

Vietnam GI

January 1968

Free

BONDS? BALLS!

The TV screen shows troops pouring out of their helicopter, ready for an operation, as the unseen commentator intones: "Do you buy Savings Bonds where you work? They do." This spot commercial is shown constantly on every stateside TV network. It implies that if GIs can be patriotic enough to buy Savings Bonds as well as fight in the war, then everybody else should be patriotic enough to at least buy Bonds.

The problem is that the public is not buying enough Bonds, which is why the Administration is putting out all this horseshit propaganda. Unlike WWII, when people backed the war by buying a fantastic number of Bonds, most civilians don't like this war and aren't interested in sacrificing for it. You don't see

DON'T BUY!

Johnson sinking his \$15 million fortune into Savings Bonds!

But then there's one group of Americans who can always be run through the wringer—servicemen. As LBJ put it the other week while visiting Bergstrom AFB: "One of the things I am proudest of is the men who do most of the fighting do most of the financing, too." Every CO has had his "quota" of Bonds to sell, and in unit after unit men have been pressured into signing up for the Payroll Savings Plan. Even guys with heavy allotments have been pushed to take out an additional deduction for Bonds. In some cases "non-conforming" GIs have been called before their COs.

Now DoD is scrambling to halt a Congressional bill aimed at eliminating this practice. S1036, a bill introduced by Sen. Ervin (D-N.C.), makes it a criminal offense, punishable by court martial, for an officer to force or intimidate his men into buying Bonds. S1036 has already passed the Senate and is awaiting action by the House. Defense officials claim no such law is needed, as new directives forbidding such command abuses are already cleaning up the problem.

As usual, the Pentagon moves to protect servicemen only when public pressure threatens to expose one of their games. GIs are already giving their time, risking their asses, and putting up with military life besides; why should they be harassed into using their small paychecks to pay for the damn war as well?—

"It seemed like I'd been doing this all my life..."

Dave Truck, 26, finds working at the Cleveland Post Office much calmer than his 13-month tour in Vietnam. A combat veteran, he spent most of his tour out in the field in the Central Highlands.

SHARLET: What unit were you in over there, Dave?

TUCC: I was in the A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, which is a part of the 3rd Brigade of the 25th. You know at that time our base camp was near Pleiku. I landed there January 8th, 1966 and flew back February 9, 1967. So that was the outfit I was in.

SHARLET: Did you and your buddies in the 3rd Brigade think you were combat-ready when you went over there.

TUCC: I would have to admit

M-16

The M-16 controversy has produced the biggest Washington scandal of the Viet War. Ever since late 1966, when stories about M-16s jamming in combat first appeared in the newspapers, the Pentagon has tried to pass the buck. As usual, they put the blame on GIs, who were supposed to have caused the jamming by not bothering to clean their own guns.

The GI's sloppiness was said to have been especially bad since the M-16's design makes it an easy gun to get fouled. Okay! Then why didn't the Army training manual tell guys this? Instead, it misled soldiers about the weapon their lives might depend on.

"THIS WEAPON REQUIRES THE LEAST MAINTENANCE OF ANY TYPE WEAPON WITHIN THE ARMY ARSENAL TODAY THIS RIFLE WILL FIRE LONGER WITHOUT CLEANING OR OILING THAN ANY OTHER KNOWN RIFLE."


That statement is pure baloney. And while we're on it, we might mention that the experts sent to Vietnam in '66 to trouble-shoot the M-16 found a widespread shortage of cleaning supplies!

But the lousiest part of the whole M-16 scandal is the story of the new, cheaper ammo. Back in 1964 the DoD decided to make a change in the M-16's ammu-

tion. They wanted to re-use a large stock of surplus gunpowder the DoD had originally purchased for other uses. And they got a company, Winchester, to do just this, making M-16 ammo cheaper.

But this "bargain basement" ammo often caused excessive fouling under heavy fire. The M-16's inventor, Eugene Stoner, the manufacturer, Colthustries, and the Small Arms Weapons Study all warned about this. In fact, back in 1964 Colt told the DoD that the new rounds caused so much fouling that over half of the M-16s couldn't pass acceptance tests. Of course, DoD told Colt to just keep on testing rifles with the old ammo. Common sense, isn't it? Then DoD turned right around and shipped millions of rounds of this same inferior ammo to Vietnam.

Well, you all know what happened. Some rifles jammed in combat, GIs wrote home about it, and the fat was in the fire. Now that the politicians and the newspapers are in on the game, DoD brass are making changes. A chromed chamber, heavier buffer, and manual bolt-closure are all on the latest model. But our question is: If the new, cheaper ammo wasn't good enough for Colt, how come DoD thought it was good enough for GIs in combat?—



classes in jungle warfare, jungle survival; we even had a prisoner of war camp, you know, which was made as realistic as possible, including the beatings. I would say that only the 173rd was ahead of us, and they were stationed on Okinawa before they left.

SHARLET: How did guys you knew in your outfit feel about it before and after?

TUCC: Well, in the first place you gotta remember that most of the guys didn't think about it politically. They looked upon it as another duty station, an adventure. At first everyone was scared, but since everyone hated Hawaii they were glad to be gone. In the main, by that time most guys thought we had no business getting involved in it, but they figured that since we were over there...you know, they figured that it's the same with any war, the politicians start it and the soldiers have to fight it.

SHARLET: Why did all you guys hate Hawaii?



TUCC: One of the reasons we hated Hawaii is because the local people certainly didn't appreciate the military. In fact, in the little town right outside Scofield barracks the GIs had to go in pairs and carry knives, because the local boys would jump on them. See, now, what I'm trying to say now, the Hawaiians will be friendly to tourists, those they can make money off of, but if you're a serviceman who spends time just unfriendly. I can count on my fingers the number of guys, both black and white, who had Hawaiian girlfriends, because it's just that the local girls wouldn't associate with us.

In fact, it was so bad that my outfit supplied gunners in those helicopter outfits. The Commanding General thought the

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EDITORIAL

THE VIPs

We are veterans of the Vietnam war. From our experience we know the Administration has lied to us and other Americans. Our being there had nothing to do with helping the Vietnamese people. Instead, we were there to keep in power a group of corrupt generals in Saigon who are hated and feared by most Vietnamese. In fact, any GI in the Nam knows the SVN government is so phony it wouldn't last a day without outside support—us!

There was not a goddamn good reason on earth for our being there. In other words, we agree with Gen. David Shoup, Marine Corps Commandant under President Kennedy, who says: I don't think the whole of Southeast Asia, as related to the present and future safety and freedom of the people of this country, is worth the life or limb of a single American.

