidate once said that to standardize medicine systems in Asia is necessary not only for expansion of Japanese export but also for acquisition of special raw materials for drugs that are in short supply in Japan. A model for the International Medical Information Center has already been set up in the medical department of Keio University since last April.

Recently, medical students in Japan organized the National Federation of Medical Students and launched a struggle against SEAMHO. They criti-

cized SEAMHO as an instrument of economic and social exploitation of the people of Southeast Asia. They pointed out the probability this kind of medical cooperation may turn into a means for establishing political and military control in Southeast Asia. They point to the precedent in Japanese history for using medical aid for imperial purposes.

The "Dojin-kai" (literally "Universalist Association"), played a vanguard role in the aggressive war in China. In fact, imperialists admit that they have learned the important role of medical teams from the "Dojin-kai," as Hasegawa Shuji has pointed out. In July, 1969, Takemi Taro wrote in "The Medical Cooperation of Japan", the organ of IMFJ. "I'm convinced that international medical cooperation of Japan originated in 'Dojin-kai'. Its founder, Ishiguro Tadanao, used to be an Inspector General of the Surgeon General. He thought that medical care was the best means to 'apologize' to the Chinese people for the serious damage done to them during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and to promote friendly relationship between China and Japan. Energetically he organized doctors and nurses who had been discharged from military service in China to start medical programs there. Soon the activities of the Association were spread throughout and it became an instrument of Japanese policy there. The Dojin-kai was never (sic) attacked even during the most severe periods of the anti-Japanese movement in China. Finally through the activities of Dojin-kai Japanese medicines swept all over China."

In its official history, it is said that the Dojin-kai Foundation was established with the purpose of making: "medical science, pharmacy and those techniques widely available to Asian countries in order to protect the health of the people, to save them from sickness as well as strengthen the tie between Japan and the recipient country so that peace in Asia shall be maintained and Asia can be led to the level of modern civilization." No one is surprised to find almost identical language in the preface of the treaty of SEAMHO.

Let us look briefly at what the Dojin-kai did during Japan's aggressive

war against China. As the anti-Japanese movement reached its height in 1937, all hospitals got into trouble and some of them in Hankow, Jingtao, and Chinan were finally forced to close down. But less than six months later after the arrival of the Japanese occupation army, the association once again formed medical teams for the treatment and prevention of epidemics. Naturally, their activities were carried out under the command of the Japanese occupation army. In 1942, there were more than 70 clinics and bases of Dojin-kai in the whole of China and around 5,000 medical experts were mobilized. Part of their activities were integrated into the bacteriological warfare conducted by the Japanese army.

One cannot discuss Japanese germ warfare without mentioning the notorious 731st Corps (or Ishii corps after the commander's name) which developed and conducted the most cruel war in China. First, they killed almost 4,000 Chinese and Russians for the purposes of experimentation. Between 1939 and 1945, the 731st Corps, almost 3,000 Japanese, conducted at least seven major operations; it dropped plague fleas from airplanes distributed cholera germs, typhoid germs or paratyphoid germs into wells, reservoirs, and houses; gave cakes containing bacteria to more than 3,000 POWs and scattered cookies loaded with bacteria around villages.

The Dojin-kai very probably participated in these operations. In a history of the Dojin-kai, it frankly stated that "the section for the prevention of epidemics was assigned to be placed under the control of Japanese troops in Middle China...." How did they cooperate? For one thing, medical teams did research on health conditions of the area so that those operations could be exercised more effectively. And it was also their task to prevent the Japanese army from being affected by the bacteriological warfare.

Today the Self Defense Forces are planning to establish a Defense Medical Institute. According to its prospectus several ex-731st Corps are expected to be assigned as professors. It also should be noted that the chairman of the promotion committee for establishing the Institute is Takemi Taro, a leading person in SEAMHO. Thus, medical science in Japan is being directed

to serve as a tool for militarism once again. (By the way, most of those who committed the most inhumane warfare in China were not sentenced as war criminals after the war. They were protected by the Occupation and during the Korean War some of their names reappeared in newspapers reporting that they were cooperating with the U.S. army.)

In the same way that the Dojin-kai had to mobilize thousands of doctors and nurses, now SEAMHO needs lots of medical workers willing to go to Southeast Asia. Medical students, of course, are expected to become volunteer vanguards of imperialism. More than 20 medical institutes have been built since 1970, each one of them stressing cooperation with Asia as its purpose and encouraging students to become internationalists. For instance, three weeks training in Southeast Asia is required in the curriculum of newly established Kyorin University. The "Schweitzer spirit" is often quoted to inspire students to dedicate themselves to medical care in "backward countries" At Kitazato University the departments pertaining to medical science are so set up that a complete medical team can be sent out on short notice including doctors, nurses, para-medical staffs.

Students studying in traditional medical institutions are also being mobilized to serve the aim of SEAMHO. In each university and college, students' organizations such as the Society for Medical Research in Southeast Asia have been actively dispatched every year in research groups to Asian countries. They have been financially supported by the Foreign Ministry, private companies and university administrations. For instance, Nippon Medical School has already sent seven research teams composed of young professors and students to Thailand. According to its report, they have concentrated on setting up health centers equipped with both preventive and curative departments in areas where hill tribes such as the Yao and Meo are living. They cooperate closely with the Thai government, which thinks it important to have medical centers in those area to prevent the hill tribes from becoming communist guerrillas.

As the SEAMHO plan has emerged, strong efforts have appeared to unite these separate students' organizations and form a more centralized one. ■■

Bringing It All Back — TOGETHER



On June 16 some 2,000 citizens protested at the very nerve of Japanese big business, the offices of Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organization). The slogans ranged from condemnation of its transparent "rehabilitation" schemes to expressions of rage against the tremendous rise of prices caused by big business's blatant speculation in basic consumer goods. The joint demonstration, initiated by Oda Makoto, included such groups as pollution victims, ordinary consumers, and anti-war groups. The offices were shut down, as riot police waited inside.

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
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It need hardly be emphasized that developments in Japan in coming years will be of profound significance for Asia, for the United States, and for the international system as a whole. Some of the most informed and thought-provoking analysis of social and economic developments in Japan and its emerging international role have appeared in the journal AMPO, which is also unique in the insight it provides with regard to popular left-wing forces in Japan. The journal has published extensive and enlightening commentary on Okinawa, Japanese imperialism, long-range tendencies in the domestic and international policies that are being shaped by ruling groups, popular struggles within Japan and numerous other topics. It is an invaluable source of information and analysis. For anyone who is concerned with the role of Japan in world affairs or the prospects for Japanese society itself, the journal is essential reading.

Noam Chomsky

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to our readers

The big news on the Japanese left today is the birth of the March 30th YONAOSHI movement, covered in two articles in this issue. Oda Makoto, in an interview, explains the political thinking behind this new development. AMPO's coverage of women in Japan is a major contribution to understanding the "women's hell" of this country, while articles on diverse topics -- such as the workers' struggle in Nissan Motor Co., the Okinawan people's struggle and the top-secret World Bank papers on Vietnam, continue to make AMPO an indispensable tool for understanding Japan and the Japanese people's movements.

Cover photo: Participants in the March 30 Movement fill the street. The white banner reads: "Let's Smash the Kra Canal Project! Stop the Use of H-bombs there! End Nissho-Iwai's Economic Aggression!" The banner in the rear expresses solidarity with the South Korean people's struggle for democracy. photo by Hashimoto Seiya

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EYE OF THE TIMES

THE U.S. MILITARY IN ASIA The Boys Go Home, The Weapons Move In

by Nakazawa Osamu

Using Cold War rhetoric straight from the 1950s, the U.S. Government says that "containment of Russian communism" necessitates building a major air and naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to supplement already strengthened air and naval bases in Japan, Micronesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

The Pentagon announced last month that it plans a two-year, \$75 million program to build a 3,600-meter runway for B-52 bombers and C-5 Galaxies plus new port facilities for nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers at the Diego Garcia atoll. The announcement has sent shock waves throughout Asia, including the rim of Asia already under U.S. military control.

Some of the loudest protests have come from countries the U.S. says its plan will defend and benefit--India and Sri Lanka. Both nations have been pushing futilely for a nuclear-free and neutral "sea of peace" in the Indian Ocean.

The outcry has also been strong in Japan where, in mid-March, all major newspapers ran daily accounts of developments regarding U.S. military strategy in the Diego Garcia move. Japanese, who since the "end" of the Vietnam War have witnessed the home-porting of the aircraft carrier Midway at Yokosuka and increased Air Force and Marine activity in Okinawa, have a special interest in this plan, for it is part of a strategy into which their "Self-Defense Force" is to be integrated as part of the "total force" once advocated by U.S. Defense secretary Melvin Laird.

While Pentagon public relations men talk about the U.S. "withdrawal from Asia," the people of Asia see steady, coordinated increases in U.S. firepower, especially nuclear might.

The U.S. build-up, geographically and tactically coordinated by the new Unified Command Structure of the four armed

services, is ostensibly based on the need for "parity" with the expanding Soviet Naval presence in Asian waters. The U.S. government says that the 20 to 30 Soviet destroyers and missile cruisers already in the Indian Ocean will open the door to naval domination of that ocean once the Suez Canal is reopened. This argument is the Pentagon's ace in trying to convince the American people to pay a record \$87.73 billion for military activities in Fiscal Year 1975 (beginning July 1).

Behind this Cold war rhetoric lies a more fundamental concern: resources, especially oil. As General Creighton Abrams recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Oil may be only the first of many vital resources used as strategic weapons against us. The threat is multi-dimensional--and very real."

In the privacy of the Senate committee room, Abrams did not single out the Soviet Union as the rationale for Fiscal Year 1975 build-ups in the military. Rather, he implied that U.S. military force might be used to lean on any nation, pro- or anti-American, which threatens the flow of basic resources to the U.S. and its major allies, including Japan. Specifically, he said that the build-ups would provide "leverage in negotiations with friends as well as foes" regarding resources.

The geopolitical realities of world resources have led Japanese ruling circles to quiet but strong support of the current U.S. "speak softly and carry a big stick" strategy. Japanese businessmen and their clients in the Tanaka cabinet have welcomed the post-Vietnam War U.S. military build-ups inside Japan, and they are even more favorably inclined toward the Diego Garcia scheme. The reason is simple: the Indian Ocean is Japan's life-line not only for Mideast oil but for growing imports of natural resources from Africa.

Although the resources crunch has come earlier than expected, and thus has increased the tempo of U.S. military deployment in Asia, the basic plans were on the drawing boards as early as 1971. At that time, the U.S. was close to defeat and withdrawal in Vietnam and started mapping the post-war strategy now being implemented. The thrust of the Nixon Doctrine strategy is for Asians to fight the ground wars, backed up by U.S. support from the air and sea.

Since 1971, moves have been under way to transform Micronesia into a large-scale base. A 4,700-meter runway was completed last fall on Majuro Island, and others are being planned. A telecommunication coordination system has been completed by the U.S. forces in Guam, and Omega radar centers are nearing completion in Japan and Australia. (The Omega system will permit Polaris submarines to fire their missiles from undetectable positions on the ocean floor, with increased accuracy based on "fixes" of position determined through the gigantic Omega towers.)

In the September 28, 1971 version of the U.S. Air Force's "Basic Doctrine," the Pentagon adopted what was to become known as its "Flexible Nuclear Response Strategy." Confidential Pentagon papers bearing that date were presented to the Japanese Diet in early February. The papers say that, in order to increase options for "wider military-political initiative," the U.S. should be prepared for "small-scale nuclear war" as well as large-scale nuclear war.

Part of this strategy is the closer integration of Japan's SDF into U.S. military planning. The Diet revelations included the fact that 1,300 copies of the Japanese translation of the "Basic Doctrine" have been distributed to local units of the Air Self Defense Force since March 7, 1973 for use in training. Chapters included in the training material cover such topics as "Light N-operations," "Heavy N-operations," and "Operations for the Maintenance of Domestic Peace in Foreign Countries," all of which should be irrelevant to the SDF, which is constitutionally forbidden nuclear arms and overseas action.

Meanwhile, U.S. forces in Asia are being reorganized for greater mobility, with Okinawa becoming the central command

post for the whole military complex in Northeast Asia. The recent shut-down of several U.S. bases in mainland Japan signifies transfers to Okinawa rather than the troops' return home.

Twenty-three military facilities are being reinforced, including ten to be strengthened within this year. A number of Air Force and Marine units moved from Vietnam to Okinawa in the past year, including fighter air-borne companies of the 7th and 13th U.S. Air Command. The U.S. 5th Air Force's headquarters near Tokyo is being closed, with the 313th Air Division on Okinawa picking up some of the responsibility. And the U.S. Army's Camp Zama headquarters, also near Tokyo, is expected to be moved to Okinawa in the near future.

U.S. Marines have also become more conspicuous in Okinawa--and in south Korea where they recently completed "military exercises" after being airlifted from Okinawa in a mock emergency situation. The Marine Green Beret units are instructing Army and Air Force personnel in the martial arts. Meanwhile, the Marine bases in Iwakuni (Mainland Japan) and Okinawa have been unusually active since the first of the year airlifting bombs, munitions and chemical warfare weapons to unknown points.

Marine BLTs (Battalion Landing Teams) have been increased in Okinawa, and there are indications that, if and when there is a U.S. troop pull-back from south Korea, these BLTs will be further increased to fill in the holes in the ROK's 600,000-man Army.

The growing importance of Okinawa for the American strategy has raised its position in Japanese strategy as well. Reflecting these developments, the rank of the commander of the SDF's Southwest Air Division, stationed in Okinawa despite residents' protests, has recently been elevated from major general to general.

The reorganization of U.S.-Japan forces and the development of Diego Garcia as a major base are part of the same overarching structure--a U.S. military formation with independent nuclear capacity resting on key points in Hawaii, Yokosuka in mainland Japan, Okinawa, Subic Bay in the Philippines, Satahip Air Base in Thailand, and Diego Garcia. ●

Interview with Oda Makoto

REBIRTH OF A MOVEMENT

Novelist Oda Makoto was chairman and the moving spirit behind Beheiren (the Japan Peace For Vietnam Committee) from 1965 to 1974.

AMPO: Beheiren, the Japanese People's Movement for Peace in Vietnam, was dissolved this January. Now you are proposing the formation of a new people's movement. What is the concept and goal of this new movement, and how does it differ from those of the Beheiren movement which, after all, lasted for nine years?

ODA: There is a great difference. The Beheiren movement was born in a time of prosperity, and it developed in a country whose wealth was growing very rapidly. Today things are different. The prosperity Japan has enjoyed has been shaken. That is very good, very good indeed. But the new situation calls for new approaches.

Beheiren had a principle. We did not begin with preaching about the world situation. Of course Beheiren was a movement against the American war in Vietnam, a movement in support of the Vietnamese people. We discussed the world situation all the time. But we refused to follow the pattern of traditional movements, which was that goals are always derived from "objective analysis" of the external world situation. Under that system people were told to do this or that because the situation is such and such. We did not adopt this pattern of behavior. Instead, things began like this: when an individual felt the Vietnam war piercing his or her heart and was moved to action, we helped translate this subjectively felt world situation into its concrete, local meaning for each locality and each person.


AMPO: Does that style have something to do with "prosperity"? Perhaps the link is that the social atmosphere was so coercive during the time of prosperity that the war in Vietnam could be easily forgotten unless it was anchored to the heart of each individual?

ODA: That's right, and that's why the "principle of the individual situation related to the world situation" that we adopted was the right one. That is why the movement attracted people, drew upon their strength, and lasted nine years.

The students' Zenkyoto movement and the anti-pollution movements have used the same principle. In these cases too, people rose up and refused to accept peremptory orders from all-knowing elites, refused to accept their analysis of the overall situation and their solutions imposed from above. This was an excellent principle, but it did have its weaknesses. One of these weaknesses was that people narrowed their vision to too narrow areas. They began to "dig deep holes" but they sometimes failed to see the whole scene.

AMPO: It seems to be a fact that many groups began to tackle specific issues, such as pollution by a particular factory, neighborhood organizing, and so forth, and the impact of the new Left as a political trend was lost.

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ODA: I think that we are facing an utterly new situation now. "Prosperity" has come to an end. Rising prices, hoarding, and deliberate price manipulations by the giant enterprises -- everybody knows about it, everybody is hurt by it, everybody is indignant about it. Our livelihood is being plundered -- thoroughly plundered. It is as if bandits and burglars are the masters of the country. The other day some of the bandits from the big companies were subpoenaed by the Diet and had to say something in apology, but it is like bandits stripping us of everything we wear, then getting together and talking it over and agreeing to return our undershirt. They are incredibly complacent and impudent! Of course I mean by the bandits and burglars the government, the big enterprises, and the banks. The Prime Minister, Marubeni Corporation, Mitsubishi, Mitsui -- anybody that plunders is a bandit.

The important thing, though, is that they have long been doing worse things in other Asian countries and in the Third World. When we had "prosperity" that "prosperity" was based on the bandits' acts in Asia and the Third World. Now, as prosperity is drawing to an end, we can see the bandits more clearly. I was in Africa recently and met the people from the Angolan liberation front. They immediately asked me why the Japanese government supports the Portuguese. The point is that before we did not know. In "prosperity" we could not see the enemy clearly. We may have seen in theoretical terms, but we did not understand in terms of our ordinary, everyday living.

The lives of other Asian people are plundered far more seriously by these bandits than ours, but even here in Japan we have already seen the lives of Koreans in Japan, of peasants and of old people and of the weak plundered, plundered in the most serious way.

AMPO: In this new situation, what is the goal of the new movement?

ODA: We need YONAOSHI. YONAOSHI is an indigenous Japanese word for revolution that literally means straightening things out. We have to clarify the kind of future we are going to make together. Each one of us is coming to face the need of YONAOSHI in the context of the whole of Asia. The various

movements and groups that are operating on local and specific issues now face the need to develop a vision of Japan and of the world, of what they are working for, and they have to do it while remaining where they are. They cannot return to the old Left practise of deducing tasks from abstract analysis of the world situation, and at the same time they cannot simply "dig deep holes." All actions and all activities have got to be knit together to cover the whole of Japan, the whole of Asia, and the whole of the world.

AMPO: Your idea is like "power to the people," isn't it?

ODA: Exactly. We have to recover our lives. We have to recover the lives of the Japanese for the Japanese, and the people of other parts of Asia have to recover their lives for themselves.

It's people's power, but the power of the people will be utterly different from the power of the state that exists at present. We are not talking about the shift of political power from the Liberal Democratic Party to the opposition parties. People's power must be entirely different. We must examine what we need and what we don't need. We need factories, we need offices, but why on earth do we need such things as business corporations? If the factories are run by the workers, and if the offices are run by the clerks, that will be enough. Then they can be operated for the benefit of the people. A corporation is an entity combining a factory and an office for the purpose of profit. It's not needed. Let's abolish it. In the same way, we don't need the kind of government we have now. We can do away with it if the people have their own organized power. Then we can determine one by one what we really need and what we can get along without.

I avoid using big words such as socialism or proletarian dictatorship. If one starts speaking in such terms, people immediately begin demanding explanations of what is happening in the Soviet Union. It confuses things, and leads into an academic maize. So I say simply social justice and the power to make it possible.

An interesting episode. I asked my students one by one "What kind of society do you really want to achieve?" Some said they wanted a society without

social discrimination. Others said that they wanted a society in which political corruption is done away with. Some said that they want the right to have control over their own lives. But not a single one said that he or she thought an ideal society one in which one can buy as much as one wants.

Our society is characterized by commercialism. "The richer the better" seems so ubiquitous. But, really, nobody really thinks that the society in which they can lavishly spend money is the ideal society. We need social justice. Everybody needs it, and this is the basis of our movement. We must formulate our theories on this basis and work out ways of achieving it. We are still at the beginning.

AMPO: When you say social justice you are also speaking in terms of international relationships, aren't you?

ODA: Of course. Japanese must live with other Asians. "Justice" here is creating a world, a context in which we can live together and help one another. Trade must be conducted on this principle. The present Japanese government says that it is "helping" the Korean people by providing economic assistance, but who are the people most keenly in need of help? The poorest people in Korea. And it is precisely these poor who should have the decisive voice in the way that Korea is helped. But the poorest people in Korea are taking the lead in demanding that Japan's economic assistance stop immediately. They tell us that Japanese assistance through Pak Chung Hee's government only makes them poorer and brings down ever severer repression on their heads. The way we really can help them is by frustrating Japanese aid programs. In the future we can be of help to them in other ways.

AMPO: How can these other ways be found?

ODA: We have to get together all future images of Asia that are entertained by the plundered people. Eventually they will merge into one picture. The people in other Asian countries should discuss the future of Japan and of the whole of Asia, just as we should discuss the future of Japan and the whole of Asia. We all have to do it. Without putting Japan in the context of Asia and the Third World, we cannot

overcome our problems.

People talk about a democratic coalition government -- a government of the united front of Socialist and Communist Parties -- but it is hardly possible for such a government to really solve our problems. These parties do not recognize the fact that Japan exploits Asian people. They will continue to work for the immediate interests of the Japanese, and the same thing will go on and on.

Nowadays people are demanding that prices be lowered. So a big supermarket like Daiei goes out and buys more shirts from Hongkong. The price we Japanese pay for shirts may go down, but that saving is taken out of the hide of the workers in Hongkong. So you see, we don't ask for lower prices. We don't petition the government or the big businesses to ease our load. We struggle, we fight to recover our livelihood from the big enterprises and the present government, working to establish a society in which prices are decided by all the people involved -- by workers and customers -- for the interests of all the people involved.

AMPO: You said we were only at the beginning. What kind of start is the new movement making?

ODA: We started our movement with a big peoples rally and demonstration on March 30th. We called it -- in Japanese of course -- "A big rally to recover our livelihood," or "YONAOSHI rally." All kinds of people joined -- peasants, professionals, workers -- all who feel that they are being trampled under the foot of the bandits and plunderers. (See full report in this issue of AMPO.) There we declared our principles in the face of the Tanaka cabinet and big business, and we began the process of gathering images of how society should be changed. We first need this coalition of images, and something more solid will come out of it. We started this movement on March 30th. I propose to call it the March 30th YONAOSHI Movement.

AMPO: Can you tell us a little about the Conference of Asians on the Future of Economic Development and the Environment?

ODA: Christian groups with extensive ties throughout Asia and people

in the anti-pollution movement are cooperating with us in the preparation of the Conference of Asians. It will be held in Japan between the 4th and 15th of June, and will include both a tour of the country and the main conference itself.

The conference will do three things. The participants will exchange facts about the effect the advance of Japanese capital into Southeast Asia is having on the lives of the people there, their livelihood. They will probe into environmental pollution, now most serious in Japan but being rapidly exported to the rest of Asia. And finally, the participants will discuss the future of Asia; they will begin to put together their images of where we are going from here.

I think that there are only two classes in the world today -- the oppressing and the oppressed, or the exploited and the exploiting. If we in Japan merely want to get prices lowered, the bandits would whisper to us that Asia has plenty of cheap land and labor, so let's go and build factories there. For big business, Asia is nothing more than a source of cheap labor and raw materials. They went in, they chopped down the trees, they bared whole mountains, and now they regard Asia as merely an export market, a place to send pollution-producing industries. In their exploitation of Asia the big enterprises raked in enormous profits. What did they do with these profits? They bought up land in Japan for speculation, they hoarded goods, they marked up prices. The same people who plundered the Asian people are plundering us Japanese, and we have come to realize that we share the same enemy.

Often some portions of the exploited and oppressed people in the advanced countries are used to oppress and exploit their brothers in the third world. They cannot get rid of their own oppression and exploitation if they do not come to realize what is happening to them. There is a vicious cycle here which we must break. All Asian people must work out an image of the future of Asia. Asian people other than Japanese have full right to discuss the future of Japan, if for no other reason than the ruling elites in Japan are busily discussing the reshaping of Asia in their image.

AMPO: So you are hopeful that in the future, Asians can end their exploitation and oppression?

ODA: Sometimes people ask me if I am prepared to see the economic growth rate of Japan drop, which would happen, they say, if my suggestion is followed. This is a queer question. It is strange because the people who ask it seem to take for granted that Japan can continue its "super-growth" for ever and ever, based upon the exploitation of Asian and Third World people. Whenever people ask me questions such as that, I respond with Does the Tanaka Cabinet promise you anything worthwhile? Super-growth? Prosperity? We must learn that we in Japan have to live with the Third World people. We have to make up our minds to do it, and we must clearly understand the reasons why we can do so and why we must do so. We have to work out an approach that will let us all live together. In this sense our movement is only beginning, but I am very hopeful about the future. ●

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE ARE USELESS, Continued from page 55

forgotten one thing; although the nation's income and that of the people might well rise to some extent, the profits of the capitalists will increase even more, generating a huge income gap between rich and poor and thus promoting long-term instability within the country. This can hardly be termed "beneficial".

In conclusion, I stress that our Thai government should not negotiate about economic problems with the Japanese government. Even direct talks with the major Japanese trading companies are unlikely to prove fruitful as these giants are interested only in profits, not in the problems and aspirations of the people. ●

"LET'S SEIZE CONTROL OF OUR LIVES!" New Unity in the Japanese Left

A new sense of militancy is strengthening the bonds of unity between the Japanese people's movement and left-wing segments of the labor movement. A first manifestation of the new mood came on March 30, when, after a three year lull in activity, the radical wing of the people's movement made a fresh debut on the Tokyo streets. Holding aloft the streaming straw mats carried in pre-modern Japanese peasant uprisings, ten thousand people representing over one hundred different groups plus thousands of newcomers rallied in Yoyogi Park to call for a fundamental change in the social system of Japan. As if to symbolize the birth of the new mood, a new slogan -- "Yonaoshi Shiyoi!" -- made its appearance at the rally. Yonaoshi, literally to "remake the world", is the indigenous Japanese equivalent of "make revolution" or "Power to the People."

Oda Makoto, novelist, leader in the anti-Vietnam War movement, and a guiding force in the new movement, addressed the rally from a truck top; "We have come together from countless different places -- offices, factories, and homes. But we are united by a single desire: the society we live in is unjust, and we will fight to see justice established." While the press reported the rally as merely a resuscitation of the now disbanded Beheiren anti-war movement in new dress, in the eyes of participants it was clear that something else was in the offing. Present at the rally, side by side with anti-war and student groups, were left-wing labor groups, farmers from rural areas, women's groups, and members of the consumer and anti-pollution movements. Novelists, critics, TV directors and publishers were also among the participants. All rallied to the March 30 Movement and to the six slogans prepared for the day's action: "Let's Seize Control of Our Lives," "Overthrow the Tanaka LDP Cabinet!" "Wipe Out All Social Discrimination!" "Fight Environmental Disruption, Preserve Human Life" "Keep Japan

From Trampling the Rest of Asia Underfoot," and "Let's Build A Society Where Workers and Consumers Set the Prices!"

Chanting rhythmically "Yonaoshi Shiyoi!" participants in massive columns flowed out of the park and into the street for a six kilometer march to the bustling downtown area of Shinjuku. Placards carried by marchers, and shouts and chants, called attention to a wide range of demands. With a baby carriage (full!) at its head, a women's liberation group protested the government's current attempt to revise the Eugenic Protection Law. Two young boys nine or ten years old kept in stride with the march while chanting their own slogan "Give Us Our Playground Back!" Internationalism was a conspicuous feature of the day's action. A huge streamer reading "Solidarity with the Struggle of the South Korean People for Democracy" was carried by the league fighting job discrimination against Japan's largest minority, Korean residents. Earlier at the rally, Reverend Li, a leader of the Christian Church in Japan, had made a scathing denunciation of the racist practices of Hitachi Ltd., which recently fired a young Korean worker on the grounds of his nationality.

The largest and most conspicuous workers' contingent at the rally was the Tokyo chapter of the General Workers' Union, which marched in file with bright red bands around their heads. Along with them were representatives of the militant minority union at Mitsubishi's Nagasaki Shipyard, and members of the General Oil Union, known for its bold action this winter in exposing the company's secret hoarding of oil and forcing the release of this oil to local citizens. Finally, thousands of marginal day laborers in Tokyo's Sanya district, whose exploitation at the hands of giant construction companies is usually hidden from the public eye, sent their representatives to the march. In the face of an increasingly militant struggle waged by these workers in recent years, the government and police have launched a full-scale repression.



A young worker from the area appealed passionately to the rally to work for the liberation of all, or not at all; for Japan can never be liberated until Sanya workers are also liberated.

The March 30 Movement is planning a series of mass actions to follow its first demonstration. Already, on April 6, a rally of one thousand people demonstrated in front of Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), the headquarters of Japanese big business, demanding its dissolution. During the General Strike Week which began on April 8, the Movement held rallies and dynamic street actions supporting the striking workers. Other actions are scheduled later in the spring.

THE LABOR OFFENSIVE

As Japan's notorious rampant inflation week by week tightens its grip on working families, organized labor this year is showing unprecedented militancy in its usual spring labor campaign. Already on March 26, National Railway services were halted for a whole day, and beginning on April 11, Sohyo-affiliated unions carried out what they called a "general strike," stopping national

and private railways and telephone and postal services across the nation.

But this year's spring campaign is distinct from the preceding ones (started in 1956) in that it has not confined itself to wage demands. While pressing for an average 30 per cent wage increase for unionized workers, the Spring Campaign Joint Committee, claiming to embrace eight million workers, has declared that they will not stop their struggle until the government also increases grants to the "socially disadvantaged strata" of Japanese society (the handicapped, old persons, welfare-recipients) in the form of higher pensions, subsidies and annuities. This February Sohyo, for the first time, sponsored a meeting for these socially disadvantaged people, "weak people", including many who came in wheelchairs. Another feature of this year's labor campaign is the determination of the National Railways and other government-run public corporation workers to win back their right to strike. Stripped of this right by the U.S. Occupation, public service workers have suffered continuous repression in the form of firing and other penalties every time they have gone out on strike. Initially,

work-to-rule tactics were used by the National Railways Engineers' Union (Doryoku) as a means of evading disciplinary retaliation, but in recent years, they have moved to a stance of open defiance of the strike-banning law, actually halting train service during strike periods.

Union votes on this spring's strike tactics reveal the fast increasing militancy of labor. Even in such tightly-controlled shops as the giant steel plants and Ishikawajima-Harima's Tokyo Shipyard, the number of votes cast in favor of striking has increased. The rightwing Domei-affiliated unions also seem to be showing signs of radicalization among their rank-and-file. The all-Japan Seamen's Union, for example, this year dropped its traditional support for the rightwing Democratic Socialist Party due to pressure from the rank-and-file.

PROMISES AND REALITY

Yet despite the current high-flown phrases of the Sohyo leadership (mainly socialists) it has displayed many weaknesses in guiding the spring labor offensive. Sohyo's intention is simply to channel the militancy of the people into a weapon it can use to win greater concessions from the government and management, and in line with this vision they are making every attempt to confine the struggle to an "orderly strike" by organized labor. One of Sohyo's powerful leaders, Ota Kaoru (formerly chairman of Sohyo and well-known as a union ideologist) has articulated this guiding philosophy in his declaration that the aim of this year's spring struggle was to "bring about reforms without causing disasters." The Sohyo leadership knows the situation this year is explosive, and is doing its best to maintain tight control over the venting of the spontaneous militancy of the workers. One of their methods for trying to achieve this has been to coin the new word "Kokumin Shunto" this year ("national spring campaign") implying that organized workers are not striking for their own interests at the expense of the rest of the population but on behalf of working people as a whole. The left wing of the labor movement is critical of this slogan, however, pointing out that in the name of the "nation" Sohyo has tried to step down strike tactics and suppress

workers' militancy. Sohyo, for example, has pressured railway workers not to use go-slow tactics because they might "provoke the antagonism of other strats of the population against organized labor."

Sohyo leader, Yasutsune Ryoji, in the meantime, has come out with another fine sounding, declaration, promising that the union will not stop its struggle, even if its immediate wage demands are won, until its other demands for socially disadvantaged people are won. While this is indeed a noble commitment, the public regards it skeptically, well aware that the spring campaign is being carried out according to a predetermined schedule which will culminate in the "general strike." None will be surprised to find the struggle at an end as soon as the major unions obtain satisfactory replies to their demands for wage hikes. At this point, the characteristic dichotomy in Sohyo ideology can be expected to prevail once again. Wage demands of organized labor must be won at all costs, but "political demands" (including demands concerning social welfare) may be left to the "progressive political parties."

The basic idea of Sohyo here is that demands of the people will be taken up by the "progressive political parties" in the parliamentary arena, while Sohyo, generously offering its services as a union of "respectable" (permanently-employed) workers to unorganized sub-contract workers, will carry on negotiations for the latter's demands. In fact, the whole process has been clearly foreseen and predicted in this year's government White Paper on Wages.

While it is premature to pass judgement on the 1974 Spring Campaign, it is clear that Sohyo and the Socialist and Communist parties lack -- if they do not positively fear -- the basic philosophy that sub-contract workers, day-laborers, and all the people at the bottom can and must organize themselves by relying on their own strength. "Power to the People" is perhaps not the most comfortable slogan for organized labor and the political parties these days. But as the March 30 Movement, where radical people's groups, minority labor unions, and sub-contract workers expressed their solidarity suggests, a struggle around this basic orientation is underway.

People's Vigil:

WATCHING THE TANKS ROLL BY


AMPO readers may recall the report in No.15 on the movement to "stop the tanks" -- tanks and other military vehicles which flow between the U.S. Army Supply and Maintenance Activities Facility in Sagamihara and America's war fronts throughout the Third World, particularly Indochina. One group of participants which has sustained that struggle for two years, the Sagamihara Citizen's Group to Stop the Tanks, has sent us news of their recent activities.

"For the past year we have been observing the movement of military vehicles (M48 tanks, M113 APCs, etc.) and vehicles carrying military supplies into and out of the Sagami Depot every night. The enclosed graph is our report on the kinds and numbers of vehicles we observed. (Since

we are not free to keep watch during the day, the report is incomplete.) The reason we felt compelled to gather this information was our realization that the government's statements simply can't be believed. In the fall of 1972 Foreign Minister Ohira claimed that 'Tanks are no longer being shipped to Vietnam,' while we know that in fact they are.

"The group's watchdog activities, night-long vigils for an entire year, have revealed that the depot's activities have continued essentially unchanged since Nov. 1972. The number of vehicles shipped out has not decreased.


"At the end of September, 1973, for instance, 40 M113 APCs were shipped in, and between the November 11-12, we




saw 30 APCs leave. We learned that vehicles which had been shipped out in the beginning of September were loaded on ships bound for Panama. Could this be completely unrelated to U.S. strategy in Latin America -- its involvement in the Chile coup included?"

activities in other areas is very important; especially fruitful has been its collaboration with a Yokohama citizens' group active at the North Pier, from which military equipment leaves Japan. It seeks cooperation with other groups in the future.

The Sagamihara group has found that cooperation with anti-military



U.S. Army Paper Bares War Role of 'Sagami Maintenance' Depot



The Sagami Citizens' Group to Stop the Tanks has obtained a U.S. Army program for the repair of vehicles at the Sagami Maintenance Depot, which clearly indicates that the maintenance base continues to be actively employed to back U.S. military action in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and South Korea.

Titled "FY-74 Combat Vehicle Program," the U.S. document details plans to send 38 M113 and other tanks from Sagami to South Vietnam, 98 to the Eighth Army in South Korea, and seven to Cambodia in fiscal year 1974. (The whole program is reproduced on the opposite page.)

After receiving this document, the group immediately protested to Foreign Minister Ohira, who, at the height of the 1972 anti-tank deployment struggle, promised that in principle war vehicles would not be allowed to be sent to Vietnam and that no more damaged vehicles would be brought into the maintenance base.

The group exposed this promise as utterly false. According to their investigation (daily all-night vigils), 147 combat-destroyed tanks and other combat vehicles were brought in between January, 1973 and March, 1974. The group has calculated that since July, 1973, 29 combat vehicles have been sent to South Vietnam and nine more are scheduled to be sent there within the current fiscal year.

Representatives of the citizens' group visited the Foreign Minister on March 22 to hand over an open questionnaire seeking clarification of Ohira's breach of faith. A young official of the U.S. Bureau's Security section met them, and quibbled that the Minister did not betray his promise, because his earlier statement included the words, "in principle". "So, exceptions exist".

The group has corroborated that the Sagami Maintenance Depot's activities have intensified since the beginning of the year. Despite earlier press reports that the facilities will be returned to Japan (for use by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces), U.S. Embassy sources were quoted by the press on March 21 as stating categorically that the repair base would never be returned to Japan.

Another point the group emphasizes is that a large number of war vehicles are being sent from Sagami Maintenance Depot to South Korea for use by the U.S. Eighth Army. "We opposed the shipment of tanks and other war vehicles from Sagami to Vietnam. For the same reason we must express our grave concern about the use of the base to support one of the antagonistic parties in the Korean peninsula," the group's statement reads.

U.S. ARMY TANK REPAIR PROGRAM FOR SAGAMIHARA

Customer	month												total
	1973	7	8	9	10	11	12	1974					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
CONUS	47	42	43	48	29	23	1	20					253
SA			7	14	14	4	15	19	25				98
OP PROJ	7				4	4	22	24	13	5			79
RVN	2	2	1		3	6	10	5	2	7			38
Cambodia R&R							7						7
WAR RES	1				1	4							6
total	54	44	51	48	51	50	23	47	39	34	37	0	481

note:

- M106 107mm Self-Propelled Gun
- M113 Armored Personnel Carrier
- M548 Armored Cargo Carrier
- M577 Armored Commander
- M125 81mm Self-Propelled Gun
- M132 Flame Thrower
- M578 Recovery Vehicle
- M88 Armored Recovery Vehicle
- XM806 Recovery Vehicle

FRON NO.	ITEM	CUSTOMER	QTY	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
* 8A41153	M106 C2 H/M	SA R&R	13												9
* 8A41153	M106 C2 H/M	SA WAR RES	2												
* 8A41153	M106 C2 H/M	OP PROJ	4						2						4
8A41087	M106A1 S/C	CONUS	1		1										
8A41088	M106A1 H/M	OP PROJ	7	7											
8A41088	M106A1 H/M	WAR RES	1	1											
8A41089	M106A1 B/D	RVN	2												
8A41085	M106 B/D GAS	RVN	1							1	1				
8A41025	M113A1 H/M	CONUS	46			10	9	4	2	1	20				
8A41025	M113A1 H/M	WAR RES	1												
8A41025	M113A1 H/M	OP PROJ	64							4	22	24	13		1
8A41025	M113A1 H/M	SA R&R	27							14	4			9	
8A41026	M113A1 S/C	CONUS	12	12											
8A41033	M113A1 B/D	CONUS	45	20	16	4	5								
8A41154	M113A1 B/D	RVN	2								2				
8A41155 (LTV)	M113A1 B/D C2	RVN	1									1			
8A41074	M113 H/M GAS	CONUS	1							1					
8A41051	M548 B/D	OP PROJ	4							4					
8A41051	M548 B/D	CONUS	66	8	8	19	27	4							
8A41046	M548 B/D	RVN	12	2						2	4	1			3
8A41065	M577 R/M GAS	CONUS	4					4							
8A41056	M577A1 H/M	CONUS	28						13	15					
8A41056	M577A1 H/M	SA R&R	7												
8A41060	M577A1 S/C	CONUS	15			11	4								
8A41061	M577A1 B/D	CONUS	7	4	3										
8A41059	M577A1 B/D	RVN	1												
8A41001	M125A1 H/M	WAR RES	1							1					
8A41001	M125A1 H/M	CONUS	9							4	5				
8A41001	M125A1 H/M	SA R&R	16							8				8	
8A41010	M125A1 B/D	CONUS	11	2	4	4				1					
8A41003	M125A1 B/D	RVN	11		2	1						8			
8A41156	M125A1 H/M	RVN	2										2		
8A41038	M132A1 H/M	CONUS	6												
8A41039	M132A1 B/D	CONUS	2			2		3	3						
8A41016	M132A1 B/D	RVN	4											2	2
8A41092	XM806 B/D GAS	RVN	2												
8A41095	XM806E1 B/D	Cambodia R&R	1												
8A41091	XM806E1 H/M	Cambodia R&R	6							6					
	M131A1 S/C	SA	15												
	M577A1 S/C	SA	17										7		
	M578 S/C	SA	11											5	6
		TOTAL:	481	57	44	51	48	51	50	23	47	39	34	31	

FY-74 CVAP PROGRAM

FRON NO.	ITEM	CUSTOMER	QTY	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
8A4E1037	Eng M113A1	CONUS	95								20	19	34		
8A4E1037	Eng M113A1	EUSA	20							2	18				
8A4E1157	Eng M125A1	RVN	31										31		
8A4E1077	Eng M48A3	CONUS	1		1										
8A4E1077	Eng M48A3	SA R&R	21						3	10	8				
8A4E1106	Eng M48A3	RVN R&R	50			1	2	6	1			8	8	8	8
8A4E1150	Eng M88	RVN R&R	6							1	5				
8A4C1151	T/M M88	RVN R&R	6									3	3		
8A4C1107	T/M M48A3	RVN R&R	20											5	8
8A4C1036	T/M M13A1	CONUS	173			23	30	30	30						
8A4C1040	T/F M13A1	CONUS	2		9										
8A4C1049	T/F M548	CONUS	4												
8A4C1039	Diff M13A1	CONUS	11		9		2								
8A4C1067	F/D M13A1	CONUS	9		6	3									
8A4E1140	Computer M48A3	RVN R&R	21										10	11	
8A4E1142	Range Finder	RVN R&R	21										10	11	
8A4E0084	Cyl/H M13A1	ASF	666												666
		TOTAL:	1164	24	28	38	42	55	13	56	146	72	8	8	674

FY-74 TVAP PROGRAM

FRON NO.	ITEM	CUSTOMER	QTY	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
8A4B0211	7871 Eng Del 5T W/C	ROKFV RR	1												
8A4B0211	7871 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	21	21											
8A4B0211	7871 Eng Del 5T W/C	SA	1	1											
8A4B0211	7871 Eng Del 5T W/C	RVN II	35				1		1	10					23
8A4B0092	7871 Eng Del 5T W/C	TRAI-A	1												
8A4B0267	7407 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	101	49	10									42	
8A4B0262	7407 Eng Del 5T W/C	RVN II	3				3								
8A4B0262	7407 Eng Del 5T W/C	ROKFV II	10	10											
8A4B0263	7092 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	81	19	8	5	20	21	8						
8A4B0264	5076 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	1			1									
8A4B0265	2273 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	2	2											
8A4B0084	6865 Eng Del 5T W/C	RVN II	2							2					
8A4B0084	6865 Eng Del 5T W/C	TRAI	1												
8A4B0084	6865 Eng Del 5T W/C	USARBCO	104	17	87			4							
8A4B0270	6865 Eng Del 5T W/C	RVN RR	174		4	62	81	10	17						
8A4B0007	3645 Eng MF 5T	SA	90							40	27	23			
8A4B0291	3645 Eng MF 5T	SA	27									27			
	4086 T/M MF 5T	SA	70										30	30	10
	3773 T/F 5T	SA	1												
	2955 T/F 5T	SA	66										30	30	6
	1300 Axle R 5T	SA	45										20	20	5
	1350 Gears 5T	SA	76										16	20	20
	6821 Diff 5T	SA	100											50	50
		TOTAL:	1016	121	110	71	105	34	75	43	150	193	114		

Programs without FRON's are for Planning Purpose.

Okinawa Citizens' Struggle against Mitsubishi and the CTS

by Toya Eiji

Toya Eiji is a journalist deeply involved in the anti-pollution movement and the Jishu-Koza (People's Lectureship), citizens' anti-pollution center.

It will soon be two years since Okinawa's reversion to Japanese administration, but one important aspect of Okinawan life has changed very little. A vast net of American military bases still dominate the islands. Although it was the heartfelt plea of the Okinawan people that reversion would mean the end of Okinawa's role as the "military keystone" of the Pacific, the U.S.-Japanese agreement made no provisions for the realization of this desire.

In a recent visit to Okinawa, I noted that even today more than a year after the cease-fire in Vietnam, U.S. marines are still engaged in heavy artillery exercises in the Okinawan training camps. On roads which are used constantly by Okinawans in their daily business, it is not uncommon to see American soldiers sprawled, relaxing with firearms in their hands. All over the islands, forbidding wire fences with their "Off Limits" signs surrounding military bases, naval ports, officers' headquarters, barracks and storage depots, cutting off the general population from the foreign army. On the bases-- now under joint U.S.-Japanese administration--the flag of the Rising Sun flutters beside the Stars and Stripes, and the banners of the United Nations and Japanese Self Defense forces, defying the wishes of the Okinawan people, have occupied some of the former American base areas.

There is also something new in Okinawan life. The on-going march of Japanese big business to "develop" Okinawa is being met by a new people's opposition movement.

The movement first attracted attention after a dramatic confrontation in the small, central coastal town

of Yonashiro (pop. 15,000) on December 23, 1973. Several hundred villagers surrounded the town hall carrying banners made out of woven tatami straw declaring their opposition to Mitsubishi's purchase of 213 hectares of ocean surface between the islands of Henza and Miyagi in Kin Bay, which they had begun to fill in in preparation for construction of a Central Terminal Station (CTS). A band of villagers had made their way into the narrow, second-floor town meeting hall where 21 assemblymen were in the process of discussing revision of the town's budget to accommodate additional funds contributed to the town by Mitsubishi. The villagers had come to present petitions to the 14 assemblymen who supported the CTS construction. After discussions, the majority of the assemblymen were about to sign a pledge to oppose CTS construction, when the meeting was broken up by the arrival of two separate kidotai (riot police) units, numbering 30 or 40 members each. The citizens were forcibly expelled from the assembly hall; at least twenty suffered injuries and one young man was illegally arrested.

It would seem that the kidotai units had been alerted by the office of the Mitsubishi Development Corporation in the nearby hamlet of Yakena. The Mitsubishi office had been exerting a covert but powerful influence over the town hall and its assemblies in matters relating to the town's "development", and was also in close contact with the police station in neighboring Gushikawa city. The two kidotai units were then dispatched to "rescue" the assemblymen from the "violent" action of the villagers.

During the month that I spent in Yakena immediately after this confrontation, kidotai appeared in the hamlet every night, patrolling the streets and guarding the local Mitsubishi office. The official explanation for this police deployment was the prevention of a collision between the pro- and anti-CTS



Yonashiro villagers mass at the town hall to stop the CTS. Hundreds more outside protest against the sellout of the politicians.

groups. In fact, the action proved an effective means of intimidating the local citizens and temporarily cooling the mood of protest in the town.

Mitsubishi's tactics for penetrating Okinawa have been extremely clever. In April 1971, while Okinawa was still under American administration, a group of big shots in Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Development Corporation secretly invited Yonashiro's mayor Nakamura Moritoshi, to visit Tokyo. Following the meeting, Nakamura exchanged with Mitsubishi representatives a memorandum to the effect that Mitsubishi, with the understanding of the local authorities, would contribute to the economic development of the town by filling in its coast line and beginning construction of a petrochemical complex.

Although knowledge of the devastating toll taken by high-speed industrial growth in terms of human lives, injuries, and environmental pollution has become widespread on the main Japanese islands, little of this kind of information was available on Okinawa before reversion. Mitsubishi was thus able to overwhelm the people with persuasive arguments about narrowing the gap between the Okinawan and mainland economies and "over-

coming poverty", and succeeded in drumming up a mood receptive to development on any terms. In Yonashiro, for example, Mitsubishi's plans were initially supported by the entire town assembly, including those seven members who later opposed it. Even Governor Yara Chobyō, well-known as a "progressive", gave permission to Mitsubishi to start filling in the bay.

Okinawan fears of environmental pollution as a result of the CTS are based on the reality of past experience. Statistics compiled by the Marine Conservation Agency show the probability of oil leakage accidents is one in thirty for each tanker every year. A Gulf Oil refinery operating on Henza Island was the source of a 190-ton leakage of crude oil in 1971; such oil leaks have already begun to poison the beautiful coral reefs and rich biological life of Kin Bay, and it is becoming increasingly common to catch fish which reek of petroleum. The chemicals which the Gulf refinery uses to cause diffusion and sedimentation of leaked oil only add to pollution in the bay, and children living in the areas neighboring the refinery suffer from a type of eye inflammation which is thought to be caused by air pollution.

