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The Radical Teacher

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A Prospectus
by Florence Howe

Most early visions of NUC included a magazine in which radical teacher-scholars would do at least two kinds of writing. First, for the movement in general: they would turn their intellectual energy and their research time to the service of problems that the movement needed solved. Generally speaking, such writing might be devoted to strategy, analysis, long-range thinking, and vital information. Second, for their own immediate needs as organizers, as radical teachers and scholars: essays might attempt to describe what we do in our own day-to-day lives, in the classroom, the committee meeting, on the campus and in the community. At the November Interim Committee meeting, Paul Lauter and I agreed to edit an experimental issue of the NUC Newsletter as a step towards an NUC magazine. We invented the title and in December circulated a call for papers.

While we did not exclude theoretical papers, we asked, chiefly as a sensible and, we thought, simple place to begin, that people write about what they are doing and why. It has taken a surprising amount of time to collect the group of essays we present here. Our problems are worth reflection.

Many of us are apparently not convinced that what we do is significant or that our experiences may prove useful to others. As editors, we had to persuade most of our writers that their essays were worth doing. That says something about our view of our daily work and/or our reluctance to put pen to paper. Are we, as radicals, embarrassed to reveal ourselves, or do we balk at taking time away from activity? Admittedly, the assignment-what do you do and why--was a difficult one: we got letters from people saying they had tried, but that; for the moment, they were "giving up."

We also had practical problems, besides those of space. Do you focus

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For Future Reference
by Paul Lauter

I want to touch on two basic dilemmas of the radical teacher, raised by these essays, and which we hope people will take up in future pieces. These concern our roles and our disciplines.

There has been considerable dispute between "radical scholars" and "movement activists" about which of these roles is appropriate to the professor: shall he stick to his last, reinterpreting historical or economic realities in the light of Marxist theory, or shall he join in the direct actions that have, if we honestly face recent history, brought about the little change in America that one can observe since 1960? A third role, which in a sense participates in both of these, but in another way is set over against them, is that of movement organizer. Radical scholars seem increasingly isolated from the "movement," however one defines that elusive force. While activists have increasingly, in theory and practice, spun off the privileged campus and into communities where confrontations grow out of the basic, daily realities of oppressed life. The problem for the on-campus organizer is how to remain in immediate touch with the

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Notes on Contributers

Sheila Delany has been teaching English at Queens College (CUNY). Among the demands of recent student actions there is that her contract be renewed.

Marianne Githens was active in the faculty strike at St. John's University. She now teaches political science at Goucher College.

Dick Greeman will be moving in the fall from Columbia, where he has taught French. A slightly different form of his essay first appeared in the Radicals in the Professions Newsletter, Vol. I, #10 (November-December, 1968).

Florence Howe teaches English at Goucher College and directs an experimental program in which undergraduates teach poetry to high school students.

Jack Kligerman teaches English at Lehman College (CUNY). He writes: "One grandfather was a plumber. The other, a junk pedlar. I would like to see as much purpose in my life as a teacher as they saw in theirs."

Paul Lauter is writing a book with Florence Howe on youth, the movement, and American institutions. He has been active with Resist.

Staughton Lynd is now at work on a history of the draft resistance movement. This article was first given as a talk at a joint session of the American Studies and American Speech Associations.

Bart Meyers is an Associate Professor of Psychology at Brooklyn College. He writes that he is "in the process of liquidating" his research in psychopharmachology and comparative psychology.

Howard Wolf teaches English at the State University of New York in Buffalo.

Mike Zweig teaches at Stony Brook when the Grand Jury is not keeping him in jail for refusing to rat on his students. He is also a member of the executive committee of the Union of Radical Political Economists (URPE--Excuse Me).

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on a single classroom moment--as Howard Wolf does? How useful is it to describe one particular course--as Michael Zweig or Jack Kligerman do? Or do you try to deal with a general frustration about your curriculum--in the manner of Sheila Delany--or about your research--in the manner of Bart Meyers? And do these fragments of experience, experiment, and anger characterize the "radical" teacher? Or the radical who is a good teacher? And when you are through, have you said anything that can help others reshape their work?

Balancing these experiental essays are three more traditionally "political" analyses. Dick Greeman's lengthy treatment of the role of Columbia's faculty in last year's strike is not only history relevant to today's struggles, but a strong reminder of the radical's role as faculty organizer. Staughton Lynd's and Marianne Githens' essays present ideological challenges to the concerns of campus liberals with "disruption" and with the "disadvantaged." We expect them to be useful in answering the attacks made upon the left. The documents from Soviet art schools after the revolution present a utopian vision, a joy, and a hope.

These essays represent guesswork and hard work. We need to know what you think about this effort--and whether it was worth the time and energy expended by all of us--before we can decide about further issues. Above all, are the essays useful; what other kinds would be? We might, for example, have included a number of pieces on grading, but we felt some of these are already being circulated and others might wait attempts by chapters to initiate programs around grading. We can print letters in subsequent Newsletters (send them to Florence Howe and Paul Lauter, Goucher College, Towson, Md. 21204). If you wish, we can plan to discuss a magazine at the June convention in Iowa. If there are enough lengthy responses, and manuscripts, we will do another issue for the fall.

At Odds with the Curriculum

by Sheila Delany

He is a man who thinks
He sits in a tiny corner of the rain.

He is what he is not thinking of.
He is a large part of Japan.

He is closed, like a small business.
An illustration of the snow.

John Morris
"Shh! the Professor is Sleeping"

If you teach English literature, the problem of relating radical convictions to teaching is more acute than it is for your friends in the social sciences: your job is to disseminate the monuments of a culture whose values you personally reject. You don't generally give courses that let you express political opinions easily--economic bases of slavery, the authoritarian personality, the modern urban community. Maybe you teach Chaucer:

For, sith a womman was so pacient
Unto a mortal man, wel moore us oghte
Receyvan all in gree that God us sent;
For greet skile is, he preve that he wroghte.

Or Yeats:

I know not what the younger dreams--
Some vague Utopia--and she seems,
When withered old and skeleton-gaunt,
An image of such politics...
Dear shadows, now you know it all,
All the folly of a fight
With a common wrong or right.
The innocent and the beautiful
Have no enemy but time...

Or composition:

During the last decade or so, American education at all levels has been undergoing a critical reassessment, brought about largely by the ideological struggle between Communism and the free world. Perhaps the most significant consequence of this reassessment is that Americans are coming to recognize and acknowledge the unique significance of intelligence in preserving our ideals and in enabling us to compete successfully against totalitarian societies.

This passage is taken from the preface to the New University Reader, an anthology of essays used widely in composition courses. To use communism as a synonym for totalitarianism, to suggest that the goal of intelligence should be "to compete successfully" against communist societies, to assume that our ideals are necessarily anti-totalitarian--all of this is absurd and will be partly undercut by such essays in the book as Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience" and Orwell's "Politics and the English Language." But the premise is not mistaken, for the tendency of English literature is conservative, or liberal at best. At Queens College (CUNY), where I teach, the percentage of English majors among students has steadily decreased over the past few years; do students sense that "the great tradition" incorporates values the reverse of theirs?

Satan prefers to suffer in hell where he is the ruler, rather than to serve in heaven. In this way he was a hero. Like today, it's the same thing the black man is saying: we rather make and live in our own hell than keep being slaves for the rest of society.

(From a black student's paper on Milton's Paradise Lost.)

There are ways in which the teacher of literature can be a radical teacher as well as a radical individual--although I don't think that relating to your job or your students in a radical way can fully compensate for conservative material. You can take refuge in method, the intellectual's panacea, and perform radical analyses on the material. As a medievalist I have written about the social conditions that account for the university student's role as all-conquering lover in the medieval fabliaux: and also about the attitude of skeptical fideism found in some late-medieval philosophy and in Chaucer's early work. But when such analyses confirm your suspicions, you are still left with the problem of teaching material you now know to be politically uncongenial. So that most of this paper illustrates the difficulty it engages, by suggesting methods that may help to bring personal life and professional life into some degree of coherence.

Hierarchy is the most valuable myth any powerful person has, whether priest, aristocrat, university president, witch-doctor, parent, army general. It allows him and those he controls to think that manipulation and exploitation are inevitable natural conditions. Hierarchy is fundamental to western literature, and much of what is amusing, tragic, or interesting in the literature is concerned with someone's attempt to break out of an ordered system. Dante's hell is hierarchal, so is Milton's heaven; and though their spiritual geography is irrelevant now, we have internalized the map. Freud (articulating our myths and dream-journeys, as Dante did for the Middle Ages) offers a structure of mind that combines psychic and moral hierarchies: not only is the personality fragmented into id, ego, super-ego, but upon the proper ranking of these fragments depends all of Western civilization. The fusion of economic and moral hierarchies is present in words we use every day: "gentle," "churl," "noble," "villain" all originally designated economic function or class. Hierarchal thought is hard to avoid: no wonder that teachers often become petty tyrants behind the desk; that they consider "unprofessional" the very idea of organizing for protest or bargaining; that they decline to defend colleagues who have been fired for political reasons. They have absorbed the myth of hierarchy and are daily engaged in perpetuating it. To reject that myth necessarily changes your role in the university, your relation to students, and your analysis of literature. I want to focus on the latter two.

If you perceive this society as a complex instrument whose effect (perhaps whose purpose) is to impose hierarchies, to separate and fragment (one class from another, black from white, reason from emotion, producer from product, man from woman, adult from child, us from nature)--if you observe these effects, then you can't help perceiving your students as sharers of a common nature, and of a common enemy that keeps you all ignorant of that nature. Your students may acknowledge neither one, and that condition is what you address yourself to: to all of us, as Laing writes, "the Dreadful has already happened."

One way of illustrating some of this to students is to guide them to origins: etymologies that reveal cultural assumptions, the earliest magical-religious-communal uses of all art, the society that generated a particular work of art. No deprecation of craft is implied here; on the contrary, craft--rhetoric, style--is the entrance to the created world of art: a tool of persuasion, in the service of a vision controlled by social as well as esthetic assumptions. Instead of providing a checklist of great works, you can demonstrate a critical method that relates means to ends, techniques to values. (The logical tension created by zeugma, chiasmus, antithesis in Pope's Rape of the Lock reproduces on a small scale the sexual ambivalence in his heroine, and the moral ambivalence of the society she inhabits.) Like philosophy, religion, and the other arts, literature grows

from a particular historical environment: it incarnates people and moral problems in magnified proportions. Therefore its lessons, technical and experiential, are not confined to the fictional world: a Marxist view finds in literature judgments that reveal what history itself may not. In this it resembles the Renaissance idea that poetic invention combines the best of history and philosophy, presenting events and judgments together. Renaissance critics also valued literature for its presentation of possible truths; not confined to what was or is, fiction can alert us to alternate ways of thinking and being--what might or ought to be.

The way such ideas will influence a syllabus or a class hour must vary. No one can prescribe classroom behavior, and the radical teacher, like anyone else, may be a performer, a group therapist, possibly a bore. In composition you work with texts and with students' own writing, selecting any materials that make the point, and helping students to apply their insights to their own work. For example: political rhetoric (Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, an essay by JFK, a speech of LBJ), scientific rhetoric (army field manual on biochemical warfare, a standard psychology text), and literary rhetoric (a Mark Twain parody of 19th century prose, a speech by Faulkner)--how are they manipulating the reader through language? Let students consider the devices by which politicians try to achieve a consensus: the plain-man persona, "we," the image of history as an organic entity conforming to certain laws and unresponsive to human intervention. Show them how the social scientist's polysyllabic latinate jargon at once dignifies what could otherwise be an obvious or trivial subject, and allows the audience to feel detached--"objective"--where otherwise it might be revolted. Examine Faulkner's comparison of unassimilated minorities to a herd of wild horses in the streets of a small town. Students too practise manipulation: their irony and fantasy sometimes serve to evade a complex or painful subject; their gentility of diction sterilizes socially unacceptable feelings. One of the most interesting (in terms of student response) short paper assignments I have given is "A Person I Dislike"--their resistance to admitting that there <u>is</u> such a person is enormous. One boy put up a terrific battle, then handed in a paper in which he substituted "Hate" for the last word--it was about his mother. Other students need to learn to manipulate--"the way it really happened" is not always the most interesting or persuasive way to tell a story; the person called "I" on paper need not correspond exactly to the person writing the paper. Originality, sincerity, eloquence, style, may not mean what they had thought.