We are bitter about our own experiences there—especially about our friends who didn't make it back from this lousy, worthless war. In other words, our basic opinion is that we ought to get the Hell out of there now before and more GIs die so the U.S. Government can play world cop.

VIETNAM GI, therefore, is an attempt to give stateside GIs the truth about the war. Moreover, as every GI in the Nam knows what it's like trying to get any "news" out of STARS & STRIPES, we want to supply some uncensored news. Third, it seems like everyone has been heard from on the war except for the main group which has been and still is fighting in it—the enlisted men. So we want to give servicemen and Vietnam vets a chance to express their views. We have been asked by servicemen, especially sailors, if the name of the paper, VIETNAM GI, means that it's a rag for Army guys alone. No, we want it to be an all-service paper which reports the experiences and views of Marines, Navy, and Air Force guys, too. Its name is mostly

The stateside scene is starting to get hip to the fact that all these Congressmen who keep touring the Nam are just after publicity and headlines. Instead of "boosting morale," these guys are just a pain in the neck to the ordinary GI. And all this "fact finding" stuff is a lot of bunk—how much can they learn boozing it up in Saigon and going on Gen. Westy's guided tours? Under the headline "Viet headache: the vips" the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS recently gave an example of the kind of stuff that's going on:

"The ripples created by the impending or even possible arrival of a VIP are far-reaching."

"At one field hospital in Saigon, for example, there is a special kit of brushes, polishes and the like to prepare for the visiting firemen. The kit includes a long string that is unwound and used to help line up the beds in a perfectly straight line."

"On the slim possibility that President Johnson might visit the hospital last week, the patients were awakened in the early morning hours for a crash polishing operation."

"Mr. Johnson went instead to Cam Ranh Bay."



"Say, Serge, could you give me that domino theory again?"

a result of the fact that the present group of Vietnam vets associated with the paper is somewhat overloaded with Army guys. We hope to have a more balanced group in the near future.

So yes, we definitely want to hear from you guys in the other services, too.

my pack and also a mail sack. SHARLET: How did you get changed around?

TUCK: Well, I stayed the mail clerk there for the first two months, and then I got into a big argument. See, this black

sergeant accused me of attempting to hinder the mails while I was on KP, because I wouldn't give him the keys to my mail safe. Naturally, since I'm responsible for it, I'm not supposed to give them to anyone else under regulations. You know how sometimes the Army is a stickler for regulations! So I told the man to go and see the executive officer, but instead this Uncle Tom goes to the Sergeant-Major and tells him I'm hindering the mails.

Now, how in the world can I hinder the mails when I'm on KP? But you know good and well if you're a GI, that liars will stick together, whether you're right or wrong. So what they did, they went that time to the

Fucking Up Quietly

name withheld


From TV reports we get the impression that the pilots flying missions over the North are a group of gung-ho, John Wayne types, but I can tell you from my own experiences in Vietnam that a lot of these cats are scared shitless.

I was a personnel



clerk with the 2nd Air Div HQ at Tan Son Nhut. Although I was only an A/1C, I was in the typical service scene where an enlisted clerk has a lot of power. For instance, in my job I had "life and death" power because I assigned pilots in VN. When they needed a body at Bien Hoa or Danang (which was the worst duty), either Scott AFB would send a pilot's name or I would just pick a name from our master list and cut orders for him. Lots of times one of these cats would come up and try to cop out. If he didn't have a good story and it looked like he was going any-ways, then he would offer me some bread, a bottle of scotch or a chick if I would reassign him. Most of these guys were pretty shook about the whole idea.

One major was already flying



adjutant and told him I was trying to hinder the mail. Well, fortunately I had a friend in the office at that time, and as soon as I went off KP I went to see the adjutant. And he gave me this BS. You know: "Tuck, even though you're doing a good job and you had a perfect score on your IG, still, it's just like the battalion commander: If he can't get along with his officers, he gets rid of them. So from now on watch your step."

In the meantime, that day I had to take some mail out to the field, and I didn't need anyone to tell me this. So the Sergeant-Major he stops me and asks me where I'm going, deliberately knowing I'm taking the mail out, you know. So, I tell the man, "I'm taking the mail out." He said, "Who told you to go?" I said, "I told myself!" So then he asked me what I told the adjutant to prevent my going out to the infantry. So I told the cat that I told the man that you're prejudiced against me as an individual, and I also believe that you're prejudiced against me as a black cat, you know. So when Captain Fryor, that was the adjutant, got back, the

Vietnam GI

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missions over the north and not digging it at all. He told me that he'd drop his load over the Bay of Tonkin as often as he could get away with it. He said he had been on flying status "I-C" with a stateside desk job before they reassigned him to combat status at Danang. This is pretty common since the AF is so damn hard up for pilots over there. He also told me that he was "tired of risking my neck for these people. They don't want us here." He even read up on the Geneva Convention and decided the whole war was illegal and worthless anyways.

For a lifer this major was a fairly hip guy. So when his re-assignment order came up, I made a mistake and shipped him stateside. Where the form says

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an RTO, part of the forward observer team. I was carrying a pack-25 on my back, and my job was to call in artillery fire. They gave me on-the-job training.

But the real reason was they were hoping I'd be killed. Unfortunately for them I wasn't. I told them if I caught him out in the field I'd kill him, but unfortunately he always stayed well away. So, while I was out there I was artillery, RTO, you know. But I might as well have been in infantry since I'm out there walking with them anyway.

SHARLET: Did you see much racism by the Army over there?

TUCK: The racism I saw—well, in the first place there was only a little. As far as the bars, you had bars to which only black GIs went and bars to which only white GIs went. And then in both groups mingled. But on the other hand, if I went into a white bar I wouldn't see any trouble, since the 25th is a combat outfit. They realize that everybody depends on everybody else. However, they do have a little discrimination as far as the job

INTERVIEW...

So guys were actually volunteering to go to Vietnam as gunners, this was TDU for three months, because they hated the "Rock," see. You know, I was amazed when I got there because I discovered guys that were so depressed because they were supposed to stay there until their ETS. There were some guys who even had their AIT in Hawaii.

SHARLET: What was your job over there?

TUCK: Well, in the first place my MOS is 1318, which is cannoneer. But then in Hawaii they made me battalion mail clerk, see. Later I was an RTO. When I hit Vietnam I was carrying 420 rounds, my rifle,

TUCK INTERVIEW

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and they're looking at movies! Finally the VC mortared them and they had no more of that. Now, this is something they should have known even before they got to Vietnam. I got to blame the brass. Perhaps they've improved since I've been over there, but when we were there we looked upon them with contempt.

SHARLET: I remember when I was stationed in I Corps we could never trust the ARVN. We would always put an inner perimeter guard of our own between our camp and the outer ARVN perimeter guard. Had the ARVN changed by the time you got over?