At the time construction rights were requested, Gulf had actually made written promises to the Yonashiro authorities and citizens that it would "use the latest technology to prevent pollution" and "put its products to non-military uses." That Gulf has made a mockery of the first promise is clear enough for everyone to see, but there are also signs that it has broken the second one. In December 1973, local newspapers reported that there were indications that Gulf was supplying large amounts of ship fuel to the U.S. Bases. Neither the U.S. Army nor Gulf have denied this.

The financial compensation that people of Kin Bay have received for their land has been outrageously small. The total amount paid to 600 fishermen who surrendered their fishing privileges was US\$400,000, or less than one dollar per square meter. At the same time, land in Tokyo Bay sold for ten times that amount! One can't help but compare this with Mitsubishi's thrust into Korea during the 1920's when the company tried to buy land for electrical power production at 1/10 of the domestic Japanese price. Fifty years later, Mitsubishi is up to the same trick in Okinawa.

Mitsubishi can hardly be expected to satisfy itself with just 213 hectares of land and the construction of the CTS. In the papers exchanged with the mayor of Yonashiro, Mitsubishi also asked for first rights in future development projects which will be on a scale much larger than those taking place in the Kin Bay area, and the mayor promised his cooperation. This means that Mitsubishi is aiming for a position of monopolistic control in the planned largescale industrial development of the eastern Okinawan Coast.

HOW THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT BEGAN

The Association to Protect Kin Bay was formed by people living in the area in September 1973. It was this group which first urged the formation of a citizen's movement to oppose the CTS construction. In the Yonashiro area, the first citizens' meeting took place on October 24 when 2,000 people gathered and resolved to oppose the filling in of the bay and the CTS. A petition circulated by this group gathered more than six thousand signatures, while one


circulated by the group supporting the CTS mustered only a thousand names in spite of a 10,000 yen payoff per signature.

The Association to Protect Kin Bay represents a completely new development in the Okinawan people's movement: it is an alliance of individuals with no official representatives. The group has rejected any representative system because, "Industrial pollution is a problem in which human life itself is at stake. No one has the right to decide on matters of life and death for someone else." In effect, every member of the Association is a representative of the association. In all its negotiations with the local administration and Mitsubishi, the Association to Protect Kin Bay has refused to negotiate except as a group. In this way, they hope to avoid the bitter experience of many movement groups in the past which have been ideologically dominated by a small group of leaders, or who have had their transactions and agreements with the offending party determined solely according to the ideas of a few influential spokesman for the group. The rejection of a representative system also assures that the greatest possible number of participants in the movement will be able to develop as autonomous political beings in the course of direct confrontation with their opponents. In this aspect, the Kin Bay movement takes on an epic significance for Okinawa where a tendency to respect hierarchical relationships remains strong.

This movement which has insisted on direct action and direct bargaining by the entire membership has often been branded as "extremist" by its opponents. However, as I observed during my own visit, the chief supporters of the movement are the elderly dwellers of fishing and farming villages, housewives, school teachers, base workers, taxi drivers, and small shopkeepers....in short, the working people of Okinawa. The establishment labor unions and so-called "progressive" party, moreover, have not hesitated to show their contempt for the group, accusing it of a "low level of political consciousness" because it has not expressed opposition to the transfer of Self Defense Forces to Okinawa and to the Japanese government's plan for the Okinawa Ocean Expo scheduled

1. Esso (10,000 barrel)
2. Toyo Oil (28,000 barrel)
3. Gulf Oil (100,000 barrel, 1,200,000 kl)

being reclaimed by Mitsubishi (180,000 square meters)



for next year. However, as Oshiro Masao, a farmer in Kita Nakagusuku village has pointed out, the labor union movement itself has never gone beyond negotiating labor's economic demands with those who manipulate labor. "They may flaunt impressive slogans, but they are not involved in a genuine struggle. Our fight against the CTS will determine whether or not this land is surrendered to the Mitsubishi Corporation and whether or not our people will become its victims. We have committed ourselves to a battle against monopoly capital in which there can be no compromise."

WINNING OVER GOVERNOR YARA

On January 18, the members of the Association to Protect Kin Bay pitched tents in front of the Okinawa Prefectural office and began a sit-in struggle to persuade Governor Yara to refuse permission for the construction of the CTS. After securing agreement from his majority ("progressive") party and other influential personalities, the governor announced his decision on January 19 not to permit the construction of the CTS. The governor's yielding to the citizen's demands, although it meant the reversal of his own administrative action, is a fruit of the tenacious struggle of the association. In the words of farmer Kinjo Seijiro: "Governor Yara is now being praised for his 'courageous decision'. In fact, I think this is the first time Okinawa has embarked on a course which really

implies reform, not just the passive position usually taken by the "progressive" party. But the responsibility for keeping the government from lapsing back into such attitudes in the future rests with the citizens' movement. It's time to bring down the curtain on that farce we've all been watching for too long, where the government keeps things quiet by winking at the contradiction between big business and the people."

Mitsubishi, in the meantime, banking on its guess that governor Yara's statement will not be legally binding, has shown no sign of abandoning its plans to push through the landfill project and begin construction of the CTS. On the contrary, Mitsubishi seems to have appraised Yara's declaration as a political gesture to placate the popular mood of the opposition. Recently the man who has emerged on the front lines firing for Mitsubishi is none other than Minister of Trade and Industry Nakasone Yasuhiro, known to Okinawans as the "god of war." In a statement to the Upper House on January 25, he said: "I strongly recommend the construction of a CTS in Okinawa."

While the Association can claim a victory in bringing a change in Yara's position, this is no more than a first step. The movement has a long, steep road ahead if it is to attain its ultimate goal--bringing an end to Mitsubishi's plans to construct a CTS.

In their "Appeal to Governor Yara and the People of Okinawa" published on January 27, we can see their aspirations for the future struggle:

"On the night of January 19 we learned of your decision to cancel the plan for building a CTS. The powerful force which urged this decision on you was no doubt the intense and heartfelt pleas of an overwhelming majority of the Okinawan people. It was the sound of their voices, crying out that the lives of their irreplaceable birthplace and the culture which they have created over their long history should not be destroyed, that must have appealed to something deep within you to bring forth this rare display of courage and honesty. Of this we are convinced. But there is still something which stands between you and the people of Okinawa, and that is the Japanese government, controlled by the LDP. Behind this government and party, moving them at will, is Japanese capital and big business, with Mitsubishi at the forefront. This is the giant which has transformed the Japanese islands into a polluted wasteland, a hell of petrochemical wastes; but though it has brought the Japanese people to the brink of disaster, it has not been able to stop its activities for even a day.

"That Mitsubishi would pack up and quietly withdraw from Okinawa just because of your statement is something we don't anticipate even in our wildest dreams. There is really only one way

to realize your decision, based on the desires of all the Okinawan people. This is to stand firm to the decision as one which has been chosen, not by yourself alone, but by the entire prefecture, maintaining it in the face of whatever pressure, cajolery, and force the government and big business may bring to bear. Our movement, with the governor and people of Okinawa united in their fierce opposition to the CTS and the pollution it will bring, must continue to grow in numbers and strength."

On February 8, Okinawa's LDP held a mass rally of 3,500 people supporting the construction of the CTS. Part of this group surged into the Prefectural Office and attacked Governor Yara and several other prominent politicians. Since then, there have been frequent incidents--attacks on members of the Association, tearing down of posters, etc. The members of the movement have not crumbled in the face of this offensive waged by Mitsubishi's hirelings. Since March, the Association to Protect Kin Bay has broadened its front by participating in joint struggles with other people's groups and kept up its on the spot struggle against the CTS by continuous mass protest actions.

As the bankruptcy of the high growth policy based on heavy industry becomes plainer by the day, this local citizens' movement to reject the advances of the government and its development welfare" policy has broad sig-
continued on page 29

Central Terminal Stations (CTS) in Kin Bay Present and future Plans for Oil Refineries

		Okinawa Co. Ltd.*	Okinawa Oil Refining Co. Ltd.*	Okinawa Oil Base Co. Ltd.**	Arabia Oil
Location		Henza, Yonashiro Village	same as left	Reclaimed area between Miyagi Island & Henza	Miyagi Island (projected area)
Date of foreign capital licenses		Sept. 7, 1967	Jan. 20, 1968	March 3, 1972	March 4, 1972
Date of opening		May 3, 1970	April 16, 1972	April 10, 1974 (scheduled)	1976 (scheduled)
Refining or storage capacity	Present (daily)	1,200,000 kl	100,000 barrels		
	Future capacities	1,200,000 kl (present) 2,500,000 kl (planned increase)		CTS 7,350,000 kl	CTS - 7,000,000 kl Refinery - 200,000-300,000 barrels
Number of employees		14	306		

* (former Gulf Oil) ** (Mitsubishi)

Source: Jishu-Koza, No. 35, Feb. 10, 1974

SISTERS AGAINST SLAVERY:

A Look at Anti-Prostitution Movements in Japan

by Kaji Etsuko and Jean Inglis


When women from thirty different groups gathered in Tokyo to celebrate International Women's Day, 1974, they responded to the appeals of their South Korean sisters by pledging to unite in struggle against the thriving prostitution system known as *kisaeng** tourism. Japan's shameful history of exploitation of Korea, culminating in the current collaboration of Japanese capital with the Pak regime, has long weighed heavily on the consciousness of Japanese women activists. Last autumn, however, when a demonstration of Korean university women greeted planeloads of Japanese men arriving in Kimpoo International Airport with the message, "Go home, sex animals, stop prostituting our country!" we made the fresh and shocking discovery that economic exploitation has brought sexual exploitation to thousands of Korean women who seek employment in the government-run *kisaeng* houses catering to the Japanese "sex animal."

As the movement against *kisaeng* tourism gains strength in Japan, it becomes clear that a strong anti-imperialism and the special feelings we have as Japanese toward the Korean people -- feelings which grow out of our knowledge of Japan's long exploitation of Korea-- provide much of the motivating force for our efforts. In fact, it might be said that, while this is an anti-prostitution struggle, it is because the prostitutes are Korean, and the buyers Japanese, that it arose. But why is there no sentiment at present to support a movement against prostitution involving Japanese women in Japan? Perhaps women in the present movement in Japan might find an anti-prostitution movement per se all too reminiscent of the liberal post-

*Similar to Japanese *geisha*. Tourists sign up for "Kisaeng parties" that begin with dinner and traditional entertainment.

war movement of our mothers. Historian Morosawa Yoko has aptly caricatured that movement as "the faithful wife of a good-for-nothing-husband": it scolded and badgered Japanese society for its "disgraceful" treatment of women, without touching the basic structure of that society. Looking back even further, we may be discouraged to find the same weakness in the anti-prostitution movements of our grandmothers and great-grandmothers. All of these movements went hand in hand with broader efforts to raise the status of women in general, as their participants recognized in the dehumanized prostitute the other side of the dehumanized wife. Two types of ideological blindness, however, limited these efforts to partial realization. On the one hand, feminist leaders of long-term reform movements naively believed that the establishment of monogamy was the key to improving women's conditions. Socialist women and anarchists, on the other hand, although they challenged marriage itself, imagined innocently that both prostitution and oppression in marriage would disappear with the triumph of socialism. But the flow of events of Japan's modern age all too quickly revealed the limitations of these beliefs. While the demands of the first group were of the sort that could be -- and were ultimately -- coopted, the lack of a clearly defined feminist theory in the latter's ideology meant that they had to face not only severe repression from the State, but also betrayal by their sexist comrades.

Today, we who hope to do better must confront and learn from the failures of our predecessors. To look at our history is to be reminded that unless we build an ideology and struggle that radically denies being made objects of men under whatever form, our daughters may hear male history pass the same judgment on our efforts as it passed on each



On this year's International Women's Day (March 8) women demonstrate carrying large streamers attacking sexual exploitation of Korean *kisaeng* women by Japanese male tourists. This streamer names seven Japanese travel agencies responsible for sexual aggression in S. Korea... Tokyu Kanko, JTB, Kinki Nihon etc.
Photo by Matsumoto Michiko

generation before, "Look, even the stones speak." Our anti-*kisaeng* tourism movement must find deeper roots in our understanding of our own non-liberation as women in Japanese society.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

"Japan is a hell for women," observed Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the foremost ideologues of Japan's Meiji modernization, almost eighty years ago. This remark was no overstatement in a Japan where the feudalistic ideology of the samurai ruling class still prevailed. This ideology had as its concrete base the *ie* patriarchal proprietary family system, a system which denied the humanity of its female members.

Under the *ie* system the patriarch exercised absolute power over the family members just as a lord over his subjects, and only the eldest son could succeed to the patriarch's position of authority. Not only could women never succeed to the headship, it was not even considered

necessary to register a female born into the *ie*. (According to the laws of the *bakufu*, sons born into samurai families had to be registered, if not after birth then upon reaching adulthood.) This oversight of its female members reflected the fact that the *ie* did not actually consider them members at all.

The peripheral nature of women's position in the samurai *ie* was true of the merchant class as well. An 18th century document on family teachings for this class reads, "When there is no natural son in the family, common sense dictates taking a bridegroom for a daughter. Wise men, however, have taught us that a daughter cannot be considered a genuine descendent of the family. If, therefore, you are afraid your line will die out, adopt a son of the same family name and give your daughter to another family."

What was this woman, then, who had no social existence in the family lineage? She was the bearer of her husband's children and their nurse. According to a popular

aphorism of the time, "A woman's womb is just something to borrow." A lord of this period famous for his wisdom, Uesugi Yozan, counselled his granddaughter upon her marriage, "Since a man takes a wife in order to have an heir, you must never become jealous no matter how many women your husband keeps. Your only responsibility is to seek ways for him to have more sons. If you find a woman better than yourself, you should recommend her to your husband. This is the path a wife should follow." Polygamy, far from being considered in disgraceful, was good family morality.

It is not surprising to find that prostitution flourished in this age of universal misogyny. "Concubines are necessities," one intellectual of the time, Ogiu Sorai, said. Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Edo Bakufu, even prescribed the number of mistresses appropriate for men of the respective classes in his social code, which served as common law for that time. He further dictated how both mistresses and wives were to be treated. Although mistresses were recognized as performing a specifically sexual function, in fact, there was no essential difference in their rights, or lack thereof, and those of a wife. In Edo (present day Tokyo) there were more than 15,000 prostitutes among a population of 530,000. There were 11 designated areas of prostitution located near shrines and no one knows how many undesignated ones. Prostitution was protected, even encouraged, by the ruling class. Japan at the close of the feudal age was indeed a hell for women, prostitutes or otherwise.

MODERNIZATION

In 1868 the dominant powers in the ruling class declared the end of feudalism and the commencement of Japan's race toward modernization based on capitalism-under-the-Emperor. "Leave Asia, join Europe" seems to have been the watchword of the day, as intellectuals and members of the ruling class stumbled over each other in their rush to embrace the bourgeois ideology of the Western world. They soon discovered, however, that in terms of that ideology the lowly position of women in Japan put their modernization efforts in a poor light. This prompted the adoption of a few progressive measures, such as the opening of elementary schools

to girls in 1872. But since measures to raise the low position of women were largely formal concessions, they had little or no real impact. In 1872, for instance, the government was forced to issue a decree "to liberate prostitutes" out of sheer embarrassment. Having joined the European community in condemning Peru for engaging in "human traffic" in bringing Chinese coolies into Japan, it found itself being called hypocritical for its boldfaced sanctioning of human traffic in females. Its decree was pure diplomatic bombast, while outlawing "human traffic" and deploring that such women "are deprived of human rights, having a status no better than cows and horses," the document went on to reaffirm the right of women who so wished to work as geishas or prostitutes. The system of public prostitution continued unchanged.

In the early days of Meiji the government was faced with the problem of establishing a legal structure along Western lines. Its 1870 law, still largely reflecting pre-Meiji legal concepts, had established that both concubine and wife occupied the same social position in the family below the husband-head. When in 1882 a modern-style criminal law was promulgated, the concubine was no longer a member of the *ie* as far as the patriarch's legal responsibility was concerned. Formal monogamy was starting to gain ground; but the actual position of wives was not thereby improved any more than that of concubines.

The strong pressure to legally establish monogamy occurred in the context of drawing up modern Japan's civil code. To the French legal advisor engaged by the Meiji government, the polygamy arising from the *ie* system with its almighty patriarch was, not surprisingly, anathema. The Japanese government imposed on women the same status as minors or insane persons, with no power to perform legally binding actions without the permission of the husband. Provisions were made for recognition of and inheritance by children, sons that is, born to mistresses. From the Emperor on down those in authority continued to practice *de facto* polygamy; to have mistresses was said to show a man's virility.

THE MOVEMENT

In Japan, organized attempts by women

based on equality between husband and wife, in which there would be feudalistic discrimination neither between spouses nor between parents and children.

The dominant ideology behind this movement, as with other people's rights movements in early Meiji, was Christian humanism, --with both its liberal and its puritanical aspects. The church was seen by *Kyofukai* members as a base where "social life would be fostered, women's status raised, and relations between men and women nurtured." Later, as the feudalistic imperialism of the State began to assert itself, these Western liberal ideas gradually lost prestige.

In 1889 *Kyofukai* launched its first nation-wide appeal. Women dressed in white robes delivered their petition to the government, carrying daggers used for *hara-kiri* to symbolize their life-and-death commitment to realizing its demands. The abolition of prostitution was central to their argument for the establishment of monogamy. "The custom of having concubines destroys home life and has an adverse influence on children," the petition started. They also condemned the unfairness of the Japanese custom of punishing adultery only when it was committed by the wife, and demanded that women be allowed to divorce on grounds of the husband's adultery. Aside from the formal concession already noted of outlawing men's double marriages, *Kyofukai*'s efforts, which continued into the Taisho era, did not realize even the limited goal of improving women's position as wife. The establishment of monogamy based on equality of marital legal rights was not realized until the postwar American Occupation.

The anti-prostitution movement, as the reverse side of the movement to establish monogamy, may have manifested a type of snobbery on the part of oppressed wives, but many of its leaders, mainly Christians, were genuinely concerned for the prostitutes themselves. One of them, Kubushiro Ochimi, was moved to join *Kyofukai* after hearing how Japanese prostitutes, who fled their San Francisco houses in the wake of the 1906 earthquake only to be ousted by the "upright" citizens of Oakland, were given shelter by Temperance Union women. She and others attacked the Japanese government for its policy of "exporting prostitution." At the time, impoverished women, especially

from Kyushu, were being sold to work all over Asia, and Japanese prostitutes in places like Siberia were a major means of giving Japanese products a foothold there. As with *Kisaeng* tourism today, the economic and political interests behind prostitution were very strong, strong enough to sustain the government through such crises of embarrassment as the scandal of "dirty" Japanese prostitutes in the U.S.

In 1923, *Kyofukai* became the nucleus for a new organization committed to struggling against prostitution: the "National Association for the Abolition of Prostitution." The group made appeals to the government with the cooperation of other humanists, and launched a petition campaign in which 15,000 signatures were collected in a single day. Yet it is not surprising that the government steadfastly ignored these demands. From the Meiji era on, Japan had held the distinction of being the one "modern" nation to refuse to sign international conventions outlawing licensed prostitution. Finally, with the advance of fascism in the 30's, even reformist women's movements were repressed.

During the Pacific War the government mobilized about 80,000 women, most of them Koreans, to be sent to the front as "war consolers." After the defeat, police stations throughout Japan were ordered to recruit *ianfu* (army prostitutes) for the Occupation Army and set up facilities for them. Older Japanese women still remember ads circulated in Tokyo which said, "Wanted: Modern-thinking Women to cooperate in the important work of consoling Allied forces at national emergency facilities. Age 18-25, etc..." The chief of police at the time stated that the reason for this recruitment of prostitutes was to "protect ordinary women and girls."

With the advent of postwar democracy, women were free again to protest, and again one of their main aims was to see prostitution outlawed. Yet despite the speed with which other reforms related to women were pushed through by the Occupation, five long years passed before a Prostitution Prevention Law was finally passed. In 1955, a Labor Ministry report records there were 2,000 places where licensed prostitutes were working, and 37,000 prostitutes. With the passage of the 1955 law this network was largely

dismantled.

Still today, almost ninety years after the first antiprostitution movement, *Kisaeng* tourism, and many other forms of prostitution, are thriving. A look at popular women's magazines in recent years, moreover, shows that at the same time wives are being advised to become more and more like prostitutes within the framework of monogamy. Women in previous movements hoped that if man's despotism in the home could be eliminated and legal reinforcement for prostitution removed their position would be improved. But they failed to analyze the fundamental split which sexist society imposes on woman's nature in the form of the two poles represented by monogamy and prostitution. Perhaps they would be puzzled by the prevailing psychology today, demanding that women incorporate what they had thought were two antithetical female roles. Or perhaps they would not be so surprised having so long observed the male exponents of this alienation commuting back and forth between wife and whore, sometimes calling the wife "dirty" and the whore "pure", sometimes seeing "holy motherhood" in the wife and a "poisonous flower" in the whore. The wife-whore division of labor which continues to be imposed on women is at the very basis of the deprivation of our humanity, making both wife and whore simply interchangeable objects in the private property system, one as a domestic, the other as a sexual, slave.

This brief overview of antiprostitution movements in Japan has had to overlook a number of women's movements which undoubtedly had a great bearing on the understanding of prostitution held by many women: the struggle for political rights for women from the times of the earliest pre-socialist peoples' rights groups, organizing among working women, the influence of women in the outlawed marxist groups, the "bluestockings" movement of writers which articulated well women's outrage at their alienation and gave women a vision of their history in the matriarchal age of female political authority and sexual autonomy. We must restudy all these movements, not just to discover their "mistakes" -- if that word can be justly used about people working against such heavy odds -- but also in hopes of learning from their courage and pride. ●



A cartoon for the baby? No. An anti-*Kisaeng* tourism placard. A scene during the March 8 demonstration. Photo by Matsumoto Michiko

to end prostitution are as old as the feminist movement itself. The first movement as such for women's rights launched in 1886 by *Kyofukai*, advanced twin demands for the legal establishment of monogamy and the abolition of licensed prostitution. This group, which took its name from the Western Women's Temperance Union, presented its demands in the form of petitions to the Meiji government, which at this time was preparing its "modern" civil code. *Kyofukai* hoped, by the elimination of polygamy and licensed prostitution, to establish "pure homes,"

SEIRANKAI

Thunder on the Ultra-Right

by Yamakawa Akio

Is Japan again headed toward fascism? This question, posed as the 1970s began, has taken on new urgency. In recent months the possibility of a fascist resurgence has been vigorously debated throughout Japan. Fears are based upon the following factors:

First, committed to a policy of rapid overseas economic expansion, Japan now faces potentially crippling shortages of oil and other resources. In the 1930s, when a resource-poor Japan experienced pressures from the great powers (the so-called ABCD encirclement), it opted for fascist rule at home and military aggression abroad. Mounting international hostility toward Japan--above all successive blows from the United States culminating in pressures on Japan's oil lifeline in the 1973 crisis--has again raised the spectre of encirclement.

Second, with the current upsurge of domestic economic grievances, particularly inflation, the Communist Party has made significant advances as a parliamentary force. Public support for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has declined to the point where the Upper House elections in July may cost it its decades long parliamentary majority. Unable to hammer out viable countermeasures to deal with its situation, the LDP appears bereft of any effective means to assure its electoral hegemony. Big business, for its part, has exploited the rampant inflation to form price cartels, hoard goods and raise prices. The result has been enormous profits, but also a series of scandals involving the major firms and the LDP. Under these circumstances, social forces with a stake in conservative rule have become crisis-minded. On January 19, the London *Economist* warned that countries experiencing price rises of 20 per cent a year would sooner or later have despotic governments. It is a prediction with ominous import for Japan, whose

inflation is the most severe among the industrial powers.

Third, the strength of frustrated rightist forces is on the rise, precipitating a rash of threats of "drastic actions," including terrorism. Current police estimates place hardcore rightist strength at 450 organizations with 115,000 active members (up 50,000 from 1960). Groups and organizations under their influence bring total right wing strength to an estimated two million.

A rightwing organization, the Bokyo Teishintai (Anti-Communist Volunteer Corps), recently plastered Tokyo's main streets with posters warning the Japanese Foreign Minister: "Ohira, You Shall Die!" Rightists charge that Ohira made rash and embarrassing promises to Washington concerning the planned visit of the Emperor to the United States. In the face of fierce rightwing opposition within the LDP, Ohira's conclusion of an airline service agreement with China has also come under attack. Meanwhile, the *Yamato Shimbun*, a rightwing daily, reported in its January 31 issue that action-oriented ultrarightists had organized a terrorist group to attack not only leaders of the Left, but Cabinet ministers (including Ohira) and some business leaders. Although the veracity of this report is questionable, such talk of terrorist actions is reminiscent of the situation that preceded the famous February 26 incident of 1936. At that time, plans for a coup were hatched by young army officers, frustrated by the corruption and profiteering of politicians and businessmen and convinced by the advance of leftwing forces in the preceding election and by the strengthened ABCD encirclement that Japan was "in crisis." The political and military elite crushed the youthful junta in the name of the Emperor, then utilized the incident to extend the scope of Imperial fascism.

The following year Japan extended its invasion of China to all-out war, with domestic repression and antagonism to the United States intensified.

This is the context for the appearance of Seirankai, a vigorous rightwing group within the LDP. Since its formation last year by young LDP Dietmen, Seirankai has staged dramatic actions both inside and outside the Japanese Diet. Immediately after its founding, Seirankai members pressured the party leadership to cancel a planned visit by LDP Dietmen to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Last summer when south Korean CIA agents--in cooperation with Japanese rightists--entered Japan and kidnapped Kim Dae Jung, former presidential candidate and a leading critic of the Pak Chung Hee dictatorship, Seirankai justified the action and lauded Pak. Seirankai members have furiously opposed ratification of the Japan-China airline agreement, wrecking the timetable of Foreign Minister Ohira. They have even called openly for the overthrow of the Tanaka cabinet. Seirankai's popular appeal was demonstrated on January 26, when a mass rally it sponsored in Tokyo drew 25,000 participants. On March 10, another rally in Nagoya attracted 10,000 people. Like Adolf Hitler, who utilized the melodies of Richard Wagner to inspire nationalist sentiments, Seirankai played the "Japan Cantata," taken from archaic Japanese music, at both rallies.

What, then, is Seirankai? Will it provide the basis for a fascist revival in Japan? A final answer at this time would be premature, but few would deny that Seirankai has made a sensational debut.

Seirankai means "young storm society." According to a manifesto issued by the organization, the word symbolizes "a summer storm that blows away the stuffy atmosphere, enlivens heaven and earth, and creates an iridescent rainbow of new hope." The name was provided by Ishiwara Shintaro, rightwing novelist turned politician, who garnered 3 million votes in the Upper House elections six years ago. An intimate of Mishima Yukio, the well-known writer who killed himself in 1970 after an unsuccessful attempt to inspire a coup by the military, Ishiwara is known for his advocacy of Japan's nuclear armament.

Ishiwara was the catalyst for Seirankai. In the spring of 1972, about 160 LDP Dietmen, including Ishiwara, formed a coalition to resist the moves of the party leadership toward a diplomatic relationship with China. The core of Seirankai took shape within this alliance. Following the December, 1972 Lower House elections, which dramatically enhanced the political strength of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), these rightists laid plans to split the LDP and form what they called a "progressive Liberal Party." A split was essential, they argued, to ensure reform of the conservative political system. Their sense of crisis eased slightly, however, after the July 1973 Tokyo municipal council election, when LDP losses were less than expected. Retracting their earlier call to split the party, they declared they would form an "action-oriented ideological group" within the LDP.

Their appeal was welcomed by relatively young, discontented elements in the party--men who had little access to leading party positions. To magnify their significance, they adopted theatrical gestures, signing a pledge of comradeship in their own blood. On July 17, 1973, after meeting on several occasions, they announced the formation of Seirankai. Thirty-one Dietmen proclaimed their allegiance.

A six-point statement, issued on the day of Seirankai's founding, provides the group's official platform:

- "(1) We defend free society, and demand that Japanese diplomacy be based firmly on the collaboration of Free Nations;
- (2) We fight to improve the nation's moral level by struggling against the prevailing trend of materialism and for the 'normalization' of education;
- (3) We demand that wealth be redistributed and that excessively large personal income be eliminated; establishing a new concept of social justice through the love of labor and more concern for the underprivileged;
- (4) We urge the people to recognize that peace can be won only when they are prepared to fight for the nation's defense; we enlighten them on the need for national defense and domestic security and actively work to strengthen Japan's military;

(5) We demand the institution of an independent Constitution to ensure true freedom, security, and prosperity to the Japanese nation in the new historical context;


(6) We fight for management of the Liberal Democratic Party which will free the party from easy compromises, bureaucracy, opportunism, and all other stale intraparty practices.

Conclusion: Seirankai will never indulge in futile discussion. Its members are prepared to risk their lives to achieve the above goals. All members have made a blood pledge to this effect."

Though the phrases are vague and abstract, they nevertheless indicate Seirankai's determination to create a new ideology and a clearcut policy to rally the Japanese people in the major areas of diplomacy, the military, internal security, and education. Nakagawa Ichiro, a leading Seirankai spokesman, minces no words: "Call me fascist if you wish, but I believe that we have to fight the opposition parties on the broad educational issue, which includes questions about the Japanese ethos and national morality... Education is sacred... we cannot tolerate education becoming a catalyst for a red flag-waving ideology or progressive election campaigning." The group seeks an end to all ambiguity about these matters, as well as about party management.

Speaking at the January 26 mass rally, Seirankai leaders were somewhat more explicit. Some described the current situation as a "national crisis," in which all Japanese should unite and fight. Others emphasized the need for a "new nationalism." A favorite slogan was the demand for total "renovation of education and the abolition of the present Constitution." Shouting and haranguing for four hours, they made clear to all who cared to listen that they sought nothing less than the destruction of Japan's postwar democracy.

Seirankai, of course, is hardly the first such group to appear in the postwar era. LDP leaders have long charged that education in Japan is "biased," pro-Communist, and oriented toward revolution. And ever since its founding, the LDP has sought the revision of Japan's postwar Constitution with its "no war" Article IX.



Notorious rightists such as Kodama Yoshio bankrolled the LDP in its early post-war days and continue to play a vital behind-the-scenes role in shaping party policy. Furthermore, Soshinkai, another powerful rightwing faction within the LDP, once boasted of more than 100 members, including former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Like Seirankai, it called for a new Constitution, more police power, and a faster military buildup. Nor does Seirankai differ greatly from Soshinkai in its mystical, emotional quality. Although it emerged in the context of a real and growing social crisis, Seirankai lacks any practical solution to it. In this sense, it is but another collection of reactionary demagogues.

Yet Seirankai has a number of distinguishing characteristics. For one thing, compared with Soshinkai, it consists of lower echelon party officials. Twelve of its members have been elected to the Diet only twice. Among the Lower House members, six have been elected once, three three times, and four four times. Of the Upper House members, all six have been elected only twice. Certainly this is a political handicap in the LDP, where seniority determines influence. Furthermore, three Seirankai members are in their thirties, 17 are in their forties, nine are in their fifties, and only two are in their sixties. LDP leaders tend to be much older. The relative youth of most Seirankai members lessens their influence in the LDP, but it also gives them a perspective different from that of their elders. Members of the largest age group in Seirankai, those in their

forties, were too young to have served as promoters of Japan's war of aggression in the 1940s; consequently, they feel no responsibility for it. By contrast, Soshinkai members, most of them over 60 years of age, faced the delicate problem of concealing their war guilt while urging an expansion of Japanese military power.

The educational backgrounds of Seirankai members are also revealing. Eight are graduates of technical colleges, while three did not continue their education beyond primary school. Eighteen graduated from universities, but only four attended Japan's prestigious national universities, while only two attended the influential Tokyo University. In a party whose leadership is dominated by Tokyo University graduates, Seirankai is virtually excluded from the elite.

With the exception of Ishiwara and a few others, Seirankai members do not come from wealthy families. Some passed their youth as vagrants, others taught at primary schools. One practiced medicine in a poor, remote village. Such backgrounds closely resemble those of the young army officers who attempted the pre-war fascist coups. Both groups are "sub-leaders" of local communities at the bottom of society. By birth, education and experience the doors to the heights of power are barred to them.

Significantly, Seirankai contains few former bureaucrats. As former bureaucrats comprise 30 percent of LDP Dietmen, this characteristic stands out particularly sharply. Most Seirankai members reached the National Diet after service as LDP chapter officials and local assemblymen. Hamada Koichi, 45, Seirankai's most active member, led a community youth group and worked as chief of the local LDP youth section in Chiba prefecture, the constituency of former party leader Kawashima Shojiro. Chosen by Kawashima as his secretary, Hamada was later rewarded for his services with a place in the national Diet. It might also be noted that for ten years Hamada belonged to Inagawa Gumi, one of Japan's most notorious gangster organizations.

These social backgrounds do much to explain the anti-Establishment tendencies of Seirankai members, particularly their

occasional criticism of big business, unearned income, and the ideology of profit-seeking. They also clarify Seirankai's action-oriented approach and ultrarightist chauvinist associations. The LDP has seen its social base contract as it has operated increasingly through existing administrative organizations, business associations, and loose support groups for local power figures. Insisting that this reliance on establishment channels be terminated, Seirankai members vociferously advocate the formation of a rightwing mass movement--an anti-Communist united front. One Seirankai activist, Nakagawa Ichiro, mobilized 1,600 supporters from his Hokkaido constituency to attend the January rally in Tokyo. Also participating in the rally were mass action groups from the Anti-Communist Alliance, encouraged by Seirankai.

The rightwing group also has vast financial resources at its disposal. Since money flows through factional channels to individual LDP Dietmen, this fact inspires respect within the party. The money comes from ultrarightist movements and from international sources, including those in south Korea and Taiwan, Japan's former colonies and again the focal points of Japanese overseas penetration.

Seirankai's international ties with Asian military dictatorships give the movement a particularly ominous cast. When Ishiwara and others planned to create a new party by splitting the LDP, they were backed financially and otherwise by Sasagawa Ryoichi (see AMPO No. 19). Sasagawa is a veteran Japanese ultranationalist and a leading exponent of the pre-war invasion of Asia. Chairman until recently of the World Anti-Communist League, he has maintained close ties with the U.S. CIA and with its south Korean counterpart. At present, he is devoting himself to what he calls the BG Plan, which, according to the May 21, 1972 issue of the Anti-Communist League newspaper, is intended to "foster sound and healthy young generations of the world on the principle of anti-Communism." Sasagawa is thus a central figure in cementing Japan's alliance with south Korean, Taiwan, Philippine and Saigon dictatorships and in paving the way for the flow of Japanese capital to these countries.

Other major financial backers of Seirankai include the Lotte food company

(whose president is related by marriage to south Korean president Pak) and the Marubeni Corporation, a giant trading firm currently planning to establish a copper plant and a large oil refinery in south Korea. Informed business sources have reported that Seirankai will receive one yen for each leaf of nori (processed seaweed--a favorite Japanese food) imported from Pak's dictatorship. From this source alone, Seirankai will reputedly garner ¥200 million a year. Certainly the south Korean connection provides one of Seirankai's major props. It is now an open secret that before Japan's last general election, Yi Pyong-hui, Pak's Minister without Portfolio, offered to fund the political campaigns of Seirankai members to the tune of ¥300 million.

Seirankai is therefore more than just another intraparty group in the LDP. It hopes to become, and to some extent already is, the Japanese spokesman for the dictatorial regimes of Northeast Asia, which rely heavily on largescale Japanese aid and investment. Nakagawa Ichiro, one of four Seirankai directors, is the main liaison officer to Pak's Korea. Funded lavishly by, among others, the Korean president of the Kushiro Fisheries Company (a relative of Premier Kim Jong Pil), Nakagawa visited south Korea last year immediately after the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping. Tamaaki Kazuo, the main contact man with the Chiang regime on Taiwan, has advocated formation of a new "Pacific Asia Community" linking Japan with Indonesia and Australia. With an eye on Japan's resource lifeline, he insists, "We must by all means keep the faith of the Republic of China, for if we are hostile to it, the Taiwan Strait may be barred to us." Thus Seirankai serves as a spearhead for Japanese imperialism in Asia, continuing the pattern of expansionism followed by Japan for the last century.


Other sources of funding suggest the direction Seirankai may take domestically. One of Seirankai's most fanatical supporters is Futamura Tomihisa, president of the Futamura Chemical Company, which has already contributed ¥300 million to the group. Futamura, a primary school teacher turned businessman, is a devoted admirer of Mishima Yukio. Journalists are also convinced that a group in the top leadership of Mitsui and Company has been secretly aiding Seirankai. The giant corporation has

never openly announced its support for the rightwing group, but, curiously, a special group has reportedly been organized within the firm to study the collapse of Weimar Germany which led to Hitler's rise. Such reports take on sinister ramifications when placed alongside the fact that a Seirankai group has long been cooperating with young officers in the "Self-Defense Forces" to study the prospects for a coup d'etat.

This does not mean that a mass fascist movement, similar to those once existing in Italy and Germany, has emerged in Japan.

Japan's current situation is quite unlike that of the 1930s. The rural community and patriarchal family structure, once employed by Imperial fascism, have been badly shaken. Moreover, grass roots democracy has grown in strength. Internationally, People's China, Korea, and Vietnam provide far sturdier bulwarks against Japanese imperialism than in the past. Even under Asia's tight, American-sponsored dictatorships, popular protest has sharply challenged Japanese expansion. Altogether, Asian people have incomparably greater strength than in the past to resist a renaissance of Japanese fascism.

Seirankai itself is numerically small, numbering only about thirty mem-



bers, some of whom may soon withdraw. It may thus become a mere intraparty, anti-mainstream faction--a harbinger of the gradual collapse of the LDP. In this connection, it is worth noting that Seirankai includes 14 members of the Fukuda faction and 10 of the Nakasone faction, but none from the dominant Tanaka and Ohira factions.

Yet Seirankai's significance should be measured not simply by the number of Dietmen it can claim, but also by its potential for generating mass action. Moreover, even if the development of a classical, mass-based fascism proves unsuccessful in Japan, fascism today may take new forms. The Imperial fascism of pre-war Japan was not propelled by a fascist groundswell from below, but directed by government, military, and economic control from above. Japan's pre-war elite merely utilized a popular rightist movement to serve its own interests. Pointing to this fact, Professor Kurihara Akisuke, a political sociologist at Rikkyo (St. Paul) University, characterized Seirankai as "one of the transitional groups that function...to complete a system of fascist control and integration of the people."

Japan's future thus depends on the people's ability to resist effectively growing rightist militancy while simultaneously leading an offensive against the state power that seeks to exploit it. Delay in launching a popular struggle could be disastrous because:

----The ruling class in a critical election year may whip up nationalist fervor over such issues as resources and foreign pressures;

----In the present inflation, if wage gains are limited to privileged segments of the working class, the appeals of rightist demagogery may find warm response among frustrated groups facing unemployment and shrinking real wages;

----Political cynicism is rife among the Japanese, who are fed up with parliamentary politicking (40 percent of the voters fail to cast a ballot, and nearly 50 percent support no political party);

----The government and the mass media have recently taken to glorifying reactionary militarism. In March the press hailed Japanese military straggler Onoda Hiroo (who finally left the Philippine jungles after 30 years of killing and harassing local villagers) as "the most beautiful personality

Japan has had since the war."

Fascism, the tool of counter-revolution, has historically emerged when the ruling class can no longer control the people in the traditional ways, when the working class suffers a defeat, and when no alliance exists between the working class and newly radicalized intermediate strata. With Japan entering a period of protracted crisis, this scenario cannot be ruled out. To thwart the rightist challenge posed by Seirankai and its international allies, progressive forces in Japan have no alternative but to forge a genuine people's alliance at home and abroad, strong enough to resist the appeal of fascism and to set Japanese politics on a new course. ●


continued from p. 28

nificance for all other people's movements. As an expression of citizens' desire for autonomy and the right to control the future direction of their lives, it is particularly meaningful. It is also worthy of attention as a movement which, in a domestic form, is the same in essence as the struggle of many Asian peoples against Japanese imperialism.

I would like to close this report with the words of Kinjo Seijiro, commenting on his observation of Nagasaki and Yokkaichi cities, both of which are undergoing severe environmental disruption at the hands of Mitsubishi. In his words we can glimpse the ideals of the Okinawan people as they carry on their struggle:

"Japanese society today is like a flock of domestic animals being raised under the thumb of big business. We, the people of Okinawa, are on the verge of becoming entrapped in the same situation, and subject to the same treatment. If the Japanese government and big business can be so heartless with their own people, who can tell what they will do to the people of Okinawa and Southeast Asia? Regardless, we are determined to oppose the concept of "development" which the central government is forcing on us. If you tell us this means a life of poverty and hardship, so be it. At any rate, our economic lives will be under our own control. This is the ideal which we are committed to realizing." ●

MIDAS on the RIGHT OSANO KENJI



"Hawks" and "doves" in Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been at each other's throats over China policy ever since Prime Ministers Tanaka Kakuei and Chou En-lai agreed to resume full diplomatic relations. The focus of their squabble has been the issue of a civil aviation pact. However, it would be naive to view the arguments over the air pact as purely political ones. The real issue is control of the lucrative (¥10 billion per year) Japan-Taiwan air route, which Japan Air Lines (JAL) must give up in exchange for Chinese landing rights. Much of the political strife is a cover for the mercenary interests of the Japanese principals.

The present negotiations, designed to reach a final agreement before next July's Upper House elections, are taking place in the context of basic principles already agreed on: Japan will not have to give up air connections with Taiwan,

but JAL may not fly the route, and China Airlines will no longer be designated a national airline. Japan's two domestic airlines, All Nippon (ANA) and Toa, are now vying for the route, while JAL maneuvers to keep itself in the money by establishing a 100%-owned subsidiary.

Behind the JAL-ANA-Toa triangle lurks the shadowy figure of Osano Kenji, 56. The major civilian shareholder in government-owned JAL (2.35 million shares), he is also the biggest stockholder in ANA (1.09 million shares) and a managing director of Toa. Osano is closely linked to Tanaka and supports his China policy because of the opportunity it gives him to muscle in on international aviation. Meanwhile, such Taiwan lobbyists and Tanaka opponents as Kishi Nobusuke and LDP faction leader Fukuda Takeo draw support for their opposition to the agreement from Kobayashi Ataru,

a leading financier and the president of JAL, and from rightist doyen Sasagawa Ryoichi.

WHO IS THE KING OF THE AIR?

Before the war, Osano Kenji was merely the owner of a small auto-parts factory. But military contracts and his appropriation of goods released by the military after defeat made him rich, while he took advantage of the occupation to establish good relations with MacArthur's General Headquarters.

It was at that time that he began the partnership with Gotoo Keita of the Tokyu group which was to make him a leading figure in Japan's transportation and real estate circles. His Kokusai Kogyo Corporation (KKK), capitalized at ¥982 mil (\$3.3m) now owns more than 3,000 hotel rooms in the U.S. (2,000 in Hawaii) and south Korea. It also holds 30 percent of the shares in Korean Airlines (KAL) and is working with the Pak Chung Hee regime to develop Cheju Island for tourism.

After the U.S. occupation, Osano needed a suitable political partner. He found his man in Tanaka Kakuei, then chief secretary of the LDP. Their similar backgrounds made them natural allies. Neither man had entered politics from the government bureaucracy or the *zaibatsu*, and both had climbed to positions of wealth and power with only primary school educations, quite different from the normal LDP elite pattern. Furthermore, both were powerful figures in transportation and real estate.

The link between Osano's money and Tanaka's political clout has continued ever since.

In 1966, while Tanaka was Minister of Finance, Osano paid the astounding sum of ¥1.8 billion for the almost bankrupt Nihon Denken Co., of which Tanaka was president. The return for such generosity was a new government housing policy, sparking a construction boom and Nihon Denken Co.'s recovery.

In August of the same year, ex-Dietman Tanaka Shoji hit Osano for ¥290 million in exchange for his silence

on the cozy relations between Minister of Finance Tanaka and Osano's Kogyo empire concerning the disposal of Toranomon Park, a valuable piece of government property in central Tokyo. This issue was raised in the Diet in 1968, but with little effect on Tanaka's political fortunes.

When Tanaka finally became Prime Minister in July 1972, it was reported that his success over rival Fukuda Takeo was due to a contribution from Osano. This cemented the alliance between wealth (Osano's estimated ¥200-600 billion) and power (Tanaka's premiership). The role of money in the choice of a Prime Minister is tied to the nature of the LDP, which has reigned uninterrupted since the war except for one brief Socialist interval during the occupation.

More a composite of assorted factions than a true political party, the LDP has used lopsided electoral districts controlled by party bosses and support from a powerful right-wing infrastructure to make its power almost independent of popular will. The president of the party, elected in a factional competition once every three years, automatically becomes Prime Minister, with power over all three branches of the government. As chief executive, he appoints ministers and controls the government's bureaucracy; as chief of the majority party in the Diet he appoints the chairmen of both Houses; and he appoints Supreme Court judges. As party chief, he also has much power over its members.

Since intraparty politics are beyond public reach, what counts in winning is money. In other words, the premiership goes to the faction whose boss touches big business for the biggest contribution to the party. Although an official report of political contributions is required by law, the real sums involved are said to be as much as ten times as high as those reported. Official reports on Tanaka's election indicate that he received ¥1.347 billion while Fukuda received ¥1.674 billion. But Tanaka's faction won the election by a vote of 282-190, and the Yomiuri Shimbum of February 27, 1974

indicates that this vote closely paralleled the hidden sums circulated during the election: about ¥20 billion for Tanaka's faction versus ¥5-6 billion for Fukuda's. According to the Weekly Asahi of March 1, 1974, "The amount of money supporting Tanaka must have been enormous. Even though big companies gave a bundle to his rival, they could not beat Osano."

It is not yet clear how much Osano will make by having installed Tanaka in the premier's chair. But three Prime Ministers were among those indicted in postwar Japan's three greatest political scandals--and none were convicted.* No doubt, no important member of the LDP will be convicted of anything as long as the LDP continues in power, but it takes little to imagine that Osano made a killing on Tanaka's "Remodeling Japan" scheme, which sent real estate prices soaring throughout the country.

Osano has emerged as a leading figure in the Japanese and Korean air worlds since Tanaka took office. On August 24, 1973, Pak Chung Hee, then in the spotlight for the kidnapping of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, awarded Osano his regime's Supreme Medal in gratitude for his holding KAL shares and for contributing to the development of Cheju Island as a tourist resort.

Osano described his advance into Korea in an interview in the Weekly Yomiuri of October 10, 1973. Before the Japan-Korea treaty of 1965 he used his links with the U.S. Army to sell trucks to Chang Jung Hwn, a member of the pro-American, compradore Han Jin Group. Since this group developed KAL, it had no objection to allowing Osano, a foreigner, to become the airline's biggest shareholder.

His role in the development of Cheju Island was disclosed in the Japanese Diet following the Kim Dae Jung affair. An Opposition member reported that Osano's KKK was operating

in conjunction with KAL to corner land on Cheju Island. Operating under the Pak regime's Standard Land Price Notice, KKK is forcibly buying land at the nominal price of ¥14 per tsubo (3.3 square meters), while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is actively recruiting Japanese investors in the island's tourist future.

Osano's tourist interests are not restricted to Japan, Korea, and Hawaii. While Tanaka plans a Tokyo-Jakarta-Canberra Axis, Osano is pouring capital into the South Pacific islands, where his hotels augur a repeat of Japan's 1880's expansion into the south seas.

Watanabe Tsuneo, the Weekly Yomiuri's interviewer, concludes that the Tanaka-Osano relationship is much like the Nixon-Rebozo one. Rising from as murky a past as Rebozo, Osano achieved enormous wealth and an aristocratic marriage. (His wife is the daughter of ex-Viscount Hotta, whose family headed the Sakura han, near the present Narita airport.) He has boasted of his alliance with Kodama Yoshio, the grandfather of Japanese terrorists who claimed to have the Prime Ministers of the early sixties under his thumb. Not one to risk all his bets on one horse, Tanaka's henchman is also close to Seirankai, which calls for the overthrow of Tanaka's rule. As a professed friend of Seirankai's chairman and secretary-general, there is little doubt that some of his huge wealth flows in their direction.