Composition allows a fair amount of freedom, but most poetry can't be made political. No one can be perpetually talking about Blake and revolution, or the way in which Donne's use of sexual imagery in religious poetry reflects certain assumptions about the role of wome. Perhaps a more permanently relevant effort would be to help students understand why traditional poetry is often inaccessible to them, why its vocabulary, imagery, and values are not part of their world. From one point of view they are handicapped--they do not fear hell, observe nature closely, go to church or to prostitutes, listen to people die or be born, die of love or consumption or the pox, venerate old men: the experiences from which our literature is made. But they possess a new consciousness which literature is not yet caught up with.

She's a twentieth century fox:
No tears, no fears,
No ruined years,
No clocks;
She's a twentieth century fox.

She's the queen of cool,
And she's the lady who waits,
Since her mind left school
It never hesitates;
She won't waste time
On elementary talk,
She's a twentieth century fox.

And you can let them work with material whose impact they are prepared to feel: the poetry of rock, black poetry, their friends' or contemporaries' poetry, Allen Ginsberg.

But is it necessary to teach poetry as politics? I don't think so; other encounters may be more necessary and illuminating, and it argues a narrow view of personality to insist that one's interests be strictly all of a piece. Late medieval philosophers found faith and reason irreconcilable. Some of them resolved the conflict by providing two answers to a given question: a logical answer and a doctrinal one. I don't propose that we give double answers, but that kind of split consciousness may be necessary for the radical teacher of literature, at least until a tradition of radical literature exists. For now, you can provide a context for literature, but to teach it well, you follow where it leads.

The literary tradition is politically conservative; the social and institutional context in which that tradition is taught is sensually conservative. To cultivate sensuality is radical, because it makes us whole people, incapable of being exploited by those who are fragmented. If taken seriously, it means resistance to all that is inhumane, to much that is (in this society) useful and "necessary" (see Marcuse on false needs). I can think of three aspects of teaching that keep us from sensuality (doubtless there are more):

1) Success, often translated as status, reputation, one-upmanship. These terms are imposed by the existing institutional set-up: publish or perish, tenure decisions, "getting along with people" as a criterion for employment, promotion, preference. Other people become obstacles, competitors, bosses, judges, rather than friends, conveyors of pleasure and knowledge. The unified impulse (what you want or need to do) becomes fragmented (what looks best).

2) Dominance, manipulation, control. These too are often imposed by institutional conditions--large lecture classes, standardized syllabi, required courses, disciplinary rules--that make robots of students and programmers of teachers. The radical teacher has to be capable of giving up control at times, of open receptivity, of feeling the impact of, being moved by, his students' needs and ideas. The system makes this difficult: a young counsellor at Queens, Elaine Green, was recently fired for distributing copies of the pamphlet "The Student as Nigger." She had rejected the role of programmer and was trying to show students something about the ways in which they are controlled.

3) Abstraction. Our business is to manipulate ideas and abstractions. But ideas are only a construct supporting truths (or untruths) that should be perceptible in themselves in all their power. Intellectuality is an instrument, though from force of habit people in the profession tend to mistake it for an ideal condition. The events at MLA this past winter exposed no lack of intelligence in the "establishment," but rather the abuse of intelligence; and intelligence is abused if it doesn't make us feel what is humanly true.

Radicals have rarely taken nature for a norm; like the 17th century Puritans, ideologues have tended to view physical and psychic nature as an enemy or an idiot, to be transformed in their own image. This is exploitive narcissism, even though human nature isn't an historical constant and a life of pure instinct isn't the best. Still, a radical programme (however tentative) has to include the psychological dimension that makes humane politics possible. Only a society based on that premise can generate a literature in which the radical teacher will feel at home, a tradition that will not require him to be "what he is not thinking of."



The University as an Agent of Social Change?

by Marianne Githens

During the past few years, a great deal has been said and written about the university as an agent of social change; but much of the discussion centering around strategies and tactics has been confused and unfocused. To a large extent, this confusion has resulted from a failure to define precisely what is meant by social change. Social change, however, encompasses a wide variety of meanings some of which are contradictory and mutually exclusive. Thus, until the question, "change for what?" is answered, there can be neither a meaningful consideration of the role of the university as an agent of social change, nor a basis for evaluating the merits of a particular program of action for the university.

At this point an illustration of the need for clarifying the nature of the change envisioned is perhaps in order. Among some social scientists, social change is taken to mean the construction of a relatively homogeneous society in which there is a common consensus about the community's long range goals. In this context, schools may serve as an agent for social change by attempting to cultivate the acceptance of a common set of values and a particular orientation towards the role of the state. Now if the society is chaotically heterogeneous, the creation of homogeneity indeed constitutes social change, and maybe beneficial social change at that. Yet when schools in this country use devices such as standardized curricula, emphasis on patriotism, and the maintenance of strict discipline to reinforce homogeneity today, few if any of us would think of describing schools as agents of social change.

The fact of the matter is that, for most of us, social change does not mean the creation or maintenance of a homogeneous society. Rather it means a number of other quite different things. For some, social change involves a reversal of the present trend towards more centralized, bureaucratized structures and a movement towards smaller, more simple, loosely structured decentralized units.[1] Some currently popular programs for university reform, such as free universities and non-structured colleges like Ben Salem, spring at least partially from this notion of social change, for they reflect a desire to dismantle complex bureaucracies.

Aside from the very obvious differences in these two conceptions of social change and the operational differences for the university which the two imply--i.e., a highly structured as opposed to a basically non-structured environment--there is another difference which must be stressed. The first notion of social change is primiarily concerned with altering attitudes and priorities with regard to values. In the process, political and social structures may be altered; but on the other hand, the older structures may continue to exist, by accomodating and adjusting themselves to new demands. For example, a school system may remain relatively decentralized in its administration provided that a uniform curriculum prevails. Eventually problems of achieving uniformity in curriculum may result in a greater and greater concentration of power in the hands of a central authority, say a State Board of Education. But if this comes about, it does so gradually. In the case of the second conception of social change, however, political and social structures as well as attitudes, must be substantially and immediately altered. Obviously, loosely structured, decentralized, autonomous schools with each "doing its own thing" preclude the existence of complex, highly structured bureaucracies impowered to supervise subordinate units. In this sense, the second concept of social change is radical, while the first is not. The first is concerned rather with a reform of some attitudes; that is to say, with some kind of social reform.

For a much larger group of people, social change means something still different. Although usually expressed in generalities, social change is taken to mean programs which will bring about a more equitable, just society that is more concerned with individuals and opportunities for their development than with the preservation of structures which prevent these objectives from being realized. Now these sentiments are good,even noble; but they are not, in the final analysis, very helpful. In the first place, they are too imprecise. What, after all, is a just and equitable society that offers opportunity to all? A classless society? A society that maintains social classes but provides for some kind of class mobility? If the answer is a classless society, the role of the university will be quite different than if the answer is a class society which provides for mobility. Furthermore, this kind of vague, general conception lumps together programs which entail radical change with those which are concerned with evolutionary change of attitudes.

It would appear that those who hold the generally prevailing conception of social change view the university as a social agent in essentially three ways. First, the university must attempt to expand the base of a middle elite: a technically trained, professional or semi-professional cadre. Specifically, this means a complete overhaul of present college recruitment programs and the further expansion of a system of two-year or junior colleges. This would mean that those who would otherwise not have the opportunity can get some college training.

The arguments and justification for providing these opportunities run something as follows. A healthy democracy requires an alert, politically aware people. Statistics show that the more education a person has, the more likely he is to participate in the political process, at least by voting. Furthermore, the more education a person has, the more likely he is to have a sense of political efficacy. Therefore, college training provides more impetus for subsequent participation in the political process and thereby for influencing those structures where power resides. Up to now the voices of the poor have not been heard because they have not participated to any extent in the political process, and consequently are not connected into the normal channels of communication which convey their needs to the decison-makers. As college graduates, their voices will no longer be ignored because they will have the same qualifications as those whose voices are listened to. In other words, by acquiring advanced schooling they will have a higher income, a better job, will be more likely to vote and will have some chance of being integrated into decision-making units. After all is said and done, this is the purpose of college programs for the so-called disadvantaged.

Second, if the university is to act as an agent of social change, it must sensitize the college-trained to the problems of the masses. The plight of the masses must be studied if the college-trained from whom the political elite is recruited are to have any real comprehension of the problems of society and to take any enlightened and useful action on them. In order to achieve this kind of sensitizing, curriculum must be changed. This means in concrete terms using the surrounding community as a laboratory where problems can be studied first hand. Sociology, political science and economics courses should draw upon the community to illustrate concepts and theories. Literature courses should include ghetto poetry. But at the same time, this extension of concern with the community must be balanced with more traditional types of training because the function of the university is still to produce a technically trained elite.

Third, the university must reject some current values and practices that tend to blunt the sensitizing process. Specifically, this means refusing to accept or cooperate with values or programs which will diminish the opportunities for the expansion of the base of this technically-trained cadre or which will reinforce structures opposed to this kind of expansion. In concrete terms this means lessening the emphasis on competitiveness which is restrictive rather than expansive in its orientation. Instead of the traditional grading systems, for example, a pass-fail system might be substituted. Since the university

is, however, still concerned with the production of a technically-trained cadre, grades can not be abolished altogether. But certainly intense competition can be eliminated.

But those who see the university serving as an agent of social change in the aforementioned ways are in actuality interested in social reform, not in radical change. Although some may protestingly claim that they are indeed very interested in effecting radical change, the truth of the matter is that the programs that they espouse do not question the principle of elitism or the function of the university in producing such an elite. They seek only to change some of the present procedures for the recruitment of elites in order to expand the base from which such elites may be recruited. Furthermore, since the production of a better-trained middle-elite is a requirement of the present industrial establishment, the university consciously or unconsciously reinforces the status quo when it trains more students who will become a part of this middle-elite.

Some may argue that the advantages of expanding the base from which the political elite is recruited outweigh the disadvantages. In point of fact, however, certain factors erode the significance of these advantages.[1] In the first place, recent studies show that since 1950, the earning capacity of college graduates from working-class backgrounds is not substantially greater than the earning capacity of their parents. Education has not proved to be the great channel for upward social mobility that it was once thought to be. In light of this, the whole argument about integrating the poor into the political process by giving them an access to a college education is weak, if not altogether spurious. Furthermore, getting more people to vote does not mean that they are automatically participating in any real sense in political decision-making. Unless there is a real participation in the selection of candidates, voting can be a rather meaningless activity. The ability to run a candidate successfully for public office is increasingly dependent on the amount of money available for a campaign. To cite just one example, the use of mass communication media, which is an essential of modern campaigning, is extremely expensive. Thus, those who have the money can, if they choose, continue to play a dominant role in the selection of candidates through their decision to finance one candidate rather than another. In other words, the newly-recruited technically-trained middle-elite will be integrated into decision-making only to the extent that the established elite is willing to agree to have them. Under these circumstances, it hardly seems reasonable that those who have acquired academic training under certain expansion programs will feel more politically efficacious when, in fact, their political effectiveness continues to remain dependent on others.