TUUCK: In the case of the South Vietnamese, like other GIs I've only contempt for them. I've never met a GI who had respect for them. Of course I have respect for the Montagnards, who are a different people. Incidentally, the casualties that the ARVN suffer, very seldom will you have South Vietnamese being killed. Usually it's the irregulars, the Montagnard civilian defense

who get killed. Now these people will fight and they're good fighters. All the GIs I know, they respect the "wards." Well, therefore, here you have the situation: You have American troops fighting on the side of those who support the Saigon Government, while those who're supposed to support the Government aren't doing a thing. Actually, I don't blame them. If I were in their shoes and could get away with it, I'd do the same thing. In other words, why should I die when foreigners from ten thousand miles away are willing to fight in my place. And just think, all they got to do is say they're against communism. So, from the ARVN viewpoint all this is pretty logical. I have to applaud them for being smart, taking advantage of it. But from the American viewpoint this is stupid, and that's the reason we're fighting for nothing.

SHARLET: Were you told how to treat Vietnamese civilians?

TUUCK: You know, before we got to Vietnam, they told us to treat the Vietnamese with courtesy and respect, give them the right of way and make friends. Well, when we got over there they told us not to make friends with the Vietnamese, not to trust them, and that the only good gook is a dead gook. You know, in racial terms. Then, in our first speech by our battalion commander, a man by the name of Jackson, he gave us an inspiring speech before our first battle. And when I said "inspiring" I meant it in a sarcastic way. He said, "I want you to keep these gooks on the run so fast so hard until I see Vietnamese blood spilling on the earth. Now, the thing that caught everyone was that the man said "Vietnamese blood" and not "VC blood" because, you know, everyone was under the impression that our enemies were only the VC. And so when one guy remarked afterward how bloodthirsty he was, you know, gradually men adopted a contemptuous and a racist attitude toward the Vietnamese.

SHARLET: What are your general feelings about the whole Vietnam setup over there?

TUUCK: I came to the conclusion that the people do not support the Saigon government, and the only ones that do have a vested interest in it. For instance, I found that the people in the towns and cities are glad to have American troops there. Not because of the VC, but because they are making money hand over fist,

and that's the truth. Some of these people don't want the war to end. Naturally the prostitutes in any war get rich, but also the shopkeepers and all the others. They never had it so good.

But on the other hand, most of the people in Vietnam are peasants, who are bearing the brunt of the war. They supply the VC with food, shelter and manpower. I found them to be of two types, either they are pro-VC or they just are tired of the fighting and just want to be left alone by both sides. I don't see anything the Saigon Government is doing for people, even in the towns. In Pleiku the worst thing is sewage; they don't have any type of sewage system for the mass of people in that town. Anyway, what I'm

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering hearing testimony from Vietnam veterans who are against the War. Both Senator Fulbright, the chairman, and Senator Grenning have been receiving mail from veterans offering to testify against U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. If you are a Vietnam veteran and are interested in testifying, immediately contact:

*Vietnam Veterans
Against the War*

Box 719

*Times Square Station
New York, N.Y. 10036*

Phone: 212 989-9376

saying is that the only ones who had running water or anything modern were the upper-class military officers, the AID officials and the CIA types.

Incidentally, as far as the AID, I didn't see anywhere they were doing any good for these people. Seems to me they stayed in town all the time, and as far as the

END THE WAR...

(Continued from page 3)

Always turns out lovey-dovey. Let's think about it a different way. What is there to negotiate about? The Washington line is that we want to negotiate an old-fashioned American compromise: some kind of coalition government of VC and Saigon generals working together. Later on there could be "free elections" deciding which side runs the country.

Now, this is a big, fat pipe-dream! The Saigon government couldn't get enough support to open a corner drug store once American troops pulled out. If we were to leave Vietnam the VC would take over look, stock, and barrel! Anyone who thinks different is just out of it. This is why the Administration is stalling on negotiations.

So the choices are really only two: On the one hand, we can push the war until we gain "victory" over the VC. To do this we'll have to wipe out most of Vietnam, and even most generals predict that it'll take us five-ten years. And those are going to be some long, bloody years for lots of guys.

I think the second choice makes more sense—to get out now and let the chips fall where they may. We don't owe the Saigon government a damn thing, and when we go they'll all be in Switzerland with their hidden bank accounts anyway. As for the Vietnamese people, we weren't doing them any favors by keeping up the war. (You notice they don't love us for it!) What kind of society they have is none of our business, and we should have remembered that four years ago.

Now it's true that to end the war would be an admission that the Administration lost a lot of lives for no good reason. But that's the truth. Let's end the war, admit to ourselves and others what our "leaders" did, and then set to work trying to get rid of them.

foreign aid supplies they always seemed to end up in the black market. My division patch, my decorations, all this I had to buy on the black market. The PX didn't have it but the black market did. Right outside my base camp a Vietnamese operated a car wash place. We saw his generator and it was the grey government type and it had the hand of friendship from the American people on its side. These generators, I understood, were supposed to be used out in the villages to provide the people with electric lights. So AID, from what I've seen, is a flop, a hoax.

SHARLET: Westmoreland says that the U.S. could win within two years. Do you think this is possible?

TUUCK: The only thing I can say is ha-ha to that, because I can recall that McNamara when they first sent troops over there, he claimed the war would be over in two years. As long as they continue "search and destroy" tactics the war could take 10-20 years. Because after all, they're fighting as a whole people, not just an army.

Since you were over there, you know good and well that a VC can be anything from an 8 year-old kid to a grandmother. It doesn't take much strength to pull a trigger or throw a hand grenade. It's more than a military thing; they're fighting ideas, and even if we reduced the VC from a menace to a nuisance, I mean they would still be around. You'd still have skirmishes and all like that. So I gotta come to the conclusion that Westmoreland's just saying that because it's an election year.

SHARLET: How do you figure out these guys who come back from over there, and after having seen it still say that we're fighting to "defend freedom"?

TUUCK: Well, I believe that when a man, a GI comes back and says we're fighting for the freedom of the Vietnamese people, I believe that man isn't being honest with himself. He is unwilling to admit to himself and others that he was fighting for nothing.

Also, you got the fact that a lot of these guys who support the war are young guys, 18 or 19. These people are easy to brainwash. For one thing, they don't know what "democracy" really is. When they lived at home their parents told them what to do. They never lived on their own, and they went right into the Army. Now the Army, if you want to be frank about it, is more like communism than anything. Everyone wears the same clothes, eats the same food, and so on. So these people have never experienced any democracy. And as for the liars, how can they tell you anything about democracy?