All of this is but a part of the complex web of bribery, old-boy ties and economic interest which surrounds the Japanese right. The whole will be unraveled only when the Japanese people seize political and economic power from the hands of such conspirators.

*The scandals were: the Coal Industry Control scandal of 1948, the Showa Electric scandal of 1948, and the shipbuilding scandal of 1954. (K.Y.) ●

From Our Friends

Banzai ! Marcos' Japanese Friend

by the Pinaglabanan Research Committee (PIRCOM)

"Two Japanese tots saved; adopted by Iloilo couple," read a headline in the happy-as-the-day-is-long Philippine Daily Express (Mar.7,1974). According to the article, financial assistance will be extended by Japanese businessman" Sasagawa Ryoichi to Salvador (whose Japanese name is Kawakuri Tado-nori) and Salvacion (Kawakuri Miyoko), who in 1945 "were only three and one years of age respectively when they were left by their parents during the American invasion."

On the next day the PDE faithfully carried another news story about Sasagawa--with a color picture at the top of its front page. "The Sasagawa Cancer Institute at the Ospital ng Maynila was inaugurated yesterday, with Ryoichi Sasagawa, the Japanese philanthropist who donated a US\$200,000 Cobalt 60 machine (a Toshiba model), aside from some 50million yen worth of materials and equipment to several humanitarian agencies in the Philippines, attending the affair." His collaborator, Ferdinand E. Marcos, had granted a tax exemption of some US\$ 300,000 on the machine when it arrived from Tokyo earlier this year. With the "businessman-philanthropist" at the ceremony were his wife and a son, Mayor and Mrs. Bagatsing (old-time friends from the Asian People's Anti-Communist League) and Ambassador Urabe Toshio of Japan. Urabe is known to be an admirer of the infamous militarist and former premier Kishi Nobusuke, who has long been one of Sasagawa's comrades in arms.

Who is this beautiful guy being played up in Marcos' newspaper? None other than the ultra-nationalist Sasagawa Ryoichi whose history in a myriad of rightist schemes and machinations extend back to 1931 ("Profile", Ampo No. 19). Sasagawa's forte, before and

after his imprisonment as a Class A war criminal in Sugamo Prison in December 1945, has been the operation of questionable "businesses" to finance ultra-nationalist affairs, and the building of various International Associations and Friendship Societies to promote Japan's chauvinist interests abroad.

During Sasagawa's stay in Sugamo Prison, where he joined with Kodama Yoshio and Kishi Nobusuke in making schemes for Japan's Imperial resurrection, he also communed with fellow inmate Jose S. Laurel III, a son of the notorious Filipino Collaborator-- Jose P. Laurel.

Young Jose had been sent to Japan by his father to attend the Japanese Imperial Military Academy right before the outbreak of WWII. Some ten years after his Sugamo life, he made a comeback as Consultant to the Philippine Panel, which in 1960 formulated the recently "ratified" RP-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. He became Ambassador to Japan for five years during the late 1960's, where he was in and out of the reparations payment transactions. He is now President of the Philippines-Japan Society, Inc. (The counterpart of the Kishi-Sasagawa Japan-Philippines Society.) The Laurel Law Office has had as clients a number of Japanese-affiliated business corporations in the Philippines. And in the case of Mariwasa-Honda--a newly formed joint venture--"Ambassador Laurel" himself is chairman of its Board of Directors.

Just as Laurel managed to outlive the postwar years, his prison-mate Sasagawa has likewise emerged on the Asian scene. In 1966 Sasagawa financed and founded the Asian People's



the government-controlled press, "promised to donate a huge slab of Romblon marble for the museum."

The direct offshoot of Sasagawa's 1972 visit was the newspaper story: "Operation 'CHERRY BLOSSOMS'"; Search started for Colony of Japanese stragglers." (PDE, Nov. 23, 1972.) This search on Mt. Halcon, Mindoro Occidental (Lubang Island is part of this province), was to locate and encourage the surrender of other Onodas who are believed to be living with Mangyan natives on the slopes of the mountain Sasagawa, then 73 years old, went to Mindoro Island to "discover" his fellow soldiers both before and after his courtesy call on the Chief Executive.

Presumably with the consent of "General Sasagawa", the Japanese Embassy also began secret activities in Mindoro Island, deploying Japan overseas Cooperation Volunteers (Japanese "peace corps"), linguists, anthropologists, and even some "businessmen and tourists," according to a high ranking informant in the Department of National Defense. After this announcement both Philippine and Japanese newspapers stopped reporting on the progress of "Operation CHERRY BLOSSOMS". The stage is not yet prepared but when it is ready, Sasagawa will definitely be calling the shots behind the curtain. The old General is about to create a dramatic scenario for an artist par excellence, the cunning Marcos-san.

Sasagawa Ryoichi is indeed a hard-core ideologist-activist of Japanese Militarism. "Speaking through an interpreter, he said that he is 75 years old, but does not wear glasses. An enthusiast of the martial arts, he said that the other rules for staying young, healthy and happy are: "Love other people. Do not get angry. Do not waste money on unimportant things. Do not eat too much. And be tender to women'." (PDE, Mar. 8, 1974.) Let us congratulate a TOMODACHI for his living so long. BANZAI!!

Note: A \$1 million "thank you" Fund For Onoda sent by the Japanese government was turned over to the Japan-Philippines Friendship Association by Marcos. ●

Nissan Motor: Hell's Battlefield

by Matsuo Kei

I. WORKERS AT HELL'S BATTLEFIELD

ATOMIZED LABOR

A former Zenkyoto student activist in the late sixties, Matsuo Kei, 27, is a labor organizer who has been working closely with militant autoworkers. Currently he is coordinator for the Nissan Socialist Study Group and the National Autoworkers' Front Coordinating Bureau, both of which are part of Zenrokatsu, a national liaison center for radical labor activists.

The Japanese automotive industry is a crucial link in Japan's economic machine and a strategic front in the battle of Japanese capitalists to overtake the United States in industrial production. In part the centrality of the industry lies in the fact that it transforms the finished and semi-finished products of almost all crucial sectors of the economy--steel, non-ferrous metals, electrical machinery, machine tools, and many others--into some seven million automobiles a year (in 1973). It also lies in the fact that the automotive industry is among the leaders in Japanese capitalism's drive for the markets and materials of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. But the automotive industry is also a leader in the effort to domesticate the Japanese labor movement and bend the workers to acquiescence under the dominion of the all powerful machine.

Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. and Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (whose products are known abroad as Datsuns) together control 70 per cent of Japanese automobile production. Nissan (Nissan Motor with its subsidiaries such as Nissan Diesel Motor Co., Ltd. and Nissan Shatai[Chasis] Co., Ltd.) is typical of the industry in its notoriously crude and unrelenting control of its workers. Back in the early '50s Nissan was a stronghold of the most militant workers in the country, and Nissan workers were among the leaders in the struggle against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (AMPO) in 1952. But with the imposition of a goyo kumiai, a company-patronized union, throughout the sprawling combine, Nissan has become known among its workers as "Hell's Battlefield," and today is a leader in spreading Japan's counter-revolutionary and exploitative labor-control mechanism throughout Asia.

Every week, Nissan places a "help-wanted" ad in major papers: "Want to earn a stable income at a super-modern factory located in green forests? Two days off every other week! No previous experience required!"

It takes no more than a week for the newly employed to realize that the attractive words of the ad mask a chilling reality. The "super-modern" factory roars around the clock; it is so noisy that one would imagine that hell, should one exist, would be a bit quieter. In his first day at Nissan, the newly employed worker takes part in a day-long orientation program. It consists of a factory tour and brief instructions on the specific work he is supposed to do. There is no explanation of the whole process by which an automobile is assembled. All that a worker is required to know is how to do his task, how to follow a set of instructions. There are many workers who, after spending years at Nissan, still do not know exactly what part they are making every day.

Today's automobile plant is built around a drastically improved version of the Ford system first introduced in the '20s. Division of labor is pursued to the extreme; each worker's operation, not to mention each line of operation, is divided into tiny fragments and arranged in such a way as to attain maximum efficiency. Forced to complete each fragment of his work within 100ths of a second, an individual auto-worker in 1974, like Chaplin's worker in Modern Times fifty years ago, is no more than a convenient supplement to a machine.

The supervisor says: "You'll find the job more interesting as you get accustomed to it." But thousands of millions of repetitions of the same simple work become monotonous and soul-killing. The speed of the assembly line is decided not by man's ability, mentality, desire and what

not, but by a computer in the company's head office, programed only to see daily or monthly sales figures.

"You feel like you're swimming in oil," says a worker in these "super-modern" factories. Without exception a newly employed worker's exposed skin soon is heavily burnt by oil splashes. Aches in the shoulders, waist and neck are normal, since workers hoist parts weighing dozens of kilograms or concentrate on minute parts measured in millimeters or in fractions of a millimeter. "I've lost weight since I started working here" is a common comment. "We won't be able to live long, if we keep working in a filthy place like this."

During the daily 8 or 9 hours of work, workers are allowed only a one-hour break at noon if they are on the day-shift, or at 3:00 a.m. if on the night shift. At meal time, the 1,000 workers on a floor jam into a tiny dining hall capable of accommodating only about 100, and are served with a meal they say "tastes much worse than what you get in jail." During the dayshift lunch hour, all the lights are turned off in order to "save electricity"; there are no facilities where the workers can rest after a meal; all they can do is to take a nap lying on a newspaper spread on the floor.

DISCRIMINATORY WAGES

For the terrible jobs the workers are forced to perform, Nissan pays very badly. (See Table 1.) It is impossible for a worker of 31, with wife and one or two children, to survive in the jungle of inflation with a scanty monthly paycheck of 70,000 yen (c. \$250). He must work overtime or on double shifts to earn extra money, but the maximum he gets hardly exceeds ¥100,000 (\$357).

The pay scale at Nissan is not only low, but it is elaborately tricky to the company's advantage.

(1) The company reserves all rights to determine a person's wages and to give differential raises to encourage "loyalty." It punishes "undesirable workers" by giving them the short end of the "average annual wage increase" which is negotiated with the company-sponsored union. For the last few years the "average" annual wage increase has been about ¥10,000 a month, but the members of a minority union strug-

gling for their class interests against management and the company-sponsored union have received only about ¥2,500. Today these minority unionists receive a monthly wage fully ¥20,000 less than the average.

(2) The already wide gap grows wider every year since Nissan offers more generous wage increases to supervisors and union officials than it does to the rank-and-file. (See Table 2.)

(3) The base salary accounts for only a small fraction--between 15% and 20%--of one's total monthly pay, including overtime allowances. It is only one third or a quarter of that paid by other typical Japanese companies. Even if a Nissan worker receives the same monthly pay as one in another company, his retirement allowance is only a fraction of the national standard, since it is calculated on the base salary.

TABLE 1. AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGE AT NISSAN
(Unit: yen)

	1972	%	1973	%
Base salary	14,924	24.0	15,322	20.9
Special allowance	44,047	71.1	54,690	74.8
Dependent allowance	1,829	3.0	1,880	2.6
Job performance allowance	1,149	1.9	1,252	1.7
Total	61,949	100.0	73,114	100.0

N.B.: As of 1972, an average Nissan worker is 31.3 years old, has been working for Nissan for 6.4 consecutive years, and has 1.2 dependents. Allowances for overtime and night shifts are not included in the above figures.

TABLE 2. WAGE INCREASES AT ONE NISSAN FACTORY (1973)

Age	Years of service	Rank	Increase in monthly wage over '72 (yen)
30	7	2	11,300
27	9	3	13,500
24	5	2	11,600
23	4	2	11,200
57	28	Supernumerary	11,300
46	17	3	11,400
41	15	3; Foreman	15,600
26	7	3	12,300

The union makes no effort to challenge this extremely discriminatory and exploitative wage structure. Indeed it doesn't even explain to the puzzled workers what each allowance and benefit item actually means.

DECEPTIVE REDUCTION OF WORKING HOURS

In recent years, big businesses in Japan have eagerly started introducing a "two-days-off-a-week" system. And of course Nissan is no exception. In 1972, it started operating on a "two-nights-off-a-week" basis, switched to a "two-days-off-every-other-week" system in 1972, and finally launched a genuine "two-days-off" system in 1973. The alleged purpose of the new system is to "enable the employees to have more leisure and enrich their lives" by cutting the total annual working hours.

But this tricky system, endorsed wholeheartedly by the union, has much in common with the one at Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries. (See "IHI, a Fake 'Kingdom of Shipbuilding,'" AMPO, #17.) The working day at Nissan was lengthened first from 7 hours to 7 and half hours, and then to 8 hours, with the daily base wage kept intact; the worker is now forced to work one extra hour a day for nothing. The longer working day means fewer overtime hours, a serious blow to workers who barely survived by working overtime. As the result of the reduction in overtime work alone, Nissan workers lost an average of ¥2,244 a month in 1971, ¥3,996 in 1972 and ¥6,916 in 1973 compared with the preceding years.

These are not the only effects of "shortening" the work hours. The company management and union leaders, while expansively talking about "a drastic reduction in working hours," hide the fact that the reduction is only about 12 hours a year. In part this is achieved by playing with vacations. Nissan has a special Nissan calendar, to which the company union has agreed, which disregards most official holidays. Twice a month it is "two days off a week"; the only other holidays are: New Year holidays, summer holidays, and --why not!--August 30, the anniversary of the foundation of the Nissan Workers' Union.

Nissan introduced the new system to enhance its reputation as a progressive

company. But in shortening work hours, however nominally, the company management found it imperative to raise the rate of productivity. The workers thus suffer doubly from an intensification of labor and a sharp reduction in pay. Far from being able to "have much leisure," the dead tired workers look forward impatiently to a free Saturday when they can have a day long sleep. In fact the "two-days-off" system is nothing but a grandiose rationalization scheme, and Nissan's management and its union leaders will adopt any strategy which promises to raise productivity, whatever its effect on the workers.

FREQUENT LABOR ACCIDENTS

One sees dozens of "safety first" slogans posted on the walls of any Nissan factory. But these slogans are betrayed by the number of "super-modern" machines --Nissan's weapons for productivity, rationalization and technological innovation--which are laid out in the building with little space for the operator or human movement.

As this contrast between the slogans and the factory layout clearly shows, the "safety education" and "safety counter-

NISSAN CALENDAR (OCT. '73 - MAR. '74)

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S		
O		1	2	3	4	5	(6)							1	2	(3)*
C								N								
T	7	8	9	10	11	12	(13)	O	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(14)
O								E								
B	14	15	16	17	18	19	[20]	M	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	*18
E								B	18	19	20	21	22	23*	(24)	
R	21	22	23	24	25	26	27*	R								
		28	29	30	31				25	26	27	28	29	30		
D								J		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	5		
E								A								
C	2	3	4	5	6	7	[8]	N	6	7	8	9	10	11	(12)	
E								U								
M	9	10	11	12	13	14	15*	A	13	14	15*	16	17	18	(19)	
B								R								
E	16	17	18	19	20	21	(22)	Y	20	21	22	23	24	25	[26]	
R	23	24	25	26	27	28	(29)		27	28	29	30	31			
		30	31													
F							1	2*								1
E									M							(2)
B	3	4	5	6	7	8	[9]	A	3	4	5	6	7	8	9*	
R								R								
U	10	11*	12	13	14	15	(16)	C	10	11	12	13	14	15	(16)	
A								H								
R	17	18	19	20	21	22	23*		17	18	19	20	21*	22	(23)	
Y									24	25	26	27	28	29	[30]	
		24	25	26	27	28										

N.B.: () = Nissan holiday other than Sunday
 [] = Holiday cancelled by labor agreement
 * = Holiday reserved for special emergency attendance
 • = National holiday but not necessarily Nissan holiday
 The New Year's holidays last from Dec. 29 through Jan. 4.

measures" adopted by Nissan are at most nominal. Workers are invited to make proposals for improving their job environment during company-wide "safety first" campaigns, but the company adopts only those proposals that cost no extra money and contribute to "productivity first." Exhausted in the rat race with constantly speeded up assembly lines Nissan workers suffer frequent labor accidents. The following examples are but a sample.

In April 1968, immediately after graduation from a technical high school, Mr. K got a job at Nissan Motor's Murayama plant in a Tokyo suburb. He was assigned to an assembly line to attach the engine and tires to the car body--a very tough job for an unskilled worker. After his third week on the assembly line, he was ordered to work on the night shift. Half a year later, in October, he fell ill from a cold and months of overwork. When he did not report to work, a supervisor dragged him out of bed in the company dorm and escorted him to his post on the assembly line. Mr. K soon broke down, and his temperature went up to 41.5 (F104) degrees. The doctor at the company's clinic sent him back to the dormitory with no medication, saying that his was a simple cold and could be shaken off after a nap. When he got worse he asked the doctor to visit him but the doctor refused to do so; the dormitory caretaker did not show any concern for him. And when his roommates came back from the night shift the next day, they found Mr. K dead in the toilet, bending slightly downward, with his shorts pulled half-way down. Mr. K's death was no accident, but an inevitable result of the inhumane labor practice at Nissan, "hell's battlefield."

Nissan Diesel Casting Co. in Saitama Prefecture was established in September 1971 as an outgrowth of the former casting department of Nissan Diesel Motor. With its construction the Nissan group boasted that the new plant, "capable of attaining drastic rationalization with its most advanced labor-saving facilities and devices, is unequalled by any casting plant in the world." In February 1972, less than half a year after it went into operation, the "labor-saving" plant claimed its first victim. A worker's head became caught in a large transfer machine which he was repairing and he was instantly killed. The cause: a foreman pushed the switch on without first confirming whether it was safe.

About a month later, a worker had his left hand cut off by a lathe at Nissan Diesel's Kawaguchi plant. Such an accident is practically impossible for a skilled turner, but this turner had been feeling ill. Although he had urgently requested sick leave, it had been denied. Another example comes from Nissan Motor's Yokohama plant, where a worker was caught in a shower of hot metal discharged from a cupola while operating a platter. Five days later he died.

Whenever business is prosperous and automobiles are in high demand, Nissan sends many office clerks and salesmen to plants, or recruits new employees, to help increase production. Complete strangers to assembly lines, these emergency reinforcements can hardly avoid accidents. Immediately after the accident mentioned above, emergency workers at the Yokohama plant suffered a whole series of serious accidents: a worker assigned to the casting department had his head caught in a machine and almost lost his life; another worker assigned to the heat treating section required 30 stitches in a wound; and in the forging section, a worker was laid up for a month with a broken bone.

Most victims of labor accidents--and there are many--are new workers employed on a trial basis. They are temporary employees and seasonal workers who are not eligible for membership in the Nissan Workers' Union or for the institutional benefits and insurance available to regular employees. After accidents they are thrown into the streets like old rags without sufficient compensation, insurance, or retirement allowance. With every accident, the company management and union leaders utter the same refrain: "What? Lines are not moving? You mean, at this busiest moment?" Instead of looking into the causes of accidents, they simply try to thrust all the responsibility on the victimized workers. They even tried to evade responsibility for the death of Mr. K by offering his family a condolence gift of ¥10,000 (\$35). "World famous Nissan" and its Datsun car is a bloodsucker grown fat by sucking at the lifeblood of the workers.

"DIVIDE AND RULE" TACTICS

The management of Nissan knows very well the workers cannot silently endure

such working conditions forever. The capitalists have therefore equipped themselves with devices to prevent and suppress explosions of anger.

Most important is a strictly structured hierarchical supervisory system. The ranks of supervisors in this hierarchy are: (1) director, (2) manager, (3) assistant manager, (4) foreman, (5) job instructor, (6) section leader, and (7) big brother. Employees with the rank of (5) or lower are supplementary supervisors not eligible for a "job performance allowance." At the lowest ranks of the hierarchy, one supplementary supervisor is chosen for every 5 workers.

According to the unwritten law of promotion, ranks (3) and above are open only to college graduates or those who have worked with Nissan for a minimum of 15 consecutive years. In order to be promoted to ranks (4), (5) and (6), an employee must be either a highschool graduate with a minimum of 4 years of service or above 35 in age; and the low rank of (7) is held only by those recommended unani- mously by their superiors. The road to supervisory rank is thus effectively closed for many workers, especially for those who start working for Nissan in their late 30s and 40s.

Various other devices include: the QC (quality control) and ZD (zero-defect) circles organized at the workers' "own initiative"; the labor union; and management conferences jointly run by the union and the company at different levels. Nissan has thus managed to spread into every corner of the factory a closely-knit spy network enabling management to trace every single move of an individual worker. Under such a vigilante system, each worker is divided so perfectly from his colleagues that he never dares voice his complaints openly, even though he knows they are shared equally by others.

A "divide and rule" tactic becomes all the more effective when it is supplemented by tacit discrimination against certain segments of workers. Even the regular employees are differentiated into multiple layers of ranks and posts, so that they keep watch on each other. Members of the minority union are ruthlessly screened out in the promotion system. Other workers, such as those in their probation periods, temporary workers, seasonal workers and outside subcontract

workers, are exploited and discriminated against even more severely.

Like other Japanese auto-makers, Nissan has extremely high employee turnover. A third of the large number of highschool graduates it recruits to its production lines every spring leave Nissan in six months; another third leave in the latter half of the first year; and by the end of the third year 99% of them leave Nissan. For a company like this, seasonal workers and temporary workers are indispensable, especially for assembly work. Many of the seasonal workers are actually peasants who come to cities after the fall rice harvest and go back to their villages the following spring. Hard hit by the capitalists' regional development and industrialization programs--i.e., agricultural destruction programs--they can no longer live by agriculture alone, thus forming a reliable industrial reserve army.

The capitalists derive a great deal of advantage from employing these seasonal and temporary workers to carry 30 to 40% of the peak work load. Even though they pay short-term workers twice the base salary of a regular employee, they more than save this by not paying them various allowances, insurance, and fringe benefits. Further, they do not have to worry about unorganized workers staging a strike or causing labor disputes--they can be fired at any time.

The working conditions of these seasonal workers have not improved at all since the "seasonal workers' uprising" of 1971. At Nissan three seasonal workers are put in a bare 10 square meter dormitory room. A worker is not allowed to use any electric appliances in the room except a shaver, a hair dryer, a lamp and a simple heater, the last two being supplied by the company and shared by the three roommates.

The dormitory has a "recreation room"--another 10 square meter room--small to serve the 100 to 200 workers living there. Not surprisingly, the recreation room is furnished only with an old TV set and an electric pot for cooking instant noodle.

On the job, the seasonal workers are discriminated against in many ways. While regular employees are given new work clothes, the seasonal workers receive old ones. They are often assigned to the filthy, dangerous, or hard jobs that regular employees dislike. The capitalists make every possible effort to encourage

the regular workers to look down on the seasonal workers as incompetents incapable of securing good jobs. The ultimate purpose of the "divide and rule" policy is of course to prevent the two groups of workers from sharing their complaints and hatred against the capitalists and from staging a joint struggle.

II. NISSAN WORKERS' UNION--A SPEARHEAD OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION

THE LABOR UNION, A CHILD OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM

How did Nissan manage to turn its factories into the "hell's battlefields" of exploitation and suppression, and the crude "divide and rule" policies?

After World War II Nissan's management had little interest in reconstructing the company. It was the impoverished workers who took on the task of putting the assembly lines back into operation for the sake of their own subsistence. Until the outbreak of the Korean War, therefore, the workers accumulated tremendous power as the real promoters of production activities, and they waged a series of militant offensives against the company management. In the 1952 struggle against the San Francisco Peace Treaty which, together with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (AMPO), was to link Japan to U.S. cold war strategy, the Nissan workers (the Nissan Local of the National Association of Autoworkers' Unions) led the labor front's militant opposition movement.

As the production lines began to move smoothly, however, the capitalists started to take revenge. The red-hunting of the early '50s destroyed much of the once flourishing militant labor movement. In 1953 Nissan retaliated with an all-out offensive to dissolve the militant union. Management locked the workers out of the plants for more than 100 days, during which they bought off some workers under the banner of a new company-created union. The Nissan Workers' Union which reigns over a majority of regular workers at Nissan today was thus born as a beloved child of the company management.

The Nissan Workers' Union, capital's left hand, has played a vital role ever since its birth not only in turning Nissan into "hell's battlefield" but also in shifting the whole Japanese working class movement toward the right. In the '70s, as

Nissan makes a strenuous effort to transplant "hell's battlefields" to Third World countries, the union has taken on the task of spreading abroad the time tested gospel of Japan's counter-revolutionary autoworkers' movement. In their effort to organize all Asian autoworkers under their own control, executive officials of IMF-JC (International Metalworkers' Federation, Japan Council) unabashedly say: "Unions like the ones at Nissan and Toyota are the best in Japan." I sincerely urge fellow workers abroad not to be deceived by these words, for every single word uttered by these union executives and every single move they make are meant to promote capital's interests at the expense of working class interests.

TABLE 3. PRODUCTION OF AUTOMOBILES BY MAJOR AUTOMAKERS IN 1972

Automaker	Production (10,000 vehicles)	Production as % of '71 figure
G. M. (U.S.)	574.1	99.6
Ford (U.S.)	319.7	113.4
Toyota (Japan)	208.7	106.7
Nissan (Japan)	186.4	117.2
Chrysler (U.S.)	169.3	111.5
Fiat (Italy)	166.1	113.6
Volkswagen (W. Germany)	145.3	87.7
Renault (France)	134.8	114.8

Source: Toyota Jidosha Sokuho

TABLE 4. JAPANESE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF AUTOMOBILES

(1,000 vehicles)

Year	Production	Export	Export as % of production
1965	1875	194	10.3
1966	2286	255	11.2
1967	3146	362	11.5
1968	4086	612	15.0
1969	4675	858	18.4
1970	5259	1086	20.5
1971	5811	1778	30.6
1972	6294	1965	31.2

N.B.: Automobiles assembled at overseas subsidiary plants constitute between 15 and 20% of the export; but the percentage is expected to rise sharply in the near future as overseas expansion by the Japanese automakers gets under way.

Source: Japan Automakers' Association

DRIVING FORCE OF RATIONALIZATION DRIVE

The Nissan Workers' Union revealed its own criminal and anti-revolutionary nature in the prospectus it drew up and circulated two decades ago. "We believe," said the prospectus, "that our livelihood depends on our company and that, without improvement in the company's productive capacity, neither our own livelihood nor labor conditions can be improved drastically." An argument like this urging workers to work to the best of their ability for their company's prosperity lies at the heart of the ideology maintained by the rightist Japanese labor movement under the leadership of Domei (Japan Confederation of Labor) and IMF-JC. The Nissan Workers' Union has remained true to this belief. Its recent resolution highlighted: "Firmly standing upon our long-held basic idea and resolutely determined to improve our livelihood through our own strenuous efforts, we have been endeavoring to reinforce our company's foundation."

It is thanks to the union leadership's very "cooperative" attitude that Nissan has managed to stage a series of drastic drives for rationalization of labor. But a new trend is evolving in the '70s. No longer merely a passive collaborator in these drives, the union has begun to take active part in and even lead new drives. After the 1971 and 1973 yen revaluations, for instance, the union took the initiative and urged its members to work harder and raise productivity so the company's exports would not fall.

It is not at all unusual for Japanese company unions to refrain from strongly denouncing the way their companies operate, but the union at Nissan is rather extraordinary. The task of the union, by its own definition, is to "see to it that the company fulfills its social responsibilities," but all it does to fulfill this mission is suppress and neutralize workers' and citizens' movements against the automotive industry's pollution. The union's own proposals for pollution countermeasures are completely dictated by the "logic of capital"; the union leaders speak loudly about the necessity to introduce "a kind of technical innovation that can improve the quality of an automobile and make it much safer," and about enacting better traffic control policies.



COMPLETE CONTROL OF A WORKER'S PERSONALITY

The union at Nissan does not promote rationalization drives directly, but through a separate organ called the "Management Conference," which is run jointly by union and management for the "achievement of common interests."

A wide spectrum of subjects are dealt with at the "management conference" table: production processes and procedures for quality control; working conditions, including relocation of plants, reassignment of appointments, and improvement of job environment; introduction of the "two-days-off-a-week" system; and even the "labor-management relationship at job sites." Thus the labor union does not have to busy itself with activities of its own except perhaps some "rituals" like the annual "spring wage-increase offensive."

But the union has become neither useless nor weak. It is an indispensable organ for Nissan, because it adopts all decisions of the management conference as its own program. To assure this, the union has one bureau which is named, accurately enough, the "Labor Management Bureau."

All the administrative positions of the union's hierarchy, from the top executive chairs down through the workshop committee, are occupied by people holding corresponding positions in the company's supervisory system. The centralized

hierarchy of the union thus reflects the centralized hierarchy of the company's supervisory system and provides union leaders detailed information on each worker. When the management conference, with its various subdivisions at each level, engages in "activities for the mutual benefit of management and labor," the union eagerly helps by controlling and manipulating the individual workers. The union's "special program for training union officials" is primarily aimed at decorating as many loyal union members as possible with one title or another. Its purpose is to expand its net of vigilance over all workers.

This manipulation is not limited to such material matters as labor conditions at job sites; it extends to private matters and regulates the life-style of individual workers both inside and outside the factory. Take, for example, the union's "Program of Activities for 1973." Realizing that the members "are becoming eager to lead a more meaningful life"—that they are becoming more and more disappointed with hell's battlefield—the program emphasizes that "union leaders, in their daily on the job union activities, are expected to be careful in handling this delicate problem, which has to do with spiritual welfare." The same program also calls for reinforcing the union's "community organizing" activities aimed at organizing the workers and their families together into a Great Nissan Coprosperity Sphere. The union is attempting to control the workers' lives both at home and at work, all for the benefit of Nissan. What is most horrifying is that the union is doing all this voluntarily, on its own initiative, helping Japan's capitalist rulers in their effort to create a new democratic fascism, which has its roots in the spontaneity of the exploited masses themselves. The horrifying intra-company fascism at Nissan is a harbinger of the new wave now swelling into a nationwide movement.

THE LABOR UNION AS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION


When Domei, the national center of the rightwing labor movement, was established in 1964, labor movement activists on the left were deceived by its apolitical stance and directed most of their criticism at this point. Indeed, in the '60s, Domei (Japan Confederation of Labor) appeared to be mainly interested in

struggling for economic gains without threatening the private corporate system, and this strategy effectively made a sizable portion of the masses apolitical. But today, the fact that Domei is no longer apolitical is illustrated by the political action of the Nissan Workers' Union.

Like Domei itself, whose support for the anti-communist and pro-capitalist Social Democratic Party betrays a complete callousness to the needs of workers, the Nissan Workers' Union is turning increasing attention to the effort to nominate and elect union officials to seats in the Diet and in local councils of government, manipulating workers for its selfish ends by absorbing their potentially revolutionary energy and anger before it finds a more useful outlet. Union-sponsored political activities are rigidly structured exercises that prohibit independent thought. The union requires every worker to collect the names of 20 friends, family members or others who will support the candidate it approves. Under Japanese election laws, many of the canvassing activities that result from this strategy are illegal, but by threatening anyone who hesitates to participate with lifelong discrimination in salary raises and promotion, by sending union officials and company supervisors to workers' homes to spur them on, and by a multiplicity of other means, such violations are made so widespread that there can be no prosecution. And for the Nissan worker there is no escape—he is either incessantly hounded until he fulfills his quota or efforts are made to force him to leave the company through verbal or even physical intimidation.

IMPERIALIST'S CANDLE HOLDER

Fearing that the rising tide of liberation struggles in the Third World could hamper Japanese imperialism, the union stresses that "in the world today, there still remain dangerous elements that can potentially cause wars." Accordingly, it maintains that "peace and security of our country can never be assured by idealistic arguments about peace which confuse wishful thinking with grim reality," and portrays itself as an important vehicle for assuring peace and security for imperialism. "Our labor union is expected to play an important role both at home and abroad."



Indeed, in the '60s, Nissan Workers' Union played an important role in the rightwing labor movement's successful offensive to make the labor movement inside Japan harmless to the capitalist system. In the '70s, it is to follow Japanese imperialism into countries of the Third World to transplant a Japanese-style counter-revolutionary labor movement, in the name of "international solidarity." Since Japanese investment in the Third World countries of Asia is spearheaded by the auto, electric appliance, and petrochemical industries, the Nissan Workers' Union has an important role to play for Japan's capitalists, especially given the anti-imperialist movements of such countries as Thailand and Indonesia.

Unlike their predecessors, today's Japanese imperialists find it imperative to establish their economic and political control in Asia while making every effort to avoid war. The best way to achieve this end is to buy off the Asian labor movements, and this is exactly where the time-tested imperialist labor movement comes in: exportation of the rightwing labor movement is the prerequisite for overseas capital investment.

Leaders of the Nissan Workers' Union, always willing to serve the cause of capital, were quick to understand the importance of the "actions for international solidarity." "In today's world," says the union's program for 1973, "both economics and politics pivot around the protection of each country's national interests. No one can talk about actions of international solidarity among workers ignoring this fact.... While it is important to remember that we will be able to play an increasingly important role as members of the international society so long as our national economy and industry keep expanding and growing, it is also important for us to offer aid and cooperation to our fellow workers in the developing countries, especially those in Asian countries, so that they can secure their basic rights and enjoy a better life."

Despite the double talk, it is clear that their "actions for international solidarity" are simply for the sake of the continuous expansion and growth of their industry, and for the sake of aggressive overseas expansion by Japanese capitalism. They never spoke of "international solidarity" before the multi-

nationals were challenged by the peoples of the Third World. Some criminal union leaders, like Shioji Ichiro (one of the most active founders of Nissan Workers' Union, who once served as an ILO committee member representing Japanese workers, and who is now Chairman of the Jidosha Soren [the General Association of the Autoworkers' Unions], Vice-president of ICFTU and Vice-chairman of IMF-JC) have even gone so far as to openly support the puppet military regime of S. Vietnam. Nor have they criticized Nissan as one of Japan's crucial weapon manufacturers producing rockets and missiles. Now such leaders have started shamelessly saying that they will help the Asian workers "secure basic rights and enjoy a better life," not because their nature has changed but because they fear the rising tide of people's struggle in the Third World.

They have long been active in various ILO and IMF-JC "educational programs for modernization" of Asian workers.

In September, 1973, Jidosha Soren (the General Association of Autoworkers' Unions) sponsored an "Asian Autoworkers' Educational Seminar" in Tokyo, drawing many union leaders from the countries of Asia and the Pacific into which Japanese automakers have made inroads. The Japanese union bureaucrats, including those from Nissan's union, used this seminar to paint a flattering picture of the Japanese unions' roles in making their companies prosperous and to praise the benefits of Jidosha Soren and its parent associations, Domei and JMF-JC.

On the day after the seminar, a new organization, grotesquely named "World Council of Autoworkers' Unions of Toyota and Nissan," was born ready to engage in activities similar to the U.S. counterpart organized by the Big Three.

These actions go directly against true international solidarity among workers jointly struggling against imperialism. What the leaders of Nissan Workers' Union want to achieve through

their "international solidarity actions" is the spread of their domestic industrial policies to every Nissan plant abroad and the "transplantation" of the "friendly labor-management relationship" existing in Japan to Asian countries. All the criminal actions of the union leaders exposed so far in this article and many others left unmentioned are to be reproduced in Asia. These criminal maneuvers must be smashed by the Asian workers themselves as part of their anti-imperialist struggles.

In the beginning of the '70s it once appeared that a Domei-oriented "united front" of the Japanese labor movements would be formed for the overseas expansion of Japanese capital. This is now undergoing a period of reorganization as a result of Sohyo's (the General Council of Trade Unions') announcement of its "Countermeasures against Multinational Enterprises." Long regarded as more "leftist" than Domei, Sohyo's measures differ little from IMF-JC ideology, especially since its lack of organizational ties with Asian labor movements will force it to keep pace with IMF-JC in its international activities.

In these circumstances, Japanese autoworkers are forced to choose between two alternatives: Should they overlook these trends in the labor movements at home and abroad, and thus allow themselves to confront the Third World peoples of Asia as imperialists? Or should they join hands with fellow workers in the Third World and wage a struggle to put an end to imperialism?

III. FROM SMALL RIPPLES INTO ONE LARGE WAVE

SEASONAL WORKERS' REVOLT

Ever since the establishment of Jidosha Soren in fall, 1972, Japanese automakers have been intensifying their rationalization drives and control over workers with help from their faithful union leader partners. It may appear that Japanese autoworkers, under the fascist rule of the two interdependent suppressors, have given up fighting for their class interests. In fact, this is what most radical labor movement activists both inside and outside the automotive industry thought was the case after 1965. At that time all but a handful of hardcore activists of the National Metalworkers' Union

local at former Prince Motor, then the most militant union of autoworkers in the country, were absorbed into the Nissan Workers' Union with the merger between Nissan and Prince. The establishment of Jidosha Soren appeared to have added a final touch of gloom.

But not every one submits to a suppressive system which, in spite of its surface efficiency, can only aggravate the basic contradictions. A series of challenges came from probationary and seasonal workers at the Kyoto plant of Nissan Shatai--from those who are not eligible to join the Nissan Workers' Union and are most seriously discriminated against and oppressed in Nissan.

The first wave of struggle began in November 1971, when Mr. Tsuji in the middle of his 6-month probation prior to full employment was unreasonably fired. A new worker in the Nissan group companies cannot pass his probation if he fails to attain a 95% attendance ratio--that is, if he is absent without leave for more than 1 day a month. Mr. Tsuji became ill from overwork and submitted a written notice of absence together with a medical certificate. The company refused to accept the notice and dismissed him, although in similar cases it usually extends the period of probation. The true reason for his dismissal was not "his failure to pass probation"; supervisors thought he was not "obedient" enough.

He tried to get help from the union officials, but they said outright that the union would not trouble itself to do anything for an outsider. Furious at the union and the company, Mr. Tsuji began to fight for himself. Moved by his appeal, a group of sympathetic workers organized a "Committee to Support Mr. Tsuji," largely consisting of underprivileged seasonal workers. They leafleted the factory twice a day for about a month. Then, they passed out leaflets and, as they tried to escort Mr. Tsuji to his work place, a large troop of unionists, mobilized by the company, attacked them and beat them up. This resulted in an increasing number of workers becoming openly antagonistic to the union and the company.

Another wave of struggle came in early 1973, from January through March. Then the presumably impossible happened!; at the height of the struggle, assembly lines, which the company never stopped

TABLE 5. OVERSEAS SUBSIDIARIES AND JOINT VENTURES

Overseas Venture	Country	Paid Capital	Share (%)	Establishment	Major Operations
TOYOTA MOTOR CO., LTD. & TOYOTA MOTOR SALES CO., LTD.					
Toyota Motor Thailand	Thailand	B35.295mil.	100	1962	Assembly and sales
Toyota Astra Motor	Indonesia	Rp806.8mil.	49	1971	Sales and repair services
Australian Motor Industry	Australia	A\$6.532mil.	50	1968	Assembly and sales
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.	U.S.A.	\$5mil.	100	1957	Sales
Toyota Parts Depot Curacao	Curacao	\$0.4mil.	100	1969	Repair parts supply depot for Latin America
Toyota do Brasil	Brazil	Cr\$21.63mil.	100	1958	Production and sales
Toyota del Peru	Peru	\$1.618mil.	48.16	1966	Assembly and sales
Salvador Castano	Portugal	Esc100mil.	27	1971	Assembly and sales
Canadian Motor Industries	Canada	Can\$2.379mil.	30.27	1972	Assembly and sales
Ecasa	Costa Rica	\$1.68mil.	20	1973	Assembly
NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD.					
Nissan Motor Corp., U.S.A.	U.S.A.	\$6mil.	100	1960	Sales
Nissan Mexicana	Mexico	\$155mil.	85	1961	Assembly and sales
Nissan Automobile	Canada	Can\$4mil.	100	1965	Sales
Nissan Motor del Peru	Peru	S/13.4mil.	51	1966	Assembly and sales
Nissan Motor	Australia	A\$0.893mil.	100	1966	Assembly and sales
Industrias Nissan Motor Chile	Chile	Esc3.866mil.	87.8	1962	Assembly and sales
Zaire Nissan	Zaire	Z0.15mil.	60	1971	Sales
Prince Motors	Thailand	B3.52mil.	35	1966	Assembly
Singapore Nissan Motor	Singapore	S\$2.50mil.	21.6	1967	Assembly
Nissan Motor, W. Germany	W. Germany	D\$0.60mil.	100	1973	Sales
Tanchong Motor Holding	Malaysia	S\$18mil.	5.6	1973	Holding company
Nissan Motor Distributor	New Zealand	\$NZ3mil.	10	1973	Assembly and sales
TOYO KOGYO CO., LTD.					
Asia Automobile Industry	Malaysia	M\$4.4mil.	36.8	1967	Assembly and sales
Matsuda Motors of Zaire	Zaire	\$0.2mil.	50	1961	Sales
HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD.					
Asia Honda	Thailand	B10mil.	100	1964	Sales
Thai Honda	Thailand	B20mil.	60	1965	Assembly of motor-cycles
Honda do Brasil	Brazil	Cr1.65mil.	100	1971	Sales of motor-cycles
ISUZU MOTORS LTD.					
Isuzu Motors	Thailand	B34.66mil.	48.27	1963	Assembly and sales
HINO MOTORS LTD.					
Thai Hino Industry	Thailand	B10mil.	35	1964	Assembly
Thai Hino Motor Sales	Thailand	B10mil.	35	1968	Sales
SUZUKI MOTOR CO., LTD.					
Thai Suzuki Motor	Thailand	B9mil.	75	1967	Assembly motor-cycles

N.B.: Mitsubishi Motor has joint ventures with Chrysler in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, whereas Toyo Kogyo, with its "pollution-free" rotary engines, have joint ventures mainly in the industrialized countries. Honda has an extensive 100%-owned sales network throughout the world. (Source: Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun, Sept. 11, 1973)

even in the case of fatal labor accidents, were finally brought to a halt!

The struggle began on January 8. Upon reporting at the factory after the new year holidays, seasonal workers were told that the factory would start operating on a "two-nights-off-a-week" basis. The introduction of the new work day system would mean a tremendous reduction in wages as well as intensification of labor, as mentioned above. But the seasonal workers, who would be affected most seriously by such a system, were not informed about it until it was actually put into practice.

The enraged seasonal workers immediately took revenge. In the first day of their work, some intentionally made dozens of rejects, others refused to work and milled into the labor management office. Although it started on an individual basis, the struggle soon grew into a collective one. The means of organizing were the assembly line conveyors that kept carrying rejects and leaflets until they were finally stopped for 2 full days when 300 seasonal workers went into a wild-cat strike and occupied plant offices. What makes this struggle outstanding is that it gave birth to a union of seasonal workers, the first one of its kind in the entire history of the Japanese labor movement.

FAR-REACHING INFLUENCE OF THE STRUGGLE AT KYOTO PLANT

The news of the struggle immediately fascinated radical activists on the labor front throughout the country, and induced them to start a similar struggle. In the Tokyo area, radical workers at Nissan's Oppana and Yokohama plants (Kanagawa Prefecture), Murayama plant (Tokyo), and Kawaguchi plant (Saitama Prefecture), organized "Committees for Joint Struggle against Nissan Capital" and started leafletting at the plants to inform fellow workers of the Kyoto struggle. At each plant, leafletters were attacked by special squads organized and mobilized by the Nissan Workers' Union. But the assault only helped workers in general understand the reality of the Kyoto struggle outlined in leaflets.

Fearing that the other plants might erupt, the capitalists and union leaders increased their efforts to suppress the revolting seasonal workers at the Kyoto

plant. The struggle at Kyoto was thus short lived and silenced in less than 3 months, but there is no doubt that it announced the beginning of the auto-workers' struggle in the '70s. One of the most valuable results of the struggle is that it helped workers at various Nissan plants who had been waging lonely and scattered battles come in touch with each other and renew their determination to continue fighting. In July 1972, these workers, though an extreme minority of the total Nissan workers, established the "Nissan Socialist Study Group." In a recent pamphlet, the group reviewed their collective struggles and summarized their intentions for the future:

"(1) A genuine struggle to challenge the existing system of discrimination and suppression will always be met by even severer discrimination and suppression by the management and the union, but we, the workers' vanguard, should not be daunted by such difficulties.

"(2) In constructing the movement, the vanguard should be free from evils of elitism, because a movement of the masses which does not identify itself with an overwhelming majority of the oppressed Nissan workers is in itself a failure.

"(3) The fundamental ideas which our movement stand for are the humanity of the masses of workers which is now denied by the union and capital. The fundamental dissatisfaction of the workers can never be resolved by Domei and the Nissan Workers' Union. We must strive to build 'our own world' among the masses of workers, and counter thoroughly the systematic offensive directed against us by the imperialists. To achieve this, it is essential that we keep examining any and all contradictions embodied in the unfair labor practice against seasonal workers, the policy of discrimination against workers of lower strata, the wage policy, undemocratic labor management by both capital and the union, undemocratic administration of the labor union, etc. Regardless of how insignificant these contradictions may appear, we should continue disclosing their true nature before the masses. Ours is an attempt to create a new movement with a structure completely different from those of the existing Old and New Left movements. A new movement is not created by simple 'transformation' of consciousness; it is something to be

constructed by replacing the existing relationships among workers who now relate to one another only through the assembly line with a completely new one. That is, we must thoroughly remodel social relationships."

At present, members of the Socialist Study Group remain anonymous, but they challenge the fascist rule in their work places whenever they can. At this early stage of their organizing activities they are relying on such tactics as raising questions on the job and at union meetings, while secretly distributing their own papers among fellow workers. In large factories where workers are divided into small teams with limited contacts, their struggle is not an easy one. But already workers have started collectively confronting their supervisors, and in some cases they have stopped the assembly lines for one or two hours. It seems that for some time in the future, these small, but unyielding revolts will be persistently repeated.

VARIOUS FIGHTS AGAINST THE SAME ENEMY

These workers are not isolated in their effort to build a movement; their struggle is echoed by those of other groups both inside and outside Nissan.

One such group is composed of those workers at former plants of the Prince Motor Company who have been functioning as a minority union at Nissan, Prince Local of the National Metalworkers' Union. As mentioned above, most of the former members of the local were absorbed by the Nissan Workers' Union often under the threat of violence. In fact, over the last 8 years those who still remain in the local have experienced various kinds of hardships including assaults by company union toughs, undue degradation, large reductions in wages, prohibition of overtime, suppression of rights to engage in union activities, etc. The local has filed suits in court and has already won many of them. It has also been effective in disclosing various crimes of Nissan, the most important of which is the death of Mr. K mentioned earlier. On the basis of the victories it has attained so far, the local is waging an unyielding struggle in close collaboration with the Socialist Study Group.

The automakers' struggle at Nissan must be seen together with those by workers at Nissan's subcontracting companies. At Tachikawa Spring, Nissan's subcontractor for car seats, the workers successfully smashed a plan for rationalization and a new wage system which the company tried to introduce under Nissan pressure. The management of Nissan intervened directly in the dispute, forcing the company to transfer 6 leaders and to prohibit their union activities. The leaders of Nissan Workers' Union forced the union at Tachikawa Spring to add a new clause to the union statute which reads: "Those employees who are denied membership in the union or who try to withdraw from the union must be dismissed from the company."

Nissan, hell's battlefield, has so far been the hardest-fought battlefield in the automotive industry. In recent years, however, similar struggles have occurred at other auto plants. Under the pressure of capital concentration the companies of the Toyota Group are aiming at a tighter integration with Toyota. Both Daihatsu Kogyo (Industries) Co., Ltd. and Hino Motors, Ltd. have started bearing down on newly radicalized workers, firing the most influential leaders. Inside Mitsubishi Motor, which is affiliated with Chrysler, the Domei union's reign is under attack; and workers at Honda Motor Co., Ltd., too, are waging a struggle.