To sum up, all these programs are concerned with rather mild social reforms, and involve at the most a minimal adjustment in the existing social order. If universities are to serve as vehicles for radical change, they must go far beyond the range of programs already discussed. Not even programs to increase student participation in the decision-making processes of the university really involve radical change. All they are finally concerned with is a redistribution of power among an elite. The crux of radical change is a dismantling of the university as a factory which produces the type of person that the industrial establishment requires for its perpetuation. Neither the expansion of the university factory nor a partial redistribution of power among the elite begins to attack this problem. Perhaps those who are interested in radical change should completely scrap the idea that the university in its present form can serve as a vehicle for radical change and develop instead a really radical program--like making every factory a university.

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[1] Although this conception of social change, which has roots in pre-Marxist socialism, nineteenth-century syndicalism and early theories of anarchism, has some adherents, it poses certain serious difficulties. It either fails to come to grips with the problem of reconciling complex, urban, industrialized society with the role of the individual in an essentially pre-industrialized society, or tends to oversimplify the problems involved in such a reconciliation.

Is Research Counterrevolutionary?

by Bart Meyers

Is it possible for a radical to be a scientist in our society? Can he be a radical inside his laboratory rather than merely outside it? As with most simple questions, the answers are perplexing. Nonetheless, it is critical that we deal with them. Specifically, we have to consider seriously the proposition of no longer performing conventional research and, instead, doing Movement research. In doing so, we must confront the fact that applications of scientific knowledge and the mystifications of ideology invested with the scientisisms of systems analysis, game theory, and such, increasingly provide the cutting edge for counter-insurgency on the streets of the ghetto, on the lawns of the college campus, and on the terrain of nations within our imperium.

If we are to attack the problem directly, the cardinal canard --already held in wide disrespect after Nuremberg and Hiroshima-- must be deflated. This is, of course, the proposition that scientific activity must be an unbridled search for truth not subject to the political critique of more mundane quests. For example, J. Robert Oppenheimer was quoted in The New York Times (Feb. 20, 1967), as saying that "our work has changed the conditions in which men live, but the use made of these changes is the problem of governments, not of scientists." Incredible! No greater alienation is imaginable than not feeling responsible in any way for the uses to which your best creative efforts are put. Moreover, it would clearly be immoral to do your scientific thing (and this argot suggests the proper perspective) regardless of the consequences. But most important is the point that I want to develop further: namely, that the scientist's research may well be not merely split off from his political activism but actually at odds with it.

Most radicals who are scientists seem to perform basic or, to use the euphemism, "pure" research. Few seem to deal in applications of science and of those who do, probably none does so in a way which violates his politics. Yet the picture is not simple because the government and the corporate complex (here treated as distinct for convenience) are engaged in applying scientific findings in ways which damn-well do violate the politics of radical scientists. For example, while bright microbiologists decode the DNA and RNA molecules, hack technicians apply their findings to breed mutant strains of virulent microbes resistant to treatment and capable of incorporation in aerosoles for germ warfare.[1] Similar applications have been made or are planned (or can be anticipated by anyone familiar with the dynamics of technology) for findings in the physics of optics, in psychopharmacology, in the social psychology of attitude change, in ecology--in fact, in virtually all branches of science. So the point is that no particularly nasty trick of application was visited upon the nuclear physicists who produced the bomb; they simply assumed a somewhat notorious vanguard role. We do not have two governments --one which beneficently funds research and another which malevolently kills in the ghetto, in Vietnam, and in Bolivia. Rather, there is a single capitalist government which supports research with the intention of acquiring powerful tools--of both the hard and software varieties--for the pursuit of exploitive and imperial goals.

So much for the standard remarks. We can now begin to look at the peculiar position of the radical scientist. If his radical critique and his commitment are to be consistent, he must stop research susceptible to use by the warfare state. The word is stop. And he must not be deluded by a counter-argument insisting on socially redeemable applications of research in medicine, transportation, child care. There are such applications, but the argument is not compelling.

As the recent Federal budgets attest, the U.S. Government does not seriously pursue the goal of social amelioration, let alone of social change. Its goal is exploitation and its method is, depending upon the objective conditions, persuasive or coercive. Just as we would be astonished to see the U.S. employ the methods of warfare for national liberation, so we should not expect a humane deployment of scientific advances. Scientific technology, a powerful mode of mastering societies and their environments, is at all times in the service of political goals and never divorced from them; and in this society at this time, it is the prerogative of powerful institutions--governments and corporations--to amass the necessary technology for successful applications of science.

Are there, however, alternative types of conventional research which would exclusively benefit mankind and which could, therefore, be performed consistent with a radical politics? As the following examples suggest, the answer appears, at least at this point, to be no.

Research in comparative and developmental psychology indicates, with gaining clarity that enriching the experience in specified ways of infants and young children may well increase their intelligence as conventionally defined. As such techniques become standardized (already some toy manufacturers market their versions), they, like other services and products in this society, will be channelled through an organization and distribution of scarcity in such a way as to become the prerogative of the middle and upper classes only. A second example is the effort being expended to develop a supersonic transport (SST). Although new principles of aerodynamics, thermal properties of metals, etc. may result from this research, only an elite will fly in these craft. The only contact most people will have with the SST will be their tax payments for its development and the possible irritation caused by its high noise potential. A third example is the latest dramatic medical advance, the heart transplant. One might hope that research in this area would have purely humane consequences. Yet Dr. Christian Bernard of South Africa has performed two interracial transplants, and you don't need my help to guess who was "colored" and who was "white" in reference to the donors and the recipients. With Dr. Bernard's urging that people be educated to "donate" their organs,[2] it is not overly visionary to predict that the society's underclass, whose labor is decreasingly in demand, will be nourished as a de facto collective "organ bank." The thrust of these examples, which could be multiplied at will, is that the beneficial achievements of scientific technology do not escape the political context but rather emerge as products which are systematically distributed in an inequitable way and become means of further defining and producing desired political ends.[3]

My argument is not that science or scientists are impure, but only that they serve a political end which must be evaluated in terms of their politics. Perhaps some fields are beyond politics, but most are not. It seems to me that among alternatives, ceasing our research as usual must be strongly entertained. What we must begin talking about in a positive vein is how can we perform research which is of value to the Movement. So little thought has been devoted to this possibility that only tentative and evocative statements are possible. For example, secrecy may be necessary in some instances. That is, there are probably certain categories of research which could be performed for the Movement but which if not classified could be rendered ineffective or even used against the Movement. Of course, a classified release of information implies the existence of disciplined political groups organized to use it while maintaining good security. Clearly, such a political form is not currently available to us. Second, there is the necessity of developing independent means of funding such research. The possibility of contributing our services to nations with revolutionary regimes has to be explored also. Third, we need to be imaginative in generating projects. For example, whoever "invented" the Molotov Cocktail devised a people's weapon since the necessary materials are so simple and widely available that a large accumulation of resources is not required to

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12 Radicalizing Introductory Economics

By Mike Zweig

People all over the world are fighting for freedom -- from oppression by racists, from domination by imperialists, from want generated by scarcity and consumerism alike, from "the national interest." Oppression is the problem. Liberation is the solution. Increasing numbers of economics faculty and students are trying to construct an economics and an economy which will be part of the solution, not part of the problem.[1] The temperament as well as the substance of these concerns are outside the bounds of standard thinking about economics. We see an America which has to change, and wee see a body of knowledge and social outlook among economists unsuited to that change. We are trying to resolve that tension by searching for a new economics which will be consistent with and relevant to a society ordered differently from our own.

As insights into these questions have developed, new courses have sometimes been added to curricula in a sporadic way, dealing with urban ghettos and domestic colonialism, black capitalism, imperialism, etc. But the basic core of economics education, especially as it is seen by most undergraduates in introductory courses, has remained virtually untouched. (Although they do not share a radical politics, some liberals are also becoming restless with Samuelson's glad-hand treatment of economic issues.) Revamping the introductory course is a miniscule element in the task of redirecting economics and the economy, but those of us who teach the course might as well teach it in a way which at least opens up possibilities for deeper changes and insights.

This semester I am teaching an experimental section of a proposed new one-semester introductory economics course at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.[2] The course proceeds through six broad areas of concern: 1) The social context and development of economic thinking; 2) Private property; 3) Economic class; 4) Markets; 5) Business cycles and national employment; and 6) Technology. Some radical economists balk at teaching market and aggregate analyses, which are, after all, essential elements of standard bourgeois theory. I think it is important for students to know this material, since it dominates the field, but to study it in historical and ideological context. Therefore we allow time to explore other substantive elements of the economic structure -- usually ignored in introductory economics courses -- such as private property and class. Although the semester is not yet even half over, the experiment seems to be turning out successfully. The students are generally interested, discussions have been lively and substantive, and topics flow reasonably smoothly one to the next.

The first week and a half of classes were devoted to a look at the history of economic doctrines. While this is not enough time to get into much of the disagreements among economists of the past two centuries, it is enough to make the substantive point that economic theories and questions and answers are shaped by the political, social, and ideological requirements of the time in which the theories are developed, and especially the time of their acceptance. The discussion fastened on mercantilist policies, the labor theory of values Marx's use of that theory and its subsequent repudiation by bourgeois economists, who developed a consumer-oriented theory of production based on capital and labor to justify a return to capital and to show how it all worked out for the masses in the end. Of all the books on the history of doctrine, Fusfield's is particularly well-suited to making the point that it is not written in the stars that economists should think as they do today and that there is ideological content, or at least purpose, to ideas.

One particular fundamental economic institution which has undergone change in response to social and ideological needs is property, the relation between man and thing. Tawney

discusses private property as it has developed historically, especially with regard to the performance of social and economic functions. (This raises important political and philosophical questions about functionalism and utilitarianism, just as the point of the history-of-thought section raises questions about cultural and moral relativism.) In class we talked about forms of communal ownership of things, the function of privacy in property holdings, and the relationship (or lack of relationship) between performance of function and material gain.

I also presented the core of John Locke's treatment of property, which proposes that privacy in property stems from a person "mixing his labor" with material, the product of which is "his," as are the tools with which he works on material in progress. Since this is the foundation of Western notions of property, it is important to see the technological context in which such a theory makes sense in general, and to note that Western ideas of property are intimately bound in men's relations with the means of production.

An understanding of Locke's ideas on property led naturally into a discussion of Marx's concept of alientation in a technologically complicated industrial society, where wage labor has no control of its product or the tools with which it "mixes its labor." It was a short step from this to an investigation of Marxist ideas on class defined by relations to the means of production, and a more general look at class divisions in terms of distribution of resources, functions, rights, privileges and power.

In the first discussion the students focussed on impediments to class mobility. We spent over an hour brainstorming about the United States and came up with four categories of barriers: 1) the distribution of resources, reflected in the distribution of income and wealth; 2) information flows, particularly the class divisions in the "grape vine" and the media; 3) discrimination, reflecting both simple racism and more subtle control for language, style of life, and culture in general; 4) the distribution of power through the State.

At this writing we are in the middle of the section on class, so the rest of the course description is prospective only. Having discussed various aspects of economic function, we will be in a position to ask how some of these functions are integrated into particular economic activity. This is the entree into a discussion of production, exchange, and markets. To facilitate the compression of many ideas onto a short period of time (3 weeks), we will begin with the notion of exchange, market and actors in the market (supply and demand functions), talk about marginal analysis as a means toward maximization, develop the notion of elasticity and use the elasticity of demand as a measure of a firm's position in the market (on the spectrum, perfect competition to monopoly). The idea will be to expose some basic notions of contemporary price theory, without going into details.

After a look at disaggregated market activity, we will go on for about three weeks to ask what are the over-all properties of the integrated system. We will then move from the division of the GNP into disaggregate income and product sectors to fuller discussions of the consumption function, investment,behavior, etc. I expect to emphasize the basic analytic notion that output is income, develop from that the existence of a multiplier and aggregate stabilization policy. But my intention is to leave details to intermediate courses in theory, which presently duplicate much of the content of the usual introductory course.