SHARLET: How did you get turned off about the war?

TUUCK: I got turned off because, in the first place, I thought it was a civil war between Vietnamese before I went, and nothing I saw there disproved this. Lots of other things I saw made me angry, but if it hadn't been for my brother being drafted, I would have never been there.

AF continued

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"assigned to permanent duty station" I accidentally filled in "Travis." Since I was thinking about the "land of the big PX" a lot, this also happened in several other cases. These pilots would be shipped to Travis where they'd be lost in the paper shuffle long enough to get themselves officially reassigned to the states.

But after this happened a few times, my NCOIP called me in for fudging up and I was shipped out of Tan Son Nhut myself. After having spend some time at Tan Son Nhut dealing with these pilots, my impression was that the longer the war went on, the less these guys, even the liars, were gung-ho about it.

Army Flips

Every GI knows the old saying about how the military works: "If it moves, salute it." If it doesn't move, paint it! A third part can now be added: "If it organizes other GIs, hit the panic button!" This sums up the Army's reaction to Pvt. Andy Stapp, stationed at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma.

Stapp, a 24-year-old draftee from Merion Station, Pennsylvania, is an avowed socialist. Even after being inducted Stapp continued to distribute radical literature around his base, and attempted to convince other troops of his beliefs. In Sept. 1966 MPs took away the pamphlets and magazines Stapp had stored in his footlocker, with the promise to return them after inspection. Of course, they were never returned. So the next time he was ordered to open his footlocker and surrender his literature, Stapp refused. The locker was then broken into and the literature taken, on order of the battery commander, Lt. Urquhart. This was in May, 1967. On 1 June, 1967 Pvt. Stapp was convicted by a summary court martial of (1) having a broken footlocker, and (2) refusing to obey a direct order. He was sentenced to 45 days unconfined hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and reduction of rank.

Since then Stapp has refused to be intimidated, and has continued his activities. In his own words: "I refused to let them take my literature because probably still be like everybody else, still uncommitted. I got in touch with Cleveland Draft Resistance for help, and since they were sharing an office with the Cleveland Committee to End the War in Vietnam, well, it was only inevitable that I'd get involved.

SHARLET: How did you feel about anti-war demonstrators when you were over there fighting?

TUUCK: Most of the GIs, they're against these people because they're figured, well, since they're against the war they gotta be against us, which is a mistake. So actually, we thought the typical peace demonstrator was a hippie, a gutless wonder. But I was surprised when I did meet the peace people to find that the great majority were ordinary people.

SHARLET: Don't you feel funny, a Viet vet associating with draft-card burners?

TUUCK: I admit it was strange

SAILOR SAYS "NO!"

On 26 Dec, a special court-martial found Seaman Apprentice Martin Hindman, 20, guilty of AWOL. The court, meeting at Great Lakes, sentenced Hindman to 90 days hard labor, drop in rank and forfeiture of pay. This is an ordinary scene, happening thousands of times each year in all four branches of the service. The difference is that Hindman is one of the increasing number of servicemen who are "dropping out" of the Viet War.

An enlistee at 17, Hindman served two tours of RVN aboard the USS Stoddard, which was doing shore bombardment. He told the court that during his second tour he watched a badly wounded ARVN die, and for the first time it came home to him what war really meant. Even though he'd served over two years of his hitch, and only had to keep his mouth shut and carry out orders a little longer to get discharged, Hindman decided his conscience wouldn't let him take part in this war.

When his ship reached San Diego he went AWOL, returning to his parents' home in Ft. Wayne, Indiana. It was there, three months later, that the Pearl Harbor attack was announced. Hindman claimed he only went home to see his parents and

the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees the right of all Americans to free speech. This guarantee certainly includes the right of revolutionary socialists to organize within the Army against America's imperialism war of aggression in Vietnam." Others at Ft. Sill, such as Pvt. Richard Perrin, Sp/4 Richard Wheaton, and Sp/5 Paul Gaedke, have publicly agreed with Andy Stapp. These men and others from several bases have met and formed the American Servicemen's Union. This group seeks to organize soldiers to win demands such as:

* Recognition of the right of all soldiers to advocate their political views, as well as to read anything they want.

* Election of all officers by the troops, in the same way as the Peoples Liberation Army of China.

* Seats on court-martial boards for enlisted men.

Since then the Army has pushed the panic button. Several members of the Ft. Sill group have been court-martialed on minor technicalities, and Andy Stapp himself was tried on the charge that he violated a restriction to barracks. Since his Sgt. admitted in court he'd told Stapp the wrong thing, this charge had to be dropped. Now the Army has decided to just get rid of Pvt. Stapp, and is trying to give him a dishonorable discharge because of his political activities. Stapp is fighting to stay in the Army.

at first. And I don't know, after having gone through a lot of experiences over there, there really isn't anything that shocks me. Also, I made up my mind in Vietnam that after this there was nothing that could scare me, nevermore. I'm just doing it. It's just like when it was time for me to come home from Vietnam. It seemed like I'd been doing this all my life, killing and war. Going home didn't seem real. Now the ending the war thing feels normal, like I'd always been doing it.

SHARLET: Would you like to go back to Vietnam to visit?

TUUCK: One thing I've got to be grateful to the Army for is giving me a desire to travel. I would like to visit Vietnam and the other countries of Southeast Asia, especially the central highlands which I think are very beautiful. I'd like to visit them after the war, as a civilian. This time I'd like to go back as a friend and not as an enemy.

"NO!"

think things over, and that after Christmas he would have turned himself in anyway. Considering that home is hardly the place to hide out, Hindman thought that at least his defense counsel would believe him. According to Hindman, his lawyer, a Lt. Vogel, told him his story was "a lot of crap" and didn't seem to care much about defending him. Worried, Hindman overheard another anti-war sailor making a phone call to CADRE, the Chicago anti-draft group. After talking with CADRE, Hindman decided to accept a civilian lawyer, Mark Schwartzman of Chicago, Illinois. On the stand, Hindman testified that he thought the military was "sick", and that he could no longer fire a gun or help carry out the war in any way. His lawyer, in pleading for mitigation of sentence, pointed out Hindman's good record and obvious sincerity. Hindman's father, who was a defense plant worker during WWII, said after the trial that he believes his son is right and backs him 100%. Hindman has told Navy officers that after he finishes his time in post 3 of the Great Lakes brig he will still refuse to cooperate and will attempt to win honorable discharge.

Vietnam GI

February 1968

FREE

Korea Next?

Is the Vietnam war going to spread to the rest of the Asian mainland? Ever since 2:30 a.m. on 24 January, when the U.S. "situation room" flashed President Johnson that the U.S.S. Pueblo had been boarded and captured off the North Korean coast, this question has shoved everything else off the front pages.

Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia are all seeming increased fighting and tension. In Vietnam itself the fighting has mushroomed, and as we go

EDITORIAL

to press the Khe Sanh area seems ready for the largest battle of the War.

If there ever was a time when Americans had to make basic decisions about U.S. foreign policy it is now—before an all-out war in Asia! And this time around we should insist that the Administration tell us what's really going on. The Vietnam war has unfolded before us like a magician's trick, with only the inner circle of the Government knowing what the real plans were.

In 1949 the Truman Administration told us we were just supplying the French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam with some arms. In 1957 the Eisenhower Administration told us we were just supplying the Diem regime in Saigon with 600 military advisors for ARVN. In 1963 the Kennedy Administration told us we were going to commit a limited number of

(continued on page 4)

"...the girls turned into whores, the men into pimps, and the kids into thieves and beggars."

Pete Mathisen was one of the three Vietnam vets to testify at the Copenhagen International War Crimes Tribunal. An artist, he served over three years in the Army, attaining the rank of Sp/5. Nov 23, Mathisen resides in California.

Q. Pete, what outfit were you with, and what was your job?

A. I was with the 541st Military Intelligence, which was the MI detachment for the 11th Armored



Cav Regiment. My own job was POW interrogator, MOS 96Z 2L39. 11th Armored Cav, because it was an armored unit, could only operate in certain areas. We were stationed 50 miles east of Saigon along Route 2, about 12 "clicks" south of Xuan Loc. This is in Long Khanh Province.

Q. Wasn't your outfit one of the first American units to go into that area?

A. Well, they ran one operation out there before, Operation Toledo, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, but they didn't have too much success. Our unit was the first really stationed in that area.

Q. Since you were in an intelligence outfit, did your unit make any special efforts to win the peasants over to our side?

A. Actually our unit...well, that wasn't its job; its job was to

get information. But if we could get information by winning over the peasants, all well and good; but we didn't have too much success. As a matter of fact, I used to run agents, you know, an agent handler. And one of our agents tried to kill me, so I gave up that job.


Q. What sort of efforts were made by the 11th Armored Cav to win over the peasants, then?

A. You know, first of all, you go in and you sweep an area. We found up who we think should be prisoners, screen them, and then interrogate them. Then the area is supposed to be fairly safe. It generally doesn't turn out that way because you can't get all the VC out. You can't get at the VC infrastructure, and this is because the infrastructure is well hidden by the people. But then S-5 comes in and gives away loads of free rice, cement, and medical aid once in a while in an attempt to buy off the people. It doesn't work, though. When Big Daddy Sugar-Bucks comes in with all his goodies he doesn't really win many friends. People who are bought don't stay bought.

Q. Was this a strong VC area when your outfit first went in?

A. Well, this area was more or less virgin territory—it was supposedly half-way under government control, what they call a "contested area". When we moved in we were supposed to secure it. And actually, when we moved in there was a VC regiment and a half running around—"mainforce" regiments. Now, when we left there were two and a half running around. When I left at least. The "mainforce" VC was actually strengthened, and the local force didn't suffer at all.

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


No Go For VN Insurance

Servicemen who are Vietnam-bound are finding it harder to get adequate life insurance. This is the report of financial writer Don Bryaman in the 4 December National Observer. In a survey of insurance companies, Bryaman found that "a number of companies have stopped writing new policies on servicemen with orders to Vietnam, and servicemen are finding that other companies are limiting the size of policies they can obtain."

Companies such as General Services Life Insurance, Government Employees Life Insurance, and even the huge John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance are no longer issuing new policies for Vietnam-bound servicemen. Others, such as

United Services Life of Washington, D.C., the largest company selling only tomilitarypersonnel, are limiting policies to \$10,000 in these cases. The most common tactic, which is being used by Prudential of America, the nation's largest life insurance company, is to add "war-risk exclusion" clauses. This makes life insurance a joke, since it doesn't cover you if you're hit in action. Those servicemen who want additional insurance above and beyond the \$10,000 you can get from the Government will have to do some real shopping. The multi-billion-dollar life insurance industry isn't interested in backing up servicemen who have to go to Vietnam—not enough profit in it.



"First In War, Second In Peace, and 46% In The Polls Of His Countrymen"

Martinsen...

(continued from page 1)

Q. What determined who you picked up as prisoners?

A. You don't actually call them "prisoners"; the Army calls them "detainees". You know, you can detain anyone, and they normally do—women and children, the whole works. You can't tell who you're fighting, really. So they just detain anyone. We figure someone is suspicious if he


interview

doesn't have an ID, but the peasants think the reverse of the way Americans do. Because their ID is so important to them they're afraid to lose it. So often they leave it at home.

It's our job to figure out who the hell we've got in front of us. Whether he's a VC, or he's a sympathizer, or he's got information, or what. This is the main problem; we can't tell, because they'll all protect the VC.

Q. Did your outfit succeed in recruiting peasants to inform on the VC?

A. That was the job of counter-intelligence, mainly. We didn't have too much luck at it. The people you recruit are the people who are bought by money, and they aren't too trustworthy because they can be bought by the other side too. You can't really recruit a peasant. Peasants



don't like Americans too much. As a matter of fact, the longer you stay the less they like you.

Q. How do the VC get the peasants to help them?

A. Well, the NLF has paid agents like we do, of course, but they have a heck of a lot more cooperation from the Vietnamese than we have! The NLF is Vietnamese, and it really doesn't have to scare most people, because most people hate the Saigon government and the NLF is against the government. So peasants are going to cooperate with the NLF much more than they are with our side.

Q. What about the prisoners? How did you get them to cooperate?

A. Every interrogation is different depending on the "detainee" you interrogate. Force was used a lot, and like, you know, you could beat them with your open

Medic Writes From 1st Div.

"What is that shot in your sector?" asked thirty-five kilo, the radio guard.

"I'm shooting everything moving out here, okay with you?" answered and asked eleven bravo, an infantry soldier on patrol.

There was no answer.

"There's movement out here, the man with me is scared shitless, a mine we set up just went off on us. I don't know



what the hell is coming off. I'm shooting at anything that moves."

There is no answer.

"Listen," eleven bravo pleaded, "code name Brown says he can't take it. He's coming in he says, and I believe him. You better do something."

There is no answer, no comment from thirty-five kilo. To us inside the perimeter the time speeds by; to eleven bravo and Brown, minutes are like hours.

"Thirty-five kilo, eleven bravo. You better send a replacement for Brown. He's coming in. Send me one too—oh scratch that. Just replace Brown. He's messed up."