Activists from these automakers and their subsidiaries and subcontractors are beginning to learn from each other's experiences through the forum of the recently established National Autoworkers' Front Coordinating Bureau, and from experiences outside the automobile industry through Zenrokatsu (National Conference of Labor Union Activists -- see "Labor Movement in Japan: Its Present and Future," *AMPO*, #17). They are still a minority, and their struggles are still embryonic. But it is undeniable that they have come a long way from the low point of the late '60s. In the face of this, there is good reason to suppose that the persistent and unrelenting struggles they are fighting today--tiny ripples--will grow into one towering wave in years to come.

nissan sales slogan
LOVE YOUR CAR, LOVE YOUR FAMILY

Japan's New Slave Trade

Foreign Workers in Japan

by Kaji Etsuko

The new and growing tendency for Japanese enterprises to import cheap Korean and Southeast Asian labor was highlighted on November 12, 1973 when Prime Minister Tanaka announced a proposal to bring in 5,000 Koreans to work on the Okinawa Marine Exhibition. Vehement opposition from labor unions and the Okinawa Prefectural Government quashed this particular plan for the time being. However, its emergence, coupled with proposed changes in the Immigration Control Law, illustrates the new government movement toward exploitation of Asian labor, which has been legally prohibited since the end of the war. At the same time, growing numbers of young Asian workers have been brought to Japan for "training" only to find themselves put to work at unskilled jobs for wages which are a fraction of prevailing Japanese standards.

The labor shortage which forms the context for these developments is particularly acute in the medium and small firms which employ the majority of the Japanese labor force. The rapid postwar economic growth has created a shortage of young semi- and unskilled workers and the small companies with their poor working conditions and low wages are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit new young laborers. Unlike the giant corporations, these enterprises do not have capital to invest in new, labor-saving technology and depend on the availability of cheap labor. For this reason, medium and small companies pioneered Japan's investment in Asia since the mid sixties, and are now pressing for the import of foreign laborers.


After the 1965 normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea, in January 1966, the two governments signed an economic agreement which explicitly raised the possibility of importing Korean workers to Japan. At that time Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions) opposed it on the grounds that, "if cheap Korean workers are imported without changing

Japan's low wage structure, our wages will be reduced even further."

Although Sohyo's powerful opposition helped thwart labor importation at that time, the Ministry of Justice has been quietly paving the way for an official change in basic Japanese policy.

The proposed revision of the Immigration Control Order (See Ampo #9-10), notorious for its strengthened political controls, also permits the entry of low-paid foreign workers into the Japanese labor force. The revised law would allow the entry of those "working in medical, health, or other fields designated by the government" and "those to be employed according to the needs of a specific situation." In other words, the Ministry of Justice would be given broad discretionary powers to admit skilled and unskilled laborers to suit the needs of Japanese capital. In fact, since 1966, several thousand "specially qualified" Taiwanese workers a year have been brought to Okinawa to harvest sugarcane and pineapple, and in 1973 300 Korean women workers were defined as "specially qualified" and brought to Okinawa to help with the sugar harvest. Labor Minister Kato stated on October 2, 1973, "We do not presently accept foreign workers, but in a few years we may consider it on a scale that does not hurt the interests of Japanese workers. We must develop a unified policy for labor relations with other Asian countries."

The revised law would also extend and formalize the present program of bringing foreign "technical trainees" to Japan, by admitting over 3,000 a year. The trainee program has become a notorious vehicle for the illegal import of cheap workers. As the shortage of new workers for small firms began to grow acute in the mid sixties, "technical training" was seized upon as a useful device to bring in Asian workers without evoking memories of Japan's wartime labor conscription practices. The "trainee" program has become an efficient



Inside the Nihon Miniature Bearings plant, visitors cannot tell at a glance who are Japanese and who under-paid Singaporean workers.

means of international profiteering--exploiting foreign labor and while maintaining poor working conditions and low wages for many Japanese workers.

CHEATED AND SOLD TO JAPAN

In July 1972, Singapore's Chinese-language Nanyang Commercial Press published the following letter to the editor from a girl working in Japan:

"We are a group of girls and a few boys, one of four groups which arrived in Japan several months ago. We had been invited by a Japanese factory to come for training....At first the company said we could go back to Singapore and work in its factory there after we finished six months, nine months, or a year of training. At the end of our three-year contract we could choose whether to leave or continue working there, they said... Three days after our arrival, we were sent to various departments and began to work. The work was very simple, and we learned to do it right away... We live in the factory dormitory, with one of us and two Japanese in a room. When we get up in the morning, we clean up and go to work, and we have to take turns cleaning the toilet. In the second week, we were divided into A and B groups; the A group gets up at 4:00 a.m. and works from 5:00 to 1:30, until 2:00 on Saturday. The B group works from 1:00 to 10:00 p.m....After six months

of this, we were all happy because we thought we could go home, but the company said we had to stay another six months. We were all miserable and said we wouldn't stay, but they said they would fine us 7,000 Singapore dollars (¥740,000) or send us to jail. So we had to sign the agreement to stay six months more, and we are still in this cruel place...."

When this letter appeared, a woman reporter from the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan's leading newspapers, investigated the company, Nihon Miniature Bearings Company. This firm, ranking first in the miniature bearings industry, produces 1,700,000 bearings a month and is a multinational with plants in Singapore, Los Angeles and several other overseas locations. It exports bearings to Europe and America for military use. The reporter described the trainees' situation:

"Attached to the firm's modern Karuizawa factory is a 6-story prefabricated women's dorm where 67 Chinese girls aged 16 to 18 were living....Their contract called for them to work in the company's Singapore factory after completing a year's 'training period' in Japan. They would be fined ¥700,000 if they broke the contract within the first year, ¥600,000 during the second year. Such a penalty for 'breach of contract' is illegal under Japanese labor law. The girls work with Japanese women at such jobs as cutting steel rods into slices, shaping, and

inspecting...Their 'allowance' is ¥12,000, while the Japanese women earn ¥50,000...Since the girls are not taught Japanese and have no Chinese-speaking supervisor, they cannot make Japanese friends, and they often have to work overtime... These complaints came from all sides. Angry that 'we are nothing but cheap labor,' the girls locked themselves into the dorm this summer and refused to work. Two hundred and fifty of them have come to Japan since the fall of 1972, and at one time they were 20% of the company's workforce.

"The company claims that, 'they learn techniques and thus receive training by doing the same work as Japanese! The illegal penalty for breach of contract 'is according to the custom of their country' and the low wages are 'to maintain the local standard.'"

After this expose, the Nanyang Commercial Press received a flood of letters recounting similar experiences. It is clear that many youths have entered Japan as "trainees," only to be used as cheap workers. The Ministry of Labor standards for foreign trainees include the provision of special instructors and curriculum which are supposed to set them apart from regular employees. When it issues a "trainee" visa for six months or longer, the Justice Ministry is supposed to have the Labor Ministry inspect the program and confirm that these conditions are fulfilled, but the Japanese Embassy in Singapore issued the six month visas immediately although the factory had never been inspected.

Another typical case involved two Malaysians who came to a small factory in Chiba Prefecture for training in May 1973. They had paid a ¥200,000 "training fee" when they answered a newspaper ad offering technical training in Japan. They received no instruction in Japanese or in techniques, but were put to work at odd jobs in an automobile repair plant, paying ¥25,000 a month--less than half Japanese wages for such work. In October they gave up and went home. Nineteen other Malaysians were found in similar circumstances in Chiba. All of them had entered Japan on 90-day "training" visas. (Asahi, 1/19/73) How many other victims of this system have entered Japan as trainees or tourists and found themselves consigned to conditions of virtual peonage?

The official beginning of this trainee/worker system came after Japan and South Korea normalized relations, but it has also been carried out in the name of "economic aid" and "cooperation" in Southeast Asia. Thirty Korean trainees came to hospitals in Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Prefecture to fill an urgent need for nurses in 1965. Employed as nurses' assistants, they were simply absorbed by the Japanese economy as "labor power." From this modest beginning, the number of trainees rose quickly as the labor shortage intensified and the average level of Japanese wages rose. The operations of the Aichi Precision Manufacturing Corporation are illustrative. This automobile parts subcontractor in Aichi Prefecture had 67 employees in 1966. Using Aichi's Bangkok plant as a recruiting base, company president Aoyama had brought 37 Thai trainees to his firm by March 1967; they worked as cooks and porters for "pocket money" of ¥15,000 monthly, an advance of ¥50,000, roundtrip airfare, and food, clothing, and housing. According to Aoyama, "Even people who walked around barefoot at home can learn simple work in a month; quick learners master their jobs in a week. Even if we stopped calling them 'trainees' and paid them more, it would still be profitable. Since we thought Japan might follow the European pattern of using foreign refugees as labor power, my brother and I made a trip around Southeast Asia ten years ago. We planned to bring workers back to Japan to learn Japanese diligence, so we could use them at the local wage when we expanded into those countries later. I was the pioneer of the trainee system."

Recently, attention was focused on the use of Korean nursing trainees by hospitals all over Japan when a television documentary described how they are put to work alone on late night shifts and given responsibilities beyond their training. Socialist Diet Member Fujiwara Michiko revealed the sordid story of one medical organization on March 29, 1973. The Nara Prefectural Medical Association brought Korean students to its Assistant Nurses' School, where they studied in the daytime and worked from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. for ¥19,000 to ¥29,000 a month (a third to a half regular nurses' wages). The association planned to bring in several hundred more students at six-month intervals. Although these trainees did receive instruction while they worked, the job category of assistant nurse for which they were trained exists only in Japan.

Thus they are not qualified to work as nurses in Korea, and it is even reported that when they return, they can often find no work but serving as "tourist prostitutes" catering to visiting Japanese businessmen. Materials released by the Welfare Ministry in the wake of the television report showed that nursing trainees also come from Tibet, Thailand, Indonesia, and Laos. And it is well known that such prominent hospitals as Keio University Hospital have been using trainees as nurses under the guise of "practical training" for several years.

As in pre-war days, it is again Korea that is slated to provide the bulk of foreign workers. As early as December 1965, an organization which places Koreans in Japanese jobs circulated a letter to Japanese mining companies offering to send large numbers of Korean coal miners. (Even though the pay was lower than that of the 1,640 Korean miners working in West Germany, many youths would prefer to come to Japan, which is so much closer, said the letter. (Mainichi Shimbun, 12/21/66) In 1966 plans were broached to provide Korean workers for Japanese fishing and agriculture. Japan proposed to supply fishing boats and techniques while the Korean supplied the workers; plans were discussed to bring 200 Korean peasant youths a year to Japan for training in animal husbandry, fruit farming, and gardening. Also in 1966, the Korean Association of Medium and Small Enterprises asked its Japanese counterpart to accept 3-4,000 trainees annually to work for three to five years. Attacked as a transparent device to utilize Koreans as common laborers, the plan was never implemented. Strong opposition also killed the March 1967 talk of bringing 30,000 Koreans to work on the construction of EXPO '70.

In July 1971, negotiations were reported between the Korean Confederation of Labor and Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei) to bring in 60 trainees in 1971, 600 in 1972, and 1,000 yearly from 1973 on. According to the Asahi Shimbun of July 7, 1971, "Labor-surplus Korea has been sending many technical trainees abroad, but America's Vietnamization policy with its reduction in special procurement orders and reduction in the size of the Korean army has increased the surplus of young workers. The idea of sending young workers to Japan has been born out of the present Korean situation." This program,

temporarily postponed because of a shortage of funds, remains on the drawing boards. But the Korean people are beginning to learn what awaits them when they go to Japan for "training." When a sewing factory in Gifu Prefecture was discovered to be paying 28 Korean women "trainees" ¥13,000 a month while prohibiting them from leaving their dorm or receiving visitors, the story was carried in Korea under the banner headline, "Cheated and Sold to Japan." Vivid memories remain of wartime slave labor in Japan when more than three million Koreans were conscripted to form labor gangs in Japan, and activists in the resistance to Japanese domination are beginning to demand control over their own economy.

SPIRITUAL TRAINING FOR EMPIRE

Since May 1, 1969 a private organization has systematically directed the flow of trainees to small Japanese factories. The Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA) describes its disguised importation of labor as "people-to-people development aid." According to its ringing statement of purpose, "our country must seek prosperity on the basis of friendly relations with all foreign countries, especially the countries of Asia. All Asian countries belong to the same spiritual culture, and the consciousness of a common destiny has gone along with the development of international society...OISCA carries out its activities in the belief that the prosperity and progress of all developing countries, including those in Asia, is profoundly important for Japan." OISCA's activities center around sending out technicians, receiving technical trainees, and "activities to arouse the Japanese people to understand and participate in development aid."

The first of these "activities to arouse the Japanese people" was a full-page ad in the Asahi Shimbun of July 23, 1970, showing a small child under the slogan, "The celebration of this child's adulthood is entrusted to OISCA." The ad solicited membership in OISCA Support Association at ¥1,000, asking readers to "hold up one side of development aid." The ad also recruited managers of small and medium enterprises by promising to "supply young technical trainees from developing countries." One entrepreneur who accepted the offer explained, "We are creating the blue collar workers who will



be the advance soldiers and non-commissioned officers of our advance into South-east Asia. Besides, we don't have enough workers, and they are cheap."

OISCA's program also aims to organize those in Japan who will cooperate in the international effort. Between 1969 and 1971, it brought 325 trainees to Japan including 120 from India, 76 from Malaysia, 32 from Pakistan, and 25 from the Philippines. Seventy-four worked on automobiles, 55 in agriculture, 44 on machines, 31 on electricity or fishing, and 20 in textiles.

These trainees were sent to OISCA training center in Okayama, Toyama, Shikoku, and Fukuoka, where they learned Japanese language and customs and were inculcated with the spirit of "working for the joy of it," and "dedicating themselves to their countries' development and contributing to their prosperity." A key part of the training program is OISCA's contention that "Japan's economic development was due not to ideology or economic strategy, but to the Japanese people's diligence. Therefore, Japan offers an outstanding model to developing countries....Trainees do not come to Japan merely to learn skills, but to learn the Japanese spirit."

After three months of such education at the centers, trainees are dispatched to private companies for on-the-job training. Since most of the participating enterprises are small and isolated, there is, in fact, no systematic vocational training program. The companies, after all, are plagued by a labor shortage, and the trainees speak and understand only the most rudimentary Japanese.

Trainees receive ¥25,000 a month "support money" from the companies, but this money is not given to them directly. Rather it is sent to the OISCA training center, because, says OISCA, "If they received the money directly, they would waste it on trivia. We give them pocket money each month (¥5,000) and save the rest for them at the centers so they will have money to buy technical books and souvenirs when they go home." OISCA's real role is thus that of a labor contractor providing cheap, docile labor to small and medium Japanese firms.

OISCA is closely tied to the Liberal Democratic Party, and its activities represent an unofficial government policy. Its president, Nakano Yonosuke, is a close friend of former Prime Ministers Sato Eisaku and Kishi Nobusuke, and has also recruited a Federation of Dietmen Supporting International Activities, consisting of 74 Diet members and 25 Councilors to support OISCA activities. Nakano has also called for revision of the constitution and "a national movement to build a sense of Japanese-ness." It was he who organized a Japanese group to greet the Emperor at various stops on his recent European tour.

Japan's giant corporations are primarily interested in grooming cadres to work in their overseas plants and influence public opinion to favor Japanese capital. These trainees come through both government and private routes--the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' OTCA (Overseas Technological Cooperation Association) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's Asian Productivity Organization.

AGGRESSION AND RESISTANCE

By legalizing the import of workers at the discretion of the Justice Minister, the new immigration bill seeks to distinguish more clearly between "trainees" and "workers" in order to strengthen the claim that training programs are a form of "technical aid to the developing countries." At the same time, however, the bill extends political control over foreigners in Japan. This brings back memories of 1930, when the Sixth Order of the Ministry of Home Affairs strengthened controls over foreigners and provided a mechanism for deportation at the same time that preparations were made to conscript Korean workers on a massive scale. This time, however, the revolt against Japanese imperialism is spreading throughout Asia, and the plans of government and capital will not be so easily implemented. ●

NEGOTIATIONS with the JAPANESE are USELESS

by Warin Wonghanchao

Originally published in "Sankomsaar Palitat" (Social Sciences Review). Warin Wonghanchao is professor of Economics, Kasetsart University, Bangkok. Translated by the author and David Boggett.

During Thailand's anti-Japanese movement of January this year, many activists were prompted by the belief that they could assist the Thai government in its negotiations during the visit of Japanese Premier Tanaka Kakuei. Many were motivated also by Thai nationalist sentiment, for there is a widespread belief among Thailand's intellectual community that the Japanese are one of the world's most narrowly nationalistic races. Unfortunately, this anti-Japanese movement did not actually reflect or respond to the real needs of today's Thai society. The intellectuals had not worked out any independent, critical approach to the problem of Japanese investment; rather they aimed merely at supporting whatever the Thai government wished to do.

Because of this underlying approach, the demands of the students and intellectuals were couched in such statements as "The Japanese should assist in solving the balance of payments problem or the unbalanced nature of Japanese economic aid" or similar platitudes about Japanese investment in Thailand. This does not touch upon the root of the matter, and, if the Thai government pursues its present economic policies unchecked, the ill-effects of Japanese economic activity in Thailand will become totally insoluble. Neither the balance of payments problem nor that of economic investment can be solved through negotiations with the Japanese government. We already know that foreign investment does not bring benefits to the recipient country; we have already seen that these moneys merely enrich the power of certain politicians or political factions who use this economic power for their own enrichment, not for the benefit of

the people as a whole.

In negotiations with the Japanese government we should not emphasize our economic problems; rather we should query Japan's political role in the area and the intentions of the Japanese military. We should pressure the Japanese government to accept and respect the neutrality of South-East Asian countries; we should make them assist in forming acceptable guarantees of S.E. Asian neutrality. The Thai government should understand well how the Japanese regard their role within this area; we should insist that the Japanese make explicit their attitudes and policy towards the USA, towards China and towards the Russians; we must probe Japanese intentions deeply, to establish whether they sincerely want peace in this part of the world; we must find out whether they regard Thailand as a mere small, poor country, unable to negotiate with them on equal terms. If the Japanese merely despise Thailand and the Thais, then there is little point in talking about any of these problems with them at all.

At any rate, it seems to me that there is certainly no point in discussing economic problems with the Japanese government. Should we, then perhaps address ourselves to the various Japanese trading companies? For these companies have great economic power - the Mitsubishi Corporation, C. Itoh & Company, the Mitsui Company, the Marubeni Corporation, Nissho-Iwai, Sumitomo Shoji, Toyomenka, Ataka and Company and Kanematsu-Gosho - these are Japan's gigantic trading companies which wield vast economic power throughout the world. The total sales of these corporations is about a quarter of

forward-thinking people to benefit the local market." These forward-thinking people are the "new Mandarins" that Noam Chomsky talks of - technocrats who have no regard as to by whom or for what purpose their abilities are being used. They continue their work, vaguely mumbling, "we are working for the benefit of Thailand."

These giant companies have some very strange slogans for their operations. For example, C. Itoh declared,

"Opportunity is our business and we can create it for the businesses willing to stay put and stay pat." This is absurdly aggressive; obviously C. Itoh and Co. will seize (not create) every opportunity, but at whose expense? Of course, at the expense of the Thai people. Consider the slogan of Nissho-Iwai, "Ubiquitous Jack-of-all-Trades". Are we to interpret this as meaning that Nissho-Iwai can do whatever they want, whenever they want, wherever they want? This implication that the company is able to exploit anything and everything is very serious indeed. Then there is Sumitomo Shoji's advertisement,

"We have a very interesting story to tell you - back in the late sixteenth century our ancestors learned the secret of extracting gold and silver from copper. Today, based on this know-how, the Sumitomo group has spawned over three dozen individual corporations. They are not backyard industries; each is a titan in its own field, to help you extract gold and silver from business ventures." This is really very frightening, for Sumitomo has confirmed that their only interest for several hundred years has been profit alone, always searching for "gold and silver", exploiting the people everywhere. It is a great mistake for us to talk about promoting investment, especially Japanese investment, in Thailand; Japanese companies - despite all their privileges here - intend only to exploit us. We cannot believe that they intend to assist Thailand, for, from their own advertising slogans here it is clear that they are working only for themselves, and not for the Thai people.

Earlier I asked, whether the Thai government should negotiate with these gigantic trading companies, rather than

with the Japanese government; but it must be realised that actually there seems little scope for negotiations with these companies; I doubt that they would even listen, for we, the Thai people or the Thai government, do not figure very highly in their considerations and priorities. If our Government cannot negotiate fairly on equal terms with these companies, then the idea of giving privileges to attract foreign investment into Thailand should be completely forgotten. Foreign investors only come to Thailand if they already know that they can make a great deal of profit from their ventures here. It should be stressed that these gigantic companies are like some new and terrifying monster; they are not ordinary trading companies; already these monsters have collected much detailed information from all parts of the world. They know the weak points of every country, and, of course, they use this information to their advantage in controlling various economies. The journal, *Oriental Economist*, quite highly regarded among businessmen and economists - said in its June 1972 issue that even the American CIA does not have as good an intelligence system as all these giant trading firms. Even the Japanese people are worried about this. The same magazine in January 1973 again confirmed that the CIA's intelligence service was negligible by comparison. Because they have so much detailed information and because they can mobilize capital anywhere in the world, these great companies are very flexible; they can build up new development projects whenever the situation suits them. In Thailand, they tried to invest in the Northrop project (Bangkok's second airport scheme, negotiated by the former Thanom government. The new Sanya administration was forced to scrap the project after Northrop withdrew in the face of angry public opposition in Thailand against the corruption over contracts in December 1973), and also in the Kra Canal Project. (They had a dream to build two cities on either side of the Kra Isthmus into which they would move people - Why? To exploit them better, of course). Naturally the Thai government and economists here are enormously interested in foreign investment from which they hope to gain new employment opportunities and a rise in the per capita income, but they have



Demonstrators gather in front of Tanaka's Bangkok hotel. The cartoon on the left appeared on the cover of a Thai magazine during his visit.

Japan's national income or about 2.3 times greater than Japan's national budget. They control 50% of Japanese exports and 60% of Japan's imports. In order, therefore, to solve our balance of payments problem, should we perhaps negotiate directly with these economic giants? For discussions with the Japanese government are only an indirect approach to the root of the problem, the giant corporations. Even if such negotiations with the Japanese government were successfully concluded, these corporations would not necessarily adhere to their government's agreements. There have been many instances where governmental agreements have been satisfactorily concluded, but in practise nothing happened. But negotiations with these trading companies is no easy matter, for their only motive and concern is to make an economic profit, unlike the Japanese government which has to answer to the Japanese people and take into account foreign relations between the Asian countries.

It comes as a surprise to most Thais to find that actually these Japanese trading companies are not nationalistic at all; they do not believe in "nationalism" and they have tried to "deJapanize" their operations as much as possible. For example, Mr. Fujino, the president of Mitsubishi used to say,

"Go out and find local people who can join us in the management and run the companies in the countries in which we are established". Fujino is trying to say that nationals of various countries can work together in building

up Mitsubishi in their respective countries. But who can be sure that the interests of Mitsubishi and those of his own country will not in the future come into conflict, especially over pollution and the development of his country's social and political institutions free of corruption? One thing at least is certain: Mitsubishi has no nationalism. Rather the company wishes to attract as many good people as possible, of every race and creed, Japanese or otherwise, not for the benefit of the people, but for the further development and expansion of Mitsubishi itself. This is a serious problem for developing countries like Thailand. The problem is highlighted in one of Mitsubishi's slogans,

"Of course, as always, we are looking for new opportunities for the future, but now we already cover the world." Thus they want to find new people; to direct a sort of brain-drain into Mitsubishi. We know that there are at least nine Mitsubishi-controlled companies in Thailand; they already have some monopolistic control over the economy. But such monopolistic control is by no means restricted to Mitsubishi; it is a feature of many other Japanese companies. For example, Mitsui Company has at least 13 companies here in Thailand and Marubeni at least four. The latter, Marubeni, advertises itself as in this way:

"We are proud of our success story. It shows how a 114 year-old all round corporation can work together with

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BUYING VIETNAM

The World Bank and the Internationalization of the Vietnam War

by Mark Selden

A compendium of recent reports, the "World Bank Papers" has come into AMPO's hands through its own channels. Taken together, these "World Bank Papers" reveal the outlines of the massive effort orchestrated from Washington and Tokyo to rescue the Thieu government from the Vietnamese people.

The World Bank has launched a covert drive to prop up the Saigon regime which is tottering at the brink of economic -- and hence political -- collapse. Bank activities, in coordination with other international organizations, are detailed in the "World Bank Papers," a voluminous compendium of secret documents. They reveal that the war has entered a decisive new stage.

Since the early 1960s, the United States has resorted successively to special war, ground war, air war, Vietnamization and negotiation. In the months following the Paris Accords, the U.S. made clear its intentions to turn increasingly to internationalization in order to bypass the Accords. As Henry Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September, "we favor broad international participation in post-war assistance to Indochina." He listed the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations as potential channels. Representatives of each of these and of 15 major capitalist nations secretly assembled in the World Bank's Paris offices on October 15 and 16 to "informally discuss" the report of a Bank-sponsored field study conducted last June, and implementation of multilateral aid to Saigon.

From its initial enunciation in Honolulu five years ago, one of the imperatives of the Nixon Doctrine has been cost-cutting for the United States, or rather, shifting the burden wherever possible to its allies. This is precisely the goal of the World Bank gambit: To shift the cost of war and to provide other nations with a stake in the Thieu regime's survival.

\$11 BILLION TO SAIGON

Through 1973 the U.S. shouldered well over 90 percent of all aid to Saigon. What sums are at stake in the new multilateral proposals to aid Thieu? R.H. Nooter of the U.S. Agency for International Development and head of the U.S. delegation at Paris last fall told Congress "one-third to one-half [of total aid] ..within two to three years." The World Bank's second mission to Vietnam, dispatched as a result of the October meeting, detailed the vast sums required. Projecting what it euphemistically labeled a "medium 'long haul'" aid program, it stipulated the necessity for a minimum of \$11 billion -- exclusive of military aid -- through 1990.

Based on Saigon's most optimistic projection for economic growth in the seventies, the mission concluded that "net aid required in 1980 would still be the order of \$770 million a year or about \$100 million higher than seems probable for 1974." Based on the extraordinary supposition of annual export growth of 25 to 30 per cent per year, the study nevertheless concluded that even in 1990 a \$450 million annual gap would have to be filled by aid to keep the regime afloat. Two decades hence, by the most optimistic projection, Saigon will require aid roughly comparable to 1974 figures. What is projected, in short is massive international infusions

**In attendance: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.*

of capital -- 70 per cent of it in grants and the rest on low interest deferred loans -- on a semi-permanent basis.

The significance of the Bank's proposal emerges with full force when its underlying political assumptions are examined. For the cardinal principle of this report -- in direct contravention of the Paris Accords -- is that Saigon is THE government of South Vietnam. While the Accords give equal status to the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Republic of South Vietnam, Chairman of the October meeting, I.P.M. Cargill of the World Bank, enumerates four states in Indochina: The Khmer Republic, The Government of Laos, The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam. The documents mention the Provisional Revolutionary Government only once in passing, noting the existence of "pockets" under its control. Both the June and November missions, however, found it more prudent to confine their investigations to Saigon.

"VERY POLITICAL INDEED"

In the face of Thieu's persistent and publicly proclaimed violations, multilateral aid sustains and rewards the sabotage of the Accords and prolongs the fighting. Little wonder then that a World Bank official described the issue as a "terribly delicate matter that could easily be upset by undue publicity." The Bank must maintain a "politically neutral stance" and "The question of multilateral assistance to Thieu is very political."

The U.S. government has made abundantly clear -- in deeds -- its own intentions to disregard the Accords and provide Thieu with the military hardware and "advisers" to secure victory. In the first eight months after the ceasefire, according to Pentagon data, it supplied Saigon with 200,000 tons of ammunition, including 86,000 bombs. In early March, Deputy Secretary William Clements told Congress that South Vietnam would be in "extremely dire straits" unless an additional \$500 million in military aid -- for a total of \$1.6 billion -- was forthcoming immediately.

In light of this, it is worth noting the stunning arrogance of Mr. Kissinger's September statement explaining the "recess" in discussion of aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "pending assurance

that the North Vietnamese are observing all the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. No requests for aid funds for North Vietnam will be made until we are satisfied as to North Vietnamese adherence to the agreement."

JAPAN'S VIETNAM PLOY

While the United States is the driving force behind internationalization, it is not alone in its eagerness. Japan's active role is one of the major revelations of the Papers. The initial suggestion for a coordinated aid program came from the single international organization which Japan dominates, the Asian Development Bank. President Shiro Inouye initially called on the World Bank to co-sponsor the project in November, 1972.

World Bank President Robert McNamara, principal architect of the military desecration of Vietnam as U.S. Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, welcomed President Thieu's April 1973 request for aid. He insisted, however, on a "truly international" effort.

It was Japan, South Vietnam's second leading trade partner, and \$7 billion richer as a result of American war procurements, which proposed the October 1973 World Bank meeting and fielded the largest single delegation.

And it is Japan, along with France and West Germany which has already provided outright grants and loans to the Thieu regime. The World Bank estimates that aid from non-U.S. sources will total \$100 million in 1974, up from \$55 million the preceding year. Japan's pledge of \$50 million remains the largest sum promised, with the exception of U.S. aid. Exploratory missions to South Vietnam from Mitsubishi and Keidanren (The Japan Federation of Business Organizations) have produced elaborate postwar development plans involving Japanese capital. Prudence, however, has thus far deferred action.

SAIGON ECONOMY ON THE ROCKS

The urgency of the international rescue mission is underlined by the critical situation in Saigon. Diplomatic historian Gabriel Kolko recently summarized Saigon's endemic problems as follows: "...it is

corrupt, it has less American money to spend than ever before, it does not really administer most of the areas it claims to "control", the goods it imports have been subject to unusually high inflationary pressures, it faces enormous capital flight from its own devotees, it has a monumental inflation, oversized and non-productive army, and a vast urban population forced to remain within range of its guns for security reasons but which is an economic cancer and social threat, ad infinitum."

The contributions of the "World Bank Papers" include their detailed and devastating portrait of the decay of the Saigon economy. Based exclusively on information provided by Saigon (some of it so outrageous as to embarrass even Washington, e.g. Thieu's claim to control 95 per cent of the population), the data nevertheless exposes the thinly veiled Saigon propaganda which the authors offer by way of conclusion.

For example: "All available evidence points to the conclusion that investment outlays since the early 1960s have been insufficient even to maintain existing productive assets...while population has grown by more than 40 percents." "Per capita commodity output fell by more than 20 percent from the early sixties." Moreover, real output declined still more precipitously while the service sector increased to cope with the influx of 550,000 U.S. troops. With their withdrawal and the consequent decline of U.S. piaster purchases from \$403 million in 1971 to \$100 million in 1973, this sector collapsed.

Meanwhile the costs of war include more than seven million refugees, an urban (largely squatter and unemployed) population which has more than doubled since 1960, and 1.2 million men, 15 percent of the labor force, who remain in the Saigon Army. In 1973, construction -- a crucial long range economic indicator -- fell to the lowest level since 1968. As one Saigon-based American expert admitted in the January Asian Survey, "The year 1973 witnessed a continued, but ultimately precipitous, deterioration of the South Vietnamese economy."

These problems are compounded by the rampant inflation which is without parallel in Asia since the collapse of

Kuomintang China in the 1949s. Even Saigon's doctored figures reveal inflation running at better than 60 percent in 1973 and the regime was forced to devalue the piaster nine times in the course of the year. Under these conditions, the much advertised effort to lure foreign investment has fallen flat -- less than \$10 million in the decade which ended in 1972 according to the authoritative Pacific Basin Report survey of last November. The flight of domestic capital to safer havens abroad continues at a rate averaging five percent of GNP. By all indicators, the crucial groups whose support is essential to Thieu's survival -- the army and civil servants -- have suffered heavily at the hands of inflation.

In response to these problems, Thieu's solution remains more dollars for the military. The military budget, which exceeds two thirds of government outlays, will swell in 1974 by 12 percent. Yet it is no longer possible to ignore the chronic gap between budget outlays and expenditures which has grown from a 1973 deficit of 115 billion piasters to 155 billion 1974. As the first World Bank mission pointed out, "the cost of conducting the war was in effect borne abroad...in the form of support for the Government budget which became increasingly imbalanced as defense expenditures mounted...the essential object of external assistance has been to provide the budgetary support necessary to achieve the desired military capability in Viet Nam..."

But the U.S. is no longer able or willing to pick up the entire tab. It is here that multilateral aid enters the scene as an integral part of the effort to "achieve the desired military capability" for the Saigon regime.

While the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and IMF attempt to create an effective multilateral aid mechanism, the U.S. is pressuring its allies to provide immediate bilateral aid and to form a working group similar to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, to coordinate overall aid. This course promises no more success than the decade-long American effort -- or the French or Japanese which preceded it -- to ensure a viable government in Saigon. Such costly moves will certainly, however, breach the Paris Accords and prolong the war. ●

A Report on the Japanese People's Movements

AMPO

No. 18 Autumn, '73



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AMPO continues to explore the plots of the Japanese ruling class and the ups and downs of popular movements.

We take up the Japanese right wing in three articles. "EYE OF THE TIMES" shows how a landmark court ruling declaring the SDF unconstitutional coincided with the coup in Chile to make the threat of a military coup in Japan more real. An article on planning for the Tokyo Earthquake of 1977 suggests another way in which the military attempt to seize power.

The major article of this issue in terms of length -- and breadth -- analyzes the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung and its connection with ultra-rightists in Japan and the swallowing of the South Korean economy by Japanese interests.

Some of the economic/political monsters that drive Japanese imperialism are described in two studies, "Nippon Koei; Engineering Colonialism" and "Kra Canal: In Whose Interest?"

From the other perspective, the struggles against pollution, imperialism, and oppression in all its forms remain our central concern. An article on Women in Japan describes the plight and the program of women struggling for their own liberation and that of their sisters from wage slavery; another details the development of a militant fishermen's movement attacking the source of pollution of the seas. Our newly instituted "review of recent films" covers three important new developments in communication and we bring you up to date on the significance of the homeporting of the Midway in U.S.-Japan global strategy -- and the movement to block it.

With PARC we continue to grow and develop.

(Cover photo by Kyodo Photo Service)

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Eye of the times

Chile Coup Inspires Japanese Right-Wing

The military coup that killed President Salvador Allende and toppled the Chilean Marxist government may have changed the course of Japanese politics. Liberal and law-abiding progressive groups saw one of their most hopeful models for unity among various groups shattered, while reactionary and ultra-rightists have become more hopeful about the prospects for a military-led coup here.

In Japan the impact of the guns of Santiago de Chile was all the greater because the Chilean coup came on the heels of a major progressive victory. Only four days previous -- on September 7 -- a Sapporo District Court decided a landmark case by declaring Japan's burgeoning "Self Defense Forces" (SDF) unconstitutional.

Judge Fukushima Shigeo changed the whole context of the debate over the SDF by ruling that the existence of the military in Japan violated not only Article 9 of the Constitution (ruling out all land, sea, and air forces), but also the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution as expressed in the preamble. The case stemmed from a four year struggle by farmers in Naganuma, Hokkaido, to halt construction of a Nike missile base in an adjacent national forest.

The carefully argued, 511 page Naganuma decision pointed out that while any nation has the right to self-defense, the constitutional way for Japan to defend itself against an invasion is through massive popular resistance -- Vietnamese-style.

The declaration that a U.S.-style professional military force is both illegal and undesirable was met with particular enthusiasm on Okinawa, where more

than half the arable land is occupied by American and Japanese military bases. Two thousand farmers who are struggling to recover land confiscated decades ago moved rapidly to file new suits, and the Okinawa Times was taken over by its reporters and printers for the evening of the decision to run lengthy excerpts from the decision under screaming headlines. In Japan proper, major unions have redoubled their efforts to persuade local authorities to cut off SDF recruiting campaigns and public relations efforts.

Although most politicians and newspapers predict that the Naganuma judgement will be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court, many right-wingers are saying that the Court cannot be expected to upset the whole Constitution. Acknowledging the unconstitutionality of the SDF, they increasingly are turning to consideration of the coup -- the favored weapon of the pre-war Japanese right.

All major ultra-right newspapers published long articles and editorials applauding the Chilean coup. "Nothing could be more liberating, especially with all the Reds rounded up and put away," crowed Teiichi Muto, a military "intellectual" and notorious war criminal, in the September 18 Yamato Shimbun. "The socialists and communists thought Naganuma was a fatal blow to the SDF, but now there is a new determination."

Meanwhile it is an open secret that ultra-rightist politicians associated with the Seirankai, a four-month-old pressure group of hawkish Liberal Democrats led by Ishiwara Shintaro, are discussing strategies for a coup with SDF officers from Fuji, Nerima, and Ichigaya-based units. They have formally established a "Coup Study Group" for the purpose.

Two basic models are being discussed: a "bloody" coup against a possible progressive coalition, and a "peaceful" coup if the conservative government is the target. Both plans are based on an assault force of 300-600 soldiers occupying strategic points such as the Prime Minister's residence, media and transportation centers, etc. Some 7,000 well-armed and determined

rightists would cooperate fully, and the planners are confident that the rest of the SDF and the police would remain passive in the hope that "national salvation" would end restrictions on military power. The Naganuma decision threatens the very core of rightist influence in Japan, while the Chilean coup is a model road to power for them. ■■

PARC NOW OPENED...

After four years of publishing AMPO, we are taking a major step forward to expand our contacts and communication with progressives around the world. The Pacific-Asia Resources Center (PARC) which opened in September, 1973, provides a setting to bring together activists and scholars -- Japanese, Third World, and Western -- for cooperative work in analyzing and exposing the impact of U.S.-Japan strategies of domination. PARC also makes possible substantially increased coverage and analysis in AMPO and wider dissemination of more immediate news about Japan through its recently established the New Asia News (NAN), PARC's news service. The following services are presently available!

*** PARC maintains a collection of more than 200 contemporary periodicals and other materials on the economic, political, military and cultural facets of U.S.-Japan activities in Asia and globally. The collection is the most comprehensive available in Japan on movement and revolutionary activities around the world. It also features specialized business and government publications and a newspaper clipping service. Its services include a monthly bibliographical bulletin of its holdings. (available on request).

*** PARC provides space and resources for the publication of AMPO (published quarterly), Rentai (Solidarity, a Japanese language publication on liberation movements) and the New Asia News. NAN is a news service specializing in information about contemporary Japan and Japan-U.S. economic, military and political activities globally.

*** PARC provides copying service, making available on request all materials in its collection to researchers in Japan and abroad.

*** PARC is cooperating in numerous research and writing activities including an ongoing joint project comprehensively analyzing "cooperation and contradictions" between Pacific imperialist powers.


To maintain and develop these services in the most expensive city in the world we need your cooperation and support. In particular we welcome information about other publications which can be exchanged for AMPO for the use of the Japanese people. We also invite inquiries about membership in the center and the full range of services available.

PARC is located in central Tokyo at The Riki Apartment, Room 305, 5-34, Akasaka 7-chome, Minato-ku. Our mailing address remains AMPO/PARC, P.O.Box 5250, Tokyo International, 100-31, Japan.

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THE USS MIDWAY'S HOMEPORTING AT YOKOSUKA



by Nagano Yoshiko

On September 12th the attack aircraft carrier USS Midway set sail from Alameda, California. Destination: Yokosuka, Japan. Mission: "Homeporting" of the Seventh Fleet ship, forging a new link in the Navy's cordon circling Asia and the world.

STRATEGIC MISSION

Homeporting of the Midway illustrates two essential principles of the Nixon Asian strategy's "new look": the concentration on expanded naval power and the stepped up military role of Japan within the framework of U.S. hegemony. Behind the smokescreen of pulling U.S. ground forces out of Asia, of cutbacks in the

overall size of the U.S. army, and of claiming lavish credit for achieving peace in Indochina, the U.S. is seeking to insure continued military hegemony in Asia.

The Seventh Fleet has already extended its domain from East Asia to the Indian Ocean. Homeporting in Japan will enhance the strike capability of the 51,000 ton Midway with its 75 aircraft and a crew of 3,800, one of three super carriers of World War II vintage which last year played a role in the saturation bombing of North Vietnam from the Tonkin Gulf. On arrival at Yokosuka in late September or early October--the Navy has given three different arrival dates to crew members to prevent effective planning for counter-

demonstrations in Japan--the Midway will become the first U.S. aircraft carrier to establish an overseas home port. It will not, however, retain that distinction for long. The Navy will homeport the main task force of the Sixth Fleet at Piraeus Naval Base, Athens, later this fall.

Yokosuka, 32 miles south of Tokyo, was once the hub of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Today it houses the largest U.S. Naval Base in the Far East. U.S. Naval Headquarters dominates the city, overlooking the more modest facilities of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense (MSDF) and symbolizing U.S. supremacy in the joint U.S.-Japan military structure. Homeporting will transform Yokosuka from a supply and repair base to a strategic forward outpost.

U.S. spokesmen have been quick to explain homeporting of the Midway in terms of cost cutting and convenience for U.S. forces. "The Midway operates in the Pacific Ocean near Asia. To return all the way to the U.S. for repairs and for the crew's vacation is a major economic and military liability. By homeporting the Midway at Yokosuka and relocating families there we will cut these losses," explained Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific (CINCPAC).

Homeporting enables the Navy to avail itself of superb repair facilities and highly trained technical personnel, perhaps the best in the world. The key installations in the mammoth 2.2 million square meter base are the Ship Repair Facilities (SRF), six drydocks employing approximately 1,800 U.S. servicemen and 3,780 Japanese base workers. From the Korean War through Indochina Japan has played a major role repairing and manufacturing American war material. Now, with homeporting, these functions will be systematized and extended. As U.S. Naval Commander Smith in Japan put it, "The largest dock in Yokosuka is capable of handling aircraft carriers up to the Enterprise class [i.e. nuclear super-carriers, ed.]. Workers there are sufficiently skilled to repair all vessels. Subic, the best naval base in the Philippines, is only capable of handling cruisers up to the 18,000 ton class.

After all, West of Hawaii, Yokosuka is the greatest naval base the U.S. controls."

But if cost cutting and expediency figured in U.S. calculations, the primary reasons for the new move are strategic. Homeporting means the permanent presence of attack aircraft carriers in Asian waters and above all in the vicinity of Korea which remains a focus of U.S. and Japanese interests and a source of potential instability. Previously carriers remained in the Western Pacific for periods of six to eight months prior to returning for R&R for the crew as well as repair and overhaul in Hawaii or California. Now they remain on station at all times.

HOMEPORTING AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Moreover, Yokosuka homeporting seems certain further breach Japan's "non-nuclear" status. The Midway is not nuclear powered. But it is equipped to carry nuclear weapons which would have to be unloaded during repairs. Since its launching in 1945, the Midway has been overhauled three times enabling it to store, load and assemble nuclear weapons. In the 1950s the ship was fitted with Regulus I surface-to-surface missiles. According to Jane's Fighting Ships, the Regulus, with a 500 mile firing range, could carry a nuclear warhead. During another long drydock period from 1966-70, new catapults, lifts and the electronic Naval Tactical Data System were added. Today the Midway carries two squadrons each of the F-4 Phantom Fighter and A6A Intruder Attack Bomber, both of which may carry nuclear payloads. Moreover, crew members are known to have received training in handling nuclear weapons.

U.S. atomic subs have long used Yokosuka as a port of call, and the city is already the home port for the Seventh Fleet Flagship Oklahoma City (13,600 tons), five destroyers, five LSTs and the guided missile frigate Warden. Homeporting of the Midway will mark the further penetration of nuclear weapons into Japan. Moreover, as Commander Smith's remarks suggest, the next step may well be expansion of homeporting to include nuclear carriers like the Enterprise. (Indeed, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's original request

for homeporting included the Enterprise). Step by step "nuclear free Japan" is becoming the nuclear bastion of America's Asia.

THE U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP

Homeporting of the Midway is but the last move to expand U.S.-Japan military cooperation in the Western Pacific. It follows in the wake of:

***Joint U.S.-Japanese naval exercises in Micronesia in April--the first time the Japan's "strictly defensive" fleet ventured so far from home in more than a quarter of a century;

***A series of Japanese naval exercises off Korea during the same month;

***U.S.-South Korean joint exercises earlier in the year;

***Joint U.S.-Japan use of Okinawa military facilities on a regular basis.


With the Midway operating out of Yokosuka Japanese forces will be freed for more active deployment to "points South". This expansion mirrors recent pointed suggestions by a variety of U.S. spokesmen including Under-Secretary of Defense William Clements in a meeting with Japanese businessmen last April.


Nowadays U.S. and Japanese authorities rarely bother to insist that U.S. forces are here to defend Japan against attack; rather their mission is to insure continued control of "Free Asia." According to the

"Total Force Concept" elaborated by Melvin Laird in 1971, reinforcement of Japan's SDF was crucial to the U.S. design of cutting back its own overseas forces. With the withdrawal since 1969 of more than half a million ground troops from Asia, U.S. strength has been concentrated in sea power. In the Western Pacific this means Seventh Fleet--with assistance provided by the ground forces of U.S. satellite countries. Above all this has meant the integration of Japan's SDF within the larger framework of U.S. strategy in Asia. Thus under homeporting Yokosuka, formerly the key U.S. naval base in Japan, is to emerge as a more formidable joint U.S.-Japan base. The might of both U.S. and Japanese forces is thus expanded and the interlocks between them increased.

Let us see how the U.S. and Japanese governments have promoted the homeporting the Seventh Fleet.

In the summer of 1971 Laird became the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to visit Japan. A major purpose of his visit was to propose homeporting and stepped up U.S.-Japan military collaboration. In November, 1971 the newly organized Destroyer Squadron 15 (DESRON 15) made Yokosuka its home base, an omen of homeporting of aircraft carriers. Then in August, 1972 the U.S. Navy in Japan announced the homeporting of the Seventh Fleet's mobile supply unit at Sasebo and moved 800 families there. The Mayor of Sasebo remarked that "The U.S. Navy will use Yokosuka as its strategic base and Sasebo as its





supply base for the Seventh Fleet."

However, it required the Nixon-Tanaka talks in Honolulu on September 1 and 2 to reach formal agreement on the Midway. On September 12th Foreign Minister Ohira officially announced the agreement on homeporting the aircraft carrier. Yokosuka's "progressive" Mayor Nagano Masayoshi immediately attacked the plan. Yet intricate maneuvers had already begun to buy off potential opponents. On October 3rd Mayor Nagano publically reversed his stand, stating that "homeporting only one aircraft carrier is nothing serious."

Powerful forces including the U.S. military, Japan's SDF, business interests and city politicians all saw the possibility of rich gains from homeporting. In July 1972 the U.S. command announced that Ship Repair Facilities at Nos. 1, 2 and 3 docks would be used by the SDF under U.S. direction; in November the U.S. expanded the joint use of its facilities by entering an agreement with Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery, a Zaibatsu firm, for use

of Nos. 4 and 5. The U.S. also permitted 800,000 square meters of shallow harbor to be opened for industrial development and returned jurisdiction of the area to the city. (Eighty-two percent of the area, incidentally, is owned by Sumitomo and Nissan Motors). The only real losers seem to have been the people of Yokosuka and the Midway crew.

THE COUNTER ATTACK



But homeporting is meeting obstacles from many quarters. The Navy's biggest headache is opposition from Midway crew members. Low ranking enlisted men have provided the main resistance to the move. These crewmen are unable to bring their families since they cannot afford to pay transportation costs. Only men with rank of E-5 and above--almost entirely officers and career men--rate free travel for dependents. For most sailors homeporting means that instead of a five to eight month separation they face the prospect of two years or more away from their

homes and families. Moreover, their "home away from home" is notorious as one of the most inhospitable and least popular ports for GIs. In the past the tiny four block bar area catering to sailors (including the "Jungle" to which Blacks have been largely restricted) has been the scene of heavy fighting among sailors.

Ever since the announcement of homeporting EMs have been up in arms. Following petition to the U.S. Congress in April GI opposition mounted as the September departure date approached. (To halt the petition's progress the Captain simply seized it, and transferred its most active proponents to other bases. The American Civil Liberties Union suit against this blatant violation of political rights is presently pending in the courts.)