Scattered throughout the semester are discussion of the nature and role of technology. From property to investment theory, the question cannot be avoided. I will try to finish the semester with a week devoted entirely to technology and its social, economic and political implications. Ellul's work is only one of many which might serve the purpose.

This introductory course covers a lot of ground. It is a difficult course. From the first experience, students seem to respond well to it, and I am excited by it. The questions students have raised have been amazing and deep: 1) Fusfeld talks some about economic planning and the USSR. But isn't it true that <u>all</u> economic theories, even strict laissez-faire, are, in principle, economic plans in that they all prescribe some preferred relationship among people to accomplish production and exchange? 2) Does the use of money logically entail the existence of private property in at least some commodities? More good questions come out in almost every session.

The economics department at Stony Brook recently adopted this course unanimously to substitute for the traditional two-semester sequence. The structure of the course will be: one large lecture each week (14 weeks in the semester, roughly 300 students in the course); a number of sections, each meeting three hours a week with no more than 30 students per section. Responsibility for the lectures will be shared by four or five faculty members, each giving three or four lectures about his special interest or love. The sections will be semi-autonomous from the lectures, but the same rough outline will be followed. Some readings will be common to all sections, but individual teachers may add to the "standard" reading according to their own preferences or the interests of their particular students.

Examinations and grading will be handled in the sections, with the understanding that the students will also be examined on the lectures. This semester, each student in my class is responsible for preparing (outside of class) something which "manifests intelligence" about ideas read about or discussed. These manifestations can take any form--e.g. epic poem, other poem, play, essay, letter, collage, mixed media, etc. They need only be substantial, intelligent, and insightful. Most students write essays, out of habit I suppose, but occasionally other work is submitted, and if I have trouble discerning substance because of unfamiliarity with form, I talk about it with the student. The substance is what counts, which is part of why I see no reason to constrain or judge the form.

It seems most honest to conceive of the entire undergraduate program as an "introduction." The introductory course in this setting should raise many questions, but it cannot be expected to furnish the student with a deep understanding of answers. Other courses and action ought to do this. One part of radical teaching and action is the eliciting or posing of deep questions. In this sense, the introductory course will be a success if students come out of it prepared to be a delight (or a pain in the neck) to teachers ever after, breaking bounds and making connections in unheard-of ways. No course can guarantee such a result, nor can any teacher. The least we can do is to make it possible.

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[1]Thanks to Eldridge Cleaver for making this distinction clear.

[2]Course outline for Economics 101
This course is an experiment....The notions, and the books you may read about them: I. The Social Context and Development of Economic Thinking-- The Age of the Economist, Daniel Fusfeld; II. Private Property--The Acquisitive Society, R.H.Tawney; III. Economic Class--Classes in Modern Society, T.B. Bottomore and Who Rules America?, G.Wm.Domhoff; IV. Markets--Prices and Markets, Robert Dorfman; V. Business Cycle--Elementary Aggregate Economics, Howard Sherman; VI. Technology--The Technological Society, Jacques Ellul.

RESEARCH (Cont'd from p. 11)

mount the technology necessary for its production. It seems clear that whether we're talking of weapons, defensive apparatus, propaganda, recruitment pitches for organizations, economic research for consumer unions, or whatever, we must be certain that the technological requirements for their application do not exceed the resources of the people. We must, if we are serious in our dedication to a new day, succeed in redirecting our professional activities away from service to the forces that we oppose and towards the Movement that we are part of. Short of this, we engage in a radical critique with no force for our own lives and, therefore, of no relevance to others.

NOTES:

1 Seymour M. Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.
2 The New York Times, December 17, 1968.
3 A small but concrete case in point is the uses to which the Special Forces troops put medicine in Vietnam. Equally pertinent for this paper is the reaction this situation prompted in Dr. Levy.

artists after the bolshevik revolution: documents and manifestoes

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After the Bolshevik Revolution the old schools and academies of art were dissolved and their property requisitioned. Soon afterwards, on the initiative of the Department of Fine Arts set up by the People's Commissariat of Education, under Anatoly Lunacharsky, they were reopened with an entirely new constitution. Previously the Union of Artists had insisted that only artists should have control over artistic matters, without any governmental intervention, and Lunacharsky agreed to accept this demand. Hence the unprecedented decrees which we publish here: decrees which inaugurated not only an entirely new vision of how education should be organized but also an extraordinary upsurge of revolutionary art. Almost all the leading 'leftist' artists were involved in the Department of Fine Arts and the art schools--in Petrograd, Moscow and Vitebsk--set up by the decrees. Tatlin was chairman of the Moscow section of the Department for a time; Altman of the Petrograd section. Kandinsky, Chagall, Tatlin, Malevich, Lissitsky, among others, taught in the schools. Their work and the work of their students represents the high point of European art in this century. Naum Gabo has described the conditions at the school in Moscow: 'What is important to know about the character of the institution is that it was almost autonomous; it was both a school and a free academy where not only the current teaching of special professions was carried out (there were seven departments: Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, Ceramics, Metalwork and Woodwork, Textiles and Typography) but general discussions were held and seminars conducted among the students on diverse problems where the public could participate and artists not officially on the faculty could speak and give lessons. It had an audience of several thousand students, although a shifting one due to the Civil War and the war with Poland. There was a free exchange between workshops and also the private studios such as mine....During these seminars as well as during the general meetings, many ideological questions between opposing artists in our abstract group were thrashed out. These gatherings had a much greater influence on the later development of constructive art than all the teaching.' This herioc experiment lasted for three years till the beginning of the New Economic Policy and the right turn which accompanied this. The 'leftist' currents in art continued their struggle, often with success, for about another decade before they were finally defeated.

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars

The Academy of Fine Art, as a state institution, is to be abolished. The Higher Institute of Fine Art is to be detached, with its own credits and its own capital, from the Academy of Fine Art, and reorganized as a Free School of Art.

The museum of the Academy of Fine Art will come under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat for Education.

All the capital and all the assets of the Academy of Fine Art become the property of the Soviet Republic, as a fund to be used to satisfy the special needs of artistic culture.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars: V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
People's Commissars: A.Lunacharsky; Stalin; G.Chicherin
Responsible Officer of the Council of People's Commissars: C.V. Bonch-Bruevich

Regulations for the Acceptance of Students in the Free Studios of the State.

1. Whoever wishes to receive a specialized art education has the right to register as a student at the Free Artists' Studios of the State.

2. Applications will be accepted from people of sixteen years and over. Note: Those who wish to enrol at the Free Artists' Studios of the State do not have to present any type of diploma.

3. All students who were registered at the ex-School of Art are thereby considered students of the Free Artists' Studios of the State.

4. Applications from those who wish to work in the Free Artists' Studios of the State will be accepted at any time throughout the year.

People's Commissar for Education: A. Lunacharsky
Director of the Section of Fine Arts: D. Shterenberg
Secretary: A. Trunin

Instructions for the election of supervisors in the Free Studios of the State. (Extracts)

1. Students in the Free Artists' Studios have all, without exception, the right to elect their teachers for their respective subjects.

2. All arts have the right to representation in the Studios.

3. All artists have the right to put forward their candidature as supervisors in the Studios.

4. Students in the Free Artists' Studios will divide into groups according to the artistic currents with which they have the greatest affinity, and also to the specific character of the various studios.

10. The groups thus organized, wherever they have more than twenty members, may choose their own supervisor independently of other groups.

14. Students also have the right to work without a supervisor.

15. Elected supervisors stay in office for two years and will be registered at the People's Commissariat for Education.

Note: Supervisors whose courses are not attended for three months will be expected to resign at the end of the academic year.

Decree of the People's Commissar for Education on the assignation of studios to painters.

To secure for painters the necessary conditions for their work, it is declared that professional painters have the right to one room for use as a studio, and one room for living purposes.

Neither room may be requisitioned for any reason, and co-tenants will not be allowed.

People's Commissar for Education: A. Lunacharsky

Appeal sent by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the students of the Section of Fine Arts to young Western Artists.

Comrades, for almost seven years we have been all but isolated. What little news we have received either on the situation in art-schools or on the development of western art drives us to seek out, with ever greater energy, the best ways of establishing contacts between young artists.

But we are also driven by the desire to share with you the joy which we feel together with the whole of the Communist Russia which is coming into being.

In the three years of revolution we have devoted many efforts first to destroying the old schools and then to creating the new. We carried out this activity in extremely difficult conditions; on the one hand, because of the economic crisis created as a result of the blockade, and, on the other hand, because we were forced to fight on two fronts, repulsing the imperialists of the Entente with guns in our hands at the same time as struggling inside the country against the 'spiritual counter-revolution', which did everything it could to suffocate us in old and mouldy academy-schools and other 'holy' institutions, under the cover of worn-out slogans like: apoliticism, cultural heritage etc. But now our combined efforts are bringing us near to total victory.

The old world, the academic world, the world of priests is beginning to quake.

Our struggle on the spiritual front inside Russia is not yet finished. For the reasons above we have not been able to organize many schools, but some are already quite good; not only the communists recognize this, but also the best theorists of the old artistic culture....

All the youth of our Republic, like the young communists, have shown themselves solid and inflexible against those bastions of the old world--the academies--just as the communists are inflexible against every bastion of capitalism.

The news which we have received, although sparse and fragmentary, tells of a crisis in Western art, of its separation and isolation, and you can well believe that we, who have always tried to learn from the West, are very concerned about this....

We find that the only way to eliminate the separation of art from life is that

of returning to the first foundation of life, to economics, which is the principle basis of everything. However hard one tries to awaken interests with gimmicks, without resolving this fundamental question, art will increasingly be impoverished and isolated, despite all the inventions and conquests of the past ten years. We would even say that these conquests will increasingly lose value, because the principal question is not being faced. You will understand therefore the joy which we feel seeing the first swallows that come flying from the West, even if the artists who see the problem in the same way as we do are few and isolated.

Academies and institutes created by the bourgeoisie will attempt to distract you in every possible way from this first cause, and only when you turn your attention to social relations, when you see the proletariat on the march and you put yourself on its side in the struggle for economic emancipation, when in your aspirations communism burns like a torch, when you make a clean sweep of all academies and institutes, then your art will not be a burden, but a spiritual necessity.

For the Communist Revolution!
For the new culture of the Revolution!
For the vanguard of culture, artistic youth!
In the name of 10 thousand students.

1919

movement, serving its needs for manpower, intelligence, and support, while at the same time sufficiently integrating himself into campus life to remain there. To recruit radicalizable students, to design course work and research to help organizers in the field, to maintain the steady contact with his liberal colleagues necessary to dun them, a radical must be doing a serious campus job. That pulls him away from the movement. On the other hand, his integration with the movement creates both internal psychological pressure and external administrative pressure driving him out of a college.

This dilemma comes into sharp relief if one considers the character of the academic disciplines. As a number of these papers indicate, our professions almost wholly, and actively, serve the status quo materially or ideologically. The contradiction in our lives is this: we can preach radicalism and even participate in campus confrontations, while at the same time doing research or teaching that strengthens the position of corporate capitalism. To remain alive in academe we must accept the standard forms of teaching and the content of research and classrooms--or we must invest real energy in changing them. We must, to choose obvious examples, introduce revolutionary literature and political concerns into English courses, or Marxist categories into economic analysis, or democratic practice into classrooms. We want to make such changes, both for self-preservation and because without them we will continue to help produce false consciousness among our students instead of aiding in the process of their radicalization. But making such changes involves us in reforming our professions; those who sit atop them are not about to accept destruction of "professional," i.e., <u>their</u> categories of knowledge, their research priorities.