"Eleven bravo, thirty-five kilo. I'm replacing Brown and giving you some artillery cover."

Artillery shots filled the air and shook the ground all around. I was on the other end of the perimeter listening to this adventure episode on the squawk box, as a person back home would be enjoying a soap opera on

hand and not leave a mark on them. Electrical torture with a field phone—we used a TA312-29 field telephone—you know, it gives a really nasty shock. You know how bad it is, and you can imagine being shocked for three or four hours by one of those things. That was pretty common.

I never dug beating up women. I saw it done a lot of times, and I even did it myself a couple of times. But we didn't use it much. The ARVN, I understand, they used a lot of that stuff. Actually, we were easy on "detainees" compared to most of the other MI detachments.

Q. How much really useful military information did you people ever get from prisoners?

A. We didn't get much, I'll tell

the radio—only I wasn't enjoying it. I was feeling the fear of a man I didn't even know. Not even his name. Just code name eleven bravo.

Suddenly shouts of a short round broke the cadence of the artillery. People all around (including myself) hit the ground...

"What the hell is going on?" a shaky voice breathed into the radio.

"It was a short round," answered thirty-five kilo. "It wasn't a VC attack, it was one of ours hitting short, do you understand?"

"Eleven bravo is hit, I'll check him out," answered Brown's replacement.

After a time he returned to the radio. His voice was calmer, but the fear and uncertainty filtered through the squawk of the radio.

"He's all right," he answered. "Just bits of trees and dirt hit him from the blast."

"I'm bringing you in," stated thirty-five kilo, as if doing some Godly deed. "We're gonna machinegun the area."

The men returned to the woodline. Machinegun bullets riddled the area. It woke all sleeping in camp, grabbing weapons and hitting the ground. They soon discovered it was their own fire and went back to their restless sleep. The firing soon ended. Nothing was hit, for nothing was really there except fear. The fear was not relieved for eleven bravo and Brown. They were sent back to the outer area to again set up a patrol.

My radio watch ended and I slid back on my air mattress. My thoughts were still on the two men out there. If anything did happen it meant certain death for them. If the so-called enemy didn't get them, then their own men would gun them down mistakenly as they attempted to pass into their own perimeter.

This whole incident, like the war itself, was cruel, needless, and absurd. To many, it was nothing. For, as I've been told, and as I've been learning every

you that! As a matter of fact, it was a real victory if we got any information at all. Most of the people, even if we tortured



"Okay, once more. Every day in every way, I am getting better and better."

Vietnam GI

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day, this terror is constant in Viet-Nam. Some reach the point mentally that diving may be better than all the hell they're going through..... I thought of all the oddities I'd seen since coming here. The things I couldn't understand, and couldn't believe. (I thought of how they take guys who in the States drove trucks, and after a two-hour class, make them infantry machinegunners. My first day in base camp, where in a war zone they were so terribly understocked they didn't even have weapons to issue. The new americanized, uplifted people! Living in fallen shacks made of beer cans flattened and scrapwood, riding Honda motorcycles. The begging children who fought viciously over a Hershey bar we won't even eat. A deaf and dumb child wearing a chain and tremendous lock around his neck to show all that he stole. Beautiful young girls turned into prostitutes for the American GI "Joe." Young kids selling pot to eke out an existence. A blind

(continued on page 4)

them, still wouldn't say anything. They just kept saying, "I don't know, I don't know." And the deal is that even if the guy isn't a VC himself, he knows something of VC activities 'cause they're so widespread. It's obvious they're lying, but force doesn't work. So what information you do get isn't reliable.

Q. You must have worked with a lot of VC prisoners. What are your impressions of the enemy?

A. First of all, we had about 600 "detainees" we interrogated formally, and many many more informally. And out of all these "detainees" we had only one communist, who was a North Vietnamese army captain. Just one communist! The VC don't

"THEY KILLED OFF SOME GUYS..."

The other day we were talking with a sailor in training as a Corpsman. He agreed to let us print part of the conversation, so that men in other branches of service could get a brief idea of what it's like where he's at.

Q. It must be pretty good duty, going to school to be a Corpsman. You guys live pretty easy?

A. I live in a "temporary" building built before World War II. It's just an old barracks, really. You ought to see it! The Navy won't paint it, or repair it, or anything because it's only supposed to be "temporary".

There's only one shower for sixty guys. Most of the time you don't even get to shower—not that you want to, because it's so cold. The sinks and toilets don't work a lot of the time, and the drains are always overflowing. Cockroaches and rats are all over the place. The heat keeps going out. Like, one night we had to all get up about midnight, because the heat

was out and it was too cold to sleep there. We had to move to other barracks for the rest of the night.

Q. How good is the training you're getting?

A. Well, they killed off some guys in Vietnam. That ought to give you a good idea.


Q. Killed off some guys? What do you mean? You mean Corpsmen did it?

A. Yeah. They were getting confused between heat exhaustion and sunstroke. They need different treatment, and they were giving the wrong treatment to guys. Some died.

Q. How did you hear this?

A. They told us to watch out—gave us special instruction at school. With sunstroke the patient isn't perspiring enough, and he's burning up; with heat exhaustion he's cold and clammy. You treat one by trying to keep the patient cool, and with the other you wrap him in blankets and keep him warm. Well, they were giving treatment for one when they should've given the other.

Most of your training comes from practical experience. You have to spend a year working in a hospital, so they can check on whether you know what you're doing. But you can't learn much in the short time you're in



look on their war as a communist war. It's a war of "national liberation" at the lower levels. I don't know what it is at the upper levels; we never had a high-ranking prisoner. But at the lower level the person you're fighting against is a nationalist. He just wants to get the Americans out. He isn't a communist.


Q. As a Vietnamese linguist, I imagine you talked to a lot of Vietnamese in general. Was this also their attitude toward the war?

A. Anyone who speaks the language and walks around, just listening, doesn't have to ask questions to see that Americans aren't too well liked there. In fact, I can't think of anyone

Know Your New Man

Before becoming Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara was the head of one of the largest corporations in the world, Ford Motor Company. He ruthlessly

influence man.... "Clifford's service to the DuPont Company from 1960 until late 1964 is a classic case in point. Under his guidance, the



"That's another thing I like about you, Cliff!"

modernized the structure—and produced the Edsell. His performance in Washington followed the same path.

Now there is a new man slated for the Secretary's chair, Clark Clifford. What kind of man is he? Washington circles, a friend, advisor, and ally of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. He earns close to \$1,000,000 per year as a lawyer, even though he rarely appears in court. Richard Harwood writes in the 28 January issue of the WASHINGTON POST:

"What precisely does Clifford do for his fees? Outsiders have called him, in Theodore Sorenson's phrase, a lobbyist and

company obtained legislation and Treasury rulings that saved its stockholders (and members of the DuPont family) about \$2 billion in taxes they otherwise would have had to pay....