In July, the Captain, in an imaginative effort to undercut opposition, sponsored a deckside barbecue for the entire crew and agreed to answer questions about the homeporting. This scheme backfired, however, when a group of EMs began asking embarrassing questions. Like: "What is the reason for having to homeport thousands of miles from the U.S. now that the war is over?" "Do the Japanese people really want U.S. sailors homeported there?" A group of about 200 black sailors used the occasion to press for an end to Navy racism. The Navy for its part has applied heavy pressure to get an "all-volunteer crew" for the Midway, but at latest report it remains 400 men short of its goal.

America's much vaunted Volunteer Army (VOLAR) is in serious trouble and the opposition to homeporting reflects some of the problems. Many EMs signed up on the basis of lavish recruiter promises of a good life. The failure to live up to many of these has fueled both dissident movements and a rapidly mounting desertion rate. And as military recruitment lags behind official quotas--the army has publicly admitted that it will fall 30% shy of its recruitment goal by the end of the first year of VOLAR and June naval recruitment goals were 41% underfilled--promises continue to inflate. Meanwhile the rapid influx of Blacks and other Third World people forced by economic necessity to enlist (in recent months 25% of all Army recruits have been Black) has produced sharp racial tensions and further repression. Many GIs whose eyes were opened at the peak of the Vietnam War are continuing to question the aggressive U.S. role overseas--



--particularly when it is they who are set up as the pawns in a big power game. During the past year the Navy (including the Marines) has become the focus of GI resistance.

Meanwhile Japanese groups based in Yokosuka have launched opposition movements. As rumors spread that the Midway would dock at Yokosuka early this year, the Communist, Socialist and Clean Government (Komei) Parties organized a "Citizens Committee Against Homeporting." The Japanese government estimated that 120,000 protestors would converge on Yokosuka on the Midway's arrival. The Committee, led by the Communist Party, proved primarily interested in mobilizing support for the upcoming Mayoralty election. In July, after the "progressive" candidate was defeated by a wide margin, the parties quietly abandon the movement. With the arrival of the Midway once again imminent, their committee has again come to life.

The initiative at the moment, however, lies elsewhere. New Left workers, students and citizens, independent of political parties, have been actively organizing since early January. The focus of their activities has been the "Yokosuka Information Center to Block Homeporting" which opened in February and has been waging an active campaign ever since. The Center maintains close ties with anti-war activists from VVAW and the Pacific Counseling Service as well as with a wide spectrum of Japanese opponents of homeporting and the U.S. military presence. On April 22nd the Center's meeting to discuss home-

porting drew 120 participants from anti-military base struggles throughout central Japan. Stimulated by this success it sponsored a public forum on June 3rd. Seven hundred people attended and 500 participated in the demonstration which followed. And a demonstration on September 15th brought out more than 800 participants. The slogans of the JCP and New Left groups reflect the differences in their approach to the homeporting issues. While the JCP calls on Yokosuka citizens to "oppose homeporting," the Information Center is organizing around the slogan "Smash Homeporting." Whether opposition forces can unite to form a single unified movement remains in doubt. But the recent District Court decision declaring Japan's SDF unconditional has given new impetus to anti-military forces throughout on the eve of the arrival of the Midway. (See P.1)

Thus far no major work stoppage, sabotage or rebellion has been reported aboard the Midway as was the case with the Constellation in October 1972. However, the struggle continues aboard ship and it can be expected to receive reinforcement from the demonstrations which will greet the Midway on arrival in Yokosuka. The struggle against homeporting will continue to develop among EMs sent to Asia and Yokosuka citizens opposed both to an expanded U.S. military presence prostituting the local population and to the new stage in U.S.-Japan military attempts to dominate Asia. ■ ■

The Newsletter from Polluted Japan

KOGAI (pollution) is a newsletter inaugurated by Jishu-Koza, which functions as a liaison center for people's movements in Japan fighting against pollution. Issue No.1 has just come out, and subsequent issues will appear every three months. The 14-page first issue contains an article by Ui Jun on the "Essence of Jishu-Koza," "Dying Oceans" by Anthony Carter and "Pollution Imperialism: Chisso in Korea" by Matsuoka Nobuo.

KOGAI is available free of charge by writing to:

Jishu-Koza
c/o Faculty of Urban Engineering
University of Tokyo
Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Japan

One Decisive Step toward US-Japan Imperial Complex

by Nakazawa Osamu

August 2, 1973 will go down in history as the date of a decisive step toward formation of a U.S.-Japan imperialist complex. In Washington, Premier Tanaka Kakuei issued a joint communique with President Nixon that not only reaffirms the two countries' adherence to the "existing framework" of international relations, but proclaims that they will "cooperate in all areas" to achieve "common objectives." The Prime Minister, in his speech to the National Press Club, asserted that Japan as a major industrial power would "make due contributions to the rebuilding of world order."

The August Summit was the 13th held between Japan and the United States in postwar years. For Tanaka it was the second summit, following his July 1972 meeting with Nixon in Honolulu. The significance of the recent summit, however, lies in the fact that it was the first such meeting since the normalization of Japan-China relations and since the Vietnamese "peace agreement." The Washington meeting was also preparatory to Tanaka's forthcoming visit to Moscow, the first such visit by a Japanese prime minister in 18 years.

Tanaka told the National Press Club that the year following the Honolulu Summit marked the "most important historical turning point" since World War II. Precisely because of this crucial change, President Nixon in his 1973 State of The World Message warned of the possibility of an independent Japan causing troubles for the U.S. on questions of energy resources and relationships with socialist countries. Tanaka proclaimed Japan's intention to remain a Junior Partner of the U.S. U.S. hegemony, he stated, should be "strengthened creatively." This new relationship was rightly described on both sides of the Pacific

as "putting relations in a world context."

During the Washington talks, Japan promised to provide Thieu's South Vietnamese regime with "humanitarian aid" of \$50 million in 1973. This aid stood in stark contrast with earlier official pronouncements that Japan's aid should go equally to North and South Vietnam. Commenting on this change the magazine Sekai Shuho (Aug. 21 issue) wrote: "There must have been some behind-the-curtain talks with America that led to this new decision." It is believed that \$50 million in aid to the puppet regime in South Vietnam is the first step toward expanded Japanese investments in the Thieu-controlled "aid for the rehabilitation of South Vietnam."

The Korean peninsula issue dominated the discussions held between Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira and U.S. Secretary of State Rogers. In the record of Ohira-Rogers meetings held during the summit talks, for the first time in U.S.-Japan diplomatic documents, the word "Republic of Korea" was not used. Instead the joint communique spoke simply of the "contribution to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula." This change of phrases reflects the shift of both governments' position of regarding the ROK as the "only legitimate government" in Korea to the new position of perpetuating the division of Korea into the North and the South. The change of phraseology does not mean that Japan's aggressive posture toward South Korea has changed. In fact, Premier Tanaka himself, immediately before he left for Washington, told the press that former Premier Sato's commitment in the 1969 joint communique (the security of the Republic of Korea was "essential to the security of Japan") would remain unchanged.

PICTURES

P.3: The USS Midway/ P.5, upper: A U.S. submarine anchored in August, '72/ P.5, lower: U.S. Navy housing facilities/ P.6, upper left: U.S. Navy communication base/ P.6, upper right: Air SDF's radar/ P.6, lower left: A big tunnel leading to SRF No.6/ P.6, lower right: U.S. Navy's liquid oxygen tank/ P.7, upper: Ameri-cong seamen at Yokosuka and local anti-war activists enjoy "Rock Festival, '72" / P.7, middle: Maritime SDF's warships/ P.7, lower: A sticker reads: "Return the Base to Yokosuka Citizens!"

Prior to the autumn U.N. general assembly (called the Korea session), the U.S. and Japanese governments jointly pressured the Pak Chung Hee regime to accept the formula of parallel and simultaneous affiliation of "two Koreas" in the United Nations. Pak yielded to this pressure. Yet while the Japanese and American governments admit that they may allow the dissolution of UNCURK (U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), they definitely oppose the withdrawal of U.S. troops that pose as U.N. forces.

The withdrawal of "U.N." forces would mean that the U.S. power of command over South Korea and the ROK military would be lost. The U.S. and the Japanese governments are not only determined to continue their intervention in Korea, but are also devising a new way of obstructing peaceful and independent unification by the Koreans themselves. In other words, the U.S. and Japan are using the United Nations to perpetuate a divided Korea. A Korean writer perceptively analyzed this situation in the intellectual magazine *Sekai* (Sept. issue). He pointed out that the new U.S.-Japan policy was tantamount to "using the 38th parallel so as to give the southern part of a divided Korea to Japan. This is clear from the economic annexation of the south being carried out by Japan."

It is noteworthy in this connection that following the summit the Japanese foreign ministry and defense agency have begun to say that "U.N." forces in South Korea would withdraw only when the following two conditions are met: (1) the completion of the modernization of the South Korean armed forces; and (2) Japan's assurance that the U.S. can use any U.S. military base in Japan with absolute freedom. A spokesman for the Defense Agency informally explained recently that Tanaka's promise to make "due contributions" should be regarded as a promise that ROK servicemen would be trained in Japan and that Japan will begin massive export of weapons to South Korea. This reminds us of a corresponding statement on the U.S. side. When a Japanese business mission visited the U.S. in May this year, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Clements formally urged that Japan annually provide South Korea with \$100 million military assistance in kind. Concerning condition No.2 (the assurance of free use of bases), U.S. navy air

force and marines have already poured into Iwakuni, the major U.S. overseas base closest to Korea. After the summit, reports indicated that U.S. fighter planes frequently arrived without prior notice at Japanese Self-Defense Force bases in Hokkaido. In this sense, the Japanese translation of the joint communique is tricky. It chooses such Japanese terms as "scaling down and herding together" of U.S. military bases in Japan, but the English text reads unambiguously that "further steps to realize and consolidate the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan" will be taken. The U.S. apparently intends to strengthen the function of its military bases in Japan.

But that was not all. Testifying before the U.S. Congress in April, then-Secretary of Defense Laird stated that Japan would naturally try to secure the safety of its petroleum transport route as part of its responsibility for national defense. Clements in the above quoted statement also referred to the same subject and urged revision of the Japanese constitution in order to give Japan the capability to safeguard its oil transport lines. This idea was reemphasized this spring with Secretary of Defense's report to the congress as a requirement of the "total force" concept. Homeporting of the Midway and other Seventh fleet warships at Yokosuka is another vital step toward integration of Japan in the strategic "deterrent" force of the U.S. in the West Pacific. Thus, the Japan-U.S. military complex has grown to a dangerous stage.

The U.S.-Japan imperial complex is not of course confined to military areas. A noteworthy new development is that the two leaders have framed an elaborate joint strategy toward the Soviet Union, chosen by the U.S. as its major rival. For the time being, Japan and the U.S. agreed on joint development of natural resources in West Siberia. Japan craves acquisition of Tyumen oil and natural gas from Yakutsk at a time when energy resources are fast becoming the bottleneck of Japan's expanding economy. Participation in Siberian development would also mean that Japanese steel makers can export vast pipelines totaling 4,000 kilometers to the Soviet Union. Moreover, if Siberian natural gas can be successfully introduced into steel production, Japanese steel magnates can expect to start using multi-purpose nuclear react-

ors for steel making. The Japanese steel industry, which already produces as much steel as does the entire EEC area, will then be able to establish an unrivalled position in world steel. That in turn will consolidate the material basis for Japan's global diplomatic maneuvers.

But Washington has blocked this Japanese design. Rather than allowing Japan alone to obtain the lion's share of the Siberia business, the U.S. forced Japan to accept U.S.-Japan collaboration in this and in other areas of global strategy (the U.S. is employing precisely the same strategy to turn the Soviet Union, too, into its junior partner). Furthermore, the U.S. succeeded in getting Japan to meet part of the enormous cost of this grand strategy. This strategy has important side-effects: if Japan becomes preoccupied with Soviet and Chinese oil, this will increase U.S. freedom to monopolize oil resources in the richest oil area, the Middle East. But, Japan, chafing at U.S. attempts to dominate, needs the U.S. as its partner in Siberian resources development as the most reliable guarantor and a source of development capital.

The U.S. and Japan thus have consolidated their joint setup to the point of advancing economically not only into Asian and third world countries but also into the Soviet Union.

The U.S.-Japan relationship today is determined at its very root by the requirements of this imperial complex. The leaders of the two countries reportedly agreed to take joint action not only in Siberia but also in exploiting Brazilian uranium and Indonesian oil. Similarly, a fourth uranium enrichment plant will be constructed in the U.S. as a joint venture of the two countries. They also reached accord on close consultations for the realization of the Kissinger's global program, the New Atlantic Charter.

All indications are that the two giant economic powers on both sides of the Pacific (with the U.S. of course as the leading force) are combining the U.S. nuclear striking force with the power of the yen to create a new world order transcending the bounds of Asia.

But events will not of course unfold as the giants wish. It is unlikely that Japan, whose aggression remains vividly

stamped on Asian minds, can tactfully perform the task which the U.S. failed to carry out with all its nuclear and conventional military capacity and the power of the dollar. It is worth recalling the great fanfare with which the Alliance for Progress in Latin America was launched in the sixties. It was soon laid bare as an alliance for corruption and dictatorship. Today it lies dormant. The same fate may await the joint economic expansion policy of the two imperialist powers in Asia. It is in fact symbolic that the first incident confronting Tanaka on his return to Tokyo was the abduction of Kim Dae Jung (See article in this issue) for this incident mirrored the deepening contradictions of the Pak Chung Hee regime in South Korea as well as its corrupt relationship with ruling groups in Japan.

Today the superpowers are being defeated by the smaller nations of the world. The imperialist powers are being tripped up both by national liberation movements of the oppressed and by the efforts of the elite of third world countries to improve their position in the world raw materials markets. While Nixon suffers from the effluent of Watergate, the Japanese prime minister has seen his popular support collapse from 60 per cent a year ago to a scant 17 per cent this autumn.

The two bosses must have consoled one another on their misfortunes when they met but there is no positive indication that they succeeded in patching up all the conflicts and contradictions between their two ruling classes. The best they can do is to try to cover over their differences as best they can. And as American power recedes, Japan is being asked to assume larger responsibility for assuring the stability that the barons of international capitalism require. The 1973 Nixon-Tanaka joint communique heralds the beginning of this new era. ■ ■

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MOVEMENT TO FREE VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PRISONERS GROWS IN JAPAN


From Sept. 17-24 in Japan, as elsewhere around the world, an intensive week long campaign was conducted for the release of thousands of political prisoners illegally held in the jails of South Vietnam. A telephone campaign to the South Vietnamese Embassy, a demonstration with marchers carrying lighted candles, leafletting and collecting signatures on a petition at a central train station, and on the 24th the reading of thousands of the signers' names over loudspeakers at the South Vietnamese Embassy -- these were highlights of the week's actions organized by the September Action Committee for Freedom For Political Prisoners in South Vietnam. In addition, well over one million yen has been collected for further support work. Participating groups included Catholic organizations, Beheiren-related citizens and youth committees working for prisoners' release. Amnesty International, a Buddhist group, and overseas Vietnamese in Japan also conducted activities throughout the week.

On Sept. 23rd the Vietnamese group, Beheito, called a public meeting in Tokyo attended by about five hundred persons. Representatives of the above-mentioned committees reported on their activities and future plans. Beyond calling for heightened efforts on behalf of the prisoners, pressure to stop the flow of US dollars which built the prisons and tiger cages and keep them in operation, Japanese backing of Thieu's Saigon regime was emphasized. The participants viewed slides smuggled out of South Vietnam showing scenes

from a few of the prisons where Vietnamese peasants, students, intellectuals, even children are being held. The now well-known pictures of tortured inmates on Con Son Island prison were followed by prison mug shots of women arrested early this month in Saigon; guards' hands were seen clutching their necks; their cries could all but be heard in the Tokyo meeting hall.

The appeals of the groups active in the Campaign call attention to the fact that the prisoners, thought to number between two and three hundred thousand, are being held in violation of the Paris peace agreement to which the Saigon regime is a signatory. They are being held without hope of a trial or defense of any kind, and their whereabouts is often unknown even to members of their families. Numerous reports of the torture and murder of prisoners have been received and corroborated.

But along with fresh reports of repression, the week also saw a message of encouragement in the form of a cable of solidarity from patriotic Vietnamese in Saigon which was read at the Sept. 23rd meeting. Inspired by the example of the Vietnamese in Saigon and their compatriots living in virtual exile in Japan, all pledged their efforts to hasten the day when Vietnamese patriots will be able to enjoy the freedom they have fought for so long and hard. ■■



KIDNAPPED: The Kim Case and the "Korean Connection"

by Kitazawa Yoko

INTRODUCTION

The kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, the leading anti-Pak South Korean politician, from a Tokyo hotel on August 8 has brought into sharp focus the acute power crisis within the Pak Chung Hee regime and has dramatized the scope of Japan's vested interests in South Korea. The incident has also brought into the open the deepening contradictions between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul -- contradictions growing out of the U.S. defeat in Viet Nam and the strategic re-shaping of U.S. policy under the Nixon Doctrine. Furthermore, contradictions between the Seoul regime and the democratic wishes of the Korean people have been exposed.

Kim, who came close to defeating Pak in the 1971 presidential election, was seized by five strong-arm goons in Tokyo's Grand Palace Hotel around noon on August 8. He was forced into an elevator, taken to a basement parking lot and whisked away in a waiting car. His whereabouts were unknown for five days. On the evening of August 13, Kim, his eyes bandaged, was released by the kidnapers near his home in Seoul.

According to press statements, Kim was taken to Osaka by car and then to South Korea by freighter. Aboard ship Kim was bound, blindfolded and had heavy weights put on his feet. He heard his captors discussing throwing him into the sea. He wasn't certain why they didn't, but he told an English reporter that he heard a sea-plane land near the boat at that point. Shortly after this he was drugged and woke up in Korea.

Kim had been in virtual exile since October, 1972. He was in Tokyo for medical care on a thigh injured in a 1971 assassination attempt in Korea in the same month that Pak declared martial law. Knowing that it would be impossible to carry on anti-Pak struggles in South Korea, he chose to spread the anti-Pak movement among Koreans residing in Japan and the U.S. During two long visits to the U.S. he tried to win the support of former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, Senator Edward Kennedy, then Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Greene (now Ambassador to Australia) and Henry Kissinger.

KIM IN THE U.S.

Kim was particularly successful in rallying influential South Koreans living in exile in the U.S. -- including the former ROK "Ambassador" to the U.N., the former mayor of Seoul, and the former ROK Ambassador to West Germany. His writing and speaking tours also led to a coalition of anti-Pak groups in the U.S. On July 7 he helped establish the "National Council for the Restoration of Democracy and Promotion of National Unity."

Kim found support for the anti-Pak struggle in many quarters in the U.S. -- including within the U.S. government and the ROK Embassy in Washington. When Pak declared martial law last year, U.S. spokesmen publicly expressed "displeasure" (though they quickly added that they would do nothing to "interfere" with the oppression). More outspoken criticism of martial law came in a special report on South Korea and the Philippines to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Moose and Lowenstein in February. The

Hotel Grand Palace

On March 23, Kim announced his 3 point platform to the press in Tokyo: (1) establishment of a democratic government in South Korea; (2) parallel and simultaneous affiliation of North and South Korea with the U.N.; and (3) creation of a loose federation of North and South states. The platform was essentially the same as the new Korea policy of the U.S. government designed to perpetuate permanently the North-South division.

In July when Kim sought to return to Japan from the U.S., the Japanese government, always sensitive to U.S. inclinations,

granted him a special entry permit. Even though Kim had no entry visa (even his official ROK passport had expired), the Justice Ministry permitted him to stay until November for purposes of "medical treatment and book writing" -- a rare exception in Japan's strict immigration control. (1)

Since his arrival in Japan on July 10, Kim had devoted himself almost entirely to organizing anti-Pak Koreans in Japan into a branch of his "National Council." As Pak Chung Hee knows, the 600,000 Koreans in Japan are politically far from a negligible force. About half of these Koreans are affiliated with Chosen Soren (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) which supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The other half regard themselves as citizens of South Korea and belong to Mindán. Mindán, however, was polarized and split two years ago when the ROK's consul to Japan, Kim Jae Kwon, blatantly intervened in the organization demanding the selection of a president hand-picked by the Korean CIA.

Mindán now has a powerful faction centered in Tokyo which openly opposes the Pak regime. Kim Dae Jung successfully organized this political force and was planning a huge anti-Pak rally in Tokyo for August 15. He was kidnapped one week before the rally.

On the day preceding the kidnapping Kim met with Kimura Takeo, a former minister of state close to Premier Tanaka. In the hours before the abduction he met with more government leaders and Tory politicians, including former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio, a member of the LDP faction of former Premier Sato Eisaku.

On the afternoon of his abduction, Kim was scheduled to speak with Utsunomiya's A-A Group about the founding of a Japan-ROK Friendship Association opposing Pak.

KIM IS SILENCED

Kim's organization of anti-Pak forces in Japan and the U.S. clearly represented a sizeable and growing threat to the Pak regime, especially since the Korea problem was at the top of the September U.N. General Assembly agenda. Pak desperately wanted Kim back inside South Korea -- quiet, under control, and with no viable political force at his command. While Kim had succeeded in building a powerful movement of Koreans abroad and winning support from important elements in U.S. and Japanese ruling circles, he lacks a strong political base inside the ROK. The party he led in 1971 -- the New Democratic Party -- was split through arrests, intimidation and infiltration. Several of Kim's closest allies were imprisoned when martial law was declared. Kim's other allies were forced out of the party and formed a new party -- the Democratic Unity Party -- which has two representatives in the parliament (which, since martial law, Pak utterly controls through his election laws and his appointment of one-third of the members).

Nevertheless, despite the weakness of his political organization within Korea, Pak found it necessary to silence Kim. The Korean CIA, with some assistance, has pulled off a masterful plot (though they don't want the credit -- they say it was pulled off by 30 unknown Koreans calling themselves the "Patriotic Nation-Saving Youth Corps"). And to those who want to think so, things seem to have returned to status quo stability.

The three part report that follows details just what that "stability" is -- and isn't: (1) the political crisis of the Pak Chung Hee regime and its increasing repression; (2) how Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped by the Korean CIA in liaison with Japanese right-wingers; and (3) the effects of the kidnapping on Japan's economic annexation of South Korea.

I. BACKGROUND FOR A KIDNAPPING:

NORTH-SOUTH TALKS AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN SOUTH KOREA

When President Nixon visited China and the Soviet Union, it was clear that he wanted (1) to prevent change in the Asian balance of power following military withdrawal from Vietnam and (2) to contain further growth of revolutionary forces in Asia. Even so, Nixon's "new" Asia policy has had an upsetting effect on such corrupt anti-Communist regimes as Marcos' and Pak's.

Pak Chung Hee barely secured the presidency in the April, 1971, election, and only then by eliminating the constitutional ban on the election of the same person to the Presidency for a third term and by engaging in gross election irregularities. Despite this, Kim Dae Jung received 46 per cent of the popular vote.

In August following Pak's "victory," he was pressured to accept the North-proposed North-South Red Cross talks. This, however, triggered anti-Pak unrest among the South Korean people. Election irregularities began to be criticized openly and students started militant struggles against compulsory military training on campus. Eighty-two leading intellectuals, seeking freedom of speech, issued a "Declaration on the Defense of Democracy."

Pak answered these moves with severe repression, using both police and military force. On July 15, 1971, he issued a Garrison Order under which the Army's Metropolitan Guard Division arrested all the student leaders of the anti-military-training struggle and conscripted a vast number of students. On December 6 Pak declared a "State of Emergency".

During 1972 the repression spread from the student movement and intellectuals to the parliament. In June, 1972, 80 opposition party representatives occupied the parliament and staged a hunger strike, protesting the boycott of the parliament by the ruling Democratic-Republicans. Pak's police poured into the Parliament "sanctuary" and violently attacked the protesting parliamentarians. (Kim Dae Jung suffered leg injuries in the melee.) Another wave of repression was unleashed against professional politicians, journalists and intellectuals.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

This development set a pattern for Pak's political maneuvers: any token

report described the repression of civil liberties in South Korea as "worse than at any time during Syngman Rhee's rule." Furthermore, the report said that "unless Pak himself agrees" to a relaxation, the Pak regime can be ended only by "revolution or Pak's death."

Then, on June 5th, the ROK consul in Washington, Lee Jai Hyon, defected in protest against the Pak regime of repression and asked for political asylum. When the U.S. State Department showed a warm attitude toward him and even joined in a protest against Korean CIA pressure against Koreans in the U.S. (including Kim Dae Jung), this was interpreted as Washington's open expression of displeasure with Pak's strong-arm tactics at home and abroad. Was Pak-style repression really the answer to "stability" in Korea? Important elements in the U.S. government were beginning to take a critical second look.

Against this background -- and against the background of the U.S.'s own strong-arm scandal, Watergate -- Kim intensified his anti-Pak organizing and found widespread support including what he considered a "go-sign" from official Washington.

KIM IN JAPAN

From January through March of this year, Kim was similarly active in Japan. He spoke before the Afro-Asia Study Group, comprising "doves" in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Lower House member Utsunomiya Tokuma. He exposed the Pak regime through a series of articles and interviews in influential intellectual magazines such as Sekai and Asahi Journal.



rapprochement with the North would immediately be accompanied by stepped-up repression inside the country. This combination of overture to the North and domestic repression culminated in martial law declared on October 17, 1972. This followed the announcement on July 4 of a joint communique with the North to pursue peaceful re-unification.

The joint communique was arranged on the ROK side by Lee Hu Rak, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), who had secretly visited Pyongyang on May 2 of that year. (The negotiator for the North was Kim Yong Ju, chief of the Organization Bureau of the Worker's Party of Korea.) Lee Hu Rak is considered closer to President Nixon than even President Pak is. He is in fact Nixon's trustee, and his visit to Pyongyang was carried out by direct instruction of U.S. Ambassador to Seoul William Porter. Testifying at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1970, Porter made it clear that he had "communicated to the Korean side the U.S. view that attention had better be directed to North Korea" for the purpose of "searching for an area in which North-South dialogue may be possible." The visit of the KCIA chief to Pyongyang meant that Pak was forced to agree to the U.S. position: that Korea's division into North and South should be perpetuated and that "dialogue" should start between them to serve this purpose. While the U.S.-ROK relationship rested for 25 years on the fiction that the ROK government was

the only legitimate government of the whole of the Korean peninsula, the U.S. at last has had to begin revising this formula to meet realities.

This development prompted Pak to further escalate his repression. Kim Gyu Nam, former parliamentary representative and international law scholar, was executed. The Anti-Espionage Law and Anti-Communist Law were invoked to arrest, torture, imprison for life and execute a number of critical intellectuals, politicians and journalists. Pak had no trust in his military either. General Ham Sin, commander of the First Army, and General Che Myong Sin, leader of an ROK division deployed in Vietnam, were deposed so that the Blue House (Pak's Presidential office) could establish unitary control over the military.

The culmination of this policy was the dissolution of the parliament and the declaration of martial law, accompanied by the closing of all schools, on October 17, 1972, and a "public poll" revising the Constitution on November 21.

Thus Pak Chung Hee completed his dictatorial power grab. The new Constitution extended Pak's term of office to six years and made it possible for him to be "re-elected" indefinitely. All judicial, administrative and legislative powers were concentrated in Pak's hands. But, ironically, this same process exacerbated Washington's distrust of Pak and led to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee's special report (by Moose and Lowenstein). It also increased Washington's interest in the political activities of Kim Dae Jung.

FATAL DISEASE?

On top of all this, rumors spread that President Pak was suffering from some terminal disease. This was one explanation for the intra-regime power struggle: that it was a fight over succession to the throne anticipating Pak's death. The Japanese Foreign Ministry this spring had to admit that political unrest may erupt in South Korea "this fall."

Though the struggle for power within the ruling quarters is concealed behind the curtains of the Blue House, it was rumored that KCIA boss Lee was shot at and injured in February in Seoul. In March, rumors spread that Major General Yun Pil Yong, commander of the Metropolitan guards

planned a coup against Pak. As a leading member of the "Revolutionary Force" (a group of former intelligence officers), Yun had been a close friend of Pak since Pak's 1961 coup d'etat. He also served as chief of the Tiger Division dispatched to Vietnam. Since the Garrison Order in the autumn of 1971, he had systematically increased his power by spearheading repression of people's forces. In these roles, he was locked in a fierce power struggle with such rivals as the KCIA, the CIC (Army Intelligence Command headed by Kang Chang Sang), Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil (who commands 200 presidential staffers) and Pak Jong Gyu, chief of Blue House security (who controls his own elite police corps).

It is not known whether Yun actually prepared an anti-Pak coup, but he was arrested on March 20 by the CIC and sentenced by the military court on April 28 to 15 years in prison on eight different charges. The KCIA was also damaged by this incident as the alleged coup involved some bureau chiefs of the KCIA including, among others, a nephew of Lee Hu Pak who was chief of the Control Bureau of the CIA. The CIA was forced to fire more than 30 leading staffers. "A letter from South Korea", printed in *Sekai* magazine (July, 1973) gives this story: "Gen. Yun and Lee Hu Rak got reliable information that Pak could not last for more than three years due to his fatal disease. Learning this, the two men (Lee and Yun) came to a secret agreement that Lee would succeed Pak and that Yun would be number two. This news was somehow leaked secretly to Pak. It is said that the informer was Sin Beom Sik, president of the Seoul News, once close to Yun. He seems to have given the information to Pak Jong Gyu, chief of the security command at the Blue House."

Later, on May 21 this year, a second attempt on Lee Hu Rak's life was rumored. If it occurred, Lee was only slightly scratched. It may have been intended as a counterattack on Lee who, with the strong backing of the U.S. and Japanese governments, had directed the North-South talks and was beginning to compete with Kim Jong Pil for the No. 2 position. These rumors indicate the ferocious power struggle which continued into July when Lee and the CIA exposed the CIC's embezzlement of the army's gasoline, thereby forcing commander Kang Chang Sang to be removed.

RELATION TO KIDNAPPING

The power struggle subsequently spilled over into the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping. The *Yomiuri Shimbun's* Seoul correspondent cabled a page-one scoop on August 23 quoting "an influential government source of South Korea" that the kidnapping was carried out by the KCIA and that Lee Hu Rak would soon be forced to resign on this account. It is now an open secret that the "influential source" was the Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil.

The circumstances surrounding Kim Dae Jung suddenly changed after this expose. The ROK government emphasized that Kim Dae Jung, already under house arrest, would be examined not only as a victim of the kidnapping but also as a "suspect". This meant that Kim Dae Jung may be brought to trial on charges of treason for his overseas anti-Pak activities. This development is also believed to reflect the power struggle between Kim Jong Pil and Lee Hu Rak. In the initial stage of the abduction the KCIA had already made mistakes. Instead of carrying out the kidnapping in complete secrecy, the KCIA saw the crime become the top news story in Japan the day it was committed. The incident immediately flared up into a serious international issue. If the Pak ruling group as a whole desired to bring Kim Dae Jung back, they neither expected, nor wanted, the huge publicity given the incident by all Japanese media. But Pak's attention soon returned to the matter of the domestic power struggle, since Kim Jong Pil was obviously using the Kim Dae Jung affair in his fight against Lee Hu Rak. Furthermore, the *Yomiuri* report gave Lee Hu Rak ammunition to start a counterattack. The power struggle within the ROK ruling groups, probably coupled with U.S. pressure on Pak, can explain another uncalculated mistake in the plot -- the indecision on the part of the kidnapers. For five days, the kidnapers held Kim Dae Jung in custody, apparently confused about what to do with him.

CHRISTIAN RESISTANCE

It is the fate of this military state with 200,000 police and 2,500,000

paramilitary "native reserve forces" that its intra-regime contradictions and corruption are bound to sharpen to the extent power is concentrated in the hands of Pak Chung Hee.

Essentially the crisis to date has been one of men at the top jockeying for power positions under Pak. However, there is also the ever-present threat to Pak of people's resistance. Though their voice is harshly suppressed, isolated, individual examples of resistance already exist. On April 19 this year, the anniversary of the 1960 April uprising, the Pak government banned all public rallies. Yet, on April 22, Easter Day, over 70,000 Christians got together at an outdoor theater in Seoul. During the rally, leaflets were scattered openly denouncing the "dictatorial Pak government" and demanding democracy as a means of liberating the people. (Rev. Pak Hyong Gu, a Presbyterian pastor in Seoul, was sentenced to two years in jail on Sept. 25 for "leading this rally in an attempt to overthrow the government.") This bold action took place in spite of strengthened repression of Christians. Rev. Ueon Myeong Gi of Nam Myong Church in Kimju City was arrested by the CIA in December last year for anti-government activities. In fact, the church has come to the forefront of resistance after workers, intellectuals and opposition politicians, one after another, fell victims to repression. Christians are fighting CIA control of workers unions, too. The Catholic Labor Youth Committee and the Protestant Urban Industrialization Mission, under extremely difficult circumstances, support workers fighting against

the cruel labor conditions imposed upon them by foreign capital attracted by guaranteed low wages. On Feb. 14, female workers of Daehan Wool Spinning Co. sent a daring open letter to the management protesting against 18-hour work on Sundays. [On October 2nd some three hundred Seoul University students demonstrated against the repressive Pak regime and its handling of the Kim Dae Jung affair. They were crushed by 1400 of Pak's crack troops after several hours.] These are just a few examples of the deep-rooted resistance of the South Korean people. They have no alternative but to fight against the Pak regime when inflation is spiralling, due to the deteriorating international payments position (caused largely by Korea's \$4 billion foreign debt and by the revaluation of the yen), and when food is becoming so scarce that two "riceless days" are in effect each week. (2)

DPRK RECOGNITION

The crisis of the Pak regime is spurred also by new developments in the international arena. Aside from the emerging possibility that Washington may give up Pak for somebody else, the deterioration of Pak's international standing is clearly shown by the decision of the World Health Organization to admit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a full member. (The May 17 decision was approved 66 to 41). Also, while the DPRK was recognized by only 36 countries through April, 1972 (as against 85 for the ROK), the number increased to 58 (compared with 88 for the ROK) by July,

1973. This tendency will be accelerated by the DPRK's new observer status at the United Nations. In this situation, Washington is prepared to go a step beyond the North-South joint communique, toward the permanent division of Korea into two separate states (two Koreas) which would both be full members of the U.N. To do this, the U.S. must pressure the Pak government to do something to improve its dark image as the "most despotic government" in the world. It is important to note in this context that then Secretary of State Rogers, who visited Seoul on July 20, hailed the North-South dialogue and expressed his hope that Pak will change his way of handling domestic adversaries. He openly advised that total suppression of free speech in South Korea be ended.

II. THE KIDNAPPING: KOREAN CIA ASSISTED BY JAPANESE RIGHTWINGERS

Kim Dae Jung's kidnapping lies at the heart of these internal and external developments. Faced with a serious crisis, Pak Chung Hee's original intentions seem to have been two-fold. He wanted to get Kim back to Korea to contain his open anti-Pak organizing abroad, and at the same time he hoped to give his repressive regime a facade of "national unity" and "democracy."

First Pak sent emissaries. In late July Yu Chin Sin, the leader of the New Democratic Party, flew to Tokyo at Pak's behest and tried to meet with Kim. Kim refused to see him. So Yu called a press conference on July 20th to get his message across. He said that Kim should return to the ROK immediately, and he announced a five-point program on the North-South problem that paralleled exactly Kim's own proposals made during the 1971 elections: (1) A conference of political parties and social organizations of North and South Korea should be called; (2) a structure should be created to facilitate unification of the nation; (3) a collective security arrangement should be set up for Korea, to be guaranteed by the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union; (4) the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) should be replaced by a new structure; and (5) a summit conference between the leaders of North and South Korea should be held. This is not only Kim Dae Jung's

own program: it is also the plan which U.S. Ambassador William Porter had suggested to Pak some time ago. Since Yu Chin Sin is the leader of the same "opposition party" under Pak's protection, it is not unreasonable to take Yu's announcement as representing the price Pak was willing to pay for Kim's return.

Then came Yang Il Tong, leader of the Democratic Unity Party, a splinter of Kim's New Democratic Party, on a similar mission. He met Kim at the Hilton Hotel on July 29th to try to persuade him to return home. At the end of that week, on August 4th, Yang Il Tong met an ROK consul in Japan named Kim Jae Kwon, a man generally believed to be the head of the Korean CIA in Japan (he is formerly chief of the 7th Division of KCIA in charge of psychological warfare).

The object of these abortive visits was to get Kim Dae Jung to abandon his organizing overseas and return home. They were unsuccessful. The kidnapping followed when Kim went to meet Yang Il Tong a second time at the Grand Palace Hotel.

Whether the kidnapers simply wanted to murder Kim Dae Jung is still up in the air, but a story that has gotten wide circulation in Tokyo is that he was saved by the intervention of the U.S. CIA just before he was to be thrown into the sea.

WHO DONE IT?

Who were the kidnapers? All evidence points to the KCIA and there are a number of reasons to suspect that Seoul's 007 boys had the active aid of certain Japanese rightwingers and politicians. (3)

In his reply to interpellations at the Judiciary Committee of the Upper House on August 23, shortly after Kim Dae Jung turned up safely at his home, Justice Minister Tanaka Isaji (no relation to the Prime Minister) made the following delicate statement: "My sixth sense tells me that the kidnapping was carried out by the secret police of a foreign country." Other cabinet ministers have kept their silence on the case, and a few days afterward the Justice Minister was criticized by the Prime Minister for his "careless statement."


The Justice Minister needed no intuition. He knew perfectly well that a powerful group of Korean CIA men had come to

Japan from the U.S. between July 10 and August 1. They included ROK Minister in the U.S., "Lee Sang Ho" and 3 other Embassy members - Choi Hong Tae (Councilor), a military attache named Lin, and the Second Secretary to the ROK Embassy in Washington, Pak Jung Il. Consul "Lee Sang Ho" is of particular interest. A 45-year-old former South Korean marine whose name is Yang Dong Won, he masterminded the kidnapping of ROK students in West Germany in June 1967.

JAPANESE CONNECTION

The Minister of Justice could hardly fail to know a second fact of significance in the case: the Korean CIA runs a very efficient and profitable travel service smuggling Korean workers into Japan. According to informed sources, it brings in about 20,000 Koreans each year, selling

CLOSE-KNIT INTER-RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN BUSINESS & POLITICAL CIRCLES OF JAPAN & KOREA



their labor power to small and medium enterprises which are unable to attract sufficient Japanese workers. The KCIA is said to charge three to four hundred thousand yen for each such worker. Every year the Japanese police arrests about 6000 of these and ships them back, but the estimated numbers of illegal entrants indicates the scale and efficiency of "the secret police of a foreign country."

When James Bond goes out on a mission of skulduggery, he works alone or with a woman. The work-a-day world of the Korean CIA is more business-like. It runs a big operation in Japan with the active cooperation of a powerful group of rightwingers. The "Japan connection" in the smuggling of Korean workers includes most importantly the so-called "Kodama organ", and circumstantial evidence suggests that the organ may have had a role in the kidnapping and smuggling out of Kim Dae Jung.

Kodama Yoshio has been a notorious leader of the ultra-right since prewar days, and he is a close associate of Pak Chung Hee and the KCIA today. (His influence on Prime Minister Tanaka and his group is fast rising.) One of the links connecting his group with the kidnapping is that Kim was abducted from the Grand Palace Hotel. That hotel is owned and operated by Machii Hisayuki, a close follower of Kodama who is a naturalized Japanese of Korean descent. Machii also happens to be a manager of the Kampu Ferry Co., connecting Japan's Shimonoseki with Korea's Pusan, and a night lord of Ginza and Akasaka. He has been decorated by Pak Chung Hee for meritorious service. Why was this particular hotel picked for the abduction? It is hard to believe that Machii and, through him, Kodama, did not have advance knowledge of what was going to happen.

Moreover, Kodama had strong motives for helping the KCIA and Pak Chung Hee. Japan Lines, one of the 6 major shipping companies in this country, hired Kodama's Toa Sogo Kigyo (TSK, "East Asian Mutual Enterprises") to act as its spokesman in negotiations for new services in South Korea. Japan Lines is not negotiating over shipping rights, but over something much bigger -- participation in building two oil refineries with a 150,000 barrel-a-day capacity at Yosu and Kang Yang, and building a shipyard on Koje Island capable of constructing mammoth 200,000-ton ships. Japan Lines is competing with such giants of Japanese industry as Marubeni Corp., the Arabia Oil Co., and C. Itoh-Teijin; it is talking about \$2,000,000,000 and it is counting on Kodama's close ties with the Pak regime to bring home the bacon.

WHERE WERE THE COPS?

The Kodama group appears to have been only one of the Japanese parties to the abduction. Who could the other be? Let us look at the police handling of the case.

In the first place, the police (and government) have been laggard and suspicious. The first reports of the kidnapping came not from the police but from Dietman Utsunomiya Tokuma's secretary, and the police did not move in on the hotel until an hour after the report came in. It took thirty

hours and much prodding for the police to establish a special group for the search -- usually a routine matter in such a serious case. Moreover, Japanese police intelligence notoriously keeps constant watch over foreigners known to be engaged in political activities, but there were no police watchers around when Kim was taken.

The government took the disappearance of Kim in stride, although he was the center of an important movement developing among Koreans living in Japan. One government spokesman even confidently predicted that Kim would soon reappear. Could the government have known something in advance? Certainly it released information on the case with a deliberation that was obviously meant to keep public excitement at a minimum. It was only on September 5th, just short of a month after the abduction, that the Metropolitan Police Board announced that the fingerprints of a First Secretary to the ROK Embassy in Tokyo, Kim Dong Woon, had been found in the room of the Grand Palace Hotel used by the kidnapers. While hinting that a score more Koreans, led by a high-ranking diplomat, had carried out the kidnapping, they moved with great deliberation in attempting to serve a subpoena on First Secretary Kim; by the time they did, in early September, he and his confederates had already flown back to Korea -- a fact that could hardly have escaped the officials. On Sept. 25th the press revealed that two detectives, including an active duty Japanese military intelligence officer on leave, had been hired by ROK Embassy First Secretary Kim Dong Woon to spy on Kim Dae Jung. Since their newly founded detective agency is neither listed in the Tokyo telephone book nor has a sign to identify its offices, the press speculated that Kim Dong Woon could only have made contact through special links between Japanese military intelligence and the Korean CIA. Japan's lukewarm, low-profiled reaction to the kidnapping contrasts strongly with the posture of the West German government toward the 1967 student kidnappings, and has led people legitimately to suspect complicity in high places.

III. ECONOMIC ANNEXATION AS BACKGROUND

Official complicity makes sense in terms of the larger complex of Japanese-

ROK relations, for the plans of the Japanese monopoly capitalists depend upon maintenance of politically stable repression in South Korea.

The Post-War Japanese advance into South Korea dates back to 1965, when the Japan-Republic of Korea Normalization Treaty was signed. Under the treaty, Japan provided massive economic "assistance" -- a half a billion dollars to begin with and \$1.188 billion in yen loans and private credits since then. Now Japan's interests in South Korea are both military and economic.

In their joint communique of 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato affirmed that the security of South Korea was "essential" to the security of Japan. In the last year, under the Tanaka regime, Japan's stance has become even more aggressive. Tanaka's August joint communique with Nixon spoke of Japan's contribution to the "promotion of peace and security" on the Korean peninsula. This step forward reflected the fact that Japan is rapidly taking over the American position there under the strategic requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. The Asahi Shimbun (July 31) reported that Tanaka spoke with Nixon about Japan "taking over military assistance to the ROK military for the promotion of its modernization." The U.S. had already lavished a billion dollars on the Korean military in connection with a "modernization" program launched in the wake of the seizure of the spy ship Pueblo in 1968, but only about 60 per cent of the

original program goals had been attained. The Nixon administration is anxious that the Japanese take over the burden. So is the Pak gang. With the threatened cutback in American aid, they desperately need Japanese money to keep in power.

ECONOMIC "AID"

So far, the Japanese have contributed far more in economic "aid" than militarily, and foreign investments have increased at a fantastic pace. In 1968 there was one case of Japanese private investment totalling \$310,000. By 1972 there were a total of 314 cases worth \$112 million. But that was just the beginning. In the first six months of 1973 there were already 132 investments totalling \$113 million -- more than the total for the previous four years. Today Japan accounts for 99.7 per cent of all new foreign capital in South Korea, surpassing the U.S. in total investment.

The nature and pattern of these investments has also changed. It used to be small and medium industries that escaped to Korea looking for cheap land and labor. Today it is Japan's giant chemical and heavy industries, and they are working toward a goal that three years ago seemed almost unthinkable -- the total integration of the South Korean economy into the Western Japan economic zone.(4)

Before Kim Dae Jung's kidnapping, plans were proceeding at full speed. This March, in Seoul, the fifth joint economic committee of Japan and the ROK de-

clared that both sides agreed that the two countries "have entered into the stage where division of labor between the two countries is especially desirable." That is to say, the ROK should be considered part of the Japanese economy. It is also to say that Japan should help out Pak on an incredible ten-year, \$5 billion development scheme.

Until the Kim kidnapping upset the schedule, a key ministerial conference between the two countries was scheduled for September 7th and 8th. On August 9th, immediately after Prime Minister Tanaka visited Washington, the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that its new \$400 million economic assistance called for (1) a loan of \$135 million for the second stage of work on the Pohang steel mill; (2) more than \$100 million for Pak's Semooul (new villages) program -- virtually a personal political donation to Pak; (3) assistance in kind of \$50 million to help improve the ROK's international payments position; (4) a loan of \$50 million for shipbuilding; (5) a loan of \$40 million for the improvement of Muk Ho port to facilitate shipment of cement to Japan; and (6) some 50 million dollars in loans for the building of subways in Seoul. Last year the sum of all Japanese aid promised at the ministerial conference was only \$175 million, less than half what is being discussed now.

TO MAKE KOREA A "DEVELOPED COUNTRY"

In addition to this "regular" assistance, the seventh ministerial conference was scheduled to discuss Pak's \$5 billion chemical and heavy industrial development program-based on Japanese construction of steel, non-ferrous metal, machinery, chemical, electronic and shipbuilding industries which are the main pillars of South Korea's plan to become an industrialized nation. The Pak regime claims that within ten years this heavy and chemical industrial development program will "increase ROK exports to ten billion dollars a year, and per capita income to \$1,000."


Even before the formal implementation of these programs, Japanese businessmen had already begun making their plans. On June 5th officials from the ROK's Economic Planning Agency met representatives of 200 large Japanese companies associated with Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) to discuss it. Also, a powerful Japanese industrial delegation visited South Korea to promote the program.

On June 10th ROK Premier Kim Jong Pil came to Japan to meet with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira to discuss the plan. After the meetings, Kim Jong Pil told a joint meeting of parliamentarians from Korea and Japan that "Japan is the only friend of the Republic of Korea which offers us deep understanding and cooperation."

Understanding aside, there is enormous profit in it for Japanese monopolists. Over the next ten years six major projects are planned for completion. Two more steel mills will be constructed to join the Pohang mill now under construction to produce 12.6 million tons of crude steel a year in the early 1980s. A mammoth petrochemical base, with an annual ethylene output capacity of 1,000,000 tons, will be constructed in the Yosu-Kang Yang area. Five or more mammoth shipyards, each capable of building more than a million tons of shipping each year are to be built on Koje island. A large machine-building industry will be constructed. An electronic parts-making combine will be built at Ku Mi. Two free trade zones will be established at the mouth of the Koem Gang river. And, as we have already mentioned, two large petrochemical combines at Yosu and Kang Yang are up for grabs, an ideal opportunity for Japan to export its pollution-producing plants and at the same time make sure that it gets the production it needs.

In addition and quite apart from these plots, on May 11 an affiliate of the Mitsubishi group, Asia Oil, announced that it will construct the world's largest central terminal station (a transit base for petroleum) on a Korean island near Pusan. The initial million kiloliter capacity of this CTS will be increased eventually to 6,000,000 kiloliters, and the whole of the crude oil stored there will be shipped to Japan.

This integration of the South Korean economy under the Japanese thumb helps explain why the police dragged their feet in the Kim Dae Jung case, and why the government has been so inarticulate about it. Things have changed from the 1960's when economic aggression was promoted by the "Korea lobby", old-line rightists such as former premier Kishi Nobusuke, and Kodama Yoshio. Now we see the business and political mainstreams, headed by Keidanren and Tanaka Kakuei respectively, in the thick of it, anxious to grab the pie for themselves.