We thus commit ourselves to a difficult two-front war: with a few of our colleagues against the mandarins, and with our movement brothers against those who hire the mandarins. I think the natural tendency of academics, who have not lived and worked day by day in the movement, is to be drawn into professional concerns, which do affect their daily lives. Which suggests the need for people to find ways of taking periodic leave to work in the movement full time. It also suggests the need for serious and steady discussion in NUC chapters, based on practice, of the shifting and perhaps fragile role of movement organizer on campus. [Thanks to Dan Stern and Fred Whitehead for focussing a number of these issues.]

In A Crisis the Center Falls Out

by Richard Greeman

Most of us who teach English, Philosophy, or History of Foreign Languages to Columbia College undergraduates have our offices and classrooms in Hamilton Hall. When we arrived there on Wednesday morning, April 24, it was already barricaded and occupied by Black students, and an increasingly unruly crowd of hostile whites was gathering outside, threatening to break in and hurling racial epithets. (I had participated in the original occupation of Hamilton the day before, but had gone home before the pre-dawn split between SDS and the Student Afro-American Society and the subsequent barricading of the building.) Spontaneously, without any discussion or organization, a few dozen Hamilton teachers took up places between the Black students inside and the mob (or prospective police attackers) outside. The teachers were soon joined by colleagues, both male and female, and a second line of nonviolent white students formed in front of them. We stood there, despite a teeming rainstorm (which had the fortunate side-effect of thinning the ranks of the mob outside) for two days and nights: talking, joking, sending out for coffee, umbrellas, and dry clothes, occasionally breaking up fights or (over bull-horns provided by students) expressing our sympathy with the Hamilton sit-ins. Some of us had had experience in the civil rights or anti-war movement; others were simply anguished over the possibility of a racial clash on campus; all felt deeply that now, if ever, the time had come to stand up for our students. The origin of the so-called "faculty cordon" at Columbia was thus a spontaneous act of solidarity with the blockaded Black students. It is important to emphasize this origin because of later transformations. That same afternoon, a hastily-assembled meeting of the College Voting Faculty (including everyone of professorial rank, but not instructors) responded to the sit-ins by calling for the suspension of the gym construction and expressing its "trust that police action will not be used," although it did condemn the demonstrators' use of "coercion." Implicit in this resolution was the basically contradictory attitude of most of the senior faculty: tacit support for the demonstrators' goals but unwillingness to break openly with the administration by sanctioning their action. The unconscious hypocrisy of this attitude is clear: the faculty would never have dared to consider taking a position on the gym, of which they all disapproved, had it not been for the mass student pressure from below expressed through direct action.

By Thursday morning, the occupation of Avery and Fayerweather had created a totally new situation. Although the mob pressure directed against the Blacks in front of Hamilton had decreased, a large and hostile crowd was gathering in front of Fayerweather and threatening to attack the sit-ins. Professor Etzioni and I managed to get between the two groups, to convince them to sit down, and to begin an impromptu debate. Although Etzioni had been a vocal opponent of the war and of secret weapons research, he opposed the strike on the ground that "nothing should interfere with education." Somewhat shocked, I replied that as far as I was concerned, the process of education at Columbia was just beginning and that the loss of a few hours of routine sociology classes was more than compensated for by this political experience. I argued for a conception of learning that united theory and practice. At that point, even the conservative students gathered in front of the building agreed that it was more important to debate the issues of the gym, IDA, and the right of rebellion than to listen to another hour of boring sociology. Although they still did not support the demonstrators, they were beginning to think. The slow evolution of the campus majority from initial shock and anger over the "disruption" to eventual support of the strike had begun. (Nonetheless, this debate was often to be repeated, and most of the professors, like Etzioni and later Melman, Kuhns, and Morganbesser, could find no better argument to discourage vigilante counter-demonstrators than that of "two wrongs don't make a right" or "don't use coercion like SDS." There was a total failure to distinguish between the two groups in terms of politics, morality, or goals. This deliberate "apolitical" attitude of the liberals made it possible

for the faculty "cordon" to be turned into an anti-SDS blockade later on.)

That afternoon, about 50 of the faculty who had remained active on campus managed to arrange a meeting with Vice-President Truman in Philosophy Lounge. This was the first direct contact we had had with the administration since the crisis had begun. Truman appeared haggard and ashen and actually broke down during the meeting. He reported the administration's attitude that it would be immoral to negotiate with the SDS students whose behavior was "illegal," that their leaders would be expelled, and that police would likely be called. At the same time, however, he announced that he had offered virtual amnesty to the Blacks in Hamilton, although their demands were identical to those of SDS. It was an obvious attempt to split the students along racial lines, and when I asked him how he reconciled this with his high "principles," he pleaded pressing business and left the room.

This time, however, we did not just pick up and go home, as usual. In an unprecedented move, Proffessor Allen Westin, a long-time associate of Truman, took the floor and declared that "our great love and respect for David Truman" should not prevent us from seeing that he was in the wrong or from taking independent action "to save him from himself." Within the hour, an Ad Hoc Faculty Committee was formed, pledged "to stand before the occupied buildings to prevent forcible entry by police and others" until "this crisis is settled" to its satisfaction. By evening, the group had grown to nearly 200, opened negotiations with the students, elected a steering committee, and resolved to remain in permanent session. Speakers like Sam Coleman, Marvin Harris, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Jeff Kaplow reflected the sense of urgency we felt over the issues of university racism and complicity in the war and noted that the demonstrating students had in fact "liberated" us to take a political stand for the first time in history--something we should have done long before. They were applauded. There was a tremendous sense of exhiliration and release as professors began to realize how long they had been infantilized by the administration and prepared to assert themselves at last. Again, it is essential to note that the origin of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee was a spontaneous and essentially anti-administration act made possible by the power-vacuum created by the students' rebellion. In consequence, both its founders and the demonstrating students expected that it would result in a fundamental shift in the balance of power. Events were to show that this was an illusion.

The Ad Hoc Group faced its first test that night, and it passed well. Although we had been told that the administration recognized our efforts and respected our views, at 1:05 a.m. David Truman entered Philosophy Hall and announced that the police were being called to arrest the strikers, ostensibly to "prevent violent clashes between opposing student groups." He was hooted out of the room under cries of "shame!" and "liar!" (It should be noted that where the faculty, merely through its moral authority, had successfully prevented such clashes, the administration had done nothing to contain the right-wing student vigilante groups who were openly threatening violence and had in fact actually encouraged them through members of the Dean's staff. Where the sit-ins were nonviolent from the beginning, the administration created violence first by sponsoring the student right and then by invoking police violence to resolve the crisis it had created.)

The faculty responded immediately by taking up positions in front of the occupied buildings while simultaneously appealing to the Mayor's office to call off the cops. The strategy worked, at least for the moment. I was stationed with a group of about 30 in front of Low Library. We had carefully cleared the area of students so that it would be clear to the press, the administration, and the cops that we were faculty. Contrary to the Cox Commission and other accounts, we had been passing through police officers and Mayor's aides, since we were aware that our own representatives were inside Low trying to convince them to forestall the police action. At about 2:00 a.m., a group of about 25 burly men in raincoats charged us across the open area in front of the line. We challenged them to identify themselves and state their business, announcing that we were Columbia Faculty. They neither spoke nor showed police badges, but beat their way through

the line. I was grabbed from behind, held, and clubbed on the head. Several of my colleagues, including two women, were punched or kicked. A few minutes later, David Truman came to the door and saw me bleeding profusely. "How did this happen, Mr. Greeman?" he asked. "What did you expect when you called the cops?" I replied. Dr. Truman was kind enough to lead me inside for medical attention, and I noticed my assailants drinking coffee at the police canteen in the corridor outside his office. The later reports (1) that the attack was not deliberate and (2) that I injured myself by slipping on the steps were deliberate lies spread by a member of the Dean's staff and accepted by the Cox Commission.

The sight of blood must have convinced the administration that the faculty was serious. As a result, at 3:30 a.m., the police action was called off, construction on the gym was suspended, and the school was declared closed until Monday. The result of this action was that the occupation could be prolonged for another four days, during which time the justice of the strikers' demands became more and more evident to the majority of the students, who began to rally in their support. Paradoxically, however, the possibility of a student-faculty alliance against the administration began to decline from that moment on.

During the next four days, the Ad Hoc group's activities were two-fold: attempts at mediation and attempts at keeping order through faculty cordons in front of the buildings. Both aspects were aimed at "preventing violence" or "resolving the crisis." Attempts to get the Group to take a consistent political stand of its own were constantly sidetracked by the Steering Committee, and the vital question of amnesty for the students never even came to a vote. As a result, the group slowly lost whatever influence, prestige, and chance of power it ever had and was effectively transformed into its opposite. Having no political position of its own, and faced with an unyielding administration, the professors' "possibilist" outlook turned them into their own and the students' worst enemy. Thus the faculty lines, originally organized to protect the students in the buildings, got turned into a kind of blockade of the buildings. The mediation efforts, originally undertaken out of sympathy for the students' goals, ended up as efforts to get them out of the buildings at any cost. Finally, the urge to assert faculty independence and take an independent stand was transformed, through the self-imposed role of mediator, into pressure to "resolve the crisis"--a goal that implied siding with the stronger party, the administration.

The faculty attempts to mediate went through several stages. The first was direct negotiations with the students: that is, liberal professors attempted to get the strikers to "soften" their line, especially on amnesty, in exchange for vague promises which the "negotiators" had no power to deliver. The logic of this situation led to such unseemly scenes as the one in Fayerwether Hall, the "softest" of the Communes, where two "socialist" professors, Seymour Melman and Sidney Morganbesser, harrangued an already divided and discouraged student assembly for over an hour, arguing that their revolt was dangerous and absurd because it was "unrealistic." The two ex-student-radicals were attempting to influence the internal politics of the strikers, apparently oblivious of the facts that (1) as non-strikers they would not have to live by the result of the decision and (2) that they were now professors with a vested interest in the stability of Columbia. One wonders where the students found the patience to listen to them.

Soon, however, these pseudo-negotiations were totally undercut by a statement from the President of the Board of Trustees, who declared that the decision to halt construction on the gym was only "temporary" and that the President had the sole power to discipline students. This was a direct slap in the face to the faculty and a reminder that they were mere employees with no real power. If anything, this should have convinced the faculty that their only chance for any real dignity or power then or in the future was to join the students. It did convince some, but the Steering Committee was so convinced of the need for compromise and consensus and so incapable of conceiving its role in terms of any fundamental change in power relationships that it ran in the opposite direction.

The result was a turn toward "public mediation" embodied in a series of compromise solutions presented to both the administration and striking students as a "bitter pill" for both sides to swallow but the only fair resolution to the crisis.

This attempt to bolster up the center in a situation where there was increasing polarization was futile from the beginning. Meanwhile, the administration, backed by some conservative professors, had engineered an "official" faculty meeting in the hope of gaining a vote of confidence and undermining the legitimacy of the Ad Hoc group. From this meeting were excluded the younger faculty members and those from the more "liberal" faculties, while those from conservative Law and Business--few, if any, of whose students were involved--were invited. Despite the disadvantage of a packed assembly, the Ad Hoc Steering Committee could have presented its proposals at this meeting, as the Ad Hoc membership had directed it to. They might have carried on a close vote, and such a show of force would have undermined the legitimacy of Kirk and Truman. To cheir shame, the Westin group refused to pick up the challenge, apparently because they didn't want "to split the faculty".

The younger and more radical members of the Ad Hoc group were naturally unhappy with the behavior of the Steering Committee. But they, too, were inhibited by a desire not to break up the Ad Hoc group, which they saw as the only place where they had a voice. Moreover, they still hoped that the Ad Hoc assembly could be brought to vote for amnesty. Unfortunately, their opponents lacked such scruples. The conservatives sent scores of establishment-type professors to pack the Ad Hoc meetings, and the Steering Committee allowed them to vote, even though they had not signed the statement committing them to any action and were in fact opposed to the group's original principles. Moreover, the meetings were increasingly subject to manipulation. The Steering Committee, meeting in camera, took over all decision-making, only reporting its acts to the body after the fact. The assembly was thus turned into a talk-shop or an errand-boy. On the rare occasions when it was actually functioning and it looked as if the key question of amnesty was about to come to a vote, the assembly was broken up. A member of the Dean's staff or some conservative professor might run breathlessly into the room at the crucial moment and call everyone out to prevent some "disastrous" clash among students; by the time the group could be called back together, the tension would be broken and more conservatives would miraculously appear. On one notable occasion, Westin himself simply adjourned the meeting just before the vote.