"When you talk about the military-industrial complex," a former Kennedy administration official has said, "all you have to do is close your eyes and think of Clark Clifford."

As an influence peddler for the biggest corporations (GE, Standard Oil, and IT&T, to name just a few), Clifford will undoubtedly use his new office to look out for his old friends and clients. The "public interest"—or the needs of servicemen—will have to take second place.

school.

Q. How long is that?

A. It's sixteen weeks. And our

training films are so old. In the film they showed us on malaria, the mosquito had rising suns on its wings and slanted eyes. It was supposed to be Japanese.... you know, the movie was from World War III!

Q. Is there a lot of feeling against the Vietnam war?

A. Yes. Even a lot of the officers are unhappy about the war. And Johnson is very unpopular. One of our teachers was showing us how to do a tracheotomy. You know, making an incision at the throat.... He drew a picture of Johnson on the blackboard and used that to show us how to do a tracheotomy....

they like less, except maybe the French. This is a general thing. I was all over III Corps: Long Khanh, Ben Long, Ben Duong, Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, and Phuoc Tay Provinces. You just...you get the impression from the peasants that Americans aren't wanted there.

The Johnson Administration says we're wanted by the peasants there, and that's not true. We're wanted by the Saigon government, but not the people. You can find that out just by listening. You go in there and they don't know you understand Vietnamese, and you actually hear phrases like "ugly American"; you know, things like that—"What's he doing here!", that jazz.

Q. Did you have much experience

working with ARVN?

A. We worked with the ARVN quite a bit 'cause our TAOR bordered 10th ARVN Division's TAOR. The 10th was a really bad division, as a matter of fact. You know, the deal was that in Vietnamese "No. 10" means something really bad. So everyone called the ARVN division "No. 10 Division". Then, this really upset the ARVNs, so they changed the name of the division to the 18th Division. Well, after that, everything that was no good in our area was called "No. 18"! That division was really, really bad. They didn't like to go out at night. There was one time when a village was overrun six "clicks" from the base camp in the middle of the night. They got a call for help: a full division

got a call for help and didn't respond to the call. And as a result, three girls were assassinated by the VC.

Q. Didn't you see any improvement in the ARVN's performance during your tour?

A. You know, I didn't pay much attention to the ARVN's performance. It wasn't much good, any way you look at it! I do know that the bulk of the weapons we captured from the VC were ARVN weapons. Like one night they sent out a squad of ARVN on an ambush patrol during Operation Cedar Falls. They had three M79 grenade launchers. They got shot at; everybody dropped his weapons and just ran. That meant the VC had three more M79

continued

MARTINSEN...

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grenade launchers, which are deadly weapons they don't normally have.

If's kind of bad that we gave the ARVN the M-16 rifle, because now it's going to be used against us. The VC are going to capture them like mad! Hell, in Cedar Falls we captured 5 or 6 BARs, loads of M1s and M1 carbines, and a few M14s. This is stuff that the ARVN lose—no, they don't lose them, they just set them down and run.

Q. What do you think are the major problems with the ARVN? Why don't they fight?

A. It's pretty funny, you know, because the VC are a South Vietnamese force and the ARVN are a South Vietnamese force. The VC fight really well and the ARVN badly. And the only impression I can get is that the ARVN know they're backing the wrong force, and that they shouldn't be fighting their own people.

interview

Q. You went to Copenhagen to testify at the War Crimes Tribunal against the U.S. Government? Why did you go?

A. Well, you know, it's a pretty strange thing....All GIs are taught about the Geneva Conventions and how they're not supposed to be violated. Most Americans at home don't believe our side commits war crimes. This isn't true. I worked for the 541st MI, the 172nd MI, the 1st and 4th MI detachments, and the 173rd Airborne, and I know that all these units use torture in one form or another. Of course, the VC do it too, but that doesn't excuse our committing war crimes. That's why I decided to testify. To shock people into feeling a kind of war is really going on over there.

Q. What kind of response are you getting back here in the States?

A. The response hasn't been too bad, except in the press. The newspapers come up and ask you for an interview and then won't print it. This is censorship, pure and simple. In the Soviet government, you might have a ministry of the press that censors things; here in the U.S. we have a City Editor who censors things. The effect is the same.

Q. From your experience, how do you see the war turning out? A. I don't know. If you read the Stars & Stripes in Vietnam or Time Magazine, or whatever, you'll notice that the 271st and 272nd VC regiments, which operate around Tay Ninh, were wiped out successfully in Operation Attleborough, and then in Operation Junction City, and then in Operation Manhattan. Later on, after I left Vietnam, they were wiped out at Loc Ninh. And now they were just wiped out again last week. This is a contradiction. I think. Of course they're taking tremendous losses, but they keep bouncing back, and that means they must be recruiting from the population. If the population is willing to fight for them, then it's pretty obvious that we're in the wrong place at the wrong time.

I can't see us losing the war militarily, because we've got so many more men and weapons than they do. Militarily, there's no way we can lose, but that doesn't mean we can win it, either. The longer we stay, the more we're going to lose the war politically.

Q. You say that we're losing the war politically. Do you mean

that the Vietnamese are getting more anti-American and pro-VC as the war goes on?

A. You know, when we first moved into our area, the Vietnamese were about 50-50 for and against us. Not really extremely against us and not really extremely for us. Just a "wait-and-see" attitude. Then people started getting killed indiscriminately by Americans, all the girls turned into whores, the men into pimps, the kids into thieves and beggars. Long Khanh Province was more against us when I left than it was when I came in. We did this, not the VC. There's the perfect example of how American troops get shocked in, and then their presence becomes so obnoxious that it turns the people against us.

Q. You mentioned inaccuracies in the way the press—particularly Stars & Stripes—reports the war. Is this faulty intelligence, or is the Government just covering things up?

A. I think it's both, really. You look at the battlefield and you count 600 bodies who are soldiers from one unit, and you say that unit is combat ineffective because they just lost one-third of their men. This is logical, but the thing is they build their units up again so goddam fast from local support. We make a big thing of how the VC have to draft people, when if it weren't for our draft, you know, in America, most of the troops in Vietnam wouldn't be there.

Other contradictions, like I think it was May 22nd we had an armored platoon, which was travelling along Route 1 from Xuan Loc. They got hit by a VC reinforced battalion and it wiped them out, 46 men, and we took 100% casualties: 22 dead, 24 wounded, 2 tanks and 3 APCs lost. And on this same day I read in Stars & Stripes how the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics said that the VC and PAVN forces in South Vietnam weren't using anti-tank weapons. I wish they could have told it to the men who died in those two burnt-out tanks. One tank took 14 penetrating hits from rocket launchers and RR, and the other took 15.