Nevertheless, the public outcry in Japan in the wake of Kim Dae Jung's kidnapping dominated the press, and opposition parties clamored for Kim's return to Japan. Vigorous reporters turned up one bit of evidence after another linking the kidnapping with the KCIA and the Korean Embassy in Tokyo.

Moreover, the American government's concern over the case added another element. Secretary of State William Rogers hinted at the "participation" of the ROK government in the kidnapping and announced on August 20th that he had communicated the U.S. concern over the safety of Kim Dae Jung to the Seoul regime.⁽⁵⁾ Six days later Assistant Secretary of State David Popper flew to see Pak and the American Secretary of Defense announced that U.S. forces might be withdrawn from South Korea as early as 1975 if a stable relationship is established between North and South Korea -- a key proposal of Kim Dae Jung.

This kind of pressure on the intransigent Pak government was soon faithfully echoed by the Japanese government. Reluctantly it decided that the seventh Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference, scheduled for September 7th and 8th, should be postponed. This decision brought the joint petroleum development project off the coast of Korea to a temporary standstill and caused unexpected confusion in the massive industrialization program for which Pak so desperately needs Japanese capital. But the postponement will be only temporary.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE

By late September the Japanese government had done nothing to settle the Kim Dae Jung case. Kim remains under house arrest in Seoul, a "suspect" who may be put on political trial after the dust settles. On September 19th the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the Japanese government has decided to "freeze" the case until the UN General Assembly is over. Indeed, during the last two weeks of September, there was hardly any effective mention of the case in the biggest daily newspapers in Japan, although smaller magazines continued to find eager readers with their weekly reports.

We know why the ruling circles in Japan cannot do what any government is expected to do in such cases. They are far too deeply involved with the Korean generals and the Korean economy to risk rocking the boat. Myriad ties bind them to the corrupt Pak regime, and it is clear from this glimpse into the tangled skein that the only solution to the Kim Dae Jung case would be to wipe clear the whole rotten relationship between the ruling cliques in the two countries. This Tanaka Kakuei and his gang will never do.

What about the opposition groups in Japan? Whipping the government for its lukewarm attitude, almost all opponents and critics of the government -- including the Japanese Communist Party -- have laid their major emphasis on the Korean

AJUKKARI KAMIKAZE

by Kim Chi-ha
translated by Katagiri Mitsuru

It is as nothing
Just a chrysanthemum flower blooming on the life-
blood sucked from Korean swine;
Just a Japanese sword hammered out from the iron
vessels they ripped off and melted down.
Why do you say courageous? Didn't you know?
Pathetic and grim, the kamikaze than which
nothing is grimmer, grim and pathetic, even that
grim kamikaze is as nothing,
Only a wind blown mad
Madly driven by ajukkari devoured from Korean
swine
Your death blown mad
Casts a chill on the colony
On the death of the colony, starved out, withering
in sickness and tightly bound, still crying and
burning.
Just an old war song
To call again the death of history
A mad war song frenziedly chanted
By a nude woman soldier thrusting herself among
nude studs
To stand up right.

Note:
Ajukkari is the castor oil plant. The Japanese forced the production of this plant on a large scale in Korea when the latter was a Japanese colony. Towards the end of World War II, Imperial Japan tried to supplement its shortage of gasoline by the oil extracted from the ajukkari plant. "Ajukkari" is given in the Japanese pronunciation.
Kamikaze was a term applied during World War II to Japanese pilots on suicide missions. The original phrase means "Divine Wind".

From "Ronin" Vol.1 Nos.10-11

CIA's infringement upon Japanese sovereignty. They rightly attack the government's passivity, but instead of exposing the essential complicity of Japanese ruling groups in both the crime of abduction and the larger suppression of the Korean people, they are pushing for governmental retaliation measures such as the withdrawal of the Ambassador. Indeed, the defense of "Japan's national sovereignty" has become a chauvinistic chorus resonant with the old anti-Korean ideology of prewar Imperial Japan, the same spirit that lay behind the annexation of Korea back in 1910.

Ironically, while the opposition forces concentrate their fire on nationalist issues, the extreme right of the Liberal Democratic Party is talking about "internationalism." The newly-founded Seirankai,⁽⁶⁾ the rightist "hawk" faction of the ruling LPD, declared: "If we accuse the Pak government of infringing upon Japanese national sovereignty in the absence of evidence that the KCIA actually did it, we shall damage the relationship with the ROK and might repeat the same mistake prewar Japan committed against China."

Notes:

(1) Japan does not subscribe to the refugee treaty and therefore has no domestic system to give political asylum to foreigners. As a poor substitute, the Justice Minister can issue a special permit for stay with a maximum term of validity of three years. See "Immigration Control" in AMPO No.12.

(2) President Pak deposed Kim Bo Hyon, director of the Agriculture, Forestry and Marine Industry Agency, on August 7th, 1973. Replacing Kim Bo Hyon was chief secretary on economic matters to the president. This step was announced to be one of "further promoting the policy of increasing foodstuff production", but it is clear that Kim was fired because of the failure of the Semooul movement and consequent food crisis. This was the first personnel change in the Pak government since the New Constitution was promulgated in November, 1972.

(3) The KCIA headquarters is located in Seoul. It is said to have 7,000 - 8,000 permanent staffers. Since one staff member

This bogus internationalism is, of course, simply a way of protecting their profitable economic aggression against the Korean people. It is the kind of internationalism that Pak Chung Hee desperately needs to protect his dictatorship. Indeed, the Shukan Yomiuri exposed the fact that three leaders of the Seirankai who were decorated by Pak in Seoul, had received funds to help finance their activities in Japan. Some fifty other Japanese politicians including former Prime Ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Sato Eisaku, are believed to have received similar "decorations" and have likewise embezzled political rebates from Japanese aid to Pak's government.

By emphasizing national sovereignty and by whitewashing the fact that the government's attempts to play down the Kim Dae Jung case stem from its sharing a common destiny with the Pak regime, the national sovereignty-motivated "progressive" parties in Japan miss the whole point. What they should do is to expose and shatter the whole scheme of integrating South Korea's economy into Japan's. ■ ■

is said to have three to five paid informers, the KCIA is believed to consist of at least 50,000 persons. The KCIA has the power to arrest any persons under the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law. The headquarters is divided into eight bureaus; the first bureau handling overseas information, the second and third in charge of domestic information; (the fourth is lacking); the fifth undertaking search and raids; the sixth responsible for psychological warfare; the eighth for overseas activities; and the ninth bureau is in charge of activities in North Korea. The first, fifth, seventh, sixth and eighth bureaus are all more or less involved in overseas activities. All foreign diplomatic missions of the ROK are said to have KCIA members as ministers, counsellors, secretaries, or consuls; they supervise lower echelon members of the KCIA.

(4) The "Japan-ROK Economic Cooperation Sphere" is a program whose main points are: (1) the creation of an economic cooperation sphere connecting the coastal areas of South Korea south of Pohang with the West Japan economic zone; (2) relocation of steel mills, oil refineries, petrochemical combines, shipyards, spinning and textile, electronics and plastic industries (which are suffering from a labor shortage and are accused of polluting Japan) to South Korea; and (3) a combination of Japanese capital and technology with the cheap and plentiful labor force, land and industrial water available in South Korea in order to increase Japan's international competitive capacity.

(5) Then U.S. Secretary of State Rogers; on July 20 this year issued a statement criticising Pak for his maltreatment of political adversaries.

(6) Seirankai is a neo-rightist caucus in the Liberal Democratic Party organized by

Ishiyama Shintaro and other younger ultra-right elements in May this year. Alarmed over the drastic loss of popularity of the LDP, they push for an openly hawkish line. The group was formally inaugurated on July 1st. To show their death-defying determination the members signed their declaration with their blood. According to a TV interview with Seirankai leader Nakagawa Ichiro (Sept. 4), they emphasize ultranationalism as the guiding principle, criticize "materialism" and propose that the constitution should be changed and that Japan should be armed with nuclear weapons. They attack the Lib.-Dem. leadership for its "ambiguous attitude" concerning the Kim Dae Jung case. When ROK Premier Kim Jong Pil visited Japan on June 10 to confer on the 10-year program for the development of heavy and chemical industries, the Seirankai members had a special meeting with him. Later, three members of Seirankai visited South Korea.

THEOLOGICAL DECLARATION OF KOREAN CHRISTIANS, 1973

We make this declaration in the name of the Korean Christian community. But under the present circumstances, in which one man controls all the powers of the three branches of government and uses military arms and the intelligence network to oppress the people, we hesitate to reveal those who signed this document. We must fight and struggle in the underground until our victory is achieved.

The historical situation of the Korean people has been very grave since last October. President Park's consolidation of power has had certain demonic consequences for the life of the Korean nation and people.

The Christian community, as an integral part of the Korean people, now stands up and speaks out on the present situation, compelled by the divine mandates of the Messianic Kingdom.

Since World War II, our people have gone through trials and sufferings, of social chaos, economic deprivation, and especially the tragic Korean War and the resulting political dictatorships. It has been an ardent aspiration of our people that a new and humane community might be restored to their lives. However, the hopes of the people for such a restoration of humane community has been cruelly crushed by President Park in his absolutization of dictatorship and ruthless political repression. This is done in the name of the so-called October Revitalization, a set of false promises which is only the sinister plan of some evil men.

We, the Christians in Korea, are compelled to speak out and take accompanying actions on the following grounds:

- 1) We are under God's command that we should be faithful to His Word in concrete historical situations. It is not a sense of triumphant victory that moves us today; rather it is a sense of confession of our sins before God; and yet we are commanded by God to speak the truth and act in the present situation in Korea.
- 2) The people in Korea are looking up to Christians and urging us to take action in the present grim situation. It is not because we deserve to represent them. We have often fallen short of their deeper expectations, and yet we are urged and encouraged to move on this course of action, not because we envision ourselves as the representatives of our people, but because we are moved by their agony to call upon God for their deliverance from evil days.
- 3) We stand in a historical tradition of such struggles for liberation as the independence movement by Christians against Japanese colonialism. We realize that our Christian community has often lacked the courage to take a decisive stand, and that the theological outlook of the official bodies of our Christian churches has been too pietistic to take up revolutionary roles. However, we do not feel disheartened by the weakness of some of our brothers; rather we are determined to seek our theological convictions from the historical traditions of our church.

The firm foundation of our words and deeds is our faith in God the Lord of history, in Jesus the proclaimer of the Messianic Kingdom, and in the Spirit who moves vigorously among the people. We believe that God is the ultimate vindicator of the oppressed, the weak, and the poor; He judges the evil forces in history. We believe that Jesus the Messiah proclaimed the coming of the Messianic Kingdom, to be subversive to the evil powers, and that his Messianic Kingdom will be the haven of the dispossessed, the rejected, and the down-trodden. We also believe that the Spirit is working for the new creation of history and cosmos, as well as for the regeneration and sanctification of individual man.

Christians are putting up sustained resistance against the Pak regime under martial law. The Declaration of Christian Ministers in South Korea was issued following the arrest of a number of ministers and raids on Christian churches this spring.

THEOLOGICAL DECLARATION OF KOREAN CHRISTIANS
1973
(ENGLISH TRANSLATION FROM KOREAN TEXT)
BY
CHRISTIAN MINISTERS IN KOREA
May 20, 1973

一九七三年 韓國 그리스도인 宣言

우리는 이 宣言을 韓國 그리스도인의 이름으로 발표한다. 그러나 한 사람이 三權을 執히 專斷하고, 國政을 專斷하는데 專斷 專權의 獨裁體제를 維持하고 있는 오늘날 상황 아래서 우리는 이 宣言을 發表한 것만으로도 罪를 償하기를 求한다. 우리는 우리의 이름이 宣言에 添하여 誰가든 罪를 償하고 罪를 免할 權을 得지 못하게 한다.

지난의 十月以來 韓國 國政이 露前한 狀況을 示하고 있다. 大韓 國에서 發生된 權力은 우리 國民의 生命에 致命한 危險을 包含하고 있다. 여기에 그리스도인들은 韓國 國政으로 示한 狀況에 對하여 우리의 義務를 履行하지 않을 수 없다. 더욱이 우리는 國家의 運命을 守기 爲하여 宣言하는 責任의 重負에 對하여 勇猛하게 行動할 權을 得는다.

第二次 世界大戰以後 우리 國政은 國권이 露前으로 暴露된 狀況에서 수많은 國民의 生命, 社會의 運命의 危險의 수반을 背負하게 된다. 韓의 獨裁體제가 그 罪를 償할 權을 得

In this grave historical situation, we as a Christian community believe

- 1) that we are commanded by God to be representatives before God the Judge and Lord of History, to pray that the suffering and oppressed people may be set free.
- 2) that we are commanded by our Lord Jesus Christ to live among the oppressed, the poor, and the despised as he did in Judea; and that we are summoned to stand up and speak the truth to the powers that be, as he did before Pontius Pilate of the Roman Empire.
- 3) that we are compelled by the Spirit to participate in his transforming power and movement for the creation of a new society and history, as well as for the transformation of our character; and that this Spirit is the Spirit of Messianic Kingdom who commands us to struggle for socio-political transformation in this world.

Therefore, we express our theological convictions on the following issues:

- 1) The present dictatorship in Korea is destroying rule by law and persuasion; it now rules by force and threat alone. Community is being turned into jungle. In fact no one is above the law except God; worldly power is entrusted by God to civil authority to keep justice and order in human society. If anyone poses himself above the law and betrays the divine mandate for justice, he is in rebellion against God. Oriental tradition, too, understands that good rule is carried out through the moral persuasion and virtue of the ruler. One may conquer people by the sword; but they cannot be ruled by the sword.
- 2) The regime in Korea is destroying freedom of conscience and freedom of religious belief. There is freedom neither of expression nor of silence. There is interference by the regime in Christian churches' worship, prayer, gatherings, content of sermons, and teaching of the Bible.
The Christian Church and other religious bodies must be the defenders of conscience for the people; for destruction of conscience is a most demonic act. In defending the freedom of religious belief against interference by the regime in Korea, Christian churches are also defending freedom of conscience for the Korean people.
- 3) The dictatorship in Korea is using systematic deception, manipulation, and indoctrination to control the people. The mass media has been turned into the regime's propaganda machine to tell the people half-truths and outright lies, and to control and manipulate information to deceive people.
We believe that Christians are witnesses to truth, always struggling to break any system of deception and manipulation, for to tell the truth is the ultimate power that sets men free for God's Messianic Kingdom.
- 4) The dictatorship in Korea uses sinister and inhuman and at the same time ruthlessly efficient means to destroy political opponents, intellectual critics, and innocent people. The use of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for this purpose is somewhat similar to the evil ways of the Nazi Gestapo or the KGB of the Stalin era. People are physically and mentally tortured, intimidated and threatened, and sometimes even disappear completely. Such treatments are indeed diabolical acts against humanity.

We believe that God has created humans in body and soul. Body as well as soul will be resurrected at the day of judgment of the Messianic Kingdom. We believe especially in the sanctity of the human body; therefore any violation of it is equal to killing a man. It is a murderous act.

- 5) The present dictatorship is responsible for the economic system in Korea, in which the powerful dominate the poor. The people, poor urban workers and rural peasants, are victims of severe exploitation and social and economic injustice. So-called "economic development" in Korea turned out to be the conspiracy of a few rulers against the poor people, and a curse to our environment.

We as Christians must struggle to destroy this system of extreme dehumanization and injustice; for we are witnesses to the ongoing movement of the Messianic Kingdom in history, in which the poor will be enriched, the oppressed will be vindicated, and peace will be enjoyed by the people.

- 6) The present regimes in the South and North are using the unification talks only to preserve their own power; and they are betraying the true aspirations of the people for the unification of their land. We believe as Christians that the people deeply yearn for authentic community on the basis of true reconciliation. Without transcendence beyond the past experiences of bitter conflict and differences in ideological and politico-economic systems, and without transformation of our historical conditions of oppression, true unification cannot be realized.

A CALL FOR ACTION AND SUPPORT

- 1) To the people in Korea: Withdraw any form of recognition of the laws, orders, policies, and other political processes of dictatorship that have been wrought since October 17, 1972. Build various forms of solidarity among the people to struggle for the restoration of democracy in South Korea.
- 2) To the Christians in Korea: As preparation for the above struggle, we Christians should renew our churches by deepening our theological thinking, by our clear stance and solidarity with the oppressed and poor, by the relevant proclamation of the gospel of the Messianic Kingdom, and by praying for our nation; and we should prepare ourselves for martyrdom, if necessary, as our forefathers did.
- 3) To the Christians of the world: Most of all we need your prayers and solidarity, and we ask you to express our common bond through actions of encouragement and support.

C O N C L U S I O N

Jesus the Messiah, our Lord, lived and dwelt among the oppressed, poverty-stricken, and sick in Judea. He boldly stood in confrontation with Pontius Pilate, a representative of the Roman Empire, and he was crucified in the course of his witness to the truth. He has risen from the dead to release the power of transformation which sets the people free.

We resolve that we will follow the footsteps of our Lord, living among our oppressed and poor people, standing against political oppression, and participating in the transformation of history, for this is the only way to the Messianic Kingdom.

* * * * *

KRA CANAL In Whose Interest?

by Kenneth O'Hara

"The Kra Canal project has been a dream of Man for the last two centuries; it is the largest achievement men will make in this century."

It is true that the Kra Canal project has a long history, one deeply tied to the competing imperial interests of the British and the French, but is the arrogance and ambition of this ranking official of the Nissho-Iwai Company in this statement justified? Who is "Man" and if the project is put into operation, who will benefit?

The first concrete step toward building the Kra Canal was taken in 1843 when two British engineers were given permission to survey the Isthmus of Kra, and since then the project was revived or ignored in cycles paralleling the cycles of rivalry between the English and the French up until the end of the Second World War. The traditional position of the British was that the Malay Peninsula up to the Gulf of Thailand was of great importance to them, and that they would brook no interference by a third power in the area. Consequently, the British were willing to accept the Canal only under the condition that it and the adjoining territory would come directly under British sovereignty.

The Thai government found this condition unacceptable and the French, with vital interests in the project because it would assure them of quicker access to their colonies in Indochina and to China, played along with the Thais. The last scene of this colonial rivalry was played out in 1946 when the Southeast Asian Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten imposed a punitive Formal Agreement upon the Thai government because of Thai collaboration with Japan during the War. Article 5 of the Agreement stipulated that "Thailand shall not cut a canal between the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam on its own territory without the permission of the Great Powers."



This was the modern nadir of the project. Two years later, however, the Thais succeeded in throwing off this restriction when they paid England £5,224,220 in war penalties.

The revival of this old imperial project has assumed a typically neo-colonialist form, with multinational corporations from many nations working in a united front so as to minimize international rivalries.

The primary impetus for the plan today is Japan's efforts to secure its oil lifeline from the Middle East, whence come some 80% of Japan's crude, and to hold down costs. There is a continuing dread in Japan that someday soon huge crude tankers of over 200,000 deadweight tons may eventually be barred from the Straits of Malacca. Hence, Japanese business is doubly interested in the Kra Canal project, because not only might it cut the costs of transport, but it will give them an additional weapon to hang over the head of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments in future bargaining sessions.

A third reason for Japanese interest in the project lies in the possibilities it offers for establishing new petrochemical complexes in Thailand. On the one hand, oil consumption in Thailand is expected to increase rapidly in the near future. To meet this anticipated demand, an international group is constructing a large petrochemical combine near Bangkok, scheduled to begin production in 1976. It is sponsored by Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests, Shell, and K.Y. Chow's Thai Oil Refinery Co. On the other hand, because of high land and labor costs in Japan itself, and because of public awareness of pollution, further expansion of the petrochemical industry here is increasingly difficult. Hence the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) now openly advocates the export of pollution by constructing refineries somewhere between the Middle East and Japan. Japanese industrialists are now scouring the whole

Proposed Site For KRA Canal



area of Southeast Asia for suitable sites. At present Singapore is the most advantageous site, but because a canal across the Kra isthmus will transfer the stream of oil and put Thailand in the spotlight, the bourgeois militarist government in Bangkok is deeply interested in the project.

Naturally, the United States cannot stand aside to allow Japanese hegemony in the region to develop this far! A Kra canal will serve to strengthen the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whether stationed in Yokosuka near Tokyo or at Subic Bay, the Philippines, by cutting three days off the time needed for reaching the Indian Ocean and by enabling the navy to bypass the sensitive Malacca Straits.

A colossal international consortium of American, European, Japanese and Thai interests is behind the present revival of the project, in this planning stage. On the American side, under the umbrella of Ling-Temco-Vought, there are four major institutions: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) of the University of California, under associate director Edward Teller ("father" of hydrogen bomb); Robert R. Nathan Associates Inc. (RRNA); the Hudson Institute under Herman Kahn; and Tippets-Abbot-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS) of New York. LLL is a research combine of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and the Livermore Radiation Laboratory, both maintaining a multi-million-dollar laboratory in Mercury, Nev., adjacent to the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Test Site where underground nuclear tests are conducted. LLL alone supports a staff of 3,150 scientists and technicians, and the combined operating expenditures of the two parent institutes amount to a staggering \$151 million annually -- a figure greater than the total budget of all colleges and universities in America. With this capacity and accumulation of experience, Teller is to study the possibility of using nuclear energy to blast the Canal. Hudson's "futurologist" Kahn is assigned to forecast the economic, political and social implications of the project. Nathan is to study economic feasibility, while TAMS is serving as engineering consultant.

The European group includes: Cie Industrielle de Travaux (CITRA), subsidiary of the French Schnieder Group; the Dutch Interbeton NV, subsidiary of the Hollandsche Beton Groep (HBG); Taylor Woodrow Ltd., international building and contracting

firm, Britain; Hochtief AG, West Germany; and Impregilo, Italy in which Impresit of the giant Fiat combine has a minority interest.

The Thai group, led by K.Y. Chow, the most persistent advocate of the Canal, is in itself of international composition, with Royal Dutch Shell in Thai Oil Company (TOC) in equal partnership with Chow. General Edwin F. Black, a retired military officer of US Military Advisory Group, Thailand, is "Thai coordinator, Kra Canal Project." Another unique feature of the Thai group is that it includes a number of higher echelon ministers of the Thai government such as Pote Sarasin, Former Prime Minister, or Malai Huvanandana, Deputy Minister of Interior.

The Japanese group at present seems to be under sole control of Nissho-Iwai Co., one of the major trading firms of Japan; it has invited minor participation from Tokyo Tanker and Maruzen Oil Co. It is important to note that Nissho-Iwai is also toying with a plan to build an oil depot/industrial complex on the Indonesian island of Batam, offshore from Singapore. The Japanese firm is in close cooperation with the giant San Francisco-based construction company, Bechtel Corp. and Pertamina, a state-owned oil company of Indonesia. The first phase of the Batam project includes the construction of an oil refinery, utility plant, metal fabricating plant, petrochemical plant, free trade zone, tourist accommodations, cattle raising and truck farming projects, and other infrastructure facilities. Overall capital outlay is estimated at \$600 million, and about 12,500 production and transport workers would be employed at the complex with the total labor force reaching 40,000. Thus, the multinational enterprises of Japan maneuver to stir up an international competition between Indonesia and Thailand.

In mid-July, 1973, the Kra Canal project came a step nearer to birth in a large Tokyo conference. Sponsored by LTV, CITRA, and Nissho-Iwai, the conference attracted some forty participants from Thailand, U.S.A., France, Holland, and Japan mainly to examine the result of a feasibility study started in January, 1973. (A list of participants is added below.) Quoting K.Y. Chow, it was reported that feasibility was proved, and that a 600-page report would be submitted to Thai authorities in September for further study.

"Plowshare"?

One major subject of discussion was the advisability of using nuclear explosives. The cost of the complete Kra canal scheme, according to Chow, would be between \$3 billion and \$6 billion. As much as two-thirds of the total would be interest. The cost of borrowed money makes atomic energy attractive. Businessmen estimate that with atomic energy the canal would take only six years to build and cost the lower estimate. If, on the other hand, conventional means were used, it would take twelve years and cost US \$6 billion, and that would require at least 20 years of operation to pay for it. The plan to use nuclear energy has met with severe criticisms from various sources. Nitipat Jalichan, secretary-general of the National Energy Authority (NEA) of Thailand, which is in charge of planning, said the blasts would contaminate over 4,600 sq. miles of land and would cause about 1 million people to be evacuated. (See Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1973)

Chow's dream and the appetite of multinational enterprises of U.S.A., Japan, and Europe, involve more than just saving transportation costs. Chow is thinking not only of a canal, but of ports and of refinery complexes at both ends, with feeder services to shallow Asian ports such as Dacca. Chow is even talking eventually of a free trade zone in the

area. The Thai government also decided that it will retain legal control of the canal and port complex, which is to be owned by a separate Thai public company. Shipping tolls would therefore accrue to Thailand, providing, as the Bangkok Bank Monthly Review gushed last year, "a short-cut to national wealth."

In order to secure financing for the project, some 20 American, European and Japanese banks have been approached to form an international consortium. Five Japanese banks are said to have been sounded out. The U.S. Export-Import Bank was reported already last summer to have shown "positive interest" in partially financing the preliminary study of the project. K.Y. Chow had discussed the project with Eximbank President Henry Kearns at that time. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other multinational institutions are also expected to join the project.

It is significant that the only information available on the Kra Canal project comes from fragments of actions by multinational enterprises, and the words of a handful of ruling elites or government-oriented technocrats. No voices have yet been heard from the people of Japan, the United States, and Europe.

Just whose dream is the Kra canal? Mankind's? Or a handful of powerful capitalists'? ■ ■

KRA JOINT ECONOMIC & TECHNICAL REVIEW MEETING

10th - 12th JULY 1973

TOKYO

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Attendants from U.S.A.

1. Prof. Edward Teller
2. Prof. Willard Libby
3. Mr. Fred Holtzer
4. Mr. Wilson V. Binger
5. Mr. Horace A. Johnson
6. Mr. Robert R. Nathan

-Livermore, California
-University of California
-LLL, Livermore, California
-TAMS, N.Y.
-TAMS, N.Y.
-RRNA, Washington D.C.

7. Mr. Jerome Jacobson
8. Mr. Ralph Dorman
9. Mr. F. Nolting
10. Mr. A.T. Downey
11. Mr. Gordon Calver

-RRNA, Washington D.C.
 -BECHTEL Corp.
 -Former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam
 -Counsel
 -Lehman Bros. (From Tokyo Office)

Attendants from Europe

1. Mr. A. AuPrince
2. Mr. R. Richard
3. Dr. Ir. H. Hoog
4. Prof. Ir. P. Ph. Jansen
5. Dr. H. L. Beth
6. Mr. H. Jeandet

-CITRA, Paris
 -CITRA, Paris
 -Consultant Engineer, The Hague
 -Consultant Engineer, The Hague
 -Consultant Engineer, Bremen
 -Former Advisor to European Investment Bank

Attendants - Thailand

1. H.E. Pote Sarasin
2. H.E. Dr. Malai Huvanandana
3. H.E. Fr. Boonrod Binson
4. Dr. Svasti Srisukh
5. Mr. Paul Sithi-Amnuai
6. Mr. Kanung Luchai
7. Mr. Theh Chongkhadikij
8. Gen. Edwin F. Black
9. Mr. I.S. Nadler
10. Mr. K.Y. Chow
11. H.E. Suphot Phiansunthon
12. Mr. Amoraksa Huvanandana

-Former Prime Minister Present, Advisor to Prime Minister
 -Deputy Minister of Interior
 -Minister of State Universities
 -Secretary General, Office of Atomic Energy for Peace
 -Special Advisor
 -Public Prosecutor
 -Editor, Bangkok Post
 -Coordinator, KRA Canal Project
 -Managing Director Thai Petrochemical Co., Ltd.
 -T.O.R.C.
 -Thai Ambassador in Japan
 -Secretary to H.E. Malai

Attendants - Japan

1. Dr. Aki Kooichi
2. Prof. Dr. Kakihana Hidetake
3. Mr. Kaifu Hachiro
4. Dr. Sato Hajime
5. Mr. Tsuboi Gengoh
6. Mr. James S. Kagami
7. Mr. Yura Keiji
8. Mr. Watanabe Makoto
9. Dr. Iijima Sadakazu
10. Mr. Takahashi Yuzo

-Professor at Takushoku University and Advisor to the Prime Minister on Regional Development
 -Director, Research Laboratory of Nuclear Reactor Tokyo Institute of Technology
 -Senior Managing Director Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd.
 -Director General of The Japan Port & Harbour Association
 -President of Tokyo Tanker Co., Ltd.
 -Director of Tokyo Tanker Co., Ltd.
 -Assistant General Manager
 -Vice-President, The Shoko Chukin Bank. (The Central Bank for Commercial & Industrial Co-Operations)
 -Executive Director Japan Industrial Location Center
 -Assistant Chief Project General Office Machinery Div. Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd.

NIPPON KOEI

Engineering Colonialism

From Korea to Vietnam

by Shimizu Tomohisa

Seoul, 1945.

Disguising himself as a sick 55 year-old businessman, he disappeared in a crowd of patients being repatriated to Japan. He feared being charged as a war criminal by the Koreans who had just freed themselves from Japanese colonialism. His escape plan worked: Kubota Yutaka arrived safely in his homeland.

After returning home, Kubota set up a small civil engineering consultant company with some of his former colleagues in Korea. In June 1946 he reorganized his business into the Nippon Koei Company capitalized at one million yen. The company was small, even in the context of the shattered Japanese economy. In the "good old days," Kubota had been President of the billion-yen Yalu River Electric Power Company. He had attained the presidency through nearly 20 years of devoted service to his boss, Noguchi Jun, head of the Noguchi Nihon Chisso Konzern.

In 1925 Noguchi's Nihon Chisso Hiryo (Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, predecessor of Chisso Corporation which has become notorious for causing the fatal Minamata Disease), began colonial penetration of Korea by building a hydroelectric power plant at Pujonggang. Kubota, then a young ambitious civil engineer, was appointed deputy director of the engineering department. As Noguchi's empire expanded to become the biggest industrial complex in Korea, Kubota played a key role in constructing new plants, especially the gigantic 700,000 Kw. Yalu (Su-phung) Hydroelectric Plant, at that time the largest water power plant in the world. After Noguchi's death in 1941 Kubota succeeded him as president of the Yalu plant.

Kubota's role in the construction of power plants meant that he also played a crucial role in the destruction of Korean life. As the Korean Democratic Jurists Association justly charged after the war: "In constructing the Chang-jin and Su-phung Power Plants, Japanese imperialists prepared death rolls for several hundred thousand Korean workers and then drove them to their death at the construction sites." No wonder that Kubota had to slink out of Korea in disguise.

Kubota committed similar crimes in China's Hainan Island. In 1940, soon after Japan's military occupation of the Island, Kubota joined Noguchi to exploit the iron mines. According to his biography published in 1966, he still complains that the Hainan people had not worked as hard as the Koreans in spite of his "encouragement." While in Hainan, Noguchi and Kubota became attracted by the great potential of Vietnam--for Japanese profiteers. Again they followed the gun and sword. Japanese occupation of French Indochina started in September 1940. By early 1941 Kubota had entered Vietnam to explore the mines and water power sites.



Noguchi's death that year led Kubota to devote himself to the Korean business. But both his own early exploration and his contact with Matsushita Mitsuhiro of the Dainang Company later proved invaluable for his postwar penetration into South Vietnam.

Although Kubota's Nippon Koei had engineers with abundant experience in colonial development, it was still a small consulting firm. Then came the Korean War. The American Military's GHQ commissioned Nippon Koei to prepare a report on reconstruction of the war-damaged Su-phung Power Plant. This was the very plant Kubota had designed and constructed a decade earlier. Nippon Koei's mission to Korea became the first officially approved foreign venture by occupied Japan and a milestone on the road to Japan's re-expansion in Korea.

The counter-offensive by Korean forces deprived the mission of the opportunity to do substantial work, but Kubota was greatly encouraged. The experience re-confirmed that the high road to profits lay in following the path blazed by the military, in this case by American armed might.

Following the Korean War Kubota recalled his experience in Vietnam. For such a hyena, South Vietnam under U.S. domination provided the perfect bait. He visited Saigon in 1955 and met Ngo Dinh Diem through the assistance of Matsushita. Kubota persuaded him to place an order with Nippon Koei for the Danhim Power Plant, and he was shortly appointed advisor to the puppet dictator.


This was the period when the Yoshida government was considering paying reparations to Asian countries who had suffered

under the Japanese imperial yoke. Kubota hustled to persuade hesitant politicians and businessmen of the bonanza that reparations could bring in terms of Japanese penetration of Southeast Asia. In his biography, Kubota proudly recalls his success in persuading Prime Minister Yoshida of the need for "generous" reparations.

The year 1959 marked Japan's serious commitment to the division of Vietnam in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, and its all out support for U.S. aggression in South Vietnam. In September 1959 Prime Minister Kishi concluded a reparation agreement with the Saigon regime. (It should be noted that Kishi was himself among the top bureaucrats in Manchukuo who had encouraged Noguchi and Kubota to build the Yalu Plant.) Despite strong opposition in and out of the Diet, Kishi forcefully succeeded in ratifying the Agreement. Japan agreed to provide Saigon with U.S.\$46.5 million, of which \$39 million was reparation and \$7.5 million was in loans.

Benefiting from the reparations, Japanese corporations quickly began to penetrate the Vietnamese economy. Nippon Koei once again was in the lead. The Danhim Power Plant, designed by Nippon Koei was designated the top priority for use of the reparation payments. Construction started in 1960 and continued as the U.S. escalated the war. Moreover, this was only the first of a number of lucrative Nippon Koei projects in South Vietnam. (See Table I)

A suggestive episode occurred in 1965. A Nippon Koei engineer, Saito Riichiro felt his life threatened while working on an irrigation project at Phanrang. The site was the target of one of the NLF's fiercest attacks. In April, in fact, four Nippon Koei engineers were arrested by the NLF and detained for 20 days. Saito has good reason for fear. In June he asked to be sent home, but was ordered to remain in Saigon. Ignoring the order, he returned to Tokyo, and immediately received a disciplinary dismissal. In November when he learned that a Hazamagumi Construction Company engineer had been killed by a stray bullet, Saito appealed to the Tokyo Civil Court requesting nullification of his dismissal. Responding to Saito's appeal, Nippon Koei's director of foreign business de-



clared: "Saito insists it's very dangerous to work in South Vietnam, but the fact is that there are many Japanese and they are working safely. If you say danger, Tokyo is full of dangers. For example, one may be shot to death by a madman carrying a rifle as happened recently. In Vietnam, we pay greater regard to the security of our men. At dangerous sites our men work under military protection. Most important, each employee must take maximum care of himself."

Japanese business interests never proclaim that "war is the most profitable business;" they simply pocket their immense war profits in silence. For them, U.S. escalation in Vietnam was a godsend. As Tables II and III clearly indicate, those "hyenas" expanded markets and accumulated profits, just as they had during the Korean War, through "Special Procurements": (1) The sharp increase in "Special Procurements" by U.S. forces; (2) The increase in U.S. civilian demand for Japanese imports as many American industries shift to production of military supplies; (3) The increase in demand for Japanese goods by Asian countries saturated with expanded U.S. aid. The more dollars the U.S. pumped into Asia, the richer the profits for Japanese "hyenas." By 1968, Japan had greatly improved its balance of payments and accumulated substantial capital. It was now prepared to launch large scale investment in Asia.

In the past two years Nippon Koei launched two important programs. One is the planning for a Southeast Asian College of Engineering to be located at Dalat, South Vietnam. Saigon is anxious to establish the College to train Vietnamese engineers for developing the Mekong River Basin and to train other Southeast Asians who can cooperate in Saigon's regional development plans. The idea was approved in 1972 at the Seventh Southeast Asian Ministerial Meeting for Economic Development. Saigon then requested Nippon Koei to draw up plans for the project. Nippon Koei submitted its report to the Ministerial Meeting and, according to its spokesman, the plan was praised and a further study requested. The report calls for a College with 10 engineering departments ranging from civil to nuclear engineering, with 2,120 students. The college remains a vision at this writing, but if built as Nippon Koei plans, it will provide a foundation on which Nippon

Koei and Japanese business in general can dominate the future of engineering in South Vietnam.

But Nippon Koei has more ambitious plans for penetration of South Vietnam. It is actively promoting the Cam Ranh Bay Area Industrial Center, a gigantic industrial complex including oil refineries, fertilizer and pulp production plants, etc. Partners in the Cam Ranh project are Mitsui, a giant trading company which has been a leader in Japan's overseas expansion, and the Nihon Industrial Location Center, an enterprise notorious for generation of pollution in Japan. A reported U.S.\$300 million is to be invested in the Cam Ranh project where the U.S. military has already developed a vast harbor facility. It is also reported that there will be abundant electric power for the proposed Center since Kubota and Nippon Koei have already prepared wisely for future needs. It is worth recalling that the new Cam Ranh project is nothing but the enlarged realization of what Kubota planned as early as 1963, and that the Bay has in fact been the target of Japanese imperialists since the early Twentieth Century.

When the Paris Agreement was concluded in January 1973, Kubota demanded that the Japanese government act decisively to insure further penetration into South Vietnam. "Now is not the time," he declared, "to refrain from action on Vietnam. Prompt decision and determined action is most important."

There are many who believe that Japanese imperialism was buried in 1945. However, Kubota's 50 year career shows that it has not died. It only slumbered briefly. The imperialist impulse continues to thrive in Japan today. Kubota is no exception. ■ ■




Table I : Some of Nippon Koei's
Undertakings in South Vietnam

Projects	NK's Undertakings	Year
Danhim Integrated Hydroelectric Power Development	Planning, design, construction management of an earth dam (38m. high and 1,640 m. long) and a power plant (capacity 160,000 kw)	1960-64
Danhim Water Power Plant	Survey and planning of a power plant (capacity 160,000 kw) and irrigation	1963-65
Phan rang Irrigation	Survey, planning, design and construction management of irrigation (30,000 ha.)	1963-65
Cam Ranh Industrial Center	Survey and preliminary design	1964-65

Source: Nippon Koei, Business Report, 1967

Table II : Japan's Estimated Income
from Vietnam War Procurements

Year	Amount (in million dollars)
1965	83
1966	445
1967	836
1968	1,064
1969	1,258
1970	1,098
1971	938
1972	847


Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry Statistics. For further details, see AMPO, No.16, p.14.

Table III: Japan's Trade with South Vietnam
(in thousand dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports
1964	34,077	6,743
1965	36,656	6,542
1966	138,086	5,386
1967	174,586	4,576
1968	198,963	2,719
1969	223,156	3,309
1970	146,073	4,554
1971	149,370	4,190
1972	104,673	13,839

Source: Ministry of Finance Customs Statistics

(Illustration by Toi Jugatsu)



Fishermen's Armada

(continued from P.47)

men is going to become even more serious in the future. Once we take it that we have only our own strength to depend on, and that there is no legal or political goodwill that can be depended on, then it is inevitable that the fishermen's struggle will become more fierce."

Events in the three years since then have developed in just the way this "Fishermen's News" suggested. ■

EXPORTING POLLUTION Asahi Glass in Thailand

by Inoue Sumio

The overseas expansion of Japanese enterprise not only destroys local economies, but everywhere produces environmental destruction. To corner timber, Japanese companies bought up whole mountains in the Philippines and recklessly laid them bare. They colored the seas yellow with the residues from copper mining. After ravaging the forests of the Philippines, foreign companies began destroying Indonesian forests in the same way. The result was ruinous floods. In the Malacca Straits, Japanese tankers are illegally disposing oil wastes, thereby destroying the livelihood of the Malay fishermen.

Despite such atrocities, protest by the victims of Japan's environmental destruction in Southeast Asia has been muted. In part this is because the region's natural heritage remains rich -- despite the pollution that has already taken place. But it is also because Southeast Asian governments, which rely on Japanese "aid" for their survival, have suppressed public criticism of Japanese pollution export. For example, immediately after the movement against Japanese capital burst forth in Thailand last November, Indonesian students discussed a similar movement. They were quickly thwarted by the Suharto government. This year, the Razak government prohibited the joint Student Council Union of Malaya University and Penang Science University, which published an anti-Japanese statement in Malaysia, from all association with the Thai student movement.

Since August 7th, Siam Rat, a Bangkok newspaper, has reported extensively on the river pollution caused by a Japanese-Thai joint enterprise. The enterprise is the Thai Asahi Caustic Soda Co. (TACS), Ltd. a subsidiary of the Asahi Glass Co. of Japan (head office, Marunouchi Tokyo; capital, 28.8 billion yen), a member of

the Mitsubishi group. Capital of the joint enterprise is 21 million Bhat (investment ratio: Asahi Glass 49%, group of Thai capitalists 51%). It manufactures caustic soda and chlorine products. The head office is in Bangkok, while the factory is located by the side of the Chao Phraya River, 27 kilometers from Bangkok. The Chao Phraya River, which flows through Thailand from north to south, is the country's largest river. It provides the people living along the river with abundant water for rice cultivation.

Rice-growing farmers along the river complained to the Ministry of Industry that the TACS factory was destroying their crop by discharging wastes into the river. The Ministry of Industry initiated an investigation in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Sanitation. By early September two points had been firmly established:

1. Caustic soda solution had been discharged into the Chao Phraya, completely destroying young rice plants in fields irrigated by the river.

2. Seven months earlier, two neutralization tanks which produce hydrochloric acid had exploded. The company simply discharged all the leftover chlorine into the river for six months until this was exposed in the press.

On the first point, the Ministry of Industry declared that farmers who suffered damages could seek indemnities by negotiating directly with the factory. On the second point, the Ministry ordered immediate repair of the tanks which were polluting the river and a decrease in production pending completion of the repairs. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun of August 31st said that although there was a movement against "the endless discharge of

pollution" by Japanese firms advancing overseas, this was the first time that a host government imposed direct restriction. It ran the story under the headline: "No More Pollution Imports, Thank You -- Recipient Countries Awakening." Thus Japan's export of pollution has progressed to the point where even the Thai government, which has been endlessly conciliatory to Japanese capital (35% of total foreign investment is of Japanese origin), could not ignore the voices of Thai victims.

Moreover, TACS is not only discharging caustic soda and hydrochloric acid. It is well known that mercury is used in the production of caustic soda. The *Siam Rat*, familiar with mercury pollution in Japan, started a campaign "No More Minamata Tragedies."

At nearly the same time, fishermen in Chiba prefecture, Japan, launched an ocean-front fishing boat blockade of companies which were polluting the Tokyo Bay; Asahi Glass was among the blockaded companies. The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* of August 17th reported that a maximum of 91.04 ppm of mercury was detected in the sea in front of the Asahi Glass plant and that Chiba prefectural government was going to order the company to dredge the accumulated sludge in the area.


The Thai Ministry of Industry is continuing its investigation of the mercury discharge. The investigation, however, has been hampered by company interference such as stopping its discharge of waste fluid on days of investigation. Mr. Yamada, director of the factory, remarked that it was really troublesome that people confused the inorganic mercury which the factory discharges with organic mercury, which causes Minamata disease. Even if the discharged mercury is inorganic, however, it is transformed into organic mercury when it enters a biological system such as in fish. This fact has been demonstrated at the Minamata trial in Japan. Director Yamada's explanation is a vicious subterfuge which attempts to take advantage of the Thai people's lack of knowledge about pollution. Moreover, 50 to 80% of the mercury detected in the sea in front of the Asahi Glass Chiba plant was organic mercury, which makes the comment of managing director Yamada a blatant lie.



The *Asahi Shimbun* reported that on August 25th Thailand's Ministry of Industry declared that if it is proved that the factory's waste is dangerous for human beings and plants, the factory might be ordered to close temporarily. Thai concern about environmental problems is clearly on the rise. For five days, from August 26th to 30th, an exhibition on environmental problems was held at the University of Bangkok. The exhibition, jointly sponsored by the environmental clubs of four universities, dealt with the harm caused by drugs in Thailand, the great differentials between the rich and the poor, and the waste discharge of paper-pulp factories, and also devoted considerable space to pollution in Japan. It also raised doubts about the environmental impact of Japan's plan to construct a new dam on the Kwai River. During the exhibition, lectures explored environmental protection and the government's role in the conservation of the environment. Staff members of the Ministries of Industry and Public Sanitation attended the lectures and saw the English version of the Japanese film, "Minamata -- The Patients and Their World." The liberation broadcasting "Voice of the Thai People" also roundly criticized Japan's pollution export.

Informed about this problem directly by the Thai people, we decided to hold a demonstration at the Asahi Glass Co., parent company of the Thai company. One hundred fifty demonstrators protested at the head office of Asahi Glass, in Tokyo on September 14th. The demonstration, which brought together activists from the anti-war, anti-pollution and labor movements was the first action taken by Japanese people against the export of pollution. Since Japan's economic expansion has become worldwide and the scale of pollution-export is increasing correspondingly, our efforts to counter it must be guided accordingly. Together with the Thai people we will fight against Asahi Glass. And this is the first step toward building an international pollution-control organization of the people to take countermeasures against Japanese enterprises which cause pollution. The realization of this plan depends on receiving such information from other parts of Asia. But the demonstration at Asahi Glass marks the start of this movement.*

*Information about pollution caused by Japanese overseas industry or requests for further information will be welcomed by the AMPO staff. ■ ■




This figure was taken from *Gijyutu to Ningen* (Technology and Man), Fall, 1973.

Caustic Soda Plants: MERCURY POLLUTION OF JAPAN

Productive capacities of caustic soda plants employing "mercury" method; as of the end of 1971.

(Unit: tons per month)



N.B.: Between 53.4 and 208 grams of mercury--an average of 140-150 grams of mercury--are produced for each ton of caustic soda. See the accompanying figure.

This map was taken from *Gijutsu to Ningen* (Technology and Man), Fall, 1973.

FISHERMEN'S ARMADA Polluting Companies Blockaded

by Masuo Ueda

Most Japanese were greatly shocked when they looked at their newspapers on the morning of June 25th. Emblazoned across the top of page one was an announcement from the Welfare Ministry of fixed limits on the amount of fish a person could eat in a week without damaging his health. The Welfare Ministry calculation of safety limits was based on the volume of mercury accumulated in the fish's body. It is well known that fish is an important source of protein in the daily diet of the Japanese. Short of an extreme food shortage, as in wartime, it seemed inconceivable that the Government could impose such a clear limitation on the staple food of the people.

Why did the Welfare Ministry choose this time for its announcement? The answer is this. From May this year, along the shores of the Ariake Sea and Tokuyama Bay in Yamaguchi Prefecture at the southern part of the main island of Japan, where people eat large quantities of fish, a number of cases have occurred of people suffering from a disease with symptoms very like Minamata disease. Minamata is a disease in which life is destroyed by industrial waste mercury which is absorbed and accumulated in the body from the fish and shellfish which one eats. If these victims from the shores of the Ariake Sea and Tokuyama Bay are suffering from true mercury poisoning it means the disease has struck for the third and fourth time in Japan, following the outbreaks in Kumamoto and Niigata Prefectures. Not only that, but factories in many other places in Japan use mercury in the manufacturing process, and mercury has been detected in the seawater or in the bodies of fish in many districts. It is clear that in the future further new outbreaks of mercury poisoning will occur.

Faced with this appalling situation the announcement of restrictions on fish consumption was the Government's desperate counter-measure. Needless to say, it was

merely an emergency measure rather than a fundamental solution to the problem. Japan's coastal seas are virtually all more or less polluted. Not only is it technically impossible to make them clean again, but it lies beyond the capacity of the government to dissolve the social and political malaise resulting from its restrictions on fish consumption. Above all, the government has neither the inclination nor the ability to order factories which continue to emit various industrial wastes to suspend operations. The polluting factories continue their operations as before, paying no heed to the suffering of the people.

Scientifically speaking, the criteria used by the government as a basis for assessing the danger level in polluted fish were extremely vague. The most reliable criticism of the government's standards is that at present there is no scientific basis by which safety standards may be calculated. Throughout the world, scientific research on the effects on the human body of minute accumulations of heavy metals and chemical synthetic substances is in its infancy. Moreover, as a result of public criticism, the Welfare Ministry quickly went through the humbuggery of relaxing its own standards, and then, a few days later, abolished completely its so-called "fish consumption restrictions."