Although this manipulation became more and more blatant, more and more frustrating, the younger and more radical faculty members were unable to deal with it. They were lulled by a false sense of community with the liberals in the leadership and so flattered by their own participation in a "real" faculty, on a basis of equality, that they were eventually coopted. To have told the truth--to denounce one's newfound "colleagues" as lying manipulators and the Deans as enemy agents sent in to disrupt--would have been a breach of academic decorum. Once again, the myth of the "academic community" proved an effective mask to hide the real power relationships.

The take-it-or-leave-it "bitter pill" proposal was predictably turned down by the Administration, which cleverly worded its rejection as if it were an acceptance. This was supposed to commit the group to support the strikers, but when they too rejected the proposal, it was "discovered" that the wording was ambiguous: it did not provide either for half-way acceptances or for the case of a double rejection. This let the Steering Committee off the hook. Their last feeble efforts at mediation--phoning Governor Rockefeller, Mayor Lindsay, and bringing in a professional mediator, Kheel--only underlined their bankruptcy. At the 11th hour, Alex Ehrlich, a distinguished economics professor and a thoroughly principled socialist, finally got the floor and placed the reality of the situation before the body: amnesty or the cops. There was no other choice. For a moment it looked as though the faculty, faced with political reality at last, would commit itself. But the liberals would not have it so. Professor Shenton introduced a motion to table, and after much debate, it carried. The abdication was complete.

With the cops on the way, each member was left to act on his individual conscience which, in most cases, turned out to be a more reliable guide than his political

courage. Many professors did interpose themselves between the cops and the students on that dismal night of the "Bust," and Shenton himself was among the most seriously injured. Paradoxically, many liberal intellectuals found it easier to face physical violence than to think about shaking up the power structure; easier to get hit on the head than to re-examine their own self-image. Self-sacrifice, "acting on principle," became a substitute for changing one's consciousness.

The epilogue was played out the next morning in McMillan Auditorium, which was packed with 750 faculty members--a larger group than had ever been assembled at any Ad Hoc or official meeting. By then the bloody-headed students and teachers had begun returning to the campus, and the moderate student leaders had called for a general strike against the administration. The mood was one of total revultion. Westin appeared on the rostrum and, to everyone's surprise, introduced a strong resolution condemning the administration and supporting the new student strike. He was greeted by thundrous applause and an immediate motion for approval by acclimation. For a moment it looked as if all would be vindicated. But the "liberal imagination" still had a few tricks left. Insisting that acclamation would be undemocratic, Westin proceeded to open the debate by calling on known conservatives in the faculty--the very men who had boycotted the poor Ad Hoc group during its earlier struggles. When, one after another, Michael Sovern, Quentin Anderson, and Fritz Stern voiced their disapproval, Westin did an about-face, withdrew his proposals, and left the room taking half the Steering Committee with him and muttering something about being unable to decide anything without consulting Daniel Bell (the "End of Ideology" man) who was evidently still in bed. The meeting was thus effectively broken up, and the vast majority, who were ready to vote for the resolution, turned into a confused mass of individuals. For Westin, the opinions of Daniel Bell were clearly more important than those of a majority of his colleagues(not surprisingly, both of them, along with Sovern, turned up on the administration-sponsored Faculty Executive Committee created later that day). The abdication was sealed by a sell-out.

Subsequent to these events, various attempts to revive the Ad Hoc group all failed. The rump group which remained in McMillan was able to vote the original Westin proposal and continued for a few days under the leadership of Marvin Harris and Eric Bentley. Then the moderates created an Independent Faculty Group under Melman, Morganbesser and others, which again tried to take a centrist position and dissolved when its membership proved "too radical" for its leaders (against a background of general apathy). A junior Faculty Group, formed when the younger faculty realized that they were excluded even from the phony decision-making bodies created by the administration, also folded. Today, six months later, most of the faculty--if they think about it at all--look back on the revolt as if it were some kind of strange dream. Most have fallen back into business-as-usual, including grumbling as usual, more than content to believe the new administration's promises about "restructuring" and to let management manage. A few have been radicalized, especially among the younger people; more interestingly, many of the allegedly intellectual radicals have been shown as establishment liberals, tied by their comfort and prestige to the status quo.

Yet the issues at Columbia were always clear. The students' demands--an end to IDA, to the construction of a Columbia gym in a Harlem public park, and to arbitrary discipline against student radicals--were surprisingly moderate. Moreover, they symbolized the three key issues of the day--the imperialist war, institutionalized racism, and law 'n order versus the right to resist--issues on which most Columbia professors are "liberals." Finally, the Kirk administration had already discredited itself, even in the faculty's eyes, through its consistent arrogance, remoteness, and incompetence (as witnessed by their mishandling of earlier student protests and the scandal of the Strickman cigarette filter deal). If ever the conditions were ripe for a faculty to take advantage of a student revolt and assert itself, it was at Columbia, where the faculty had plenty of grievances of its own: low salaries, poor housing, slow promotion, academic decline, and the absence of anything like a tradition (such as a faculty senate to ensure their participation in decision-making).

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE 1ST AMENDMENT

BY STAUGHTON LYND

As the United States enters a period of rightwing repression, radicals find themselves without a consistent theory of civil and academic freedom. A normative conception is needed so that we may keep clearly in mind what should be in struggling against what is likely to become present fact.

The question of liberty in the larger society and the question of liberty on the campus are alike in some ways, different in others. On as off the campus, a theory of freedom must deal clearly with the traditional liberal distinction between thought and action. On as off the campus, there is the problem, recently highlighted by Justice Black, of the relationship between First Amendment rights and the right to private property. However, the following seem to me peculiar to the academic situation:

1. In the academic situation, teachers and administrators have, or often feel, a quasi-parental responsibility for students;
2. In contrast to the larger society (and in contrast to public elementary and high school), the university community has been interpreted as a voluntary association, entrance into which entails implicit acceptance of a social contract additional to that which binds all members of the society;
3. A majority of the members of the university community--namely, the students--are transients;
4. A university provides a service for a price.

Because of these features which pertain to the campus but not to the society at large, a clear conceptualization of freedom on the campus appears to me extraordinarily difficult.

Notwithstanding these differences between the milieux of the campus and of civil society, the trend of recent court decisions and administrative practice is toward a unified theory applicable to both. At Cornell University, for example, a student-faculty committee recommended in October 1967, "abandonment of the theory that the university can act as an away-from-home parent." Reflecting on problems which had arisen in connection with the use of marijuana, Vietnam war protests, and alleged obscenity in a student magazine, the committee suggested that the university should "no longer interpose itself between the police and students who get into trouble."[1] Students, in other words, would henceforth run precisely the same risks as fully responsible adult citizens.

The tendency toward assimilation of the theories of academic freedom and of civil liberty exposes students to new risks at the same time that it holds out the promise of new protection. One risk is direct intervention by Congress to punish campus dissent. Protesting against Federal legislation to withdraw government stipends from disruptive students, The New York Times commented: "This is an effort to institute a particularly insidious form of Federal control over academic life and to infringe on the traditional rights of academic communities to govern themselves."[2] Similarly, the Times urged university administrations to refuse to turn over to government committees the membership lists of student organizations.[3]

Sometimes, however, dissident students and teachers are only too happy to see government infringement on the traditional rights of academic communities to govern themselves, as when courts require publicly-supported colleges to respect the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1967, a student newspaper gleefully reported three Federal court decisions which prohibited state institutions of higher education from expelling students without specifying charges and holding

a hearing:

> In Montgomery, Ala., a Federal judge ordered Troy State College, Troy, Ala., to readmit a student editor who had been expelled after a dispute with college officials over the censorship of an editorial he wrote for the student newspaper last spring. In the second case, the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered Howard University in Washington, D.C. to take back four students who had been expelled for alleged black power activities on campus. And in Columbia, S.C., a Federal District judge ruled that three students were unlawfully suspended from South Carolina State College last February.[4]

A year later the American Civil Liberties Union released a report on "Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools" which said that high-school students should "have the right to live under the principle of 'rule by law' as opposed to 'rule by personality'." The ACLU recommended that high-school students be understood to possess the following rights:

> To organize political groups, hold assemblies and demonstrations, wear buttons and armbands with slogans as long as these do not disrupt classes or the peace of the school.
>
> To receive formal hearings, written charges and a right to appeal any serious violation of conduct charge.
>
> To dress or wear one's hair as one pleases and to attend school while married or pregnant unless these things "in fact" disrupt the educational process.
>
> To publish and distribute student materials without prohibitions on content unless they "clearly and imminently" disrupt or are libelous.[5]

Thus from the standpoint of the campus radical, the intrusion of the off-campus world may be either a boon or a bane. Not surprisingly, radicals have been profoundly ambivalent as to whether or not they wanted such intrusion. Consider the contrast between the rhetoric of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and the rhetoric of student radicalism in the year of "Dow shalt not kill." In January 1967, six students convicted for conducting a sit-in at Berkeley declared: "The rights of free political expression and association are supposed to be the inalienable rights of all citizens. When we enter the campus of the University of California, we do not surrender our citizenship."[6] Theirs was certainly a strong case, comparable to the current argument that citizens drafted into the United States Army should not lose their rights to receive what literature they wish, to speak or otherwise communicate their views to their fellow-soldiers, to picket in or out of uniform when off-duty, and so on. Less than a year later, however, those who sought entrance to the campus were not SNCC recruiters but recruiters for Dow Chemical, maker of napalm. The rhetoric changed accordingly. Radicals suddenly became enamored of the life of the mind. The student government president of the University of Chicago, an SDS member, stated: "Dow representatives are not interested in taking free part in the free public discussion which is the essence of the university, but rather their sole interest is to use its facilities to sell their company to prospective employees."[7] On the same grounds, a college-wide teach-in at Oberlin College decided to permit military recruiters on campus only if they would agree to debate the morality of napalm. But then what about the dark young men in blue jeans who only a little while before had come on campus "to use its facilities to sell their company to prospective employees," and in addition dismissed debate as hot air because what was needed was immediate action? Depending on who the outside intruder was, radicals conceptualized the university alternatively as a sanctuary from a corrupt society or a storehouse of democratic energies, depending on the political needs of the moment. Such inconsistency is unworthy of a serious political movement.

While the Movement has been debating whether non-academics should be allowed on university property, the courts have been inching their way toward the same problem. Within the past year, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of trade

union members to picket within a privately-owned shopping center, and upheld the right of antiwar protestors to distribute leaflets within the "busiest bus terminal in the world," the publicly-owned terminal of the Port of New York Authority.[8]

The Port of New York decision, like the ACLU recommendations on the rights of high-school students, made the traditional distinction between thought and action. Speech, including the distribution of literature, is to be permitted only so long as it does not interfere with the normal functioning of the environing institution. Whatever else courts and administrators may recently have called into question, the distinction between thought and action has not been reconsidered. In 1967, the President of Harvard University placed protestors against Dow recruiting on probation with the following words of explanation:

> No one in an official connection with the university has ever suggested that students should not have freedom to demonstrate in an orderly fashion or otherwise to express their views on these or other matters of concern to them. Indeed they have been encouraged to do so.
>
> Objections arise only when they become so carried away by their conviction about the rightness of their cause and so impatient with civilized procedures that they seek to restrain the freedom of expression or movement of others who may not agree with them.
>
> This kind of conduct is simply unacceptable not only in a community devoted to intellectual endeavor, but, I would assume, in any decent democratic society.[9]

As if to confirm Charles Pusey's extension of his rule of conduct from Harvard Yard to the civilian community, in 1968, a Federal judge upheld the suspension of 11 Brooklyn College students who had sat-in on behalf of the admission of more Black and Puerto Rican students. Judge Joseph Zavatt wrote:

> that "a reasonable balancing of interests must reserve to the college the power to preserve its facilities for their intended uses."
>
> "The [students'] right to communicate does not include the right to confiscate," he added...
>
> "It may even be argued," concluded Judge Zavatt, "that college authorities have an inherent power, even in the absence of published rules, to maintain order and exclude students whose conduct deprives other students and college officers of access to school buildings."[10]

Clearly current doctrine with respect both to academic freedom and civil liberties remains: Talk but do not act; instruct but do not obstruct; discuss but do not disrupt.