It's lies all the way around, censored news. Just like at the peace demonstrations at home. All the news pictures are taken of the bearded freaks; you don't see the normal people who are the vast majority of the peace marchers.

Q. From what you've said, I get the impression that you think that the VC are still primarily a South Vietnamese force. The newspapers tell us that more and more the VC are North Vietnamese? Is that true?

A. I think we had about 15 "main force" regiments around III Corps area when we were there. Only one was a PAVN regiment, North Vietnamese, and the others were "main force" South Vietnamese units. Of course, there was a purge in April or May, where the high command of the NLF, which was South Vietnamese until then, was replaced by North Vietnamese army officers. I think this was due to the fact that they weren't pushing the war as heavily as the North Vietnamese thought they should have.

There's definitely a North Vietnamese influence, and it's growing stronger. But that doesn't mean anything, because they're all still Vietnamese. The only way you can tell a North from a South Vietnamese is by listening to him speak, and seeing if he has a sixth tone in his language. It's one country, with lot's of problems, and it's their problems. It certainly isn't ours. This is a dirty war, and there's no reason on earth for us to be there.

KOREA NEXT?

(continued from page 1)

troops, which would be withdrawn in a few years. In 1968 we have had a million troops in Vietnam, and are locked in an exhausting war that just keeps growing.

When did the people ever vote for this war? In 1964 they thought that by voting for President Johnson they were voting against bombing North Vietnam and escalating the War! Time and again the Government has had to manufacture "commitments" and crises in order to get support for its policies.

Remember the "Bay of Tonkin Resolution" in which Congress gave the Johnson Administration the "green light" to step up the War? This winter the Senate Foreign Relations Committee uncovered evidence that there may have been no torpedoes fired by the North Vietnamese PIRs at the American destroyer. Further, these ships were being used to enter North Vietnamese waters, to deliberately provoke a response so that intelligence could analyze it. Seen in that light, the Bay of Tonkin incident was just an ordinary and pretty minor thing to both sides. There seems little doubt now that it was deliberately played up by the Administration in order to get support for the War.

Can the Pueblo incident be more of the same? The Congressional "hawks" are demanding to know why we didn't

destroy the Pueblo and her crew rather than let them reach North Korea. The North Koreans are claiming that the entire crew of the Pueblo are "war criminals" and must receive "deserving punishment". Once again, it seems that ordinary servicemen are everybody's pawns in the worldpower struggle. Meanwhile, the DoD has called up 15,000 USAF and USN Air Reservists, which the military needs in Vietnam.

Let's cut out all the crap! We aren't all over Asia because the Government is worried about people's freedom. Most of our allies in Asia don't know what freedom is. The South Korean Government—for which thousands of GIs died—is a savage and corrupt bunch of barbarians.

We aren't in Asia to "stem the communist menace", as the super-patriots keep saying. DeGaulle is giving the U.S. more trouble than communism is! We give foreign aid to communist nations like Poland and Yugoslavia, and some of the titanium metal for our jet engines we buy from Russia. We can't be "stopping China", since she's just sitting there watching us spend thousands of lives and billions of dollars fighting the people of other countries.

We're fighting in Asia because the U.S. Government wants to control what goes on in every other part of the world. They want to make the decisions for Latin America, Asia, and as much of the rest of the world as they

Medic

(continued from page 2)

man trying to sell us a little girl.... The disgusting treatment of the people by the average GI, taking his ammosites for being here out on them, instead of the faction back home which sent him here. People so hungry that when we leave an area they are there at daybreak waiting for us to pull out so they can dig up our garbage dumps....

I remembered how I laughed when, in the middle of a base camp in a war zone, I found

can. As the TOLEDO BLADE said on 2 January, 1968:

"Because in the American language imperialism is a dirty word, most Americans reject the suggestion that there is such a thing as an American empire.... Imperialism is exploitation. It means demanding privileges and shaping the destiny of alien peoples to the imperial will.... "Our worldwide power... is imperialism whether we call it that or not."

Our Government thinks that making decisions for other nations is its right. Maybe so, but ordinary Americans get nothing out of it. The job of running the world means that thousands of men will die in foreign wars—wars that have nothing to do with freedom. And since everybody hates the Cop, the job is never done.

After all, the French successfully fought a vicious seven-year war in Algeria. At the end the rebel army was marooned over in Tunisia cleaning their weapons, and the guerrillas within Algeria were reduced to operating at the platoon level. But the French had to give up! Because they lost the "political war". They were so hated that to hold Algeria would mean a permanent military occupation on a massive scale. Whether Washington likes it or not, in the long run letting other peoples work out their own solutions is the only answer. The alternative is an endless war in Asia.

near-coolie wages. Cleaning for us. Taking our abuses as they serve us our food and work in our bars and clubs, washing our dishes, burning our faces, selling their bodies for the price of a 42nd Street movie....

It's a strange, beautiful, untouched land. I'm sickened by it, because I'm forced to it. I'm learning from it. Finding I want no others here. I only want my fellow Americans in one war. The war at home. Signed,

a PFC in Viet-Nam
1st Infantry Division

VIET-NAM VETERANS SPEAK OUT

We are veterans of the Viet-Nam war. We believe that this "conflict" in which our country is now engaged in Viet-Nam is wrong, unjustifiable and contrary to the principle of self-determination on which this nation was founded. We believe that the activities and objectives of our forces in Viet-Nam are directly contrary to the best interests of the Vietnamese people and of the people of the United States. We believe that our policy in Viet-Nam supports tyranny and denies democracy. We believe this because of our experiences in Viet-Nam. We know, because we have been there, that the American public has not been told the truth about the war or about Viet-Nam.

- We know: that Viet-Nam is one country—historically, culturally and as specified in the Geneva Accords of 1954.
- that this conflict is basically a civil war.
 - that the government in Saigon, despite the recent "election", is a military dictatorship—supported by a small feudal aristocracy, the ARVN (Saigon) officer corps and half a million American troops.
 - that the majority of the people we are fighting in south Viet-Nam are south Vietnamese.
 - that the basic problem in Viet-Nam is not military—but social, economic and political—not American—but Vietnamese. There is no military "solution." There is no "American" solution.

We believe that if the American people realized this they would join the dissent of the millions of Americans already against this war.

We believe that true support for our buddies still in Viet-Nam is to demand that they be brought home (through whatever negotiation is necessary) before anyone else dies in a war the American people did not vote for and do not want.

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1st. Co. C-Coordinator