Did the Welfare Ministry's lifting of these restrictions mean that fish caught along the Japanese coast were safe for consumption? Far from it. Quite the opposite is the case. It is already no secret that fish caught along the Japanese coast and in nearby seas are polluted with heavy metals and chemical synthetic substances, including mercury and PCB. It is also clear that the reason for this pollution is to be found in the waste products discharged from the heavy and chemical industrial areas lining the Japanese coast. If the government was to conduct the most thorough investiga-


to questions. She was slightly tired after 18 days in jail and preparations for her defense, and she

tion, and fix maximum safety standards for fish consumption in accordance with that investigation, nearly all the fish caught in Japan's coastal waters and nearby seas would have to disappear from the Japanese dinner table. The government is afraid of the social and political confusion that would be likely to result from such a step.

It is of course the coastal fishermen who suffer the most from pollution of the seas. For example, most Minamata disease victims, suffering from mercury poisoning, were small scale fishermen, accustomed to eating lots of fish. As a result of having eaten much fish the health and sometimes the lives of these fishermen, were sacrificed. Not only that, but through the reclamation of land to set up factories, and through pollution of the water by wastes discharged from the factories, they lost their fishing grounds as well. Furthermore, even if the fishing industry can carry on, in cases where the fish have a strange smell due to waste products from factories, or where fish are found

in which the accumulation of harmful substances exceeds national standards, the transport to market of the catch is stopped. In other words, the fishermen are deprived of their means of livelihood.

Pushed into this desperate plight, it is only natural that the fishermen should stand up to protest against the polluting enterprises, and against the government that protects them. This June the fishermen of Niihama in Ehime Prefecture in Shikoku, in protest against pollution of the seas by mercury from the Sumitomo Chemical Factory, blockaded Niihama port with flotillas of fishing boats. For three days they completely barred all ships carrying raw materials or water to the factory, or finished products from it. At around the same time the big industrial belt at Mizushima in Okayama Prefecture facing the Inland Sea was blockaded by flotillas of fishing boats. The three factories which had been using and discharging mercury in the greatest quantities were forced to suspend operations for three days. In today's Japan it is unthinkable



that a factory should suspend operations save in the case of unexpected disaster, a strike, or regular holidays. It is a reflection of the seriousness of the pollution situation that such a step should have to be taken because of the direct action of fishermen from outside.

The Inland Sea lies between the western half of the main island of Japan and Shikoku island. From ancient times the beauty of its natural scenery was sung about, and it was a treasurehouse of fish. However, over the past ten years or so, big businesses, taking note of the convenience of transport of raw materials or finished goods, of the sales market and the labour power available there, have moved one after the other into the coastal strip on both sides of the inland sea. Today a string of factories stretches around it in an unbroken line. The industrial wastes discharged day and night by these factories are polluting the Inland Sea, polluting the air in the vicinity of the factories, causing fine dust to fall like rain on thickly populated areas nearby, and destroying the health of the people. People say: "Now the Inland Sea has become just a drain for waste from the factories." They do not exaggerate.

In the summer of this year this writer paid a visit to the fishing people of Iejima, Hyogo Prefecture, in the Inland Sea. On this island they breed the high quality "hamachi" (yellowtail) and boast of being Japan's number one producer of the fish. Last summer several million "hamachi" died as a result of an abnormal "red tide." The financial losses suffered by the fishermen as a result were enormous. "Red tides" have occurred time and again in many areas of the Inland Sea in recent years. They are caused by the excessive enrichment of the sea water due to the inflow of artificial substances, above all factory waste.

The blows suffered by the fishermen of Iejima did not end there. This June the price of fish caught in the Harima Strait area, which includes Iejima, fell drastically when PCB levels exceeding the standards fixed by the Government were found in fish caught about 30 kilometers from Iejima. One old fisherman the writer met in Iejima complained: "It was terrible. We were quite unable to see any future for the fishing industry of Iejima. Young fishermen lost the

will to work and fell into a state of apathy."

However they were not just wringing their hands. Seven years ago, when Idemitsu Petroleum planned to construct a petrochemical factory on Shikama Bay on the coast opposite Iejima, the fishermen of Iejima waged a stubborn campaign, eventually storming into the site at the time of the ceremony to mark commencement of construction work and achieved a complete stoppage in the construction plan. (As a result of their forceful struggle, Idemitsu moved to Chiba and built in Shikama only an oil storage depot, which was but a small part of what they had planned.) The demands which leaders of the Iejima fishermen recently thrust at the Governor of Hyogo Prefecture contained the following uncompromising items:

1. Call a complete halt to the discharge into the Harima Strait of all effluents from factories facing the Strait.
2. Stop effluents from the factories of Osaka Bay and the industrial belt of Mizushima from flowing into the Harima Strait.
3. Get rid of the muck that is polluting the sea and restore the environment of the fishing grounds to what it was 50 years ago.
4. Close at once the factories of Kanegafuchi Chemicals and Mitsubishi Paper which are the cause of the pollution of Takasago, and make them repent.
5. Close all factories along the coast of the Inland Sea.
6. Stop the fishing industry in the Inland Sea for a period of five years. (In other words, forbid the catching of polluted fish.)
7. Let there never ever be land reclaimed for factory sites along the coast of the Inland Sea in the future.
8. Let there be an absolute stop to the construction of factories along the coast of the Inland Sea.

These demands are certainly not just the self-conceit of the fishermen of Iejima only. They are demands common

to the fishermen of the Inland Sea coast as a whole. The fishermen of Iejima, like the fishermen of other districts, are waiting for the time to ripen to battle for the implementation of all or part of their demands.

In the summer of this year, there was a simultaneous outbreak of disturbances in which fishermen in various parts of Japan took action by force to blockade bays and harbors, lay siege to factories, block up factory drainage outlets, conduct sit-ins in front of factories and stop operations in factories. This fishermen's rising was in flat opposition to the established view of fishermen as a conservative class - itself a conservative view. Quickest to experience a shiver of fear, and to give voice to their fear, after this direct action by the fishermen, were none other than the defenders of the capitalist system. For example, Kuraishi Tadao, Chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party's Policy Board, prophesied: "If a forest of fishermen's flags were to be unfurled now along the Japanese coast, they would soon turn into red flags." (The "tairyoki," the flag which used to be unfurled on returning to port with a good catch, has become the banner of the fishermen's struggle.) In other words, Kuraishi was afraid that the fishermen, who had hitherto been seen as one of the pillars of conservative control, would, under the impact of industrial pollution, become antiauthority, left-wing, radicalized and openly involved as a wing of the forces opposing the capitalist system.


To deal with this, the Government and ruling party simultaneously threatened the use of police force, on the grounds that direct action by the fishermen was a violation of the laws controlling sea traffic and use of port and harbor facilities, and they strove to wind up the struggles quickly by softening up the conservative upper strata of the pyramid-shaped fishermen's organization by buying them off or making concessions. It is a fact that this attack by means of candy and whip had a certain efficacy in calming the fierce flames of the fishermen's struggle.

There have, however, been cases in which the fishermen have been triumphant. At Saganoseki, in Oita Prefecture, in the southern island of Kyushu, the official "Fishermen's Association" had been for 40 years in the hands of a leader-

ship acquiescent to the demands of capital, even to the point of secretly promoting the "New Industrial Towns" plan in the area. Two years ago, 400 men broke away to form an "Association of Fishermen Comrades" to resist this leadership. From June 24th to 28th of this year they carried out a blockade of Nihon Seikojo's copper refining plant at Saganoseki, which had been discharging cadmium and arsenic into the sea. After the plant had been forced to close down for these four days the men's demands were completely accepted. They were:

1. cleanse as far as possible the polluted seas.
2. install equipment to prevent absolutely any further discharge.
3. provide equipment to satisfy the specifications set by the residents.
4. residents have the right to enter and inspect the plant.

This is an excellent example of the power of the fishermen to regain some control over their local environment



through united and determined struggle.

At the same time, the weak point of the fishermen as they stand up to struggle is that they often struggle in isolation. But we can never blame the fishermen for their being isolated. The people who are to be blamed are rather the various strata apart from fishermen, especially the people living in the big cities. The mass of workers, by their refusal to act in solidarity with the fishermen, isolated them.

There is a recent example of workers' hostility to the fishermen's struggle. In August this year, fishermen along the Shiranui coastline blockaded by land and sea the Chisso factory from which Minamata disease originated. They demanded compensation for the losses suffered by the fishing industry as a result of sea pollution, and brought operations at the factory to a virtual halt. The leadership and members of the "second union" (the company union) which is loyal to the enterprise and to which most of the workers belong, not only demanded that the fishermen end their blockade but even requested

the local police to use force to put an end to the behavior of the fishermen that was causing the work stoppage.

One of the excuses given by people living in the cities for their indifference or coldness towards the activities of the fishermen is this: "Fishermen are egoistic. If they get their compensation money they will surrender to capital, give up the struggle, and abandon their livelihood and the sea." People who give such an excuse do not know the real situation the fishermen are in, and do not really understand their feelings. Those fishermen who could be satisfied in their hearts with compensation money, and abandon fishing, could never constitute a majority. For the majority of fishermen, retreat and defeat, however reluctant, were inevitable when faced with the overwhelming onslaught of power and wealth, and the fait accompli of pollution through heavy and chemical industrialization. The fate of the fishermen victims of Minamata disease will presently be the fate of the people living in the cities. The fish pollution disturbances this summer are omens of what is to come. There is no denying the fact that fishermen and land workers are bound by the thread of a common fate.

But one new phenomenon which appeared last summer was the open appeal for support of the fishermen issued by a section of the urban workers' and peoples' movement groups. In July one group of workers demonstrated at the Tokyo offices of Keidanren, the GHQ of capital, making clear their open support for the fishermen's direct action struggle, and their opposition to the polluting companies.

Also last August anti-pollution peoples' movement groups from Tokyo distributed leaflets in Chiba city supporting the action taken by the Chiba fishermen in blockading Asahi Glass and other factories discharging mercury. These examples of fishermen's struggles being openly supported by strata other than fishermen indicate that the germ of solidarity between fishermen and people living in the cities has begun to develop.

The Winter, 1970, issue of "Fishermen's News" (Gyomin Tsushin) the paper which reports developments in the Japanese fishermen's struggle, said: "Judging from the way things have been till now, the situation for Japanese fisher-

(continued on P.38)

The Invisible Proletariat: working women in japan

by Kaji Etsuko

Sexism is nothing but a means of exploiting and controlling women by keeping them divided. The ideology that woman's place is in the home and that her primary function is to rear children and keep house has always been used to justify the treatment of women as low-paid temporary employees, but their problems have been generally overlooked even in the workers' movements. One reason for this is that the ideology also leads them to think of themselves first in relation to their husbands and families and only secondarily in relation to each other. It is harder for women workers to unite in struggle than it is for men. And in Japan, the strength of the sexist ideology is reflected in an appalling lack of social services for children to make women prefer grossly underpaid jobs as temporary workers, because this is the only way they can combine work with childcare; the notoriously long Japanese work week applies to all fulltime workers included in the regular pay scale.

To understand how sexist ideology works for exploitation and control, we have to clarify the nature of the sexual division of labor and its role in the private reproduction of labor power in capitalist society, the exclusion of women from socialized work because of their physiology, and the function of the private family in consumer society. All of these institutions are perpetuated by the myth that childcare - or the nurture of tomorrow's social labor force - is not a social function, but a purely private one. Studies in this field are urgently needed for the development of the women's movement, particularly as government and capitalists co-opt such demands as better working conditions, nursery schools, protection of motherhood, and equal pay for equal work.

An understanding of women's position in society is an important first step in developing a perspective from which to build up a working women's movement to fight against sexist ideology and women's exploitation. The following is AMPO's initial discussion of the situation of Japan's working women.


INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE BACKS OF WOMEN

Japanese capitalism is second to none in its exploitation of women as a cheap labor force; indeed, its establishment and development can be said to have been made possible by the role of female factory workers. The industrialization of Japan, which began with light industry, especially the textile industry, could never have been accomplished without young, unmarried girls brought from peasant villages throughout Japan. Cloistered in dormitories inside the factory compounds, they were forced to work for twelve to sixteen hours a day in unhealthy and dangerous conditions, and were then sent back to their families immediately if they got sick. Until 1930, female factory workers outnumbered men by substantial margins: in 1895, there were 248,625 female workers and 159,515 male workers in all factories with more than 50 employees. In 1896 the textile industry employed 921,386 female workers and only 57,334 male workers, while match factories employed 4,228 women and 1,765 men. But women's wages were about one third of men's. The first year in which there were more male factory workers than female was 1930.

Today, women make up almost one third of the Japanese labor force. In 1972, there were 41.48 million women over the age of 15 in the Japanese population, and of these, 19.56 million were employed

outside their homes while over 2 million more engaged in cottage industry. Women's rate of participation in the work force was 47.8 per cent. In other words, almost one out of two adult women is now engaged in some kind of work for pay. Of the total 34.52 million employed workers, 11.2 million or 32.4 per cent are women. The drastic increase in numbers of working women during the last ten years is shown in Chart I, but their basic situation as working women has not changed significantly since the pre-war years.

Chart I. TREND OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT



Growth in the number of employed women does not indicate corresponding advances in the liberation of women, because this growth has been initiated and directed by capitalists to fit their own needs. The majority of working women receive low wages in temporary, part time or sub-contract jobs. At the same time, increasing numbers of women earn a little money by doing piecework at home.

On the other hand, the large number of women now categorized as "housewives" engaged solely in child care and domestic labor cannot be considered a non-working stratum. More and more married women are going to work, and today they account for almost 60 per cent of all working women, while government and industry are aggressively stepping up their recruitment.

Housewives have become a reserve labor force which Japanese capitalists hope to use to overcome a growing shortage

of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. The high growth policy that since 1960 has brought Japan unprecedented economic expansion at the cost of low standards of living and the world's worst pollution has also transformed the labor market drastically. The supply of young and relatively unskilled workers has not kept up with increasing demand, and the government has begun to promote women's employment to overcome the shortage. This is part of the social background behind recent increases in the number of working women. (See Chart II)

Chart II. EMPLOYMENT AND MARITAL STATUS OF WOMEN WORKERS

	Unmarried	Married	Widowed or divorced
Regular employees (8.92 mil.)	552	332	108
Temporary (1 mil.)	172	742	92
Casual (daily) (.46 mil.)	92	802	112

Source: Prime Minister's Office, Investigation of the Labor Force (1969)

A report by a study committee of the Committee of the Council on the Labor Force in the Economy ("Rodoryoku Jukyu no Tembo to Seisaku no Hoko," December 1969) states: "In order to maintain an annual rate of economic growth of 10.6 per cent, there will be a demand for additions to the labor force of 16.42 million between 1968 and 1975. Increases in the work force in tertiary (service) industry will amount to 8.67 million and that in secondary (manufacturing) industry to 9 million. The work force in primary (agricultural) industry will decrease by 1.25 million. During this period only 8.41 million new workers will be supplied by new school graduates. The balance of 8.01 million must be recruited from a labor force which has not yet been drafted, mainly housewives."

Thus a housewife is a potential worker today, whether she thinks of working or not, and her status has become a fluid one, fluctuating between employed and unemployed. Although such questions as "Should a woman work outside or stay at home?" are still asked, they no longer apply to the majority of women. The fact that the question is still asked at all, however, helps to explain how women are kept in poorly paid and insecure jobs.

There are two major aspects of the so-called "woman power policy" of the seventies, which is being carried forward under the slogans of "development of women's capacities" and the "expansion of women's

job area." The first is the mass recruitment of housewives to part-time and temporary jobs, and the second is a bill to revise the labor law by relaxing its provisions for the "protection of motherhood." Both of these measures are intended to recruit large numbers of low-wage workers, and both are supported by the government in an effort to resolve the labor shortage.

For the capitalists, the major concern is to be able to draw women into the work force and send them home again according to fluctuations in the need for labor. Not only are all women discriminated against as members of a reserve labor pool, but they are divided from each other by greater discrimination against married women than against the unmarried, and still greater discrimination against mothers than against the childless. Of course, the so-called private work that women do at home in bringing up the next generation of workers for their capitalist masters is not paid for at all, so working women are doubly exploited at home and on the job.

CAN A WOMAN STAND ON HER OWN TWO FEET AS A WORKER?

Working women can see their exploitation and the control which keeps them divided most clearly in discrimination in wages and in the dual structure of women's employment. The average woman's wage in Japan today is only 48.2 per cent of the average man's wage, which is a result of women's position in the labor force. Chart III shows that the majority of women workers are concentrated on the lower end of the wage scale. According to 1970 figures, 37 per cent of women employees earned less than Y30,000 (\$120) a month and 76.1 per cent less than Y40,000 (\$160). In small businesses with fewer than 100 employees, 51 per cent of the women workers were paid less than Y30,000 and 84.6 per cent less than Y40,000. In striking contrast, only 3.5 per cent of all male workers earned less than Y30,000 and only 14.2 per cent less than Y50,000.


The industries with more female than male workers -- including electric, textile, service, and sales industries -- are notorious for their low pay. With advancing age, particularly after 30, the wage difference between men and women becomes steadily larger. For a worker entering a new job after 30, the difference is decisive. In other words, while the Japanese system of pay increases according

to seniority prevails for men, women's wages are not significantly differentiated according to age groups. The average woman's wage increases by about 40 per cent from the under-17-year-old group to the highest wage group, 25-29 years old. Male workers, on the other hand, receive their highest pay in the years between 40 and 49, when the average wage is 300 per cent that of the youngest group. (Chart IV). This means that in Japan, where there is no national minimum wage, women are excluded even from the mechanism which customarily guarantees rising subsistence levels for each age group. Instead, all women belong to the low-wage category, regardless of age, dependent children, academic background, or career.

Even when men and women perform the same jobs, their wages differ. For example, the wage difference between a male and female radio or TV assembly worker after ten years is Y20,000 to Y30,000 per month. And such highly skilled jobs identified with women as nurses, kindergarten and elementary teachers, are badly paid.


There is a strong patriarchal ideology behind the conventional idea that "women's labor is less valuable" or "it's enough for them to supplement the family budget," which women themselves often take for granted: women are not considered responsible for supporting a household, or capable of taking full responsibility on

Chart III STRUCTURE OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT ACCORDING TO JOB CLASSIFICATION (1950-1970)



Note: For 1970 the figures in parenthesis include 50,000 women in management, and 10,000 in mining. Source: 1950-1960, National Census; 1970, Investigation of the Labor Force.

Chart IV AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES BY AGE GROUP AND SEX (June 1970) (unit in thousand yen)



Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Statistics Investigation of the Wage Structure

the job. Thus, their low wages reflect their general exclusion from responsible and professional jobs. Furthermore, if women are paid too much, the argument goes, there will not be enough to maintain the present wage level of men, who are household heads and entitled to reasonable earnings.

One of the reasons for the large difference between men's and women's wages is that most women workers are not organized. Only 29.4 per cent of women workers belonged to trade unions in 1970 compared to about 38 per cent of men workers. Since "equal work" for men and women is far from being a reality, the demand for "equal pay for equal work" appears almost irrelevant.

MOTHER AND WIFE FIRST

Closely linked with the overall discrimination in wages is the dual structure of women's employment. A woman highschool graduate, living in a Japanese city who is less than 24 years old, unmarried, and childless can probably find a full-time job in good working conditions at a salary from Y60,000 to Y70,000 a month, about the same as that of a man at the same age. She may even live in an apartment and enjoy an independent life. But no matter how successful she is at her job, she shouldn't fool herself with any idea that

she will be able to keep it after she gets married or has children. A housewife with children, on the other hand, will usually have to accept a poorly paid part-time or temporary menial job. This is what is meant by the dual structure of women's employment.

Where do full time workers work and how are they treated on the job? According to 1972 figures, more women work in factories or offices than anywhere else. 31.2 per cent (3.5 million) of women workers are either unskilled or skilled factory production workers, while 31.1 per cent (3.48 million) do clerical work. Women make up 57.5 per cent of all factory workers and 46.8 per cent of all office workers. In numbers, factory and office workers are followed by women in service industries and retailing, which account for 13.6 per cent (1.52 million) and 10.4 per cent (1.16 million) of women workers respectively. In short, women's work is concentrated in the production, clerical, services, and retailing fields.

Under the slogan of "expansion of posts for women," it is often emphasized



that various technical jobs are now open to women. In fact, women's increased participation in the work force has corresponded to the progress of rationalization and computerization in both factories and offices which has simplified many jobs to the menial level. According to a Labor Ministry Study, almost 1,000 businesses opened jobs to women which had previously been reserved for males in the period from 1966 to 1970. The 49 job categories in which women have joined or replaced men include programming, various types of clerical work, lathe operation, and drafting. Women have been introduced into these jobs as automation has simplified and rationalized labor processes and lowered job qualifications. Or in some cases there simply aren't enough male workers to fill the positions, or women's wages are cheaper than men's. Not long ago, a manager at a major bank stated, "Recently it has been difficult to save on labor costs except by hiring women, and we plan to replace male workers with female to reduce the cost. Most women workers get married in about four years. This is the most important point in hiring them." The likelihood of early marriage is considered to relieve the company of the kind of life-time obligation it incurs when it hires a man.

While 90 per cent of women factory workers used to be concentrated in the textile industry, large numbers of women now work in other industries. In 1970, out of 3.57 million women production workers, 42 per cent worked in such factories as steel, nonferrous metals, metal goods, general machinery, transportation machinery, electrical equipment, precision instruments, and armaments. While the proportion of women factory workers to be found in the textile industry has dropped from 67.5 per cent in 1937 to 32 per cent today, the sections of the electric industry producing transistors, TV sets, and electric bulbs are now occupied almost entirely by women workers. (Chart V)

For instance, the number of women workers at Toshiba Electric increased from 6,300 to 15,000 during the ten years between 1957 and 1967. At Matsushita Electric and Sanyo Electric, almost 50 per cent of all employees are women, and at the Toshiba Transistor and Hitachi Musashi plants the proportion of women in the work force reaches 80 per cent and 74 per cent respectively. The average age of these workers is 20, and almost 80 per cent of them are less than 25. The pace

of the production line is such that these young women wear out and are replaced within three or four years: those who manage to survive are retired from the full time labor force when they marry or have children, because their household responsibilities make them unavailable for late-night shifts.

Most factory work in these industries is the assembly of parts manufactured by subcontractors or household workers. The production process has been divided into such simple, repetitious operations that "any worker can be skilled in a week." Furthermore, women are considered particularly suited for the labor-intensive workshops because of their manual dexterity and endurance. Employment in the electrical industry today resembles that in the pre-war textile industries: many plants operate on double shifts and their young workers stay in company dormitories.

Progress in rationalization through technological development in factories and offices has not only opened new jobs to women; it has also intensified aliena-

Chart V. HOURLY WAGE ACCORDING TO SEX
AND BRANCH OF INDUSTRY (1970)

	Branch of industry	Hourly wage	
		Women	Men
	Manufacturing	211	400
Group A	Clothing & accessories	165	285
	Timber & wood products	174	310
	Furniture & equipments	185	300
	Textiles	193	343
	Leather & leather goods	198	353
Group B	Metal goods	208	367
	Oil and coal	210	501
	Foods	211	377
	Rubber products	215	390
	Electric appliances	230	366
	Publishing & printing	232	414
Group C	Retailing	250	450
	Iron & steel	259	503
	Chemicals	273	475
Group D	Finance & insurance	338	690
	Utilities (electricity, gas, water)	386	630

Note:

- 1) Data limited to manufacturing enterprises with more than 30 employees.
- 2) Hourly wages computed by dividing monthly wage by the number of hours actually worked.

Source: Ministry of Labor, Survey of Monthly Labor Statistics, 1972

tion from labor and created various occupational diseases. Victims of inflammation of the tendon sheath and cervical syndrome have increased rapidly, especially among women working at tasks such as operating a punchpress at the high speed of three punches a second or assembling and electrically welding micron-sized parts in a conveyor belt system. These diseases are now called new women's diseases.

What is happening in the workshop? Here are some reports from various plants and offices.

"As the conveyor belt is speeded up, more and more workers feel pain in their shoulders and loins. Up till now we have thought that these symptoms were caused by our own weakness. Few workers recognize them as occupational diseases..."

"Although these diseases specifically attack women workers, it's hard to organize ourselves to demand compensation, because most of the women quickly stop working."

"At a telephone company's information section, about one in five workers contracts the disease, and the number of patients has increased drastically in the past one or two years as labor has been intensified."

"Within a month after the new machine was introduced, eight out of ten women developed inflammation of the tendon sheath or cervical syndrome. I myself was immediately transferred to another section. I feel angry because technological development only means scrapping women workers."

"I am typing at the printing company. Last year I used to type 15,000 strokes a day, but this year the management directed us to finish 20,000 to 30,000 a day. Most of my colleagues now feel new symptoms of pain..."

PART TIME JOBS AND HOME INDUSTRY
(PIECE WORK)

While the majority of full time women workers are forced to work at mindless jobs for low pay, many more women work in worse conditions as temporary workers in even lower positions than those of their full time colleagues. This is attributed to the fact that most of the increase in the female labor force under the woman-power policy is accounted for by the re-entry of older women into the labor force.

From 1955 to 1970, the rate of employment in the 15 to 19-year-old age group remained constant at about 30.55 per cent, while that in the 20-24-year-old age group increased by 160 per cent from 36.2 per cent to 59.8 per cent. In contrast, the rate of employment among women over 35 increased two or three hundred per cent, and the proportion of businesses employing women on a part time basis also increased rapidly from 10 per cent overall in 1965 to 35 per cent in manufacturing, 28 per cent in wholesale and retailing, and 17 per cent in finance/insurance and transportation/communication in 1970. Although part time work is not restricted to women, in Japan the overwhelming majority of part timers are housewives, whose numbers are estimated



by the Labor Ministry to be about 800,000, or over 10 per cent of working women.

About half of them are engaged in rudimentary factory work. These workers are typically neighboring housewives with children. Their average age is 37, and they usually work five hours a day on a short term contract, frequently two months. Though they are barred from becoming full time workers, they often work for a long time at one company at rock bottom wages by renewing their contracts.

Very often "part time" doesn't mean short working hours. In 33 per cent of part time jobs, working time is only one hour less than for full time, and one study of manufacturers in Tokyo found that 20 per cent of part timers worked the same hours as regular workers. Yet part timers are hired on an entirely different wage system, usually without social benefits such as insurance and pensions. Usually their contracts forbid them to join the union. In any event unions tend to be hostile to them, since they hinder the general struggle for better working conditions and higher wages. (Chart VI)

Older part time women workers are much more likely to be hired by small businesses

or sub-contractors than by big enterprises, so that they share in the poor working conditions and precarious situations characteristic of many small companies. In 1970 62.7 per cent of all women workers were employed by small businesses with fewer than 100 employees. The smaller the business, the larger its proportion of women workers. In small businesses with 1 to 4 employees, women make up 40 per cent of the work force in manufacturing, 56 per cent in retailing, and 67 per cent in services. The average age of part timers is 31.5 overall, and 38.2 for manufacturing.

However, since 1965, big industries have started aggressively recruiting housewives as part time (i.e. temporary) workers, following the lead of the electrical industry, which keeps its full time young women only two or three years before replacing them. Thus the dual structure of women's employment exists even within the same company. Even when employers need their labor power, they do not want women with babies as regular workers, since responsibility for small children often forces the mother to take days off from work. In some factories, Sony and Morinaga Milk for instance, a regular worker who has a baby must become a tem-

porary employee if she wants to continue to work and to use the company's nursery school or daycare center. Many women in fact prefer the flexibility of part time work, because childcare facilities are so inadequate, and regular employees must be willing to work on the second shift. Mothers who leave their children with grandparents, in unlicensed daycare centers, or alone while they work, are socially condemned and feel enormous guilt. The general view is that they are pursuing their own fulfillment, or money, at the expense of their children's fundamental welfare. Thus, there is acceptance of almost any working conditions if the schedule is flexible. This is the true genius of Japanese capitalism's exploitation of women.

Even professional women workers such as teachers and nurses find it almost impossible to return to their original jobs under the same conditions after having quit to have a baby. Barriers such as age limits for entering employment leave them no choice but to work at lower pay as substitutes or short term workers. Thus the increase in the number of working women does not reflect their full integration into the labor force in big industries and the professions. No wonder that today many women committed to their own liberation are struggling for the right to work as regular full-time employees.

Married women, who must bear the full responsibility for their households and children, are not only placed in a lower class of workers, but in excessive competition for jobs. This is shown by the employment of about 2 million workers in extremely low-paid household industry, of whom 92 per cent are women and 88.2 per cent (1.6 million) are engaged in home industry. In addition to these, it is reported that almost 3.5 million women have expressed a desire to work. The Labor Ministry's 1970 estimate of 2 million workers in household employment represented a 300 per cent increase over the 700,000 reported in 1958. These figures are gross underestimates, however, for another official report indicates that 2.77 million households or 12.3 per cent of the total, have members doing domestic industry piece work.

The range of domestic industry has enlarged noticeably during the last four years. Side jobs related to trans-


portation machinery, electric equipment, foods, and ceramics have increased by 167 per cent, 902 per cent, 175 per cent and 149 per cent respectively as Japan's national focus has shifted from light to heavy and petrochemical industries. In addition to traditional jobs, including most daily commodities from sewing to craft work and toy making, new kinds of side jobs include cutting the edge of parts for automobile press work, making machines for diesel engine fuel pumps, assembling and packing nylon zippers, making mosaic tiles, coating wire, and assembling parts for TV sets and communication instruments. A study of the production process for plastic goods in Aichi Prefecture discovered that among 158 firms, 34.6 per cent of the work was done by 3500 housewives in their homes as side jobs for which they were paid piece rates. They represented 46 per cent of all the workers involved in plastics production. Thus, the firms have integrated household industry into the production process.

Big business uses part time and domestic work to separate older women into a segment of the labor market tied to the exploitation of small business by giant enterprises. This restriction of older women to the small business and part time labor market is the foundation for the exploitation of subcontractors. For in spite of the low wages paid to women by the big industries, small businesses can survive only by paying even less. This is the main reason why the average women's wage declines after age 35. The relative position of male and female, regular and temporary workers can be seen clearly in their comparative wages. The whole system represents a rationalization of the use of women's labor by big business for its own benefit. (Chart VII)

Chart VI. HOURLY WAGES ACCORDING TO SIZE OF ENTERPRISE AND STATUS (1970)

Size of Enterprise & Status		Hourly Wage	Remarks	
All enterprises (over 30 employees)		¥246	Ministry of Labor, <u>Monthly Labor Statistics</u> (1970)	
			Average Monthly Wages of Women ¥42,710	Working Hours per Month 173.4 hours
Manufacturing (full-time workers)	Over 500 employees	273	¥46,726	170.9
	100 - 499	223	¥38,436	172.6
	30 - 99	190	¥33,390	175.9
	5 - 29	164	¥30,782	187.5
Part-time workers	Manufacturing	152		
	Management, clerical skilled workers	170	Ministry of Labor, <u>Basic Statistics on the Wage Structure, 1970</u>	
Domestic workers		102	Bureau of Women and Youth, Ministry of Labor, <u>Results of Investigation on Wages in Domestic Industry, 1971</u> Monthly wages.....11,978yen Hours worked per day.....5.8hours Days worked per month.....21days	

Chart VII. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF DOMESTIC AND PART-TIME WORKERS



Source: Bureau of women and youth, Ministry of Labor, Basic Investigation of Employment in Domestic Industry; quoted from Sato Masami, "The Problem of Domestic Labor Today," Quarterly "Labor Law," No. 82, p. 209.

The whole structure rests on Japan's industrial employment system in which men



bourgeois life style, and the work structure secures the turnover of young women workers.

My-home-ism has a double function. On the one hand, it converts alienation from social labor into the illusion of happiness in a home life supposedly free of the drudgery of monotonous and exhausting work in order to stimulate the flow of young women from workplace to home. On the other hand, since a primary function of the nuclear family is consumption, women are forced to earn money to add to the family's disposable income; but in this case, they are taught to think of themselves not as workers but as housewives trying to earn "just a little extra." Thus the success of the so-called woman-power policy, depends on taking advantage of this cycle, through early withdrawal of young women from the full-time labor force.

Even where there is no mandatory retirement, most women are forced to give up their jobs before the age of 30, either by social pressure when they marry or practical necessity when their first children are born. Recent court decisions have ruled against compulsory retirement, as in the case of the Tokyu Engine and Machinery Company, which was ordered to revoke its retirement-at-30 policy in 1969, and the Mitsui Shipbuilding Company, whose retirement-at-childbirth policy was ruled illegal. But even today, 9 per cent of 2500 businesses with more than 30 employees demand retirement either at marriage or childbirth, and 7 per cent set a young age for mandatory retirement. Only 140 out of the 2500 companies force a man to retire before the age of 54, while 85 per cent enforce women's retirement before that age. 11 per cent require women to quit before the age of 35, and more than a third explicitly deny women the possibility of advancing to management positions. It should be noted that the trade unions have not fought against the inclusion of such discriminatory provisions in labor agreements.

Although government employees seem to be guaranteed "equal pay for equal work," women are discriminated against in various ways here, too, as in the cases of nurses and teachers.

REVISION OF THE LABOR LAW

— Tokyo High Court Rules —

'Female Workers Inferior To Men Physiologically'

The Tokyo High Court ruled Monday that female workers are physiologically inferior to male workers and that setting the retirement age for female workers at 50 as against 55 for men is not illegal.

Presiding judge Shigetaka Taniguchi said that the physiological capability of a 55-year-old woman is equivalent to that of a 70-year-old man, so that a five-year difference between the retirement ages for men and women workers does not constitute illegal discrimination against the women.

The court ruling was made on appeal filed by Miss Miyo Nakamoto, 54, of Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture, who had been ordered by her employer, Nissan Motor Co., to retire Jan. 14, 1969, when she became 50. The retirement age

for women workers at the company is 50 against 55 for men.

Miss Nakamoto had filed with the Tokyo District Court an application for a court injunction to preserve her status at the company at the time, but the district court turned down her application in April, 1971, ruling that the retirement system of the company did not discriminate against women workers when working conditions at the company were taken into consideration. Then, she appealed to the high court.

Miss Nakamoto intends to appeal the high court decision against her in the Supreme Court.

The Japan Times,
March 13, 1973

Female Teachers Sue School for 'Unfair' Firing

URAWA (Kyodo) — Four female teachers of a kindergarten, dismissed on the grounds that they became pregnant or that the terms of their employment contracts expired, have filed a suit here against their employer.

The suit was filed Thursday with the Urawa District Court by Mrs. Sachiko Kitajima, 26, Mrs. Nobuko Kuroda, 24, Miss Fumiko Numata, 24, and Miss Michiyo Oba, 24.

Mrs. Kuroda and Miss Numata were dismissed in October last year and Mrs. Kitajima and Miss Oba this month by Mrs. Teruyo Sato, president of Asaka Wako Kindergarten at Asaka, Saitama Prefecture.

Mrs. Kitajima and Mrs. Kuroda were dismissed on the ground that they became pregnant and that it would "prove a hindrance to the execution of their duties."

Miss Numata was dismissed on the account that she had taken a day off twice without notifying her employer and that she often came late to her work.

The kindergarten president also dismissed Miss Oba on the ground that she did not agree to renew her employment contract on a yearly basis.

The four teachers asserted that leaves from work on account of childbirth and menstruation were the vested rights of women.

The Asahi Evening News,
February 24, 1973

Recently, the Japanese government has developed a particular interest in women's way of life, and it has been kind enough to define femininity and prescribe how women ought to live. As an outgrowth of the "woman power policy", four bills on women have been successively introduced in the last few years, of which one passed the Diet last June. A women's movement to oppose the other three is gradually growing throughout the country.

The newly passed "Working Woman's Welfare Law" grew out of the "5-year Plan for a Welfare Policy for Working Women" issued in 1969 by an LDP committee on labor. According to this policy, employment of about 2.5 million housewives in the period from 1970 to 1975 would require the organization of side jobs, vocational training for women, and the establishment of daycare centers within enterprises. Articles 2 and 3 of the law express its basic idea (and that of the ruling class): the working woman "must first play the most important role of building up a new generation and at the same time she must contribute to both economic and social development." Therefore, she is "to strive to secure harmony between professional and home life" and should be guaranteed the opportunity to work through special consideration of her motherhood. The law regulates the means to develop women's potential, vocational training, the arrangement of working hours before and after childbirth, etc.

The other three bills introduced are the "Eugenic Protection Law" (see AMPO no.17), the "Revision of the Labor Law" and the "Infant Care Leave for Women Teachers Law," all of which are meant to utilize women's labor power to insure maximum profits.

"Infant Care Leave" has already been introduced in many companies, and it is applied especially to skilled women workers. According to this system, women can return to their previous positions after an unpaid leave of about a year for infant care. Even though this system represents an advance for women, its basic motive is rationalization for capital rather than protection of women workers. Spokesmen for the Japan Telephone Company and Fuji Film, the first companies to introduce this system, admitted that the company prefers to have women workers come back after they recover completely rather than having them take days off un-

MY-HOME-ISM AND MANDATORY RETIREMENT

Japanese capitalism uses two methods to hold women in low-wage temporary work: My-home-ism projects an image of women's happiness in the nuclear family and petit-

expectedly for childcare. It is also less expensive than setting up a nursery school within the factory.

Nevertheless, the infant care system has been welcomed by women who want to continue working, and women in the union movement have struggled for this system for years. Certainly there is a strong need for it, since so many women are forced to retire when they become pregnant because of the absolute shortage of nursery schools and daycare centers. But as long as infant care leave is based on the patriarchal idea that women are first of all wives and mothers, it cannot lead to women's total liberation, which requires socialization of childcare. Even as this system is being introduced, the mass media seek out stories of children dying or being injured in childcare centers to reinforce the belief of mothers that they should, after all, care for their children at home.

Furthermore, the proposed "Infant Care Leave" bill is only for skilled workers, teachers in this case. It excludes women workers in other jobs, such as clerical workers, telephone operators, and receptionists, not to mention production workers. A woman who takes the leave will not be paid, and when she returns to teach she will have lost a year of seniority and its corresponding pay raise; thus the gap between her pay and that of male teachers will have grown. These contradictions illustrate the truth that the bill is designed for the benefit of the employer

and not of the women; indeed, it tends to divide the women from each other by restricting maternity leave to privileged occupations.

The bill to revise the present labor law includes the relaxation of regulations governing hazardous and latenight work for women, abolition of menstruation leave, and the establishment of a law covering the employment of part time workers (legally reinforcing their de facto exploitation).

In the past, the liberation of women in Japan meant freedom from the feudalistic family system. Participation in socialized work itself was the goal for independence and emancipation. But today, women are oppressed at home and on the job. Many have begun to understand that struggle for improvement in their working conditions is not enough for their complete liberation. Today many women are fighting in the workplace for the right to work as regular workers and at home for the end of the old exploitative division of labor between the sexes. As more women join the work force, they must begin to recognize themselves not as the mutually isolated dependents of individual men -- as the patriarchal capitalist ideology would have them see themselves -- but as workers in their own right struggling in mutual solidarity. Although the Japanese women's movement is still small, it is full of energy based on deep anger against male-dominated society and determination to fight to final liberation. ■■

Photo credit: Matsumot Michiko

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QUAKE TO HELP SDF TAKEOVER TOKYO?

Rumors about Imminent Earthquakes

Living in one of the world's seismic centers, the Japanese have every reason to expect earthquakes, large and small, once in a while. But in 1973, fifty years since the "Great Tokyo Earthquake" of September 1, 1923, in which 140,000 persons died and 700,000 houses and buildings were destroyed, rumors of another imminent earthquake have become a marketable commodity.

Current rumors may not be entirely groundless from a "scientific point of view," especially in view of some recently discovered "hard facts":

- A weather monitoring satellite in May, 1973, located a three to four hundred-kilometer-long strip of land in the process of dislocation in the northern suburbs of Tokyo.
- In the same month, a fishing boat in the waters of the Ogasawara Archipelago in the Fuji volcanic zone, discovered a new submarine volcano. By late September it had risen about 50 meters above sea level.
- In September, yet another submarine volcano was discovered in the Fuji volcanic zone.
- The Boso Peninsula of Chiba Prefecture is presently experiencing a steady, violent upheaval.

In the face of these facts, the mass media have made sensational predictions of another earthquake and innocently urged that "lessons must be drawn from the Great Earthquake."


Yet these rumors simply reflect the fact that the bourgeoisie with all the technology and capital at its command has done virtually nothing to help Tokyo working people prepare for a disaster. According to the Ministry of Construction, for example, 900,000 Tokyo families, close

to one third of the total, rent small, privately-owned, wooden flats of about 11 square meters, at an average of ¥13,500 a month. From the fact that the population has increased four and half times since the Great Quake, one can easily imagine the havoc which another quake and fire would create. No wonder the rumors manifest themselves as a series of very sick jokes:

- A science fiction novel dealing with an explosion of Mt. Fuji which ultimately sinks Japan beneath the Pacific Ocean has sold a million copies since its publication earlier this year.
- Tokyo department stores are selling out of ¥10,000 "emergency knapsacks" containing a transistor radio, crackers, canned food, a rope ladder, a torch lamp, and first-aid outfit.
- As if hoping for a great earthquake to revive Premier Tanaka's already bankrupt plan for "Remodeling Japan" large banners hang from steel skeletons of highrise buildings under construction: "An earthquake is coming; let's build more quake-proof buildings!"
- On September 1, "Disaster Prevention Day," the Governor of Tokyo led 270,000 residents who took part in the annual "Disaster Prevention Drill" in some 1,000 different areas throughout the city. But no one expects much from a Metropolitan authority whose master plan for disaster evacuation designates Tokyo's major parks as refuges and as mortuaries to accommodate more than 200,000 corpses.

Tanks in "Disaster Prevention Maneuvers"

The discussion about an earthquake becomes even less humorous if one realizes that the Self Defense Forces (SDF) is taking advantage of deeply held fears to prepare to place Tokyo under its control in case of a disaster.



Photos by Ohno Koji

"Emergency knapsacks" and other quake-relief utensils on sale

The SDF has been actively taking part in "disaster prevention drills" sponsored by the Tokyo municipal authority each year since 1960. On such occasions, the SDF mobilizes only a couple of platoons such as those having to do with protection of lives and communication. However, major forces are mobilized on other occasions when the SDF holds "disaster relief maneuvers" of its own. These independent maneuvers have become increasingly frequent in recent years. Last year alone SDF units in Tokyo area held at least five maneuvers. And this year, the SDF attempted--thus far unsuccessfully--to use tanks and fire arms in "disaster relief maneuvers."

When, for example, SDF's Nagoya unit was engaged in one such maneuver in Kyushu in late August, it tried to transfer four M24 tanks and two cannons, in addition to trucks and water-trailers, all the way from the port of Yokkaichi to Kyushu by boat. The attempt to ship tanks and cannons was blocked by local citizens. And the commander of the unit apologized by saying that "there was extra room for tanks and cannons in the vessels." In the same month, a similar incident took place in Niigata. This time the SDF tried to use rifles and to lay down a smoke screen in a "disaster relief maneuver," but was again blocked by local citizens.

As a matter of legality, the "Law on Self Defense Forces" provides that "in case of natural and other disasters and if necessary for the sake of pro-

tection of human lives and properties," the SDF may deploy its forces upon request of prefectural governors. However, it can operate solely on its own judgement "if the situation admits of no delay." No wonder that the SDF does not bother to mobilize major forces in "disaster prevention drills" sponsored by municipal authorities.

But why tanks and rifles? The "Governmental Instruction on the Deployment of SDF in Case of Disasters" allows SDF soldiers to carry "minimum necessary fire arms and ammunition required for their disaster relief activities." Also, soldiers thus deployed are endowed with some police powers such as entrance into private property and calling on ordinary citizens to collaborate with them. What is more, "disasters" as defined in the "Basic Law on Disaster Countermeasures" include extraordinary natural phenomena, large fires, explosions, and "other disasters to be defined by a government ordinance," thus enabling the ruling class to construe "disasters" in the broadest sense and to view mass uprisings and moments of internal crisis as "disasters." A well known example in which the SDF was deployed for maintenance of "law and order" in the guise of a disaster rescue action was an emergency scramble by SDF planes in March, 1970, when the Red Army hijacked a JAL plane and directed it to the People's Republic of Korea. The scramble was explained away as a disaster rescue action by then Defense Agency Director Nakasone Yasuhiro.

It becomes much clearer that disaster rescue maneuvers are mainly aimed at training SDF soldiers to maintain law and order if we look at SDF interpretations of more legitimate "mobilization for law and order." In the words of the "Law on Self Defense Forces," the SDF is to be deployed for law and order "at the time of an indirect invasion (i.e., internal revolutionary moments) and other emergency cases, and when the ordinary police power is found unable" to do the job. Asked to elaborate on the meaning of "other emergency cases," a high-ranking Defense Agency official explained in the Diet in 1969 that "a situation like the Great Earthquake can be considered a typical case."

A Perfect Example of Military as Outlaw

SDF officials today have a special reason of their own to find a prototype of "disaster relief operation" in the earthquake fifty years ago. At that time, their predecessors became marauders in the name of maintenance of law and order, and turned quake-torn Tokyo into a bloody scene of massacre. Several years preceding the quake, they had suppressed internal and external people's uprisings. In the Rice Riot of 1918, residents of more than 300 cities, towns and villages attacked rice merchants, land owners and capitalists for three months before being repressed by the military. In 1919 in Korea, the colonized Koreans staged the First of March Uprising against their Japanese rulers. Well aware of the power of the people as a result of these encounters, within 24 hours of the earthquake the military mobilized 50,000 soldiers and promulgated martial law. Through control of the communication network they circulated false rumors to the effect that "Koreans are poisoning our wells!" and "Koreans are setting fire to houses and starting riots!" Many local residents took the rumors as fact and organized "vigilante committees" to attack innocent Koreans. The exact number of Koreans massacred, later estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000, is still unknown.

The military and the police also seized the opportunity to kill at least one dozen "undesirable and subversive" Japanese including Ohsugi Sakae, a well-known anarchist of the day, his wife and ten labor union activists.

After the event, the Imperial Guard Division compiled "A Review of the Forces Deployed for Police Action" in which it boasted of its activities and specified the following tactics as essential in the event of future earthquakes:

- 1) Immediate encirclement of the city's outer perimeter to halt traffic and to prevent subversive elements from infiltrating the city;
- 2) Prompt occupation of governmental organs, especially nerve centers, telephone and telegram stations, newspapers, print shops, electric power plants, water supply plants, cargo depots, naval ports, etc.; and
- 3) Deployment of forces in areas inside the city where subversive elements are residing or have caused disorders to suppress these elements and prevent riots.

Many of these lessons are incorporated explicitly as well as implicitly in the "Plan for Deployment of the SDF in Case of a Large Earthquake or Fire" published by the Defense Agency in March, 1971. According to the plan, a total of 57,500 soldiers, 365 planes and helicopters, 10,300 vehicles, and 50 vessels--more than 20% of the total existing force of the SDF--would be concentrated in the Tokyo area.

The first two duties these forces are to carry out are collection of information by a total of 101 jet reconnaissance planes, helicopters and other planes, and installation of emergency communication facilities. Information gathered by the aircraft is first transmitted to the Prime Minister's Residence, the Defense Agency and the Imperial Palace so as to enable the SDF and the nerve center of ruling circles to monopolize all flow of information (and "disinformation" such as that about poisoned wells) as well as communication and transportation. The third duty is to rescue VIPs with the use of 10 to 14 multipurpose HULB helicopters out of 14 stationed at Tachikawa Air Base in Western Tokyo.

Other, more general duties include: treatment of the injured people by the medical corps; re-opening of roads by 400 vehicles of the engineering corps; transportation of military personnel and relief supplies by 400 vehicles, 45 planes and 38 vessels; and accommodation of

64,000 sufferers in SDF bases and in the tents.

One problem with the plan is that all these duties, except for reopening roads, are to be carried out by the SDF quite independently of other parties concerned, such as the municipal authorities.