I want to challenge this doctrine. I want to challenge it in the light both of my research as a historian and of my experience as a practicing radical. I want to challenge it in its application both to the campus and to the larger society. And I want to challenge it within the framework of the rule of law and classical democratic theory.

Historically, secular free speech developed from religious free speech: for instance, from Milton's Areopagitica. But free speech about religion was gained only at a price. The price was that men had to agree not to translate their beliefs into action, a restraint which, viewed from a different angle, is known as "hypocrisy." Today, we rationalize the separation of speech from action on the ground that speech should not be translated into action until a majority has been won to the speaker's outlook. But this democratic rationale was not the original rationale. The original rationale was that religion and secular society were two separate and mutually-exclusive spheres. Thus in his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke asserted that while liberty of conscience "is every man's natural Right," he esteemed it "above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and the other."[11]

Carried over into contemporary life, the distinction between thought and action prevents a man not only from being a good citizen but also from being a good academic. At least in the social sciences, action may be essential to the

search for truth itself. Paul Goodman puts the case this way:

> Certainly if we consider the masters of the century prior to our generations--whether Comte, Marx, Proudhon, Durkheim, Kropotkin, Sorel, Veblen, Lenin, Freud, Dewey, etc., etc.,--we are struck by their activism, their actual or projected experimentation on a civic scale. Some of these men are unthinkable as academics and some had uneasy academic lives. The present-day preoccupation with careful methodology is academically praiseworthy, but it does not lead to intensely interesting propositions. One cannot help feeling that a good part of the current concern with statistics and polling is a way of being active in the "area" without being actively engaged in the subject matter. There is a good deal of sharpening of tools but not much agriculture.[12]

Goodman and others add that the teacher must also be able to act, politically and socially, because "what is learned in the classroom is him, the teacher,"[13] and his students look to him as a model for a whole life.

I believe that a teacher should be free to act as he wishes outside the classroom so long as he continues to perform his academic duties. I reject the distinction between thought and action which would protect the teacher so long as he talks and would fire him if he acts illegally. For one thing, what is an illegal act? My trip to Hanoi was widely described as illegal, but in the end, the courts held it protected action under the First Amendment. If a teacher is sent to jail, he will be unable to meet his classes. At that point, his academic employer might understandably conclude that the teacher's public activities temporarily interfered with the performance of his academic duties, and, if charitably inclined, give him a leave of absence. But academic employers should eschew appointing themselves judges, and convicting a man before the courts themselves have acted. Teachers, like other citizens, should be innocent until proven guilty.

How can the teacher's freedom of action be protected? Not by the AAUP alone. My experience leads me to believe that, at best, AAUP action may induce an administration to act differently the next time. What it rarely does is to save the job of the aggrieved individual. In my opinion, the only hope for a mistreated teacher is to think of himself as a workingman trying to organize a factory. If such a man were fired because of his radicalism, his fellow-workers would go on strike until the grievance was settled. In exactly the same way, the students at San Francisco State, whatever the incidental excesses of their action, are right in principle to try to shut down a university to save the job of a discharged teacher. To say that they may never do so is no different from a permanent injunction forbidding civil rights demonstrators to march or workingmen to strike.[14]

Now how can obstructive or disruptive action be reconciled with a commitment to the rule of law and democracy? If it remains nonviolent. The usefulness of nonviolent civil disobedience as an aspect of democratic process is its enabling individuals to act on their deep convictions without destroying law and order itself. If you tell a man not to act on his beliefs until a majority agrees with him, you compel him to be a hypocrite. If you permit him to act on his beliefs by violent means, you invite anarchy. Nonviolent civil disobedience offers a third alternative. What makes it particularly congruent both to democracy and to the spirit of academic life is its satisfying the criterion of universality. I do not ask that only I be permitted to break the laws. If you feel compelled to refuse a portion of your taxes to protest the enforcement of civil rights laws, I do not find this threatening. Clearly you feel deeply, for you are risking going to jail for the sake of your beliefs. In acting, you have not physically injured any other human being. Had you merely spoken or written, I might have hastily dismissed your concerns, but the fact that you have "put your body where your mouth is" inclines me to pay a little more attention.

Admittedly, disruptive disobedience --sitting down in the middle of a street or occupying an administration building-- raises an additional issue. If I refuse

to be inducted, I say in effect: Have your war if you want to, but without me. However, if I stand in front of troop trains, block the doorways of induction centers, and surround the cars of campus recruiters, I say something different, namely: What you are doing is so wrong that I shall try to stop you. Both are forms of nonviolent civil disobedience. But the first is disobedience by withdrawal, the second disobedience by obstruction. The latter has been condemned not only by constituted authority but also by national AAUP. Denouncing General Hershey's advice that obstructers be drafted, the AAUP nevertheless stated that "action by individuals or groups to prevent speakers invited to the campus from speaking, to disrupt the operations of the institutions in the course of demonstrations or to obstruct and restrain other members of the academic community and campus visitors by physical force is destructive of the pursuit of learning and of a free society."

Radicals have not adequately justified disruptive civil disobedience against this argument. Their tendency has been to agree with their conservative antagonists that disruption, even if nonviolent, is essentially revolutionary in the sense that it challenges the whole structure of law and order. Disruption, in this view, presupposes a readiness for Locke's "appeal to Heaven." He who disrupts expects no protection from the law. His action is insurrectionary. He will win or die.

The outstanding recent argument along these lines is Herbert Marcuse's essay on "Repressive Tolerance." Insisting that indiscriminate tolerance bolsters the status quo, Marcuse justifies:

> withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc. Moreover, the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in the educational institutions which, by their very methods and concepts, serve to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse and behavior...[15]

To justify such extensive repression of the speech and action of one's opponents, so that one may oneself come to power, is to invite one's opponents, who presently have the power, to use it in the same spirit. For all practical purposes, Marcuse's argument amounts to saying that whichever side is strongest, wins.

But I believe Marcuse's rationale to be unnecessarily drastic, an instance of intellectual overkill. So long as we are speaking of nonviolent disruptive disobedience rather than armed insurrection, a better defense is simply to offer the same opportunity to one's opponents. If I block your doorway one day, you may block mine the next. Seen in this light, nonviolent obstructive disobedience remains a kind of dialogue. "Speaking," to be sure, in which the interlocutors are concerned so deeply that they act out their convictions with their lives and bodies; but for all that, an exchange in which a sense of reciprocity is preserved, in which the awareness of one's opponent as a human being and of oneself as conceivably fallible is not yet abandoned. Such disobedience remains within the framework of democratic process.

If, despite all the special features of the campus community, disruptive disobedience can be justified on the campus, its rationale in the community at large is more straightforward. Classical democratic theory offers no intermediate steps between politics-as-usual and revolution. According to Locke's Second Treatise, for example, one either strives for change through the existing structure or seeks to overthrow the government. But what about the case where a particular policy of the government is resented with that pitch of intensity which would ordinarily justify revolution, and yet a total overthrow is not desired? Chattel slavery was such a policy, and Thoreauvian disobedience was improvised in response. The Vietnam war is another such policy which the draft resistance movement strives to prevent.

Nonviolent obstructive disobedience explores the twilight zone between reform and revolution. Without yet seeking to overthrow the government, resisters declare their determination to overthrow a given policy or complex of institutions by refusing to obey them or to permit them to function. The resister does not rely on the electoral process or the courts to bring about the change he seeks, but he leaves open the possibility that these conventional institutions can adapt themselves to changes brought about by more direct means.

From the standpoint of society as a whole, such resistance by nonviolent obstructive disobedience might be seen as an experiment or probing operation to determine whether revolution is required. It is a means of assessing the nature and degree of social crisis which at the very least valuably supplements the electoral process. Perhaps the obstructor will receive so little popular support, or be repressed so harshly, that he will conclude that resistance from within the society is hopeless. Perhaps the obstructor and his associates will make so deep an impression --on national opinion, or on the armed men sent to suppress them, or on a significant number of potential draftees and defense workers-- that they will sense the possibility of becoming a majority through conventional means more rapidly than they had previously supposed possible, and for this reason lay aside extreme tactics. Perhaps the obstructive action will lead both to harsh repression and a rallying of wide support behind the obstructors and so to deepening revolutionary crisis of the traditional variety. The essential thing to recognize is that this disobedience, far from representing an alternative to politics-as-usual, is a third course men can adopt when in frustration and despair they might otherwise turn to insurrection.

Nonviolent civil disobedience, even obstructive disobedience, seems to me then an essential corollary concept to the theory of academic freedom and civil liberty.

NOTES:

[1]The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1967.

[2]Ibid., Aug. 2, 1966.

[3]Ibid., July 24, 1967.

[4]The Roosevelt Torch, Oct. 2, 1967.

[5]The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1968.

[6]Quoted in The National Guardian, Jan. 28, 1967.

[7]Jeff Blum and Bernie Aronson, "A Case for the Banning of Dow from Chicago," The Chicago Maroon, Nov. 3, 1967.

[8]The New York Times, Nov. 13, 1968.

[9]Ibid., Nov. 1, 1968.

[10]Ibid., Aug. 3, 1968.

[11]John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (London, 1689), 48, 6.

[12]Paul Goodman, "The Freedom To Be Academic," in Growing Up Absurd (New York, 1960), 261.

[13]Leslie Fiedler, "Academic Irresponsibility," Playboy, Dec. 1968, 275.

[14]See the incisive comment on injunctions by Anne Braden, "How Injunctions Crush Peaceful Protest," The Southern Patriot.

[15]Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston, 1965), 100-101.

Conflict in the Classroom

by Howard Wolf

Teaching, as most of us know it and have known it, is rather like proscenium theater with a clear line drawn between art and life, audience and performance. But, unlike traditional theater, the classroom situation does not have the saving grace of illusion, the willing suspension of disbelief, the projection of a self and world freer than the self-in-society that we recreate in drama. Classrooms have been, in some sense, a theater of censorship. The performer-teacher as authority-figure, consciously or unconsciously, denies by role the very dynamism, process, and conflict inherent in the classroom. In order to resolve this contradiction, I have tried a number of strategies in the service of freedom.[1]

Some months ago, I went into a classroom (a trailer here at Buffalo--apt symbol for the enclosed, mobile society) to teach Hawthorne's "The Minister's Black Veil." The night before I had seen Far From Viet Nam and couldn't pry the story loose from my response to the film. I moved, it seemed, in a world of moral blackness. Had I been truer to my concept of teaching, I would have allowed the conflict to surface, would have dramatized the limits of objectivity, would have moved from my own dilemma to a discussion, say, of the myths of cognition, the attempts to pry knowledge loose from its moral and historical implications; but I concealed the conflict, though only momentarily, and acted as if we were engaged, once again, in formal analysis--the bete noire of my generation, of my training, Amherst in the Fifties. But the moment a student, a somewhat uptight sorority girl, objected to the gloom and depression in Hawthorne, I launched, untypically, an attack upon her defensive blindness, her bourgeois inclination to see art as an adjunct of the living room, her desire to domesticate experience. I invoked as much of modern history as exploded and burned in my mind and set the disasters of war before her eyes. "Is this gloom or actuality?" I asked. As soon as the class ended, the student, I will call her Cathy, came up and said: "Everyone in this room is Jewish." Then she was gone. I knew what had happened.

Because she felt oppressed--I suspect the anger she experienced towards me was projectively placed in me--she had to name the oppressor, but in such a way as to avoid direct confrontation. If my obvious interest in Freud during the semester had not in itself suggested the basis for an anti-semitic response, my recourse to Yiddish humor and autobiography would have; and then there is the elan of the Buffalo English Department, to say nothing of the leadership of the activists on campus, and the large contingent of students from New York City at S.U.N.Y.A.B. All told, these factors were condensed and expressed as "everyone in this room." Cathy had found and concealed her target. She had found her scapegoat and taught me something about the instantaneous access to myth that always lurks beneath the surface of the mind.

I worried about her because I knew, given past class behavior, that the feeling she had exposed would overwhelm her, would have to find a hiding place. Perhaps, she wouldn't come back--like an analysand who can't bear the penetration of his defenses, or a politicain whose rhetoric becomes more distorted and out of touch with reality as dissent moves towards protest and confrontation. She did come back, but, poignantly, in disguise: heavily powdered, almost mask-like, and wearing a wig. She was, for a moment, unrecognizable. With R.D. Laing's The Divided Self and The Three Christs of Ypsilanti recently in mind, I was frightened. Had she--like one of the three Christs--assumed a false self to protect a wounded one? and did the physical, almost ritual, presentation of the false self imply further delusional elaboration? Had she, like one of Laing's patients, or Bettleheim's children, chosen non-being as a way of not being hurt ? There had to be a confrontation, a working through of conflict, but the situation was too volatile. I taught a subdued class and asked Cathy to come with me to my office. There, I apologized for acting out my rage against the war. She accepted my apology, perhaps too readily, as if it were best to deny that there had ever been an upsetting experience.

In the next class, without making reference to the disguise, to the adoption of a false self to conceal a threatened self, I asked the group to discuss what had happened. Some students thought I had been too harsh to Cathy, some, too soft, some--quite balanced. We talked about the relationship of thought and feeling, Summherhill, sensitivity training, encounter groups, detachment as a defense, the need to talk about the experience of a class as opposed to the content of the course. It was, perhaps, the best class of the semester. Cathy continued to attend undisguised and was more willing to participate than before. She had begun to emerge as a real person, however painfully.

We had had, at least for one period, a living classroom, participatory learning, a sense of community. The oppressed and oppressor were demythologized; and, paradoxically, the primitivization of the classroom led towards objectivity. Along the way, we made Hawthorne live. Somewhere in all of this, there are notes towards the fusion of group therapy, psychodrama, literature, education, and freedom.

But one point is clear to me: radical politics is deeply related to a revolution of consciousness. This revolution of consciousness must take into account the myths and fantasies that "protect" our feelings and identity. The further Cathy goes in the exploration and sharing of her feelings, the more she will be able to sustain criticism. She may learn that though there are people who want to change the world, they are not challenging her rights to selfhood. No matter how much I disagree with Cathy, I can't deny her claims to being human. If she really believed that of me, of others, she would be more willing to discuss political and social matters. If radical teachers assume a one to one relationship between ideology and identity, they are more likely to intimidate than to instruct, even to persuade.

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[1] I have written about one of these strategies in "Composition and Group Dynamics: The Paradox of Freedom," which will appear in the March, 1969, issue of College English. I have discussed other strategies in position papers I have written as one of the planners of Cassirer College at Buffalo.

Columbia Strike (cont'd from p. 22)

The fact that this faculty could not even split openly on principled positions, much less join with the students is a fact to be reckoned with. Now that the initial shock has worn off, this fact has enabled Columbia radicals to take a fresh look at the role of the intellectual in bourgeois society and the nature of the university in a capitalist economy. Significantly, many of the professors who took the lead in the anti-war Teach-in movement two years ago turned up as our worst enemies in the Columbia revolt. The centrist role they played reveals the basic contradiction between their liberal ideals and their social position. Totally disoriented by the rupture in their secure existence and the revelation of their contamination by the forces of war and racism, they could only abdicate although as individuals they might bravely face the cops.... Professors are not the power structure, merely its unwitting tools. Neither are they potential revolutionaries, as a group. And in a crisis, the center falls out.

To student rebels, this means allies must be sought in the black ghettoes and in the ranks of labor, not on campus. It means that "a free university" will only exist after we have won a "free society," through a total social revolution. To young faculty rebels, it means we must organize on the basis of our own constituency, not as part of a fictitious academic community which will either exclude or coopt us. Rather than fighting for positions within some sort of faculty senate, we must form unions to defend our position as one fundamentally opposed to the interests of the administration and of the senior faculty that is tied to it.

P.S. I wrote the above last September. Since then, the Columbia faculty has slid even deeper back into its ante-April apathy. The Faculty Executive Committee personnel has been changed to include even more administration supporters, and its proposal for a Faculty Senate is heavily weighted in favor of the administration. Moreover, only a handful of students or faculty turned out for its "open hearings" on "restructuring." On the other hand, a group of junior faculty around NUC has formed a union organizing committee. We will have to wait to see the response.

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by Jack Kligerman

Coming to teach poetry once again to a freshman class at Lehman College this Fall, I was overtaken by a thought which I had given the slip to for some years. Four weeks of a semester were not that at all. They were four weeks of my life, not mine to spend, let alone spend teaching poetry. I might as well have asked myself what I had invested in my wife on our honeymoon, whether we had spent our eight years together economically, having in the end made wise investments with the capital we had accumulated daily during that time, or whether we had finally reaped the rewards in the dividends running around the house under our feet. No, one did not spend one's time in bed with one's wife, though one could very well spend one's money on one's mistress. I had to give up the metaphor spend. It didn't work. I even had to say that poetry was no longer a mean mistress. It was no longer a mistress at all. I hesitate to say poetry had become my wife, but we were undoubtedly wed together--poetry and I, that is--for these four weeks in a way that we had never been before.

There are all kinds of marriages, however. How could I describe this one? I set out in quest of another metaphor, thinking that what I wanted to achieve in teaching poetry was something like what Yeats had achieved in "Among School Children": "O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,/ Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?/ O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,/ How can we know the dancer from the dance?" Ah, these lines, the fusion of thought and emotion, the fusion of form and content: the burning intensity of a passionate intellectual involvement with poetry, as I had phrased it in a committee meeting some weeks before. These lines should have done it for me. What they did do, in fact, was betray me. I, with four weeks to live, had disappeared. Only Yeats was to be found. I had therefore to give up searching for a metaphor to explain my marriage, to account for what I wanted to do in teaching poetry. But perhaps one doesn't teach poetry at all. Perhaps one reads it.

I gave up my search and started to snow-proof my boots. I remembered a hike my wife and I, carrying our two children on our backs, had taken in Washington several years before. It was ten miles in all, up from Hurricane Ridge, over Mt. Angeles, then down the face of a glacial cirque, eventually stretching out three miles from an alpine lake through a rain forest to the campground. The trail had taken hold of us, had forced us up over some grueling switchbacks, scrambling at last through treacherous gravel to the top, where my wife nursed our baby, Mt. Baker staring at us over the clouds a hundred miles away. God, how we had damned each other on the way up, constantly giving in to turning back, giving out, then resting, then starting up again. Coming down was no easier, along a trail that had been eroded by winter snows, spring thaws, and summer rains. Then a rest at a lean-to at the lake. Some fresh water. Rising trout that wouldn't bite. Then the last miles down through dark, still woods, the only life now at dusk one winter wren. We had not spent time. We had lived through it. We had nothing to show. Yet we were not the same people we were when we had started. So with poetry. It's a goddamn hard trail if you take it, and it beats hell out of you. If it doesn't, you're not reading it. I decided to read Roethke's The Far Field. I would let him take me with him. Could I get my students to go too? What if they preferred to eat marshmallows by the fire?

I had chosen The Far Field for many reasons, even though by academic standards I was barely acquainted with Roethke's poetry and not at all with him. A man who could take from Eliot's "East Coker" the line "Old men ought to be explorers," turn it into a question, and answer it with "I'll be an Indian./ Iroquois," must have something going for him. I shared his love of the seashore, of the "low, barnacled, elephant-colored rocks," "the rows of dead clam shells," "Even the gulls quiet on the far rocks." And I was terrified by the opening sections of "Journey to the Interior" and "The Far Field." I knew what Roethke meant by "In

a dark time, the eye begins to see," and I could say with him, "Now I adore my life/ With the Bird, the abiding Leaf,/ With the Fish, the questing Snail,/ And the Eye altering all;/ And I dance with William Blake/ For love, for Love's sake." If I could show to my students my self being affected by poetry, if I could convince them that I cared, then maybe we could "dance on, dance on, dance on."

Since I had therefore denied the usual assumptions of an introductory course--for example, that I was to teach a basic understanding of poetic techniques--and stressed the human values of reading poetry, I asked my class to write a paper attacking the following questions: What have you experienced in reading the poems of Theodore Roethke? How have the poems changed your vision, the way you see things? And, finally, What specifically in the poetry has led you to your conclusions? The order of these questions signals a change in my values and reintroduces the matter of why one should read poetry at all. (A year before I had asked a similar class to discuss the different uses made of figures of speech in two Elizabethan sonnets. I was saying that what could be measured was what should be taught.) In asking my class this year to tell me how they felt on reading Roethke's poems and why they felt so, I was bringing my students' reading of poetry as close as I could to the reasons why a poet writes to begin with: because he has felt or thought and has wanted to recreate those feelings or those thoughts in or for others. I was also telling my students that their reactions mattered, that it was important to be affected by poetry. If they learned <u>why</u> people read poetry, perhaps I could teach them more easily <u>how</u> to read it. I wanted above all to let them know that their being alive mattered to me and that in some incomprehensible way it mattered to Roethke too, or he would not have written poems. This was the kind of "information" proper to an introductory course in poetry. It turned out, as I had hoped, that my objectives were achieved better with one book of poems by one man at one stage of his life than by the usual anthology.

I don't mean to mislead you. One girl came to me before writing her paper, <u>after</u> the four weeks, and asked where she could buy the book. I felt more the helpless despair of one confronted with a violation of faith, than the angry frustration of a teacher faced with a student who "had not done the work." So my course in poetry failed as every "course" in literature must fail. How can we measure success without measuring the quality of the lives lived by those people, our students, whom we have met along the way? We do see some signs, though, or we would not keep at it. One boy said that he could not read beyond the first section of "Journey to the Interior," for "It brought back so much from the past." He had taken STP in Central Park: "One of the detours I took." He could finish "The Rose,' however. "My knowledge of animals is slight," he wrote. "I don't know what a towhee or a scoter is. But I learnt of their movements. How they turned their heads in expectation." And this student finished by quoting the lines, "Near this rose, in this grove of sun-parched, wind-warped madronas/ Among the half-dead trees, I came upon the true ease of myself." He had undergone the kind of psychological, spiritual experience that Roethke had. His "criticism" was perceptive and honest. And it was far more valuable to both him and me than any paper on poetic technique that he could have written. He understood the poetry. I had done my job. Other signs from other students I hope are still forthcoming. I gave them a sign of my own by reading to them an earlier version of this essay.

It depresses me that I write this essay for a publication called "The Radical Teacher." Nothing that I have written now seems radical or revolutionary. It rather seems a small expression of what poetry has meant for humankind since the beginning.



"In our idiom, rhyme is a keg. A keg of dynamite. The line is a fuse. The line burns to the end and explodes, and the town is blown sky-high in a strophe." ---Mayakovsky