But the most serious problem is that all these duties would, in the opinion of military strategists, require 10,000 soldiers at the most, far short of the 57,500 specified in the plan. The odds are that the majority of troops will be assigned to carrying out the lessons of the Imperial Guard Division. In an effort to draw lessons from the Earthquake, the Eastern District Headquarters of the Ground SDF compiled in 1962 with the help of the Metropolitan Police a document called "Study Material on Countermeasures for the Great Earthquake" which had this to say: "A great earthquake will not only invite political and economic disorder but also make the ordinary police insufficient. Sufferers will feel uneasy and will be deeply disturbed. It is expected that certain organizations with special ideological inclinations will take advantage of such a state of confusion and dare to mobilize masses to petition the Diet, governmental organs, the Tokyo Metropolitan authority and the like. These actions in all probability will result in massive illegal actions. From the point of view of maintaining law and order, this problem requires most serious attention."

A "disaster relief operation," which is synonymous with "mobilization for law



and order," thus boils down to a coup d'état staged by the SDF within an intricately formulated legal framework.

Strategic Meaning of "Disaster Relief Operation"

Previously, an overwhelming majority of SDF officers had a negative attitude toward deployment of their soldiers as disaster relief forces in districts stricken by typhoons. They thought that such operations would only lower the morale of the soldiers, but accepted them unenthusiastically as a means of pacifying popular criticism directed at the SDF.

But the SDF began to see a "positive" meaning in disaster relief operations and maneuvers after 1960 when it came close to mobilizing in the name of law and order to smash opposition against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Ampo). It was in the same year that the Tokyo municipal authority started to hold its annual disaster prevention drill with collaboration of the SDF, and that the Staff of Ground SDF compiled "Lessons Drawn from the Great Earthquake" to underline the following lesson along with many others: "If Japan should encounter another emergency, vigilante committees similar to those in the Great Earthquake will emerge spontaneously through more or less the same process... One problem calling for special consideration by the SDF is how to determine the type of arms such organizations are to be equipped with."

In the 1970s, strategic importance is attached to a "disaster relief operation" as one of the few remaining resorts for a crisis-ridden system. This was vividly exemplified in a recent warning by Sakurada Takeshi, an outspoken hawkish leader of the Nikkeiren (Japan Employers' Association), when he likened the current Japanese situation, crippled by inflation, pollution, high rents, etc., to the eve of the Rice Riot of 1918.

Editor's note: The above article, written by Murata Goro of the AMPO Editorial Board, owes much to a recently published book by Fujii Haruo, Jieitai to Chian-shuppei (Self Defense Forces and Deployment for Law and Order). Fujii, a well-known expert on military affairs who wrote an article for AMPO, No.12, is also a board member of the Pacific-Asia Resources Center. ■ ■

FILM REVIEW

"PUBLIC" VERSUS "PRIVATE" IN THREE CURRENT JAPANESE FILMS

by Hariu Ichiro

Hariu Ichiro is a noted art critic who leads a progressive writers' organization, and is chairman of the New Japan Literature Society. During the 1969-70 campus struggle, he was known for his sympathy and joint struggle with radical students.

Fifteen years ago, Alexandre Astruc ushered in the era of nouvelle vague films with his theoretical essay, "The Camera As Pen." Movies, he wrote, were more than mere exhibits or records of fact; they were a kind of language in which the artist, using his camera as uninhibitedly as a solitary writer scribbling with a pen, expressed a personal vision much as he might in a novel or essay.

At the time when Astruc wrote, Japanese movies, at the heart of the nation's mass media and monopolized by the giant film companies, were hardly a "pen" to be brandished freely. To hear many Japanese critics boast in the face of this (Astruc's theory of language turned upside down) that "film explores the universe which cannot be expressed in words" sounds doubly absurd.

And yet, from the look of many Japanese films today, Astruc's vision seems finally about to be realized in Japan, too. First, with the demise of the giant movie companies, movies vanished from the mass media scene. A few months ago, the announcement of the dissolution of Oshima Nagisa's Sozo-sha (Creativity Company) brought to an end the era of independent producers which had followed the era of large companies. Now, it is television which has become the very fabric of our daily life. These images are generally controlled and manipulated by "public organs." Thus, a very narrow realm has been left for Japanese films--the realm of the "private" where they function as a meta-language--a visual language used to explore the functions of images and

thus to explore the relationship between the self and the outside world.

Kaigenrei, A Drama of the Absurd

The unorthodoxy or originality of theme of many current Japanese films, however, has not been enough to guarantee the genuine depth of their exploration. Yoshida Kiju's *Kaigenrei* (Martial Law), produced jointly with Art Theater Guild, is a case in point. While Yoshida's aim in the film--to probe intimately the psychology of Kita Ikki, the charismatic, pre-war "Founder of Japanese Fascism"--is seemingly a daring excursion into previously taboo subject matter, Yoshida ultimately fails to develop his material in a truly independent way.

The subject of the film is the bloody "February 26 Incident" of 1936 (an attempted coup involving the assassination of government officials by mutinous Army officers and soldiers inspired by Kita's thought), but its focus is unswervingly on Kita himself, and the tormented, schizophrenic mind which was the source of his vision. Our first introduction to Kita comes as the movie opens, when Asahi Heigo, a fanatical adherent of Kita's thought, stabs to death a prominent Zaibatsu leader of the day. Seconds before carrying out his action, Asahi paused--in full view of the surrounding crowds--and counted deliberately from one to ten. When Kita is told of this, he comments, "It was to make his action even more solemn that he filled those last moments with danger. His deed has manifested the essence of martial law."

The idea of "Martial Law," introduced by Yoshida at the opening of the film, lies at the very heart of Kita Ikki's ultra-nationalist, "revolutionary" strategy. (*) Kita envisions the establishment of a state of martial law following a coup d'état, in which the

former leader of the struggle, has finally been surrendered to the public corporation. A village meeting, called to discuss the latest developments, opens in silence. No fiery speeches, not a word of strategy planning...the camera circles again and again the silent faces in the room. At last an uncertain voice breaks the quiet, and slowly, but with gathering strength, the community begins to plan the next steps. In the weeks which follow, the remains of the former leader are transferred safely to new ground. A program of assistance to families whose sons have been imprisoned is begun. The peasants, unable to bear the sight of grass springing up on land which has been taken over by the airport corporation, instinctively go out with their scythes and sow a "collective field" to bring in funds for the continuation of the struggle. For each of these tasks, the cooperation of every family in the community must be enlisted, for thus it has always been in the hamlet. As the state bears down on the peasants with the most modern forms of attack, the deepest communal traditions of the past are reborn with a new meaning, becoming the most powerful weapons of resistance. As the villagers work, celebrate festivals, and chant the *nembutsu* (Buddhist prayer), they reveal



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a humanity which, throughout the passage of time and history, has never been crushed.

Minamata Revolt

Tsuchimoto Noriaki's *Minamata Revolt: Men and Women Questioning Life* documents the lives of Minamata victims after the court decision recognizing their damage claims, through the period of their negotiations for medical funds and pensions with the Chisso Corporation. The camera focuses starkly on the confrontation between the claimants, so pathetically "victim-like" in their physical pain and their need, and the company executives, who can only repeat mechanically that "there are limits to what business can do." The victims, however, pursue their questions relentlessly, in phrases which cut to the quick. "I don't care about money, sir, just cure me. Just make me better again." or... "Mr. President, can I be one of your girlfriends--Number 2 or Number 3, and you look out for me while I'm alive?" The company's official excuses--nothing more than rhetoric in the defense of private enterprise--are shown for what they are in the film, while it is clear that the requests of the victims are grounded on what should be the basis of public ethics: fundamental human rights. The observation of Minamata photographer Eugene Smith that "history does not concern these victims, only their immediate anguish" is certainly true, but their sufferings, as Tsuchimoto's film records them, have a powerful historical message for those who watch. For the tragedy of Minamata belongs to the whole world and we must bear the imprint of its memory in our hearts as we search for a new revolution, one which can heal mankind from the cruel "mistakes" and destruction which the Industrial Revolution has everywhere left in its wake.

I was struck by the fact that both the Sanrizuka and the Minamata films utilized the technique of simultaneous photography and recording. This technique makes it possible to evoke both the words and the silences of actual time, the drama which lies in the depths of objects and space. Here for the first time the camera seems to have become a pen--not a pen animated by the vision of a single mind alone, but one which searches external reality tirelessly in pursuit of its hidden meaning. ■ ■

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
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It need hardly be emphasized that developments in Japan in coming years will be of profound significance for Asia, for the United States, and for the international system as a whole. Some of the most informed and thought-provoking analysis of social and economic developments in Japan and its emerging international role have appeared in the journal AMPO, which is also unique in the insight it provides with regard to popular left-wing forces in Japan. The journal has published extensive and enlightening commentary on Okinawa, Japanese imperialism, long-range tendencies in the domestic and international policies that are being shaped by ruling groups, popular struggles within Japan and numerous other topics. It is an invaluable source of information and analysis. For anyone who is concerned with the role of Japan in world affairs or the prospects for Japanese society itself, the journal is essential reading.

Noam Chomsky

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RISING UP ANGRY: MONA LISA "SPRAYED" IN DRAMATIC PROTEST

AN INTERVIEW WITH YONEZU TOMOKO

by Brett DeBary Nee

Brett DeBary Nee is presently working as a freelance journalist in Tokyo with a special interest in the women's movement. She has studied Japanese literature and is co-author of Longtime Californ': A documentary study of an American Chinatown.

Yonezu Tomoko was released from jail May 7. She is now facing trial for "creating a public disturbance." She was arrested on April 20th after spraying red paint on the bullet-proof glass enclosing the Mona Lisa at Tokyo's Ueno National Museum.

In anticipation of massive crowds flocking to see the Mona Lisa, whose loan to Japan was one of the few fruits of Premier Tanaka Kakuei's recent visit to France, Japan's Cultural Affairs Ministry issued an order prohibiting entrance to the exhibit of handicapped people with crutches or wheelchairs and women with small children. "Safety" was cited as the reason for the prohibition, but when one of Japan's leading newspapers questioned the justice of denying handicapped people access to the work of art, the decision was modified slightly and a "Special Day for the Handicapped" was designated.

While handicapped citizens would continue to be barred on ordinary viewing days, on the "Special Day" they would be permitted to enter the exhibition free. Entrance of women with young children was also permitted, but only if the women carried the children in their arms.

The "Special Day for the Handicapped" took place as scheduled on May 10. Thousands of victims of polio, cerebral palsy, nervous diseases, and injured war veterans arrived in busses from all over the country, entered the museum, and enjoyed a few seconds in front of the Mona Lisa before being prodded on.

On the same day, Miss Yonezu and a small group of other handicapped people and women activists staged a protest outside the gates of the museum. They carried leaflets, posters, banners; several times Miss Yonezu lay down in front of the museum gates, symbolically demonstrating her condemnation of a society which enforces segregation of the handicapped and the "normal," even in the appreciation of art.

Media coverage of Miss Yonezu's protests has been discriminatory and chauvinist. A graduate of Tokyo Art University, she was described in newspapers covering the event in terms which suggested she was not only physically handicapped but psychologically disturbed. Japan's unique male-oriented semi-pornographic comic magazines have been quick to subject her to ridicule. The May 25 issue of "Big Comic" shows a cross-eyed young woman spraying paint on the picture "unable to contain her jealousy" --until she is carried off the scene (naturally, upside down with her bare legs waving) by two policemen.

The interview was conducted in the Shinjuku Lib Center, a center for activists in the women's movement where Miss Yonezu is a member of a women's collective. She is slender and delicate, soft-spoken--so that one is at first surprised by the speed and precision with which she organizes answers to questions. She was slightly tired after 18 days in jail and preparations for her defense, and she

2 Mona Lisa

occasionally rested on a pillow while she talked. A childhood victim of polio, her right leg is in a brace.

NAN: Newspapers reported that you blocked the entrance of other handicapped spectators by lying in front of the museum gate. What were your intentions in taking this action?

YONEZU: My purpose was not to prevent handicapped visitors from viewing the Mona Lisa, but to express my outrage at the society which forces them to see it alone. Since April 20 "healthy people" have been purchasing tickets and viewing the Mona Lisa, while handicapped people have been turned away. On May 10, the one day when handicapped people were able to enter the exhibition, "healthy" people were turned away.

In this sense, while my primary motive was to protest discrimination against handicapped people, my gesture was on behalf of "healthy" people as well, who are also victims of discrimination against the handicapped. In Japanese society, with its emphasis on super-productivity and speed, where every healthy, capable person is more or less worked to the bone, ordinary people will inevitably come to feel that handicapped people are in the way, require too much time, and so forth, and will gradually cool and harden their attitudes toward them. We, of course, often see this in the case of working mothers with babies, too. It is the false barrier that a rapacious industrial machine places between human beings that I wanted to protest.

The "Special Day" was symbolic of the "divide and isolate" process which goes on in Japanese society in other ways, too. The government graciously waives the ¥200 admission fee for its handicapped citizens, while refusing to spend the money necessary to give them the kind of life where they could afford to pay that ¥200 just like anybody else. (Note: The Japanese Health and Welfare Ministry's monthly stipend for handicapped citizens is ¥7,500 (\$25).)

The government saw to it that the "Special Day" was publicized well enough, but I don't think the publicity was really aimed at the handicapped people themselves. It was just to improve the image of the government among the public at large. Actually, I don't think most handicapped people entered the museum without certain anxieties such people usually feel in places they don't know well. Would they be able to use the bathroom facilities, for example, or emergency exits? But all of this was overlooked in the attempt to "dispose of the problem efficiently" by herding them all through on one day.

The whole idea is like the scheme for "disposing of the problem" of handicapped people in daily life by herding them into institutions so they won't be in people's way. You'll notice in Japan that all propaganda about institutions for the handicapped is addressed to the parents. Obviously, because if anyone consulted the handicapped themselves, they would not choose life in an institution above that with their families and friends. But they have no say. Their parents are just urged to think of them as a nuisance they would rather get off their hands.

NAN: Do you have any comment on your April 20 action?

YONEZU: Naturally many people found the action shocking. Although I maintained silence, the police were able to learn that I graduated from Tokyo Art University. "And you an art student!" they blinked self-righteously.

In fact, it was only after quite a bit of thought that I came to feel it was necessary for me to carry out this action. It was in no way directed against the Mona Lisa as a work of art. There seems to be undue confusion on this point. My act was a gesture of protest--no, outrage--against the way the Mona Lisa was exhibited and the distorted values the exhibit represented. "Shut out"--those were the words that crystallized in my mind. The exhibit was just another occasion to shut us out of the rest of society.

Why did I feel that I should be the one to challenge the insult to all handicapped Japanese? I felt that it was easier for me to act and accept the consequences than for most other handicapped people. Since I am able to walk, I could enter the exhibit myself, while others would have been turned away. I have no children or family who would suffer by my absence in jail. And I knew I could rely on my friends in the collective for help and support. But I don't want to justify the action as having been merely personally necessary for me. In the final analysis, it was Japanese society which demanded and made necessary the action by its inhuman treatment of handicapped persons.

--May 16, 1974

Women Fight for CONTROL

ABORTION STRUGGLE IN JAPAN

by Nagano Yoshiko

Japan - an "abortion paradise"? In the late '60s, as Japan started blossoming - economically, politically, militarily and ideologically - as a "great power," a campaign was launched to get rid of this country's supposedly disgraceful image as a heaven for abortions. This campaign has now become a national issue centering on the government's efforts to put through a bill reforming the "abortion" law. The ultimate aim of this campaign is to prevent the liberation of women from the male supremacist social structure and to insure our continued repression and exploitation in the interests of the "great power" of the '70s and beyond.

On May 11th of this year - for the third time in four years - the government introduced a bill in the Diet to change the present "Eugenic Protection Law" in order to tighten up the regulation of abortions. The bill's introduction was greeted by a strong opposition movement comprised of radical women's liberation groups, "handicapped" persons, liberals, even some conservatives. The Family Planning Federation, for instance, noting that many countries had followed the lead of Japan in liberalizing their abortion laws, called the bill "regressive" inviting "the ridicule of the world."

A clue as to the government's aim in sponsoring this unpopular and seemingly anachronistic legislation was provided by former Primer Minister Sato last year when he defended the same bill in the Diet. Though he touched on the "disgrace" of the "abortion paradise" label, his concern went further: to the so-called "destruction of the social order."

"Respect for life is being ignored in these times - as symbolized by the





confusion in sexual morality... We have to preserve the sense of nurturing the embryo as our own child, a gift from Heaven...not for the labor supply, but in relation to the social disorder, we should revise the Eugenic Protection Law which is a fundamental cause of social vice."

.... lady, you ain't poor

A key element in the proposed reform is the removal from the law of the "for economic reasons" clause as grounds for abortion. The government contends that whereas acute food and housing shortages in the immediate postwar years necessitated the liberal policy in effect up until now, the current improved standard of living obviates this part of the law.

In its reaction to the proposed reform, Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) challenged this contention. The chief of Sohyo's Women's Section stated that the present conditions of low wages, housing shortage and lack of childcare facilities compel women to have abortions. "The government should

take measures to solve these social problems instead of revising the present law."

A number of women's organizations such as Tokyo YWCA, the Japan Nurses' Association, the Women's Electorate League have united to oppose the bill; but the strongest opposition movement is being conducted by progressive women's groups like the Asian Women's Association and the Women's Democratic Club, women's liberation groups focused on the Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center, and persons suffering from cerebral palsy.

The day the reform bill was introduced in the Diet, a coalition of 22 such groups, "The Working Committee to Block the Reform of the Eugenic Protection Law," protested at the Ministry of Health and Welfare under slogans like "Women decide whether to bear babies or not," "Don't permit the government to control women's bodies," etc. On May 15th women's liberationists were ejected from the offices of the Health and Welfare Minister whom they had sought, unsuccessfully, to meet. Prospects for passage of the reform bill in the current Diet look dim, but the women and "handicapped"



persons leading the movement for its defeat have continued the demonstrations and teach-ins to fight the pernicious ideological trends the "reform" is aimed at consolidating.

.... we don't need 'em

Prominent in the struggle against the reform bill have been members of Aoishiba-no-kai, a group of cerebral palsy victims and their supporters. Labelled "handicapped," they are often regarded more like defective products than human beings; and the proposed reform of the Eugenic Protection Law contains a provision which further undercuts their already precarious existence. This provision explicitly OKs abortions in cases where it is found that if the pregnancy came to term the child would be born physically or mentally "handicapped." Actually the present, liberally administered law has given latitude to women to have an abortion in such cases. The inclusion of this clause, then, which might at first glance appear "compassionate," on the contrary, reinforces discrimination against the "handicapped." Yokota-san, a spokesman for Aoishiba-no-kai, said at a recent demonstration, "The reform bill denies the right of the

'handicapped' to live. It fails to put first things first. It is the urgent task of government to create a society where those who are born as the 'handicapped' do not feel unhappy."

.... mothers first

A third proposed change in the Eugenic Protection Law would authorize expansion of the service of the Eugenic Counseling Office set up under the present law to include "guidance" to women to encourage starting childbearing at the "proper" age (read "young"). This move to preserve the oppression of women in the nuclear family has its counterpart in the current outcry in the mass media against "the loss of motherhood" supposedly responsible for the infanticide and child-abandonment cases which have been given remarkable coverage in the past year. A recent court ruling in a child-custody case declared that mothers who were not wives and full-time stay-at-home babysitters were not fit. Another recent ruling which upheld discrimination against women in the work place underscores the government's determination to keep less oppressive life options outside the home closed to women.

Taken as a whole, then, the reform bill is aimed at prohibiting abortions "for economic reasons," encouraging abortions in cases of "handicapped" embryos, and finally, lowering the age at which women start childbearing, thus effectively controlling their entire life cycle.

Those were hard times....

The Eugenic Protection Law was established in 1948 to cope with the postwar social and economic chaos. There was a "baby boom," population control was considered essential for reconstruction, and black-market abortions were flourishing. The "for economic reasons" clause was added in 1949 in conditions of general and often acute poverty. A second revision in 1952 simplified the administrative procedure for obtaining an abortion, stipulating that only the permission of a certified doctor was required. The next year the figure for reported abortions jumped to over 1 million where it remained until 1961, when it started a slight decline. The total annual rate of abortions (illegal abortions included) is now estimated at between 2 and 3 million.

Also in 1952, anti-abortion forces, Catholic groups and a "Catholic-Shinto" groups called Seicho-no-Ie, formed the "League to Abolish the Eugenic Protection Law." Claiming that the Law, in permitting abortions "without restrictions," was responsible for a breakdown in morals, even "the loss of motherhood and humanity," they launched a campaign to outlaw abortion and eradicate the "abortion paradise."

The league's propaganda further bemoaned the fact that whereas in the good old days "natural selection" (without doing violence to "the traditional Japanese thought and spirit" no less) wiped out all but fit offspring by the age of twenty, these days, "superior babies are being aborted together with inferior ones." The present Eugenic Protection Law is, they say, "having a harmful effect on the Japanese race" in spite of the fact that its stated purpose is, besides protecting the life and health of the mother, "to prevent the birth of offspring inferior from the eugenic point of view."

The voices in the Diet raised in support of the present reform legislation

have, in fact, echoed this position. And the statement of the Minister of Health and Welfare defending the bill in last year's Diet all but declared abortion "immoral." But in the days of reconstruction, the Ministry felt the Eugenic Protection Law functioned effectively for population control and put off the strong demands of the ultra-nationalists and religionists with the argument that family planning was a priority.

It was in the late '60s that, backed by Seicho-no-Ie, LDP Diet members began to take up the question of revising the Eugenic Protection Law. In 1967 the then Minister of Health and Welfare launched the "wipe away the dishonor of the 'abortion paradise'" line, and the next year a white paper on public welfare announced: "Now that the national income has increased, it is time to consider prohibiting abortion for economic reasons."

The following year the Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted a survey on abortion with the cooperation of doctors of obstetrics and gynecology throughout the country. The result of this and other studies on population trends provided another angle for the forces calling for abortion reform. The 1969 Interim Report on Population Trends in Japan noted that while a fertility rate of 2.33 is necessary to maintain zero population growth, the present fertility rate in Japan is just 2. The net reproduction rate is less than 1, the lowest in the world except for Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Since this low rate has continued for over ten years, the Report concludes that "it is desirable to regain a net reproduction rate of over 1, that is, an average of over 2.10 babies per female."

Business circles, already faced with a labor shortage and worried by the figures showing a declining birth rate, joined the movement to revise the Eugenic Protection Law. Their tone recalled the prewar nationalist slogan, "Have babies, increase our posterity!" Yet, interestingly enough, when its Final Report came out in 1970, the Ministry of Health and Welfare played down the alarmist conclusions others had drawn from the survey results. The head of the Ministry's Institute for Population Problems noted, furthermore, that while

Japan had a net reproduction rate below 1, so did all Western countries. And he pointed out that the females born in the "baby boom" years would soon start childbearing.

Nationalists and a few business men aside, few people in the year 1973 believe abortions should be curtailed because of a "population crisis." The question remains: what is the aim of the legislation to reform the Eugenic Protection Law?

Many critics of the proposed reform have maintained that if abortion for economic reasons is outlawed many women will be forced to resort to illegal abortions. If we look more carefully at the administration of the present law, however, and at the attitude of the medical establishment toward the proposed reform, this criticism would seem to miss the point. This author shares the opinion of those who believe that the bill is not aimed primarily at decreasing the number of legally performed abortions.

In the present Eugenic Protection Law there are five items under which a woman may be granted an abortion. Item 4 covers the case of "A mother whose health may be affected seriously by continuation of pregnancy or by delivery from the physical or economic viewpoint." Although women's reasons for seeking abortions are obviously varied, 99.7% of them turn up on the mandatory reports from abortion practitioners simply as the "maternal health" of Item 4.


When the abortion reform bill was first presented in the Diet four years ago there was considerable protest from the medical profession. This year hardly a doctor's voice was heard on the matter - an indication, in part at least, that doctors are confident that their discretionary powers would not be lessened under the bill, nor their clientele decreased.

The aim of the reform law is not to decrease abortions - to insure an adequate labor supply, say - but to shift the "blame" for abortion from society (which in itself necessitates abortions for economic reasons) to the individual woman. The reform bill, which would substitute the "mental health" of the mother for

"economic reasons" carries the implication that women who have abortions are not psychologically normal or are "easy women" who have deviated from public morality. The government would like to have this invisible moral weapon to hold over the heads of the women of the "Japanese Empire" it is now in the process of shaping. "Wipe away the dishonor of the 'abortion paradise'" - but not abortion with its attendant suffering for women.

The Eugenic Protection Law, whose purpose is "to prevent the birth of inferior posterity and to protect the life and health of mothers," inherited the spirit of the National Eugenic Law in effect from 1940 to the end of the war. To preserve the purity of the Yamato race, that law forced women to have babies for Tenno (the Emperor) with penalties for the "crime of abortion." The same ultra-nationalist, male chauvinist motivation has lain dormant in the postwar Eugenic Protection Law and would seek fuller expression in its "reform." This is shown by the fact that while liberally applying the Eugenic Protection Law for its own purposes after the war, the government never struck the "crime of abortion" from the books. Article 212 of the Criminal Law makes it a crime punishable by





imprisonment for a woman to abort her unborn fetus. Since the number of persons who have been prosecuted under this law since the war has been infinitesimal, its purpose is clearly not to prevent abortion, but to assert the government's "right" to control women's reproductive function.

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On a recent Sunday in Tokyo over 500 people gathered at a meeting called by the "Working Committee to Block the Reform of the Eugenic Protection Law." Most were young women, some with little children; there were older women scattered here and there; a large contingent of "handicapped" persons attended, some in wheelchairs; there were some men, too. After several speakers explained the significance of the reform bill's three main points, discussion was opened and the mother of a mentally retarded person stood up to speak.

"When I came into this hall somebody handed me a leaflet calling for the dissolution altogether of the Eugenic Protection Law. When I saw that I could have jumped for joy. Even the Law as it now stands expresses an essential discrimination against the 'handicapped.' Besides fighting against

this reform bill, we must cry out against the whole 'Eugenic Protection' system!"

The leaflet she referred to, prepared by a Tokyo women's liberation group, questioned the dominant line in the anti-reform bill movement which sees an increase in illegal abortions as the main threat of the bill. "That is not the point," the leaflet says.

"The reform bill illustrates clearly the character of the Eugenic Protection Law: an ideological attack on women who challenge the family system in which children are brought up for the interests of the ruling powers... Now is the time to demand the dissolution altogether of the Eugenic Protection Law, to call into question a society based on authoritarianism and discrimination, to smash the structure of 'superior - inferior'."

I believe that, whatever their opinion may be when they enter the struggle, women will more and more come to recognize the moralistic repression as the movement develops to dissolve the Eugenic Protection system and to abolish the crime of abortion. Confident that the movement has prevented the reform bill from coming up for deliberations this year, the coalition of women and "handicapped" persons have planned rallies and demonstrations in the movement against the Eugenic Protection System. ■■

Where is the PILL?

Six big drug companies in Japan produce the Pill for export to Southeast Asia. It is not commercially available in Japan.

In December, 1971, the Pill was designated by the Minister of Health and Welfare as a drug to be bought only with a doctor's prescription. The Ministry's "warning" to druggists up to then not to sell the Pill for purposes other than "regulating menstration" had proved ineffective. Now conversations like the following are apt to be heard at drug-stores around the country.

"Do you have the Pill?" a woman asks.
"Sorry, we don't carry such a thing," a druggist replies with a frown.
"Well, then, do you have 'Norluten-Dl' or 'Ovulen'?" The woman mentions the names of two "pills" she has learned by heart.

"Yes, but we can't sell them without a doctor's prescription."

"Norluten and Ovulen are the same as the Pill, aren't they? It's funny you have them, but you don't have the Pill."

The flustered druggist replies, "We would be prosecuted if we sold the Pill," and he explains the notice of the Ministry.

Interestingly enough, since the Pill was designated a drug for which a doctor's prescription is required, production and sales have increased. According to one Diet member's investigation, sales of the brand "Evinat" have gone up 40%, and 80% for "Lindiol" in the first three months after the Ministry decision. Women

have difficulty getting the Pill at pharmacies - where they cost from 500 to 700 yen for a month's supply - but doctors sell the Pill freely, charging from 1,800 to 2,000 yen for the same amount. The Ministry is dealing with the "problem of harmful side effects of the Pill" by making its restricted sale a lucrative business for doctors.

But while the Pill is still "banned" in Japan, it is being exported on a massive scale to Southeast Asia. Ono-Seiyaku, one of the big pharmaceutical companies in Japan, has been conducting research on the postconception abortifacient, "Prostaglandins," for eight years. Two years ago doctors in the medical schools of National Universities started clinical tests of the effects of this drug. These tests were deemed successful enough to permit the production of Prostaglandins in tablet form for export to Southeast Asia. The doctors did not feel, however, that the drug was safe enough yet for sale in Japan! Further research was necessary, they said, to eliminate the danger of harmful side effects of the drug.

Recalling the Black and Puerto Rican women who were used as human guinea pigs for the development of the Pill in the United States, Southeast Asian women are being given an evidently risky drug while in Japan women are being "protected" from the harmful effects of the Pill by an illogical and inconsistent "policy" of prohibition.

Photos:

P. 14, above: "Dissolve the Health and Welfare Ministry"
-- Women's surprise sit-in on May 15, 1973

P. 14, below: The first nation-wide assembly of women's liberation groups held in Tokyo May, 1972

P. 15: Health and Welfare Ministry's male bureaucrats terrified by women's shout against the bill

P. 16: Women fight for control -- Demonstration in Tokyo June, 1972

P. 18: "Unmarried" mothers fighting against the family system

P. 19: "Block the reform of the Eugenic Protection Law"
-- Meeting held in Tokyo on May 20, 1973

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* With this article,
* AMPO starts carry-
* ing a series of
* articles of Japan-
* ese women fighting
* against sexual
* discrimination.
*
* Women's caucus
* in AMPO
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People's Power is Only Pollution Counter-Measure

AMPO: It is well known that pollution is one of the most serious problems in Japan, and that the government and some business firms nowadays speak frequently about pollution countermeasures. As an activist in the anti-pollution movement and also as a specialist, would you explain something about this recent situation?

UI: Pollution countermeasures should not just be understood in terms of technology as people often do. They are primarily a social behavior of the polluting corporations and the government, and should be understood as their countermeasures against the anti-pollution movements carried on by the victims of their pollution and local people. Whether proper steps are taken to eliminate pollution or not is determined not by economic factors alone but by broad sociological factors, the most important of which are the awareness of the people and the power relationship existing between the victims and the victimizers. This is why I say that there is no third party as far as pollution is concerned. If the victimizing side is socially powerful, pollution is aggravated. If the victims become socially strong, the assailants find it more difficult to keep polluting the environment. Any action or measure taken serves either to strengthen one side or the other and only the measures that serve to help the victims can be considered the real pollution countermeasures.

AMPO: So, are you saying that under no circumstances can business firms and government think in terms of the interests of the people?

UI: Correct. The Japanese government has developed a special mechanism for protecting the interests of business firms. We cannot distinguish between the government and business, when they set out to decide, for instance, criteria for waste discharge. They collude with each other. Under these circumstances, the victims of pollution always confront not only the victimizing corporations but also the entire political-bureaucratic structure because they mystify the root cause of pollution by taking complex measures.

AMPO: Is that why you once said that the best pollution countermeasure is to set up libraries in all localities where necessary documents are available to the public? In a word, you trust only in the power of the people to fight against pollution.

UI: You are right. Let me talk about the case of Kochi Pulp Co. set up in 1948 and closed down last year. It is a typical case. Its sulphite pulp factory was built as a major regional development project of Kochi Prefecture in Shikoku Island, with the strong backing of the prefectural office. However, local people were warned because they knew that a sulphite pulp factory would cause tremendous pollution. Therefore, they forced the company to sign a fantastic agreement with them--an agreement unparalleled in its democratic contents. They set up a joint control committee, two thirds of whose members were from local inhabitants and the remaining one third from "third party" people. Under the contract, the company had to deposit

SISTERS AGAINST SLAVERY:

A Look at Anti-Prostitution Movements in Japan

by Kaji Etsuko and Jean Inglis

When women from thirty different groups gathered in Tokyo to celebrate International Women's Day, 1974, they responded to the appeals of their South Korean sisters by pledging to unite in struggle against the thriving prostitution system known as *kisaeng** tourism. Japan's shameful history of exploitation of Korea, culminating in the current collaboration of Japanese capital with the Pak regime, has long weighed heavily on the consciousness of Japanese women activists. Last autumn, however, when a demonstration of Korean university women greeted planeloads of Japanese men arriving in Kimpo International Airport with the message, "Go home, sex animals, stop prostituting our country!" we made the fresh and shocking discovery that economic exploitation has brought sexual exploitation to thousands of Korean women who seek employment in the government-run *kisaeng* houses catering to the Japanese "sex animal."

As the movement against *kisaeng* tourism gains strength in Japan, it becomes clear that a strong anti-imperialism and the special feelings we have as Japanese toward the Korean people -- feelings which grow out of our knowledge of Japan's long exploitation of Korea-- provide much of the motivating force for our efforts. In fact, it might be said that, while this is an antiprostitution struggle, it is because the prostitutes are Korean, and the buyers Japanese, that it arose. But why is there no sentiment at present to support a movement against prostitution involving Japanese women in Japan? Perhaps women in the present movement in Japan might find an antiprostitution movement per se all too reminiscent of the liberal post-

*Similar to Japanese geisha. Tourists sign up for "kisaeng parties" that begin with dinner and traditional entertainment.

war movement of our mothers. Historian Morosawa Yoko has aptly caricatured that movement as "the faithful wife of a good-for-nothing-husband": it scolded and badgered Japanese society for its "disgraceful" treatment of women, without touching the basic structure of that society. Looking back even further, we may be discouraged to find the same weakness in the antiprostitution movements of our grandmothers and great-grandmothers. All of these movements went hand in hand with broader efforts to raise the status of women in general, as their participants recognized in the dehumanized prostitute the other side of the dehumanized wife. Two types of ideological blindness, however, limited these efforts to partial realization. On the one hand, feminist leaders of long-term reform movements naively believed that the establishment of monogamy was the key to improving women's conditions. Socialist women and anarchists, on the other hand, although they challenged marriage itself, imagined innocently that both prostitution and oppression in marriage would disappear with the triumph of socialism. But the flow of events of Japan's modern age all too quickly revealed the limitations of these beliefs. While the demands of the first group were of the sort that could be -- and were ultimately -- coopted, the lack of a clearly defined feminist theory in the latter's ideology meant that they had to face not only severe repression from the State, but also betrayal by their sexist comrades.

Today, we who hope to do better must confront and learn from the failures of our predecessors. To look at our history is to be reminded that unless we build an ideology and struggle that radically denies being made objects of men under whatever form, our daughters may hear male history pass the same judgment on our efforts as it passed on each



On this year's International Women's Day (March 8) women demonstrate carrying large streamers attacking sexual exploitation of Korean *kisaeng* women by Japanese male tourists. This streamer names seven Japanese travel agencies responsible for sexual aggression in S. Korea... Tokyu Kanko, JTB, Kinki Nihon etc.

Photo by Matsumoto Michiko

generation before, "Look, even the stones speak." Our anti-*kisaeng* tourism movement must find deeper roots in our understanding of our own non-liberation as women in Japanese society.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

"Japan is a hell for women," observed Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the foremost ideologues of Japan's Meiji modernization, almost eighty years ago. This remark was no overstatement in a Japan where the feudalistic ideology of the samurai ruling class still prevailed. This ideology had as its concrete base the *ie* patriarchal proprietary family system, a system which denied the humanity of its female members.

Under the *ie* system the patriarch exercised absolute power over the family members just as a lord over his subjects, and only the eldest son could succeed to the patriarch's position of authority. Not only could women never succeed to the headship, it was not even considered

necessary to register a female born into the *ie*. (According to the laws of the *bakufu*, sons born into samurai families had to be registered, if not after birth then upon reaching adulthood.) This oversight of its female members reflected the fact that the *ie* did not actually consider them members at all.

The peripheral nature of women's position in the samurai *ie* was true of the merchant class as well. An 18th century document on family teachings for this class reads, "When there is no natural son in the family, common sense dictates taking a bridegroom for a daughter. Wise men, however, have taught us that a daughter cannot be considered a genuine descendent of the family. If, therefore, you are afraid your line will die out, adopt a son of the same family name and give your daughter to another family."

What was this woman, then, who had no social existence in the family lineage? She was the bearer of her husband's children and their nurse. According to a popular

aphorism of the time, "A woman's womb is just something to borrow." A lord of this period famous for his wisdom, Uesugi Yozaan, counselled his granddaughter upon her marriage, "Since a man takes a wife in order to have an heir, you must never become jealous no matter how many women your husband keeps. Your only responsibility is to seek ways for him to have more sons. If you find a woman better than yourself, you should recommend her to your husband. This is the path a wife should follow." Polygamy, far from being considered in disgraceful, was good family morality.

It is not surprising to find that prostitution flourished in this age of universal misogyny. "Concubines are necessities," one intellectual of the time, Ogiu Sorai, said. Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Edo Bakufu, even prescribed the number of mistresses appropriate for men of the respective classes in his social code, which served as common law for that time. He further dictated how both mistresses and wives were to be treated. Although mistresses were recognized as performing a specifically sexual function, in fact, there was no essential difference in their rights, or lack thereof, and those of a wife. In Edo (present day Tokyo) there were more than 15,000 prostitutes among a population of 530,000. There were 11 designated areas of prostitution located near shrines and no one knows how many undesignated ones. Prostitution was protected, even encouraged, by the ruling class. Japan at the close of the feudal age was indeed a hell for women, prostitutes or otherwise.

MODERNIZATION

In 1868 the dominant powers in the ruling class declared the end of feudalism and the commencement of Japan's race toward modernization based on capitalism-under-the-Emperor. "Leave Asia, join Europe" seems to have been the watchword of the day, as intellectuals and members of the ruling class stumbled over each other in their rush to embrace the bourgeois ideology of the Western world. They soon discovered, however, that in terms of that ideology the lowly position of women in Japan put their modernization efforts in a poor light. This prompted the adoption of a few progressive measures such as the opening of elementary schools

to girls in 1872. But since measures to raise the low position of women were largely formal concessions, they had little or no real impact. In 1872, for instance, the government was forced to issue a decree "to liberate prostitutes" out of sheer embarrassment. Having joined the European community in condemning Peru for engaging in "human traffic" in bringing Chinese coolies into Japan, it found itself being called hypocritical for its boldfaced sanctioning of human traffic in females. Its decree was pure diplomatic bombast, while outlawing "human traffic" and deploring that such women "are deprived of human rights, having a status no better than cows and horses," the document went on to reaffirm the right of women who so wished to work as geishas or prostitutes. The system of public prostitution continued unchanged.

In the early days of Meiji the government was faced with the problem of establishing a legal structure along Western lines. Its 1870 law, still largely reflecting pre-Meiji legal concepts, had established that both concubine and wife occupied the same social position in the family below the husband-head. When in 1882 a modern-style criminal law was promulgated, the concubine was no longer a member of the *ie* as far as the patriarch's legal responsibility was concerned. Formal monogamy was starting to gain ground; but the actual position of wives was not thereby improved any more than that of concubines.

The strong pressure to legally establish monogamy occurred in the context of drawing up modern Japan's civil code. To the French legal advisor engaged by the Meiji government, the polygamy arising from the *ie* system with its almighty patriarch was, not surprisingly, anathema. The Japanese government imposed on women the same status as minors or insane persons, with no power to perform legally binding actions without the permission of the husband. Provisions were made for recognition of and inheritance by children, sons that is, born to mistresses. From the Emperor on down those in authority continued to practice *de facto* polygamy; to have mistresses was said to show a man's virility.

THE MOVEMENT

In Japan, organized attempts by women



A cartoon for the baby? No. An anti-*Kisaeng* tourism placard. A scene during the March 8 demonstration. Photo by Matsumoto Michiko

to end prostitution are as old as the feminist movement itself. The first movement as such for women's rights launched in 1886 by *Kyofukai*, advanced twin demands for the legal establishment of monogamy and the abolition of licensed prostitution. This group, which took its name from the Western Women's Temperance Union, presented its demands in the form of petitions to the Meiji government, which at this time was preparing its "modern" civil code. *Kyofukai* hoped, by the elimination of polygamy and licensed prostitution, to establish "pure homes,"

based on equality between husband and wife, in which there would be feudalistic discrimination neither between spouses nor between parents and children.

The dominant ideology behind this movement, as with other people's rights movements in early Meiji, was Christian humanism, --with both its liberal and its puritanical aspects. The church was seen by *Kyofukai* members as a base where "social life would be fostered, women's status raised, and relations between men and women nurtured." Later, as the feudalistic imperialism of the State began to assert itself, these Western liberal ideas gradually lost prestige.

In 1889 *Kyofukai* launched its first nation-wide appeal. Women dressed in white robes delivered their petition to the government, carrying daggers used for *hara-kiri* to symbolize their life-and-death commitment to realizing its demands. The abolition of prostitution was central to their argument for the establishment of monogamy. "The custom of having concubines destroys home life and has an adverse influence on children," the petition started. They also condemned the unfairness of the Japanese custom of punishing adultery only when it was committed by the wife, and demanded that women be allowed to divorce on grounds of the husband's adultery. Aside from the formal concession already noted of outlawing men's double marriages, *Kyofukai*'s efforts, which continued into the Taisho era, did not realize even the limited goal of improving women's position as wife. The establishment of monogamy based on equality of marital legal rights was not realized until the postwar American Occupation.

The anti-prostitution movement, as the reverse side of the movement to establish monogamy, may have manifested a type of snobbery on the part of oppressed wives, but many of its leaders, mainly Christians, were genuinely concerned for the prostitutes themselves. One of them, Kubushiro Ochimi, was moved to join *Kyofukai* after hearing how Japanese prostitutes, who fled their San Francisco houses in the wake of the 1906 earthquake only to be ousted by the "upright" citizens of Oakland, were given shelter by Temperance Union women. She and others attacked the Japanese government for its policy of "exporting prostitution." At the time, impoverished women, especially

from Kyushu, were being sold to work all over Asia, and Japanese prostitutes in places like Siberia were a major means of giving Japanese products a foothold there. As with *Kisaeng* tourism today, the economic and political interests behind prostitution were very strong, strong enough to sustain the government through such crises of embarrassment as the scandal of "dirty" Japanese prostitutes in the U.S.

In 1923, *Kyofukai* became the nucleus for a new organization committed to struggling against prostitution: the "National Association for the Abolition of Prostitution." The group made appeals to the government with the cooperation of other humanists, and launched a petition campaign in which 15,000 signatures were collected in a single day. Yet it is not surprising that the government steadfastly ignored these demands. From the Meiji era on, Japan had held the distinction of being the one "modern" nation to refuse to sign international conventions outlawing licensed prostitution. Finally, with the advance of fascism in the 30's, even reformist women's movements were repressed.

During the Pacific War the government mobilized about 80,000 women, most of them Koreans, to be sent to the front as "war consolers." After the defeat, police stations throughout Japan were ordered to recruit *ianfu* (army prostitutes) for the Occupation Army and set up facilities for them. Older Japanese women still remember ads circulated in Tokyo which said, "Wanted: Modern-thinking Women to cooperate in the important work of consoling Allied forces at national emergency facilities. Age 18-25, etc..." The chief of police at the time stated that the reason for this recruitment of prostitutes was to "protect ordinary women and girls."

With the advent of postwar democracy, women were free again to protest, and again one of their main aims was to see prostitution outlawed. Yet despite the speed with which other reforms related to women were pushed through by the Occupation, five long years passed before a Prostitution Prevention Law was finally passed. In 1955, a Labor Ministry report records there were 2,000 places where licensed prostitutes were working, and 37,000 prostitutes. With the passage of the 1955 law this network was largely

dismantled.

Still today, almost ninety years after the first antiprostitution movement, *Kisaeng* tourism, and many other forms of prostitution, are thriving. A look at popular women's magazines in recent years, moreover, shows that at the same time wives are being advised to become more and more like prostitutes within the framework of monogamy. Women in previous movements hoped that if man's despotism in the home could be eliminated and legal reinforcement for prostitution removed their position would be improved. But they failed to analyze the fundamental split which sexist society imposes on woman's nature in the form of the two poles represented by monogamy and prostitution. Perhaps they would be puzzled by the prevailing psychology today, demanding that women incorporate what they had thought were two antithetical female roles. Or perhaps they would not be so surprised having so long observed the male exponents of this alienation commuting back and forth between wife and whore, sometimes calling the wife "dirty" and the whore "pure"; sometimes seeing "holy motherhood" in the wife and a "poisonous flower" in the whore. The wife-whore division of labor which continues to be imposed on women is at the very basis of the deprivation of our humanity, making both wife and whore simply interchangeable objects in the private property system, one as a domestic, the other as a sexual, slave.

This brief overview of antiprostitution movements in Japan has had to overlook a number of women's movements which undoubtedly had a great bearing on the understanding of prostitution held by many women: the struggle for political rights for women from the times of the earliest pre-socialist peoples' rights groups, organizing among working women, the influence of women in the outlawed marxist groups, the "bluestockings" movement of writers which articulated well womens' outrage at their alienation and gave women a vision of their history in the matriarchal age of female political authority and sexual autonomy. We must restudy all these movements, not just to discover their "mistakes" -- if that word can be justly used about people working against such heavy odds -- but also in hopes of learning from their courage and pride.●

SEIRANKAI

Thunder on the Ultra-Right

by Yamakawa Akio

Is Japan again headed toward fascism? This question, posed as the 1970s began, has taken on new urgency. In recent months the possibility of a fascist resurgence has been vigorously debated throughout Japan. Fears are based upon the following factors:

First, committed to a policy of rapid overseas economic expansion, Japan now faces potentially crippling shortages of oil and other resources. In the 1930s, when a resource-poor Japan experienced pressures from the great powers (the so-called ABCD encirclement), it opted for fascist rule at home and military aggression abroad. Mounting international hostility toward Japan--above all successive blows from the United States culminating in pressures on Japan's oil lifeline in the 1973 crisis--has again raised the spectre of encirclement.

Second, with the current upsurge of domestic economic grievances, particularly inflation, the Communist Party has made significant advances as a parliamentary force. Public support for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has declined to the point where the Upper House elections in July may cost it its decades long parliamentary majority. Unable to hammer out viable countermeasures to deal with its situation, the LDP appears bereft of any effective means to assure its electoral hegemony. Big business, for its part, has exploited the rampant inflation to form price cartels, hoard goods and raise prices. The result has been enormous profits, but also a series of scandals involving the major firms and the LDP. Under these circumstances, social forces with a stake in conservative rule have become crisis-minded. On January 19, the London *Economist* warned that countries experiencing price rises of 20 per cent a year would sooner or later have despotic governments. It is a prediction with ominous import for Japan, whose

inflation is the most severe among the industrial powers.

Third, the strength of frustrated rightist forces is on the rise, precipitating a rash of threats of "drastic actions," including terrorism. Current police estimates place hardcore rightist strength at 450 organizations with 115,000 active members (up 50,000 from 1960). Groups and organizations under their influence bring total right wing strength to an estimated two million.

A rightwing organization, the Bokyo Teishintai (Anti-Communist Volunteer Corps), recently plastered Tokyo's main streets with posters warning the Japanese Foreign Minister: "Ohira, You Shall Die!" Rightists charge that Ohira made rash and embarrassing promises to Washington concerning the planned visit of the Emperor to the United States. In the face of fierce rightwing opposition within the LDP, Ohira's conclusion of an airline service agreement with China has also come under attack. Meanwhile, the *Yamato Shimbun*, a rightwing daily, reported in its January 31 issue that action-oriented ultrarightists had organized a terrorist group to attack not only leaders of the Left, but Cabinet ministers (including Ohira) and some business leaders. Although the veracity of this report is questionable, such talk of terrorist actions is reminiscent of the situation that preceded the famous February 26 incident of 1936. At that time, plans for a coup were hatched by young army officers, frustrated by the corruption and profiteering of politicians and businessmen and convinced by the advance of leftwing forces in the preceding election and by the strengthened ABCD encirclement that Japan was "in crisis." The political and military elite crushed the youthful junta in the name of the Emperor, then utilized the incident to extend the scope of Imperial fascism.